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writing “strikes a note of dissonance in the 
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political theory more broadly.
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“‘America’s Marx’ (as Michael Rogin called him)? Or ‘America’s Ishmael’ (as Jason Frank 
proposes)? Either way, Herman Melville is, as Jason Frank suggests in his fine introduction 
to this comprehensive volume, a writer ripe for political theoretical inquiry, right 
alongside Emerson, Whitman, and Thoreau. Timely and long overdue, this volume puts 
Melville on the map of political theory, right where he belongs. No course on American 
political thought will leave Melville out now, nor will students in those classes be able to 
proceed without consulting this valuable collection.”—Bonnie Honig, Brown University
“The scholars in this excellent collection confront the towering genius of Melville with 
remarkable intellectual courage. They explore with open minds the overt and implicit 
political meanings of his work and collaborate to make a fresh contribution to the 
literature on Melville.”—George Kateb, professor emeritus, Princeton University
“This collection brings together fourteen consistently stimulating and often profound 
meditations on the political theory at work in the writings of Herman Melville. Indeed,  
I have seldom read a collection of essays offering such stunningly diverse insights and of 
such uniformly high quality. The volume will interest all Melville readers and scholars, but 
perhaps especially those in U.S. literary and cultural studies, who may discover here that 
the questions posed by cutting-edge political theory can illuminate—and transform our 
understanding of—a major American author.”—Nick Bromell, University of Massachusetts 
Amherst
“Frank has put together a wonderful series of essays that capture the diversity of Melville’s 
thought in all its intensity, complexity, and nuance. This is a fantastic book that is well 
deserving of the attention of political theorists, literary critics, and Melville scholars 
alike.”—Simon Stow, The College of William and Mary
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Series Foreword
Those who undertake a study of American political thought must attend to 
the great theorists, philosophers, and essayists. Such a study is incomplete, 
however, if it neglects American literature, one of the greatest repositories 
of the nation’s political thought and teachings.
America’s literature is distinctive because it is, above all, intended for 
a democratic citizenry. In contrast to eras when an author would aim to in-
form or influence a select aristocratic audience, in democratic times public 
influence and education must resonate with a more expansive, less leisured, 
and diverse audience to be effective. The great works of America’s literary 
tradition are the natural locus of democratic political teaching. Invoking 
the interest and attention of citizens through the pleasures afforded by the 
literary form, many of America’s great thinkers sought to forge a democratic 
public philosophy with subtle and often challenging teachings that unfolded 
in narrative, plot, and character development. Perhaps more than that of 
any other nation’s literary tradition, American literature is ineluctably po-
litical—shaped by democracy as much as it has in turn shaped democracy.
The Political Companions to Great American Authors series highlights 
the teachings of the great authors in America’s literary and belletristic tra-
dition. An astute political interpretation of America’s literary tradition re-
quires careful, patient, and attentive readers who approach a text with a view 
to understanding its underlying messages about citizenship and democracy. 
Essayists in this series approach the classic texts not with a “hermeneutics 
of suspicion” but with the curiosity of fellow citizens who believe that the 
great authors have something of value to teach their readers. The series 
brings together essays from varied approaches and viewpoints for the com-
mon purpose of elucidating the political teachings of the nation’s greatest 
authors for those seeking a better understanding of American democracy.
Patrick J. Deneen
Series Editor
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INTRODUCTION
American Tragedy
The Political Thought of Herman Melville
Jason Frank
“The ship! The hearse!—the second hearse!” cried Ahab from the boat; 
“its wood could only be American!”
—Herman Melville, Moby-Dick
Melville has not received as much attention from political theorists as some 
other major writers of the American Renaissance—especially Emerson, 
Whitman, and Thoreau. His work is left out of anthologies of American po-
litical thought, overlooked on syllabi, and very rarely engaged in professional 
research. Various explanations for this neglect come immediately to mind. 
Unlike the others, for example, Melville was never a political activist; he was 
not overtly engaged in the momentous political struggles of his time over 
slavery and white supremacy, industrialization and class conflict, western 
settlement and Native displacement, national unity and sectional discord, 
self-governance and imperial expansion. He was also almost exclusively a 
writer of fiction—short stories, novels, and poems—not of political essays, 
treatises, and reviews. Melville’s work is moreover not easily situated on the 
ideological spectrum of left to right, liberal to conservative, and not easily 
placed within the discursive paradigms of liberalism and republicanism 
that often frame scholarship in the history of American political thought. 
His writing strikes a note of dissonance in the established harmonies of the 
American political tradition.
Though there are several outstanding anthologies examining Melville’s 
work, this is the first to be dedicated solely to his political thought. This 
introduction proceeds from the premise that political theory’s general ne-
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glect of Melville has impoverished our understanding not only of American 
political thought in the nineteenth century, but of the American political 
tradition itself. Melville’s collected work—from Typee (1846) to Billy Budd 
(posthumously published in 1924)—offers what is arguably nineteenth-
century America’s most sustained interrogation of the American political 
imaginary, of the narratives and norms, principles and presuppositions, that 
animate the American political tradition and give shape to American politi-
cal identity. Though Melville was not actively engaged in the political strug-
gles mentioned above, the essays in this volume will show that his fiction 
wrestled with the conflicting values and commitments underwriting these 
struggles with a philosophical depth and subtlety unsurpassed by his con-
temporaries. Melville’s “provocative, prophetic books,” one recent biogra-
pher writes, “compose a kind of underground history of America.”1 Michael 
Rogin—the political theorist whose work on Melville is the most impor-
tant exception to the field’s general neglect of him—has dubbed Melville 
America’s Marx because of Melville’s systematic critique of the structures 
of domination in nineteenth-century America. Following Melville’s own in-
vitation in the opening line of Moby-Dick (1851), we might instead call him 
America’s Ishmael, the quintessential biblical outcast and prophetic voice of 
America’s dispossessed and disinherited—its “renegades and castaways.”2
Although Melville was not directly engaged in the partisan politics 
or reform movements of his time, he demonstrated a preoccupation with 
political critique across the entire span of his writing career; it is seri-
ously misleading to claim that “politics never engaged him deeply.”3 Mel-
ville sometimes evinced his literary preoccupation with politics by overtly 
espousing positions. His first novel, Typee, for example, includes lengthy 
condemnations of missionary violence and moral hypocrisy in the South 
Seas, reflections on the “civilized barbarity” of colonialism, and even a con-
cluding vindication of Lord George Paulet’s brief governance of the Ha-
waiian Islands. Mardi (1849), Melville’s first work of experimental fiction, 
dwells on the violence of the slave trade and the moral inconsistencies of 
a slave-owning republic. White-Jacket (1850), his report of life aboard a 
military frigate, admires British naval policy while railing against the prac-
tice of flogging in the United States Navy. “The Paradise of Bachelors and 
the Tartarus of Maids” (1855) is, among other things, an indictment of the 
economic exploitation and spiritual alienation that characterized the indus-
trial workplace, where workers in a demonic paper mill (in this case young 
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women) “did not so much seem accessory wheels to the general machinery 
as mere cogs to the wheels,” “blank-looking girls with blank, white folders 
in their blank hands, all blankly folding blank paper.”4
These were controversial positions in his time, and Melville was criti-
cized by some of his contemporaries for taking them.5 Melville’s political 
significance, however, goes far beyond his positions on the controversial is-
sues of the day, and it also exceeds the political ideologies that underwrote 
those positions. More important for contemporary political theory is how 
Melville’s fiction articulates political critique at the level of philosophical 
principle and deep cultural presupposition. Melville did not merely critical-
ly engage the politics of his time—the ideological controversies, conflicts of 
interest and identity, and personal animosities that define American demo-
cratic pluralism, then and now—but, rather, interrogated the very space of 
the political, the stage on which these controversies appeared and became 
publicly legible and significant. Melville’s best work examines the usually 
inarticulate conditions that animate and surreptitiously unite competing 
political positions, claims, and identities. His work is preoccupied with what 
Toni Morrison has called “the unspeakable unspoken” in American politics, 
its unifying professions of faith, its hegemonic rites of assent.6
Melville’s engagement with the unspeakable unspoken of American 
politics is perhaps most profoundly exemplified in his masterpiece, Moby-
Dick, but this “little lower layer” of political preoccupation can be traced 
across the entire span of his work. Consider the following examples: Typee’s 
exposure of the distorting but hegemonic discourses of “savagery” and “civi-
lization,” and its investigation of how the arbitrary demarcations of cultural 
“taboo” work to naturalize relations of domination in everyday life (among 
both the Marquesas Islanders and European colonizers); Melville’s subver-
sive exploration of the artificiality and precariousness of seemingly natural 
social roles in Pierre (1852), especially those roles central to the Victorian 
cult of domesticity (sister, mother, and wife; son, brother, and husband); the 
influential philosophical examination of social entrapment and passive resis-
tance in “Bartleby the Scrivener” (1853), with its reflections on the inscruta-
bility of personal identity and the uncanny challenge posed by the “doctrine 
of preferences” to the “doctrine of assumptions”; Benito Cereno’s (1855) 
dramatization of the mechanisms through which white supremacy and fan-
tasies of American innocence misrecognize violence as legitimate authority, 
and its demonstration of how the psychological interdependence of mas-
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   3 10/29/13   10:57 AM
4  Jason Frank
ter and slave works to perpetuate and contest that violence; the American 
“Metaphysics of Indian-Hating” examined in The Confidence-Man (1857), 
and the co-implication it establishes between moral certitude and genocidal 
demonization (just “as the brother is to be loved,” Melville writes, so “is the 
Indian to be hated”); the tightly imbricated discursive relationship between 
national identity and blood sacrifice, patriotism and death, poetically ex-
plored in Battle-Pieces (1866); and Billy Budd’s probing study of law’s de-
pendence on violence, the norm’s exposure to the exception, and the tragic 
vicissitudes of political judgment in times of emergency and crisis.
These literary examinations of the unspeakable unspoken in American 
politics also demonstrate Melville’s profound understanding of the political 
power of narrative and his subversive commitment to political possibilities 
opened up by narrative proliferation and reorientation (an understanding 
and commitment formally enacted in such works as Moby-Dick, “Bartleby 
the Scrivener,” Benito Cereno, and Billy Budd, with their reflexive prolif-
eration of competing stories about stories). “Truth uncompromisingly told 
will always have its ragged edges,” Melville wrote in Billy Budd, and he em-
ployed this raggedness in his work to loosen the grip of authorized cultural 
narratives and tropes. Melville recognized that the principles and cultural 
presuppositions that compose the American political imaginary were pri-
marily transmitted not by edict and argument so much as by tales and telling. 
He was acutely attuned to the stories that Americans tell themselves about 
themselves, and to the mechanisms through which these stories shaped—
and continue to shape—American self-understanding, moral orientation, 
and identity. As many literary scholars have recognized, Melville had a dis-
tinctly biblical appreciation of America’s defining “stories of peoplehood.”7 
As is true of Israel Potter’s (1855) provocative retelling of the revolutionary 
birth of the nation—the book is ironically dedicated to “His Majesty, the 
Bunker-Hill Monument”—Melville’s work at once mobilizes and subverts 
dominant cultural narratives, articulating their essential features and then 
exposing the values, commitments, and lives that these monumental nar-
ratives erase and deny. Potter’s story, for example, begins heroically in the 
fight for American independence, but then deviates dramatically from the 
expected script of individual and political self-making established by such 
culturally paradigmatic works as Franklin’s Autobiography. (Franklin is 
savaged in the novel.) Melville presents Potter as a revolutionary hero, but 
Potter’s postrevolutionary life is defined by exile, loss, and disappointment 
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rather than independence, progress, and triumphant achievement. Many 
of Melville’s greatest stories are populated with such isolated individuals 
caught up, carried away, and tragically disregarded by the prevailing winds 
of modernity and progress, not only Israel Potter and that “inscrutable scriv-
ener” Bartleby, but also Pip and Jimmy Rose, Don Benito and all those lost 
souls aboard the Fidèle as it makes its way down the Mississippi River. Mel-
ville’s literary catalogue of ruined lives reads like the debris piling up at the 
feet of Walter Benjamin’s “Angelus Novus” as he is swept backward by the 
winds of progress, mournfully wishing he could “stay, awaken the dead, and 
make whole what has been smashed.”8 Such stories are animated by a con-
cern that America’s fantastic narratives of heroic independence and futu-
rity diminish the actual lives of mortal, vulnerable, interdependent human 
beings, especially those monumental narratives associated with American 
exceptionalism, the hegemonic discourse of American national experience 
to which Melville’s oeuvre can be read as a sustained counternarrative—a 
resounding “No! in thunder.”
“The United States has solved all the major problems of mankind,” 
declared Melville’s contemporary the great American orator and Mas-
sachusetts senator Edward Everett in 1853, perfectly exemplifying the 
exceptionalist hubris of his age.9 Melville eloquently captured the core ele-
ments—and biblical associations—of American exceptionalism in a passage 
from White-Jacket:
And we Americans are the peculiar, chosen people—the Israel of our 
time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world. . . . God has predes-
tined . . . great things from our race. . . . Long enough have we been 
skeptics with regard to ourselves, and doubted whether, indeed, the 
Messiah had come. . . . But he has come in us, if we but give utterance 
to his prompting. . . . Let us always remember that with ourselves al-
most for the first time in the history of the earth, national selfishness is 
unbounded philanthropy; for we cannot do a good to America but we 
give alms to the world.10
The messianic moral certitude of such exceptionalism not only defined 
mid-nineteenth-century American political culture, but reverberates across 
the long course of American political history, sometimes with an abiding 
sense of obligation and mutual sacrifice—as in Winthrop’s “A Model of 
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Christian Charity” or Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address—but often with the 
vicious triumphalism of armed innocence wronged—from the Pequot War 
to George W. Bush’s wars of freedom. America has long seen itself as what 
Reinhold Niebuhr called “the darling of divine providence” and “tutor of 
mankind in its pilgrimage to perfection.”11 The idea that America’s singular 
history is endowed with universal significance—that its “national selfish-
ness” is the same as “unbounded philanthropy,” and that doing “good to 
America” is to “give alms to the world”—has remained a potent concept 
in American political history. It engenders the sense of moral purity and 
“innocency” that leads one of Melville’s paradigmatic American captains—
Amasa Delano aboard the Bachelor’s Delight—to reprove Don Benito with 
the chillingly familiar statement that “the past is passed; why moralize upon 
it? Forget it.”12 Melville’s work is an extended response to Delano and the 
culture of freedom he personifies, an examination of the disavowal of trag-
edy, the haunting presence of past injustice, and the moral and political cost 
of such imperatives of independence, futurity, and forgetting.
In Melville’s time these exceptionalist ideas were given influential ar-
ticulation by his friend Evert Duyckinck and the Young America movement, 
democratic nationalists and literary boosters of American expansion and 
“Manifest Destiny” (a term coined by John L. Sullivan, one of their most 
prominent supporters). Melville was associated with Young America in his 
early career, but he eventually became a searing critic of their core ideals 
(they are satirized in Pierre). His early association with Young America may 
help explain why so many prominent twentieth-century scholars misunder-
stood Melville as a proponent of American exceptionalism rather than one 
of its most articulate and thoroughgoing critics. For Progressive admirers 
like Lewis Mumford and Vernon Parrington, as well as for cold war lib-
erals such as F. O. Matthiessen, Melville was a committed exceptionalist, 
but one who grew increasingly skeptical of America’s ability to live up to 
its professed ideals. Thus, Mumford could write that Melville “laid open 
America” and “was a yardstick to measure the shortcomings of its professed 
civilization,” and Matthiessen could identify Melville with his transcenden-
talist contemporaries on the basis of their shared concern with American 
consumerism, materialism, and imperialism.13 Whereas Melville’s work was 
often condemned by his contemporaries as subversive, irreligious, and even 
mad, his twentieth-century admirers have just as often celebrated his work 
as a sane and sober literary affirmation of as-yet-unrealized American ide-
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als. The twentieth-century canonization of Melville as a great American 
writer, and Moby-Dick as the great American novel, has been beset from 
the beginning by a tension, if not paradox: how can the writer said to best 
encompass and exemplify the “idea of America” in the nineteenth century 
also be responsible for the most rigorous literary interrogation of the under-
lying assumptions of that idea?
What many of his twentieth-century admirers failed to recognize was 
that Melville understood the very ideals invoked by his transcendentalist 
contemporaries to critique the failings of American society—freedom, in-
dependence, self-reliance—as complicit in the political pathologies they 
were called on to diagnose and critique. One of Melville’s central political 
theoretical insights, dramatized across his work but most brilliantly engaged 
in Moby-Dick, is that, when viewed from “a little lower layer,” America’s 
defining ideal of freedom as autonomy engenders the material and spiri-
tual forms of domination that mark American history and mar its demo-
cratic futures.14 Melville’s far-reaching literary explorations of the tragic 
interdependence of freedom and domination and its penetration of human 
affairs—from the formal policies and legislation of the state to the uncon-
scious motivations of individuals and collectives—help define his continued 
significance to scholars interested in the complexities of the American polit-
ical tradition and to present-day citizens critically reflecting on their politi-
cal condition, so powerfully defined by pervasive border anxieties coupled 
with feral libertarianism. Melville’s insights on these questions are just as 
relevant to today’s “don’t tread on me” democracy as they were in the de-
cade leading up to the Civil War.
While most readers agree on the sharply critical thrust of Melville’s 
work—approaching him as “one of early America’s frankest commentators 
on the hopes and failures of democracy”—many also lose sight of the pre-
cise conceptual nature of Melville’s critique.15 This is of obvious importance 
for political theorists turning to Melville’s work. The central conceptual 
difference around the question of critique may be stated as follows: Was 
Melville engaged in a form of immanent critique? Is he best understood as 
a “connected critic” who appealed to the highest ideals professed by Amer-
ican society—formal equality, for example, or the rights of “life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness”—in order to critique its failure to live up to 
those ideals in practice? Or, on the contrary, was Melville’s political critique 
more radical? Does Melville’s work adopt a critical perspective beyond 
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those most highly professed ideals, thereby bringing the ideals themselves 
into critical focus?16 If the former conceptualization is more accurate, then 
Melville can be placed alongside such other prominent nineteenth-century 
critics of American democracy as Emerson, Whitman, and Thoreau. This 
Melville remains inscribed within the horizon of American exceptionalism 
and its hegemonic “rites of assent,” where even political protest performs 
the work of cultural authorization through an overarching commitment to 
the promise of the new, to what Sacvan Bercovitch, the most influential 
proponent of this view, describes as America’s “long-nurtured vision of fu-
turity.”17 If Melville writes from a perspective beyond the horizon of those 
ideals, however, then his work brings the prospects and the precepts of 
American democracy into a more skeptical and critical view.
In this latter instance, it might be tempting to situate Melville’s work 
outside the tradition of American political thought altogether—as, for exam-
ple, Louis Hartz famously did with the work of the nineteenth-century con-
servative sociologist George Fitzhugh.18 But Melville’s work is not so easily 
bracketed from the tradition. Unlike Fitzhugh, whose Cannibals All! (1849) 
defended southern race slavery from the perspective of a feudal authoritari-
anism reminiscent of Thomas Carlyle, Melville sustained a conflicted and 
tragic commitment to the democratic ideals he scrutinized in his work, at 
once affirming and exposing them. “Stay true to the dreams of thy youth!” 
was the telling challenge Melville wrote to himself on the box holding his 
final manuscript of Billy Budd. Melville’s political thought unfolds primar-
ily in the tragic mode, but his affirmation of tragedy does not merely reflect 
a “fatalistic attitude toward political change tied to his pessimistic view of 
mankind.”19 One way to appreciate his distinct contribution to American 
political thought is to understand how he lodges tragedy at the very heart 
of a dominant tradition built around its systematic disavowal. Melville was, 
as Joyce Carol Oates writes, “imbued with a tragic vision as elevated as that 
of Sophocles and Shakespeare,” making him America’s “tragic visionary.”20 
Like Sophocles’s and Shakespeare’s, Melville’s work chastens and mitigates. 
In the place of moral self-certitude and messianic providentialism, he ex-
presses skepticism and doubt; in the place of capacious perfectionism he 
emphasizes finitude and limitation. Melville’s work dwells on irresolvable 
tensions, contradictions, and paradoxes: with every triumph comes a de-
feat (the “cadaverous triumphs” of “Bartleby”), with every emancipation a 
new form of entrapment (the “stalled winds” of Benito Cereno’s very non-
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Hegelian master-slave dialectic), with every moral advance a hidden moral 
cost (the heroic monumentalization of independence in Israel Potter dimin-
ishes the actual lives of those who fought for it). Melville’s ubiquitous sea 
metaphor captures this worldview in an all-encompassing symbolism: it is 
a space of freedom and a space of paralysis, a space of joyous exhilaration 
and a space of terror. In Moby-Dick only the black cabin boy, Pip, “the most 
insignificant of the Pequod’s crew,” caught in the whale line and temporarily 
abandoned at sea, fully grasps this tragic duality and the basic challenge it 
poses for political life.
Melville openly declares his affiliation with tragedy in “Hawthorne and 
His Mosses” (1850), a text that announces Melville’s own literary project 
as much as it describes Hawthorne’s. There Melville writes admiringly of 
Hawthorne: “He says No! in thunder, but the Devil himself cannot make 
him say yes. For all who say yes lie.”21 Melville’s brilliant appreciation of 
Hawthorne’s “blackness, ten times black” reveals the countervailing skepti-
cism and Calvinistic sense of original sin that Melville shared with the older 
writer, to whom he dedicated Moby-Dick (while also suggesting the cen-
trality of race to America’s own tragic history). Both were sharply critical 
of the moral perfectionism of their contemporaries and deeply suspicious 
of utopian thinking. Though Melville and Hawthorne shared a tragic sense 
of human limitation at odds with the triumphalism of their age, however, 
the political ethos that each cultivated from this shared sentiment was re-
markably different. Hawthorne’s skepticism led him to embrace a politics of 
acquiescence if not outright indifference—it enabled what one biographer 
calls “a cowardly protection and freedom from commitment”—whereas 
Melville’s work emphasizes the inescapability of the double binds of tragedy, 
the dilemmas of human agency in a world of “mortal inter-indebtedness,” 
but then it also continues to wrestle with affirmation and the imperatives of 
action nonetheless.22
Some scholars who have emphasized the tragic dimensions of Melville’s 
thinking have overlooked this important contrast and its political conse-
quences. The emphasis on tragedy among many cold war admirers of Mel-
ville, for example, was primarily intended to deflate the hubris of political 
radicalism—its purported utopianism—and to affirm instead a perseverant 
human spirit that achieves ethical wisdom—if not political emancipation—
through undergoing struggle with “a deluge of calamity.” Their association 
of Melville with a “moral humanism” that transcends the realm of politics, 
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or accepts it only as an unfortunate concession to necessity, might be more 
accurately characterized as a “mortalist humanism,” since it emphasized 
shared vulnerability, precariousness, and finitude as the ethical basis of a 
common humanity.23 C. Wright Mills rightly targeted this politically qui-
escent conception of tragedy as an abdication of political responsibility and 
a replacement of social and political action with the solace of individual 
understanding and ethical satisfaction. Rather than affirming such intellec-
tual and ethical withdrawal from the conflicting imperatives of political life, 
Melville’s dramatization of tragedy is sustained by an energizing struggle 
against the tragic insights his work continually affirms; indeed, the very 
thumping vitality of Melville’s prose seems stylistically to defy quiescence 
and resignation. Hawthorne seems to have recognized this very important 
difference between them in a journal entry written shortly after a despon-
dent Melville had visited him in England (where Hawthorne was serving 
as the American consul in Liverpool). Melville can “neither believe, nor be 
comfortable in his unbelief,” Hawthorne wrote, “and he is too honest and 
courageous not to try to do one or the other.”24
Hawthorne’s invocation of Melville’s “honest and courageous” strug-
gle with divinity and religious belief applies equally to Melville’s fraught 
commitment to democracy and its core ideals. Melville embraced “a ruth-
less democracy on all sides,” but he did not shrink from confronting the 
dangers and violence attending that commitment.25 In placing tragedy at 
the heart of his political thinking, Melville sought to establish democratic 
commitment in a chastened recognition of the failure of any unitary and 
foundational perspective, not to treat it as an expression of Nature or pro-
vide it with a new moral foundation. (Unlike most present-day democratic 
theorists, Melville did not believe in the reconciling power of abstract prin-
ciples.) As Robert Milder insightfully writes, “Democracy in Melville’s writ-
ing is not set against a backdrop of universal consonance and seen as its 
natural expression in society and politics; it is set against the backdrop of 
blackness, or tragic dissonance, and advanced as a humanly wrought stay 
against nothingness and common victimhood.”26 Melville hoped to reori-
ent democratic politics through counternarratives that could engender what 
he described in Moby-Dick as an honest and courageous ethos of “mortal 
inter-indebtedness” that might sustain the hard political work of this “hu-
manly wrought stay against nothingness” and disenthrall readers of their 
fantasies of “masterlessness,” of their cherished delusions of chosenness and 
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   10 10/29/13   10:57 AM
Introduction 11
“innocency.”27 Melville even cast a critical eye on the defining American 
value of freedom itself, which he believed, taken as a superordinate ideal, 
set the course for self-destruction, not to mention the terrible violence it 
inflicts on those perceived as obstacles to its (impossible) achievement. In 
the place of the “City upon a Hill” and the “Citadel of Liberty,” “Manifest 
Destiny” and “Nature’s Nation,” Melville envisioned a more reflexive, chas-
tened, and just democratic politics, one animated by a tragic awareness of 
its inevitable complicities and exclusions, and one mature enough to con-
front the basic difficulties of humans living together—the vicissitudes of 
our political life—rather than disavow these difficulties through escapist 
fantasies of absolute independence.
The essays collected in this volume do not speak with a single voice or 
always concur with the broad interpretation of Melville’s political thought 
put forward here. Indeed, some contributors contest this account of Mel-
ville as tragic critic of the dominant traditions of American politics and 
culture (for example, Ferguson, McWilliams, and Berkowitz), whereas oth-
ers extend and elaborate on this account by examining particular works 
and themes in closer detail (for example, Mihic, Shulman, Hecht, Mariotti, 
Balfour, and Dumm). Others focus on a different set of contemporary po-
litical and theoretical issues entirely or set Melville in a more international 
and universalist context (for example, Attell, Jonik, Strong, and Culbert). 
Without expressing enforced consensus, all of these essays demonstrate 
how particular works—from Melville’s early South Sea adventures to Billy 
Budd, from sprawling and difficult novels like Moby-Dick and Pierre to 
lesser-known stories such as “Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!” and “The Encanta-
das”—insightfully engage with questions of central importance for political 
theorists and historians of political thought. The result is a richly ragged 
account of Melville as a political thinker who was preoccupied with political 
dilemmas from the beginning to the end of his writing career. The chrono-
logical organization of the volume aims to provide readers with a sense of 
this continuity of preoccupation, appreciation for the range and diversity of 
Melville’s work, and the juxtaposition of different essays focused on more 
widely known and discussed texts (Typee, Moby-Dick, “Bartleby the Scriv-
ener,” Benito Cereno, and Billy Budd).
In “Who Eats Whom? Melville’s Anthropolitics at the Dawn of Pacific 
Imperialism,” Kennan Ferguson rejects readings of Melville that interpret 
Typee and Omoo as unambiguously critical of American empire. Ferguson 
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argues that Melville develops an “anthropolitical imaginary” in these early 
novels that subverts European colonial scripts of civilization and barbarism 
but that offers a different and more distinctly American justification for co-
lonialism in their place. These novels develop a “scientific” and “zoological” 
view of indigeneity that “dislocates Pacific Islanders into the realm of pure 
nature” and affirms the preservation of cultural difference as a means of 
conquest and domination. According to Ferguson, Typee and Omoo estab-
lish a distinctive imperial framework that Melville develops in his later work 
and that influences American understandings of its own imperial prospects 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. Sophia Mihic’s contribution, 
“‘The End Was in the Beginning’: Melville, Ellison, and the Democratic 
Death of Progress in Typee and Omoo,” takes up Ferguson’s provocation 
and offers a sharply contrasting view of Melville’s early novels. Mihic argues 
that Melville refuses, “to force a verb, [to] noble savage [the Marquesan Is-
landers] out of their humanity” and ascribe to them a “nature” on which 
a civilizational discourse of progress and modernization might be founded 
and authorized. In Tommo and Toby’s encounter with the Typees, “states 
of artifice meet states of artifice,” Mihic writes, and through them Melville 
develops an alternative framework for thinking about cross-cultural dialogue 
and political action “without the operative assumption of a better future and 
without the guarantee of one’s own status.” Mihic draws out the political 
consequences of these insights through a productive comparison with Ralph 
Ellison’s exploration of similar themes in Invisible Man (a novel that begins 
with an epigraph from Benito Cereno). On Mihic’s reading, both Melville 
and Ellison force readers to confront the responsibility of political action 
without the falsifying support of the “world picture of progress,” and to “act 
within a field of present possibility rather than wait for a logic of history.”
In “Chasing the Whale: Moby-Dick as Political Theory,” George 
Shulman does not enter into debates over Melville as imperialist or anti-
imperialist, but he turns instead to examine how Moby-Dick’s tragic em-
plotment of “romances of liberal emancipation and national redemption” 
refuses the criteria often used to frame those debates. Shulman’s complex 
excavation of tragedy differs from those that reduce “the tragic” to a partic-
ular content or worldview. Instead, Shulman shows that Melville’s deploy-
ment of tragedy dramatizes the conflictive perspectives and experiences 
undergone in the novel. To read Moby-Dick “not as a melodrama, or as 
a philosophic treatise defending a single (even ‘tragic’) point of view, but 
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as a tragedy,” Shulman writes, “is to experience the mutually constituting 
tension between ‘Ahab’ and ‘Ishmael’ as modalities of democratic life, at 
once incommensurate and necessary.” Shulman, in other words, aims not 
to extract a political theory from Melville’s great novel but to seize on the 
novel as an exemplary occasion for reevaluating what political theory is, 
what we should expect from it, and how it might operate within a broader 
democratic context. In this, according to Shulman, Melville’s novel shares 
much in common with ancient tragedy itself, “a form of mediation by which 
a political community can reflect on its core axioms, constitutive practices, 
and fateful decisions.”
Susan McWilliams’s “Ahab, American” also rejects readings of Moby-
Dick that reduce the novel to a series of political lessons, particularly those 
readings that present Ahab as a pathological and even totalitarian Other to 
American liberalism and affirm Ishmael as the good, tolerant, democrat-
ic alternative that Melville endorses. While McWilliams does not portray 
Melville as gripped by the double binds of tragedy to the same extent as 
Shulman—her essay is guided by Tocquevillean values of civic association 
and fraternal interdependence—she does portray Ahab as a representative 
American whose isolation and desire to dominate are shared by the Pequod’s 
motley crew and, by extension, the American citizenry they represent. As 
such, Moby-Dick dramatizes widespread practices and norms that seriously 
threaten “democratic flourishing in the United States” in Melville’s own 
time and our own.
In “‘Mighty Lordships in the Heart of the Republic’: The Anti-Rent 
Subtext to Pierre,” Roger W. Hecht examines other obstacles to “democratic 
flourishing” by situating one of Melville’s most difficult and controversial 
novels in an often-overlooked political context. Hecht argues that Melville’s 
treatment of the Anti-Rent Wars, which pitted tenant farmers against large 
landed proprietors in New York during the 1840s, serves as the platform for 
Melville’s philosophically rigorous interrogation of the “natural” claims to 
property rights in the nineteenth century, and how these rights were used 
to justify the creation of “Mighty Lordships in the Heart of the Repub-
lic” that made a mockery of America’s celebrated democratic equality. The 
Glendinning family’s hidden illegitimacies expose a gulf between property 
and propriety, ownership and moral authority, in the novel that challenges 
central premises of American liberalism and questions its compatibility 
with democracy. According to Hecht, Melville’s novel relentlessly tracks the 
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consequences of this founding contradiction and how it grounds the “larger 
social and political criticism scholars have found in Pierre.”
Turning from Melville’s novels to his short stories from the 1850s—
several of them compiled in Piazza Tales (1856)—Shannon Mariotti’s “Mel-
ville and the Cadaverous Triumphs of Transcendentalism” revisits Melville’s 
uncertain relationship to Emerson and Thoreau. Surveying the inconclusive 
scholarship on this question, Mariotti develops her own distinctive account 
of this relationship through a careful reading of what she considers two 
“companion” stories: “Cock-A-Doodle Doo!” and “Bartleby the Scrivener.” 
Mariotti argues that Melville elaborates a “skeptical critique of transcen-
dental practices of awakening” and their underlying “theory and practice 
of self-reliance,” which terminates not in noble autonomy but in an abstract 
evasion of socially embedded and embodied life. In “Language and Labor, 
Silence and Stasis: Bartleby among the Philosophers,” Kevin Attell situ-
ates “Bartleby the Scrivener” in a very different philosophical context by 
examining the story’s importance for an influential group of modern philos-
ophers: Maurice Blanchot, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Giorgio Agam-
ben, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and Slavoj Žižek. Attell argues that 
the remarkable uptake of Melville’s tale by Continental theorists has medi-
ated the polemics and disagreements between them and can serve as an 
illuminating prism for understanding their competing political preoccupa-
tions, especially at the level of “first principles of the philosophical-political 
argument.” Arguing that the Continental “Bartleby” crystallizes into two 
dominant themes—the withdrawal of language and meaning, and the pro-
ductivity of labor and action—Attell demonstrates not only the philosophi-
cal complexity of Melville’s story, but also the political resources it offers to 
present-day efforts to think politics beyond the binary organization of our 
conceptual and institutional life, a politics that points to a “new space out-
side the hegemonic position and its negation.”
In “Melville’s ‘Permanent Riotocracy’” Michael Jonik also turns to con-
temporary Continental philosophy, and especially to the work of Deleuze, 
alongside the South American revolutions of 1808–1826, to elaborate and 
explain a central political theme in Melville’s work: the recurrent trope 
of mutiny, sedition, insurrection, and riot. Referring to many of Melville’s 
works, but focused primarily on his enigmatic “Encantadas,” Jonik argues 
that Melville’s “permanent riotocracy” is misunderstood as a conservative’s 
skeptical regard for the possibilities of revolutionary emancipation; rather, 
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it is Melville’s effort to diagnose “the structure of the workings of revolt” 
and envision new forms of egalitarian collectivity. The “outlandish politics” 
reiterated across Melville’s work aims to knock “the ego world off its iden-
tity axis,” Jonik writes, and conceive a “politics that does not consist in an 
instituted, consolidated paternal authority or state-controlled system, but 
multiplies into an ‘archipelago of brothers, a community of explorers,’ mutu-
ally implicated in the struggle for universal emancipation.”
Melville’s literary reflections on the workings of rebellion and insurrec-
tion are also at the heart of the volume’s two essays on Benito Cereno, Mel-
ville’s tragic masquerade of racial domination and slave rebellion. In “What 
Babo Saw: Benito Cereno and ‘the World We Live In,’” Lawrie Balfour ex-
amines the story’s “imaginative destabilization of prevailing fictions of race” 
and its “attention to the rituals that cloaked the viciously inegalitarian racial 
order” to argue that the story reveals as much about how racial domina-
tion operates in the wake of slavery as it does about the racist justifications 
for enslavement itself. According to Balfour, Benito Cereno allows readers 
to see how racial domination persists in slavery’s afterlife not in spite of 
“white goodwill,” but, in part, because of it. In the context of radical racial 
inequality, civic goods like “friendship” and “social trust,” much lauded by 
democratic theorists and political scientists alike, work to obscure the liv-
ing legacies of slavery and, in doing so, help sustain them. Tracy B. Strong’s 
contribution—“‘Follow Your Leader’: Benito Cereno and the Case of Two 
Ships”—also centers on the story’s examination of the mechanisms of racial 
domination, but he situates this examination in relation to what he considers 
broader questions of sovereignty, leadership, and rule: to what there is in all 
“human relations [that] gives rise to slavery.” Strong argues that while fo-
cused on the dynamics of racial domination, Melville’s story also illuminates 
troubling continuities between sovereignty and enslavement; it approaches 
“slavery as a consequence of the fact of domination and it is thus about the 
meaning of how one follows one who is in power.” The novel “impresses on 
the reader the ease with which one accepts one’s prejudices as natural, and 
the difficulty in abandoning them. . . . This difficulty is made all the greater 
by virtue of the fact that one is not clear for what one abandons them.” To 
“follow your leader,” Strong argues, is to ultimately be enthralled by—and 
driven to—death.
Thomas Dumm’s “The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating Revisited” turns 
to the last novel Melville published in his lifetime—The Confidence-Man—
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to examine the distinctive form of racial demonization Melville analyzes 
there, and its solemn echoes in subsequent American political culture, from 
the novels of Laura Ingalls Wilder to Vice President Dick Cheney’s rational-
ization for the War on Terror. According to Dumm, Melville’s “Metaphys-
ics of Indian-Hating” has two prominent characteristics: proclamations of 
innocence vis-à-vis their enemies, and a related sense of moral superiority 
over them. Like Strong in his analysis of domination, Dumm argues that 
Melville attempted to provide a political and existential analysis of the psy-
chosocial dynamics of demonization. Melville, he writes, sought “to under-
stand the origins of a permanent human emotion, that of hatred, and its 
changing object that becomes fixed, an obsession. In this sense his under-
standing is as close to Freud’s as it may have been to Plato’s.”
In “Melville’s War Poetry and the Human Form”—the only essay in 
the volume dedicated to Melville’s poetry—Roger Berkowitz examines 
the tragic vision of war developed in Battle Pieces and Aspects of the War 
(1866). According to Berkowitz, Melville’s poetic reflections on the Civil 
War offer a searching examination of the necessity and insufficiency of 
“forms, measured forms,” in political life. Human spirit and vitality surge 
in times of war, even as humanity is undone; war ravages human associa-
tion and brings new association to life; it breaks with law and procedure, 
yet demands a “lawful formality that will straitjacket human passion into an 
equally human need for order.” In the end, Berkowitz considers Melville’s 
Civil War poems as attempts to imbue poetic form with the “compelling 
power to rebind a broken people.” As Berkowitz notes, Melville’s troubling 
vision of war as the occasion for “formal acts of greatness” through which 
we might “bind ourselves to a grand vision of who we are” also has powerful 
echoes in his last work of fiction, the posthumously published Billy Budd.
The volume’s last two chapters offer mutually supporting readings of 
Billy Budd that break from recent interpretations focused on dilemmas of 
legal form and judgment during “states of exception.” Like Berkowitz’s, Jason 
Frank’s contribution—“‘The Lyre of Orpheus’: Aesthetics and Authority in 
Billy Budd”—focuses on the problem of “forms, measured forms,” but for 
Frank this concern leads to an investigation of the mechanisms of aesthetic-
affective captivation and the role of these mechanisms in producing, sus-
taining, and contesting authoritative relations aboard the H.M.S. Bellipotent 
and, by extension, within the American republic during the Gilded Age. On 
Frank’s reading, Melville’s preoccupation with the performative mainte-
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nance of political authority in the novel is “before the law” in two distinct 
senses: “it is at once prior to law and a question of law’s appearance in front 
of its beholden subjects.” Jennifer L. Culbert’s “Melville’s Law” also attends 
to the appearance or presentation of law through a reading of Billy Budd 
that moves beyond approaches that attempt to grasp the “essence of law” as 
an object of inquiry (especially prominent in recent “Law and Literature” 
scholarship) to an appreciation for the strange and paradoxical dilemmas 
that emerge in the quest for such answers. For Culbert these questions are 
central to the “experience of law” itself, which is obscured by the dominant 
legal-positivist portrait of law—“being subject to an external or internal 
will”—and has a surprising resonance with the shattering experience of love. 
The image of law that emerges from Culbert’s essay is not a “willed blow 
resolving matters” but a “touch exposing and unsettling them,” thereby dem-
onstrating the continued vitality of Melville’s final work of fiction for provok-
ing us to reflect on our own experience being subjects to—and of—the law.
Melville’s admirers have often wondered at his prescience and prophet-
ic power, how he managed to capture a century and a half ago, in the words 
of C. L. R. James, “the world in which we live.”28 The essays gathered here 
should only enhance that appreciation and wonder. Taken together, they 
demonstrate Melville’s importance to American political thought—and es-
pecially to its dissenting traditions—but also to political theoretical reflec-
tion more broadly construed. Melville does not offer us a unifying public 
philosophy, and we should be skeptical of efforts to translate his work into 
a clarified and systematic political theory. His stories, novels, and poems, 
however, provoke us to engage more deeply and reflectively with some of 
the most pressing issues of our political life—to restate just a few engaged 
above: empire, freedom, race, progress, memory, violence, individualism, 
democracy, war, and law—and to do so without the mendacious simplifi-
cations of our public discourse and the arid abstractions of much of our 
political theory. Melville’s political thought does not offer up authoritative 
rules, norms, procedures, or principles that might adjudicate our political 
conflicts; it does not save us from the difficult work of facing up to—and 
wrestling with—these difficulties ourselves. Taking Melville’s work serious-
ly as political theory can provoke us to think more reflexively about what we 
expect political theory to provide, and what kind of authority it can claim 
when it is situated in a purported democracy and addressed to free and 
equal democratic citizens.
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1Who Eats Whom?
Melville’s Anthropolitics at the Dawn of Pacific 
Imperialism
Kennan Ferguson
In no respect does the author make pretension to philosophic research.
 —Herman Melville, Omoo
“From where?” asks Melville, in story and novel. What is the source of 
justice, of desire, of revenge, of human experience? When someone arrives 
at a new destination, what brought him (for the narrator is always male) 
there? How do we attempt to escape our pasts and how does their return 
compromise us? The role of the past in the present and the demand for 
causation and those resistances to that demand constitute both literature 
and humanity within Melville’s corpus.
But the question should be asked of Melville himself as well. From 
where did his authorship arise? What dynamics of literature made him 
the famed writer who by the twentieth century was considered one of the 
greatest American novelists? Surprisingly to some, the answer lies not in the 
United States, but in the South Pacific. Long before Melville’s posthumous 
fame as the writer of Moby-Dick, before his brief and suggestive novellas 
and short stories that make Billy Budd and Bartleby familiar names, he 
came to the literary world’s attention as a writer of putatively autobiographi-
cal nonfiction. Focusing on sailors and savages, civilization and cannibalism, 
he emerged not as a literarily canonical figure but as an author of adventure. 
In his first two works, Typee and Omoo, Melville operated as an anthropo-
logical narrator, a sympathetic captive, and a possible fabulist.
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Both books tell of adventures in the South Pacific. The first describes 
how Tommo, the narrator and stand-in for Melville, jumps ship to escape 
the drudgery of civilization and finds himself captured by a tribe of Mar-
quesans. These Taipis, called “Typees” by Melville, he first thinks to be 
cannibals, but after living among them for a while, he ultimately comes 
to admire their life and culture, even though he still desires escape.1 The 
second follows the same narrator (now, revealingly, called “Typee” by his 
new shipmates) to Tahiti, where he observes the mostly pernicious effects 
that colonial administration has on the indigenous islanders. The political 
content, genre trouble, and imperial outlook of these works have drawn 
the attention of today’s critics, but they were far more popular in Melville’s 
day than any of his subsequent posthumously canonized work. These books 
formed the basis for Melville’s fame, and for the tropes that his later writing 
would draw out and develop.2 In each case, the narrator comes to doubt 
his own knowledge: appearances are subverted, assumptions are disproved, 
surfaces mislead. In his later work, Melville would extend these doubts to 
much of nineteenth-century American existence.
Melville gave the Anglophone world an imaginary of the South Seas, 
especially the islands of the Marquesas and of Tahiti, as powerful as that 
developed a generation later in France by Paul Gauguin. Melville did so in 
the middle of the nineteenth century, in a time of imperial expansion, when 
the relationships between the United States, England, and France—among 
other imperial powers—were being contested on the lands and bodies of 
Pacific peoples. In the stories narrated in these two tales (many of which 
depended on—were even plagiarized from—others’ works), Melville 
presented scientific knowledge, cultural study, adventure, and narrative 
ambiguity in the form of reportage.
His anthropolitical imaginary presents the Pacific Islanders as a beguil-
ing mixture of savagery and wisdom, populating islands of beauty and dan-
ger. Unlike his fellow white sailors, Melville sees the indigines as justified 
in their violence both against one another and against foreign invaders, and 
he views the intrigues between island chieftains and queens as equivalent 
to those of their European counterparts. He reports on their clothing, food, 
toilette, and traditions with a benignant eye, noting that his admiration for 
their culture opens him to a charge of being sympathetic with cannibals. 
The admiration he feels for the “native damsels” hints at an erotic freedom, 
one embodied in the emblematic figure of his lover, the girl Fayaway. But 
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these admiring glances mix with a simultaneous narration of civilization 
and savagery that dislocates Pacific Islanders into the realm of pure nature, 
a narration that undermines a simple interpretation of Melville as an anti-
imperialist. Telling of his own capture, Melville emphasizes the danger of 
the warlike tribes. When he discusses his own travels, he highlights the 
distances involved. And when he explains the practices of “natives,” he un-
derscores their strangeness and inhumanities. The Typee and the Tahitians 
are not peoples to be emulated, even if they are to be admired, for the 
civilized man should never aspire to such a lack of society.
The Pacific thus became for his readers a manifold and complex 
place: a location of primitive but beguiling cultures, one threatened by 
the currents of colonization overwhelming them but also of delights and 
conquests for the courageous traveler. Melville wrote “the mythopoetic 
source for a wide variety of literary conventions which have been used to 
dramatize the culture clash between Western civilization and the primi-
tive world.”3 For many, Melville’s experience with and generosity toward 
Pacific Islanders mark him as a critic of American imperialism, and 
indeed he strongly criticized the missionary work, consular power, and 
sailorly ignorance he found. But in its place he introduced an idea of indi-
genes as people to be visited, experienced, and investigated: a scientific, 
zoological approach to such cultures. In doing so, Melville created a new 
template of imperialism for the American imaginary, one that holds itself 
as protecting cultures from foreign influence while manipulating them to 
its own ends; as saving peoples from the vagaries of international capital 
while using them as a touristic destination; as valuing encounters with 
alterity while ultimately remaining unmarked by the experience. Typee 
and Omoo taught America how to be an empire. This would be an empire 
of cultural zookeepers and armchair anthropologists who mobilized dif-
ference for imperial ends rather than the more familiar and more violent 
European models of English colonization and Belgian work camps, but an 
empire nonetheless.4
The Anthropologist’s Eye
The respective narrators of the books, Tommo and Typee, both come across 
as travelers with a greater-than-average knowledge of history, discernment 
regarding situation, and sympathy for their island interlocutors. They are 
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not normal sailors, in other words, but interlopers in work in the Pacific 
that began in earnest before their arrival. Because of the claims to facticity 
and verity that begin each work, each narrator stands in for Melville more 
overtly than do most others for their authors.
They thus serve not only as adventurers but also as what we would 
today call theorists. Melville overtly denied that what he was doing was 
theory, which his period associated with European decadence, precisely 
because he did not want to be seen as presenting merely an updated Rous-
seau. In an intellectual milieu that perceived theory as bloodless, abstract, 
and divorced from reality, Melville’s philosophy, even his political philoso-
phy, would emerge not from a Kantian investigation into first principles but 
from the lived experience of explorers, natives, and seamen. It would be 
empirical, descriptive, scientific, and, most of all, adventurous. It was only 
by actively grappling with the complexities of the world, especially the 
diversity of its peoples and their cultures, that one could begin to discover 
one’s own self. If philosophy embodied dead thinking, adventure promised 
embodied living.
These are also books of anthropology and history. In the course of 
Tommo’s and Typee’s adventures, they describe not only their own dangers 
and excitements, but also the practices, living conditions, and language of 
Marquesans, Tahitians, and sailors. Experiencing these worlds as outsiders 
and naïfs, they nonetheless quickly become proficient in important proce-
dures of understanding and action. What a sailor sees as savagery they see 
as justified; what a missionary sees as incomprehensible they see as cultural; 
what a native sees as a local outrage they see as part of a complex system of 
emergent colonial power.
This insightfulness comes in part from these narrators’ ability to 
understand native languages with superhuman alacrity, so that they can 
know a fairly complex lingua (or at least its pidgin version) with an authorial 
omniscience. It comes also from their location outside the presumed nar-
rative timeline—they speak of access to research materials and documents 
consulted after the fact of the experience being recounted. Perhaps most 
tellingly, this discernment also comes from the ability to make connec-
tions—between English captains, Maori harpooners, Tahitian chieftains, 
and American readers. All combine to explore the emergent complexities of 
the Pacific, to be surprised by its myriad peoples, languages, and events. As 
creators of these connections, they become anthropologists of cultures: they 
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explain histories and practices with an eye to appreciating their complexi-
ties, authors who teach why and how these far-flung islands are intriguing 
and useful to an emergent American power.
A retelling of a simple encounter with a farmer became, for Melville, 
an opportunity to generalize for two chapters about all “Farming in Polyne-
sia.”5 The second of those chapters digresses further, explaining the history 
of cattle raising and hunting in Hawai‘i. Critics have read similar excurses 
in Moby-Dick (concerning kinds of whales, for example) as everything from 
a temporal narrative device designed for slowing the plot to an engagement 
about nature with contemporary Romantic authors. The similarity of these 
divagations in Typee and Omoo shows their roots in Melville’s anthropo-
logical impulse: the author provides the important social, political, and 
historical contexts so that the reader understands not just that cows existed 
in Tahiti, but how and when they came to be there.
Hogs and sailors and cows and whale oil: all are taken from one place 
and put in another, and the author and reader alike find these changes and 
juxtapositions worth figuring out. When the Typee take Tommo prisoner, 
he soon discerns out that they are not the savage, vicious, disorganized war-
riors of the sailors’ nightmares, but instead a complexly organized society 
dedicated to protecting itself from conquest, both militarily and symboli-
cally. Tommo’s realization that their life revolves not around warfare and 
cannibalism but instead around making tapa cloth, gathering fruits and 
raising pigs, swimming in shaded pools, and fishing, allows him to question 
why one tribe has a reputation for friendliness while another is feared. He 
discovers that reputation serves a purpose, that it could effectively serve to 
protect a group from the predations of the ships that appear on their shores 
and make demands on them.
The Europeans, he noted, engaged in “unprovoked atrocities” against 
natives who originally welcomed them: “The instinctive feeling of love 
within their breasts is soon converted into the bitterest hate.”6 Both books 
overflow with stories of captains whose ships require aid (water, food, sex, 
or shelter) and who presume that their need translates into obligations on 
the part of native groups. If those demands are not properly met, they turn 
to vengeance; to teach the savages lessons in propriety, the European sailors 
kill, burn, rape, poison, and steal.7 Their lives, lands, and possessions, the 
narrators note, are constantly at risk from the whites and from other tribes, 
and part of their reputations and external practices is meant to signal to 
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these outsiders that their ferocity knows no limits, even alongside the plea-
sures and relaxations of their quotidian lives.8
Melville’s proto-anthropology, then, looked not only to describe na-
tive practices (a classic subject of travelogue), but also to examine these in 
relation to causes and effects, structures of power and war, which explain 
external reputations and rumors.9 Tommo constantly fears the specter of 
cannibalism; he is almost convinced by his fellow captive, Toby, that a suck-
ling pig he is being fed is actually a human baby, and he repeatedly worries 
that the Typee’s hospitality merely covers a larger desire to fatten him up 
for a feast. Failing to see evidence of cannibalism over the course of his 
capture, he begins to suspect that it was merely a rumor the Typee spread 
to appear fierce to their enemies. (Ultimately, when he sees a member of 
the Happar tribe captured and presumably killed, Tommo gathers as much 
evidence as possible to prove that the Happar had been eaten. This serves 
both to convince him to attempt his ultimately successful escape and to 
reinforce the idea of the ferocious Typee) (Typee, 270–277).
Melville’s descriptions of these foreign practices were not entirely his 
own. In truth, much of his representation of Pacific cultures was literally 
unoriginal. Not content merely to borrow insights from previous writers, 
Melville overtly plagiarized throughout both books. At times he recognized 
his own references, as when he clearly states the histories on which he 
relies; at others he entirely neglects to mention his sources, as in his unat-
tributed use of Captain David Porter’s Journal of the Cruise of the U.S. 
Frigate Essex.10 He also borrowed their writing styles, their histories, even 
their personal experiences with islanders.
James Cook’s voyages to the South Pacific remained the most popular 
template in Melville’s time.11 The first version of these, John Hawkesworth’s 
1774 description of Cook’s travels, set a particularly compelling framework 
for the international conception of the Pacific. Hawkesworth repeatedly 
interjected Rousseauian declarations that human nature was obviously pure 
and innocent before being corrupted by societal living.12 The idea of the Pa-
cific region as free from the corruption of politics became so powerful that 
by his third voyage, Cook traveled with a special passport in his possession, 
granted by Benjamin Franklin to protect him from American sailors by 
representing his project’s transcendence of the British-American hostility.13
The success of Typee depended equally on images of a beautiful, 
uncorrupted humanity. The central figure of the novel—the persona who 
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though filling only a few pages became famous as the imagined archetypal 
Pacific Islander to Melville’s readers—is the girl Fayaway. Referred to as a 
“damsel,” a “nymph,” and a “maiden,” Fayaway provides the book with both 
a recurrent erotic charge and a symbolic referent to the island’s beauty. 
It probably does not damage her attractiveness (to both Tommo and the 
reader) that she is generally found wearing the “primitive and summer garb 
of Eden” (Typee, 107). She is often found swimming and playing with her 
many friends and sleeping alongside the narrator.
Her “easy unstudied graces” arise not only from her natural beauty, 
which the narrator spends a considerable amount of time describing, but 
also from her nurture, raised as a “child of nature”: “breathing from infancy 
an atmosphere of perpetual summer,” “nurtured by the simple fruits of the 
earth,” and “enjoying a perfect freedom from care and anxiety” (Typee, 
106); this all combined to produce a personality fully dedicated to fun, to 
pleasure, and to relaxation.
In the most famous (and infamous) scene of the book, Tommo chal-
lenges the taboo that females cannot enter canoes and manages to teach the 
islanders “a little gallantry” (Typee, 159). Once in the canoe, Fayaway seems 
“all at once to be struck with some happy idea,” removes her tapa robe, 
and lifts it as a sail. As her hair flies in the breeze, Tommo recounts, the 
canoe shoots toward the shore; “a prettier little mast than Fayaway made 
was never shipped aboard any craft” (ibid., 160–161).
This image of a naked nymph using her tapa tunic as a sail for a primi-
tive canoe proved so appealing and tantalizing to a Western audience that 
it served as the cover for a number of editions of the book. Combining 
innocence, sexuality, desire, beauty, and subservience, Fayaway encapsu-
lated and embodied a version of Polynesia as a land of freedom and satiated 
desire. Both playing on and inflaming the masculinist Western perception 
that the Pacific was made up of beauteous and fierce humans, Fayaway 
proved both easily seduced (though the book never overtly mentions her 
amorous activities, there seems to be little doubt, as she and Tommo are 
constantly “stealing away” or waking up together) and yet still resistant to 
the constraints of Western ideals and power (the dress that Tommo makes 
for her from cloth he has stolen from his ship is easily and often shucked, 
and Fayaway and her nymph friends can easily dunk Tommo when he swims 
with them) (Typee, 161, 158).
It should be clear that Fayaway is less an actual individual than an 
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idealized version of Melville’s Polynesian maiden. Her commitment to 
Tommo’s pleasure, her dewy-eyed emotionalism, even her blue eyes point 
to her as a fiction. The idea that a girl whose people have known only canoes 
would spontaneously decide that the craft should be powered by a sail is 
equally far-fetched. And the success of Melville’s rendition led to a com-
mon trope in expansionist literature: rare was the subsequent account of 
Hawai‘i or Tahiti that did not contain a rendition of the innocent, sensual, 
and undressed girls to be found there.14 Even those seeking the subjuga-
tion or elimination of native islanders recognized the power of Melville’s 
imagery; Elizabeth Parker, the white wife of an American living in Hawai‘i, 
wrote only five years after Typee’s appearance in the United States that 
she had “looked in vain for his noble warrior, or graceful Fayaway, in the 
wide-mouthed, flat-nosed creatures around me.”15
Even though Parker and other Americans read Melville’s idealizations 
as applying to all Pacific peoples, he actually placed them in a somewhat 
complex anthropolitical hierarchy. The Typee as a race compare favorably 
with the “dark-hued Hawaiians and the woolly-headed Feegees” (Typee, 
217) who show their inferiority through their skin and hair. The Marquesans, 
in contrast, had a “European cast [to] their features—a peculiarity seldom 
observable among other uncivilized people” (ibid.). Melville’s anthropolitics 
not only recognized but reinforced the idea that a scientific outlook served 
to place different peoples in racial relation to one another; he merely argued 
that the people he spent time with belonged on a higher rung of such a ladder. 
Once their proper place is determined, it is implied, then those of European 
descent can properly conceive of their rightful connection to the natural 
world. Melville would not make savages of his readers; he would, rather, point 
out the scientific value and anthropological hierarchies of a racialized world. 
In doing so, he posits the Typee as both the highest of the savages and most 
convincingly in touch with the Edenic possibilities of human life in nature. 
This latter skill, the ability to live with one’s natural surroundings, is what the 
missionaries and administrative authorities most challenge.
Missionary Positions
Many theorists have examined Melville’s development of nature in its anti-
pathetic relation to culture. The unrepresentable nature of the great white 
whale at the core of his masterpiece points to a large array of symbolic 
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untamability: the sublime that always resists the capture and control of the 
rationalized Western world.16 The behavior of those who hope to capture 
and constrain the wild represents not only a distrust of natural order, but 
also a dismissal of other humans’ points of view. The organization of civiliza-
tion opposes both the greatness of nature and the particularity of demo-
cratic respect. Melville rightly takes his place among the great critics of 
modernity, showing how contemporary forms of authority and self-interest 
undermine the human ability to see one another as equals and the world as 
a site of wonder and sublimity.
In both these first two works, Melville excoriates missionaries. Typee 
overtly compares the alleged savagery of the islanders with the ostensible 
civilization of American evangelists, a comparison summarized by an out-
raged contemporary of Melville’s: “Redundant with bitter charges against the 
missionaries, [he] piles obloquy upon their labor and its results, and broadly 
accuses them of being the cause of the vice, destitution, and unhappiness of 
the Polynesians wherever they have penetrated.”17 Omoo describes at length 
a laughable sermon, given by a missionary, in absurd pidgin: “The Island no 
more yours, but the Wee-Wees’ (French). Wicked priests here, too . . . no you 
speak, or look at them—but I know you won’t. . . . Soon these bad men be 
made to go very quick. Beretanee [British] ships of thunder come, and away 
they go” (Omoo, 498). By Melville’s estimation, the only aspect of Christian-
ity the Tahitians come to embrace is the Sabbath, when they refuse to work.
Like most nineteenth-century American authors, Melville often overtly 
refers to or indirectly alludes to the Bible; indeed, his references and allu-
sions are particularly elaborate and hermeneutically dense. But his religious 
usages more often than not undercut the solemnity of religion. To note 
that “the penalty of the Fall presses very lightly upon the valley of Typee” 
(Typee, 229–230) or that a group of islanders are “sunk in religious sloth, 
and require a religious revival” (ibid., 211) took the mission and language of 
the Christian faith fairly lightly. To Joseph Firebaugh it showed “the rhetoric 
of the Bible paraphrased and burlesqued.”18 The narrator makes clear that 
his own attitude is not particularly pious; upon discovering that the captain, 
Nathan Coleman, was long ago responsible for introducing mosquitoes to 
Tahiti, he “found much relief in coupling the word ‘Coleman’ with another 
of one syllable, and pronouncing them together energetically” (Omoo, 543). 
Though he does not reprint the particular obscenity he used here, the care-
ful reader can suspect one of a number of sacrilegious interjections.
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Unsurprisingly, Melville portrays missionaries unflatteringly. At the 
end of Omoo, he finally reveals how they ultimately triumphed in Tahiti. 
The machinations of the king, Pomaree II (“a sad debauchee and drunkard, 
and even charged with unnatural crimes”), who was driven from the throne, 
led him to raise an army abroad with the help of the missionaries and 
“slaughter” his countrymen: “Thus, by force of arms, was Christianity fi-
nally triumphant in Tahiti” (Omoo, 633). Melville presents the missionaries 
not only as wrecking the traditional Pacific life, but also as introducing evil. 
“So far as the relative wickedness of the parties is concerned,” he surmises, 
“four or five Marquesan Islanders sent to the United States as Missionaries 
might be quite as useful as an equal number of Americans dispatched to the 
Islands in a similar capacity” (Typee, 151).
His attacks on U.S. missionaries proved enough to scuttle the American 
publication of Typee. Not until he removed all references to missionaries as 
well as a critical comment about the dispossession and extirpation of the 
“Red race” in North America was it printed in the United States.19 Yet even 
with these redactions, readers did not miss Melville’s attempt to contrast the 
two civilizations: referring to the Typee as cannibals, a review in the New 
York Daily Tribune recommended “the effect of eating one’s neighbors, as 
a humanizing effect for some of our war-breathing legislators.”20
Melville ultimately blamed the missionary history for the massive 
depopulation of the Pacific Islands. He noted that “about the year 1777, 
Captain Cook estimated the population of Tahiti at about two hundred 
thousand” (Omoo, 517). By the middle of the nineteenth century, this had 
decreased to nine thousand. “These evils, of course, are solely of foreign 
origin,” he notes. The various evils the missionaries stood against, such as 
drunkenness, smallpox, wars, and child murder, were precisely the evils 
they themselves had brought (ibid., 519).
These mistreatments of the natives are echoed in the reprehensible be-
havior of those entrusted with authority on board the ships of these imperial 
powers.21 The authorities (of “Papeetee,” Tahiti) obstruct justice in a section 
of Omoo that highlights issues of political legitimacy and democracy (Omoo, 
401–414). The captain of the ship, already ineffective, takes ill and is brought 
ashore, leaving his bad-tempered and dictatorial first mate, Jermin, in com-
mand. The already mutinous crew are denied access to land or food, as Jer-
min (properly) fears they will desert. Consequently, Typee and the educated 
doctor on board convince the crew to petition the English consul for redress.
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Figure 1. Round robin from Melville’s Omoo manuscript. (Courtesy of the Univer-
sity of Florida Digital Collections at George A. Smathers Libraries)
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It would not do to sign such a document normally, for one name would 
have to come first. Fearing that one of the crew would be seen as the leader 
of this incipient rebellion and accused as a mutineer, Typee suggests a 
”round robin.” Under the list of grievances, a circle is drawn, labeled “all 
Hands,” and each crewmember signs or marks his name in a rotating cor-
porate signatory.
How common the round robin was at sea remains unclear, but Melville 
assumed the process unusual enough not only to explain it in detail to his 
readers, but also to present it as one of the few images in any of his pub-
lished works. The round robin, in his telling, collectivizes the crew, showing 
how a democratic affiliation can arise through opposition to authority. (That 
the round robin is written on blank pages torn from the book A History of 
the Most Atrocious and Bloody Pirates cannot be accidental.) It is worth 
noting that the historical document on which this is based—the adjudicated 
mutiny that involved Melville himself—had a clear ordering of names and 
no round robin.22
Authority proves feckless and self-interested, from the captain to the 
consul to the missionaries. The consul, representing the order of the is-
lands, sees no reasons to respond to the democratic demands of the crew, 
and—through a series of events—a number of them end up arrested for 
mutiny and imprisoned by the consular authorities. These authorities, 
however, remain dependent on the colonized Tahitians for the effecting 
of the punishment, and it is in this distance between the colonizer and 
the colonized that Melville recognizes the generosity and humanity of the 
latter. The locale of imprisonment proves to be a “beautiful spot” (444) and 
the jailer, a Tahitian who calls himself “Capin Bob,” an exceedingly cheerful 
and indulgent man. The prisoners are told to remain within earshot and are 
pinioned in the stocks only at night.
In both Typee and Omoo, Melville juxtaposes two forms of unjust 
power—on the one side the lack of recognition of the legitimacy of the 
islanders who live under missionary and colonial control, and on the other 
the lack of democratic practices among the Europeans who see themselves 
as bringing civilization to the Pacific world. It may be true that, in the words 
of one critic, Melville presented “life on board a ship [a]s a microcosm of 
the tyranny exercised in most nineteenth-century societies,”23 but the rela-
tionship between the two is not as simple as one merely reflecting the other. 
Melville showed, instead, how the particularity of individual tyranny had an 
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outside: that of the project of empire. Yet this realization on the part of the 
characters, the author, and—presumably—the reader did not necessarily 
translate into outrage or political opposition. At the moment of decision, 
Melville’s characters prove to be revenants: they go home and, in doing 
so, once again recognize their alliance with the powers that they have so 
recently been criticizing.
Tattoo You
A map of the Marquesan Islands appeared on the page opposite the table 
of contents of Typee’s first edition (in its original British titling, Narrative of 
a Four Months’ Residence among the Natives of a Valley of the Marquesas 
Islands; or, A Peep at Polynesian Life). The American edition contained the 
same map. Melville had a map of Tahiti specifically engraved for Omoo.24 In 
both cases the maps added nothing beyond geographical context to the nar-
rative, both because the scale of the maps is too small to see the particular 
valleys and bays that Melville describes and because the plot and events 
of the books don’t depend as much on geographical space as on cultural 
relationships. This God’s-eye view of the islands geographizes these Pacific 
peoples just as Melville’s anthropological discourse positions them in rela-
tion to the civilized world.
This demarcation of land is reinforced by the stories the books tell: 
they mark each place as particular, special, and insecure. The islands and 
the people who live there are both endangered and isolated, imperiled in 
their smallness while protected from the broader forces outside them by the 
vast distances of the sea. The maps that begin each book mark the inhabit-
ants, positioning them within the missionary-empire nexus that (Melville 
hinted) would soon come to swallow them up. In writing the books, Melville 
himself also marked them: as zones of adventure, excitement, and forbidden 
desires. And it is this second kind of demarcation that enables an imaginary 
of the Pacific as a location of ur-humanity, where the effects of a corrupt 
Western civilization have not yet been felt.
A third kind of marking is at work, one that fascinates the authorial 
stand-ins but that each finally rejects. As Sophia Mihic notes, Tommo en-
gages with and becomes part of the Typee culture (certainly more so than 
does his companion, Toby), but the partiality of this acceptance ultimately 
becomes a rejection and a leave-taking: the mark of a tourist rather than 
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a full participant. Although both narrators remain adventurers, they both 
ultimately refuse the connection to these foreign lands that would forever 
situate their bodies in relation to the Pacific. They reject the mark that 
would locate them in the social culture of the islands: the tattoo.
Many of Melville’s critics, especially those who notice his imperial sym-
pathies, emphasize this aspect of Typee and Omoo; conversely, his cham-
pions often overlook the role of the tattoo. The complexities of Melville’s 
attitude toward imperial power—as he criticizes consular and missionary 
remakings of local cultures while simultaneously positioning these indi-
genes as desiderata for an emergent American anthropolitics—are rivaled 
by the complexities of Pacific tattoo. Melville expresses fascination with the 
tattoo, noting how it serves as a mode of physical, material communication 
between and among the bodily experiences of different natives, sailors, and 
travelers.
Sometimes he plays this for humor, as when, in the first chapter of 
his first published work, he describes a formal encounter between French 
sailors and the king and queen of Nukuheva. The queen, fascinated by the 
tattoos on an “old salt” among the French, bids him show his ink. In return, 
she, “eager to display the hieroglyphics on her own sweet form,” turns 
around, bends over, and lifts her skirts, shocking the French into a hasty 
retreat (Typee, 16–17).
Other times he played it for horror, as when the crew of the Julia meet 
up with Lem Hardy, previously an Englishman but now a “renegado from 
Christendom and humanity” (Omoo, 353). Hardy signifies his deserter 
status by being tattooed with a blue band across his face and a blue shark 
on his forehead. That he had voluntarily submitted to this mark, “far worse 
than Cain’s,” which could never be erased, only increased the crew’s horror 
(ibid.). Melville underscores the evil of tattooing through Tommo’s insis-
tence on the minimal nature of the tattoos on even the perfect Fayaway, 
describing her as not “altogether freed from the hideous blemish”: “Three 
minute dots, no bigger than pinheads, decorated either lip, and at a little 
distance were not at all discernable. Just upon the fall of the shoulder were 
drawn two parallel lines half an inch apart” (Typee, 107).
And at still other times, the tattoo is represented as the nexus upon which 
generosity, hierarchy, and art are most fittingly synchronized. In Omoo the 
story of the “Lora Tattoo” tells of the history of La Dominica, where highly 
skilled tattooists have become more costly than most can afford. The wise 
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“Noomai, King of Hannamanoo,” therefore transforms tattoo into a public 
good and offers his palace to tattooists, provided they “practice without fee 
upon the meanest native soliciting their services” (Omoo, 356–359).25 Even 
a novelist could hardly conceive of a better system of artistic support than 
such full state patronage.
But Melville’s narrators ultimately refuse to participate in this dis-
course of equality, this recognition that they themselves are embodied in 
the Pacific. Though Tommo seems content enough in his extended pseudo-
captivity, one event stands out as motivating his escape from the Typee. 
As Samuel Otter asserts, the critical moment in the narrative (though not 
necessarily in the fictional temporality of the story, which jumps back and 
forth in time) arrives when Tommo becomes convinced that he will be tat-
tooed as a member of the Typee.26
Tommo first encounters the tattooist “Karky the artist” engaged in his 
work, and the anthropological narrative takes over (Typee, 253–257). The 
narrative explains that Karky’s tattoos are painted with a shark’s tooth on 
a stick (among a range of sharp implements for various patterns), a piece 
of wood wielded as a hammer, and a candlenut-based black fluid. But once 
Karky notices Tommo, he becomes obsessed with the idea of tattooing his 
“white skin.” His desire transfers quickly to Tommo’s previous friends, to 
the king and the chiefs, and to the larger society. He receives a “choice of 
patterns. I was at perfect liberty to have my face spanned by three horizon-
tal bars, . . . or to have as many oblique stripes slanting across it; or . . . I 
might wear a sort of freemason badge upon my countenance in the shape of 
a mystic triangle” (ibid., 256).
Tommo is happy to participate in Typee culture: “I made a point of do-
ing as the Typee did” (Typee, 245). In many cases, he learns their customs 
and manages to take part in them, even to the point of enjoying them. In 
one narrative he describes his amazement that anyone could eat raw fish, 
consuming them “in the same way a civilized being would eat a radish” 
(ibid., 244). He feels outraged and disgusted at seeing Fayaway eating a fish 
whole, though “in a more ladylike manner than any other girls of the valley” 
(ibid., 245). But in time he comes to eat the fish himself, and even “to relish 
them” (ibid.). Temporary participation in Marquesan life seems fine, even a 
learning experience.
Permanence, however, proves different. The tattoo would mark him 
as Typee forever and always. It would signal to those in his homeland that 
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his traveling has exceeded the limit of touristic voyeurism and that he 
has transformed himself visually in service of a foreign culture. It would 
mark him, literally, as an outsider in the Bostonian culture to which he will 
undoubtedly return, to which he had returned by the time of the book’s 
writing. Typee, after all, was dedicated to Lemuel Shaw, the chief justice of 
Massachusetts, Melville’s father-in-law at the time of the book’s publication.
This inscription highlights one important similarity between Melville 
the author and Tommo the character. Tattoo, as some critics have noted, 
writes.27 Printing on the skin of the subject—or, more properly, printing 
patterns of meaning subcutaneously—is a mode of marking that stays in 
the body until death. Like other kinds of writing, it demands a concordance 
between more than one person. Just as writers need a kind of generosity and 
forbearance from their readers, tattooists need agreement and cooperation 
from their canvases. Tommo’s fear that he could be forcibly tattooed, as 
the traditional Hawaiian tattoo artist Keone Nunes has pointed out, was 
absurd: an unwilling subject can destroy the artistic intent of a tattoo by 
merely flinching or twitching at any given moment.28
So why does Tommo (and, presumably, the armchair traveler) remain 
convinced that he could be tattooed at any minute? It is possible that the 
tribe want to preserve their reputation as fierce, in which case his tattooed 
face will mark him as a previous captive; it is also possible that they ascribe 
unfortunate events to the presence of an untattooed adult in their midst.29 
Tommo, however, sees it merely as an insult to be potentially forced on him 
and, other than dismissing it as part of the Typee religion (“they were re-
solved to make a convert out of me”) (Typee, 256), does not seem to inquire 
into the importance of tattoo. He thus resists, and ultimately escapes, the 
possibility of joining the Typee way of life.
Melville’s fear of tattoo bespeaks his distrust of the full flowering of na-
tive cultures. Even though both he and his readers saw Typee as an embrace 
of native life, it ends on a breathtakingly imperialist note. In the appendix, 
Melville (no longer the narrator Tommo, here, in a strange authorial shift) 
admiringly recounts the British takeover of the Hawaiian kingdom. In doing 
so, Melville the author belies an underlying attitude toward Pacific peoples: 
he celebrates their ways of life so long as they stay within the natural world, 
but when they demand equality and recognition within the civilized realm, 
they go too far. Melville’s anthropolitical imaginary celebrates humans in 
cultural zoos, but their escape from such enclosures threatens the systems 
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of civilization to which he ultimately returns.
With the restoration of the monarchy, he argues, brought about by the 
Hawaiian royalty and ill-advised American outrage against the overthrow, 
civilization faces riotous threat. In Melville’s telling, Lord George Paulet 
generously took over the islands, forcing King Kamehameha III (“the imbe-
cile king”) (Typee, 293) out of power at gunpoint in order to better regulate 
the islands.30 Melville argues that Paulet “endeared himself to nearly all 
orders of the islanders” (ibid., 294–295) during his rule, but through co-
ordination between the king and the missionaries he was shunted out of 
power. Since these figures preferred “continually shifting regulations” (ibid., 
295), the lawlessness of the post-appropriation period “reveals in their true 
colors the character of the Sandwich islanders,” in that they “had plunged 
voluntarily into every species of wickedness and excess, and by their utter 
disregard of all decency plainly showed . . . they were in reality as depraved 
and vicious as ever” (ibid., 297).
The Hawaiians thus cannot be trusted to rule themselves. In presuming 
political and cultural equality with the English or American societies, they 
have set themselves up to be ridiculed. Only an outsider such as Paulet can 
develop true order. To end his book, Melville falsely claims that “the great 
body of the Hawaiian people invoke blessings on his head, and look back 
with gratitude to the time when his liberal and paternal sway diffused peace 
and happiness among them” (Typee, 298). Only through a disinterested and 
civilized ruler can such a people interact with the rest of the world.
Melville’s attitude toward the Hawaiian people and the Hawaiian mon-
archy showed his distrust of Pacific Islanders who claim autonomy within 
the modern world. The prelapsarian bliss of the Typee can exist on its own 
terms, but only in isolation from true civilization. The influences of the 
Europeans must be resisted, whether in the form of missionaries, consular 
authorities, or kings; once introduced, such developments make a people 
ridiculous, laughable, and inferior. The Typee need to remain independent 
and unaffected, to remain as the anthropological destination where Fay-
away and her friends welcome the white male traveler.
Tattoo, conversely, embodies complicity. Connection, shared meaning, 
the materiality of the body, the coordination of artistic creation and recep-
tion: tattoo literalizes these connections of self to others. A tattoo shows a 
direct association to a moment, to a place, to a people. Ultimately, Tommo, 
Typee, and Melville reject this recognition, even as their reputations and 
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fame are built on them. One can desert a ship, a captain, a society, but never 
one’s own body.
These connections between narrator and author, between Typee and 
sailor, between nature and culture—as much as Melville undermines the 
logic of such divisions (especially in his later works), his narratives still 
reject the implications of these connections. The older, European modes 
of colonialism insisted on the full subsumption of the native to the colonial 
power, whether through military annihilation and genocide or through 
missionary and political acceptance of the colonial way of life. Melville’s 
pointed criticisms and vicious satires of these systems properly sting. But 
the American version of anthropolitical imperialism he replaces it with, 
whereby native peoples are to be protected in their proper place, entails its 
own exclusions. Their cultures can be celebrated, but not their aspirations 
to engage the world on their own terms; they can be visited, with great 
profit, but the visitor should not be lured away from his own kind of life; 
they can have their own religion and practices, but safely tucked away in a 
valley or on an island. For Melville, the Typee should continue to live free 
from interference, so long as their markings do not appear on the skin of 
Americans. In truth, Hawaiians and Typee and Tahitians alike are already 
implicated in the American project, and Melville’s denial of the mutuality 
of these interconnections merely points to a new way of imagining empire, 
not to its end.
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2“The End Was in the Beginning”
Melville, Ellison, and the Democratic Death of 
Progress in Typee and Omoo
Sophia Mihic
Drawing a distinction between the savage and civilized in Typee and Omoo, 
Herman Melville demonstrates the contrastive nobility of the Marquesan 
Islanders. He does not, however, to force a verb, noble savage them out of 
their humanity. They are hospitable but cunning, indulgent, and controlling. 
Likewise, the critique of progress inaugurated in Melville’s first two novels 
is not a simple reversal. The relationships among past and future, archaic 
and modern, are too complicated to allow for an easy trade-off between 
progress and regress. In Typee and Omoo events and revelations that do 
not fit the progressive world picture prompt its effacement; and when the 
assumption of progress is relaxed, problems of moral and epistemic perspec-
tive emerge and transfigure the meanings of actions. Melville explores these 
dilemmas throughout his work and elicits his readers’ surprise at strengths 
and weaknesses, possibilities and refusals, where we do not expect them. 
This surprise is on display in Benito Cereno when the blind stupidity of 
an American democrat is contrasted to the insightfulness of an aristocratic 
Spanish captain. And it is on display when the young Yankee adventurer in 
Typee escapes from his native captors in Omoo. He was a free man shipped 
on board an Australian vessel, and his life was suddenly much more austere 
and degraded. His food was sparse and spoiled, his quarters were cramped 
and rotted, and the company was meaner upon his return to civilization. He 
missed the kindness of his Typee companions even though he had struggled 
to leave them. He moved from an “indulgent captivity” to a constrained 
freedom and wondered at “how far short of our expectations is oftentimes 
the fulfillment of our most ardent hopes.”1
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Still, we do go on advancing our plans—even though our hopes and 
grander assumptions of progress routinely fail us. The young adventurer 
will join a successful enough mutiny on the ship of his newfound freedom, 
and the aristocrat will die because he cannot live with his newfound un-
derstanding of his slave’s superiority. None of the characters is ever really 
“saved” by these upendings. There are shadows cast upon them all, but they 
act nonetheless. Melville’s texts comprehend what it means to act without 
direction: without the operative assumption of a better future and without 
the guarantee of one’s own status. What political lessons can we learn from 
such perseverance when the assumption of progress is thwarted and our 
faith in it is dissipated? Let us take this dissipation as a gift and explore the 
possibilities it presents as Melville does.
Pairing Melville’s Typee with Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, I will 
argue that democratic maturity requires giving up on progress and being al-
ways ready to reframe our perspectives to see the world as it appears before 
us. This is the lesson Ellison’s protagonist learns through a course of mis-
adventures. “I believed in hard work and progress and action,” he tells us, 
“but now after first being ‘for’ society and then ‘against’ it, I assign myself no 
rank or even limit, and such an attitude is very much against the trend of the 
times.” His world, however, “has become one of infinite possibilities.”2 I will 
argue that the savages Melville’s protagonist encounters are quite civilized, 
because they, like Ellison, comprehend a world of possibility without prog-
ress: they understand that to stage a picture of the world is to exercise power 
and political agency. Can we follow them and accept that the democratic 
struggle of self-rule is never the struggle, progressing toward emancipation, 
but instead daily struggles to define ourselves? To do so would be to un-
derstand politics not as a matter of having to overcome anything—history, 
the law, man—but instead as entering into, seeing, and effecting where and 
what we are as a polity. This will always be an incomplete endeavor. But in 
refusing the world picture of progress, striving to resist it, we see the world 
provisionally at least in the moment and we can act from this vantage. We 
can act within a field of present possibility rather than wait for a logic of 
history to unfold before us and guide our actions. “Life,” Ellison writes and 
Melville understands, “is to be lived, not controlled; and humanity is won 
by continuing to play in face of certain defeat.”3
For Melville and Ellison, to see is to see ourselves and others in the 
myriad of hopes and prospects with which we each and all frame our in-
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dividual lives and collective existence. This effort is never solipsistic; and 
resisting the assumption of progress does not mean that we can assume 
away the past simply to be here now. We may sometimes withdraw and 
hibernate or otherwise gain our repose, but we must ultimately return to 
the world that never leaves us even in our seclusion. Melville’s protagonist 
thinks of “home” and “mother” while in the world of the islanders—these 
are the only English words he taught his host, Marheyo, while captive4—
and Ellison’s protagonist, ruminating alone, finds he must “at least tell a few 
people” what he is thinking about life in the world he has tried to leave.5 
What do these exercises in thinking tell us? Pursuing our hopes and pros-
pects without the assumption of progress may require conservation—the 
path without progress may sometimes be conservative—and at other times 
it may even prompt destruction. We may sometimes have to backtrack and 
begin again. These are lessons learned in Typee before the protagonist and 
his companion, Toby, recover terrain they have just crossed over. Stalling 
the decision to turn back, they know “there is scarcely anything when a 
man is in difficulties that he is more disposed to look upon with abhorrence 
than a right-about retrograde movement—a systematic going over of the 
already trodden ground” (Typee, 70–71). And these are lessons ultimately 
embraced by Ellison’s protagonist, who tells us, “I have come a long way and 
returned and boomeranged from the point in society toward which I origi-
nally aspired.”6 No one and nothing, including the assumption of progress, 
determines in toto the execution of anyone’s plan for living or the facts of 
any given present.
How are we to grow up and act within this contingency? If the notion 
of maturity without progress is too paradoxical to bear, let us think not of 
unhinging the two completely, but instead of resisting by pluralizing prog-
ress. Can we celebrate a retrograde, as well as a forward, movement? There 
are many ways to take direction and to define success. Paganizing and ren-
dering polytheistic the fact that we go on along many winding and even re-
cursive journeys, as Melville pluralizes and effaces the monotheism of the 
Christian God and as Ellison deconstructs the American dream, will be 
the approach of this essay. With Melville and Ellison, let us relax the onto-
theology of progress, the almighty god progress—its lingering hold, that is, 
on contemporary self-understanding and political possibility. The pervasive 
assumption of progress defines a right wing currently pursuing a globally 
“manifest” American destiny. At the same time those to the left cannot use 
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the words liberal, leftist, or socialist to name themselves and often present 
themselves instead as “progressives.” The American war machine, the oli-
garchy, and resistance to these effects of empire are all presented as striv-
ing toward some better future. Can we stand still for a moment and attend 
to the democratic present? Can we step back and separate the twin gods of 
republic and empire in the American context and save the republic? Prob-
ably not, because the two have never really been separate, but let us follow 
Melville’s lead and at least play with the idea that we savages might find a 
way to help ourselves.7
Travel Narratives and the Remove of Thinking
The Typee and Omoo pair is in many ways the same book as Invisible Man, 
even though their publications are separated by roughly one hundred years. 
All three novels tell stories of American men on journeys. They are tales 
of ups and downs and of removal from the world in order to understand 
it. The misadventures of Ellison’s black protagonist as he travels from the 
South to the North—through his education and into work and participation 
in “the Brotherhood”—are not as picturesque as the travels of Melville’s 
white protagonist in the South Seas. But the perceived quaintness of Typee 
and Omoo obscures the philosophical insights Melville and Ellison share in 
these works. Ellison adopts and develops temporal structures and narrative 
devices suggested by nineteenth-century existentialists such as Nietzsche 
and Dostoyevsky. Melville, however, finds and propagates these structures 
and devices. He is a nineteenth-century existentialist, as many have rec-
ognized interpreting his later work.8 Yet as an American whose work and 
thinking begin with reflection on his experiences with the Typee, Melville 
comprehends dimensions of collectivity and of race and race-thinking in 
ways that the European existentialists could not.9 Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky 
are a bridge between Melville and Ellison. Or perhaps we should think of 
them as their third whale in the context of this essay. In existential—or 
what Hannah Arendt would call existenz—philosophy, we find cradled the 
insights regarding progress and regress that Melville and Ellison share and 
tie expressly to politics.10 Their critique of progress is not simply saying no 
to the modern now and its progressive vision. Their critique is, further, an 
alternative mode of seeing—of descrying—and thus of thinking and acting. 
Melville and Ellison comprehend the task of world disclosure in concert 
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with self-disclosure. They bring to light for us the always provisional, and 
often haphazard, tasks of enacting and participating in collective life. And 
in Typee and Invisible Man they ponder the joys and trials of striving to 
flourish despite one’s outsider, or minority, status. We can read Ellison 
through Melville to begin an exploration of these revelations, because he 
was clearly influenced by Melville. But we can also read Melville through 
Ellison to demonstrate that the earlier writer’s philosophical thinking does 
not begin with that other whale and the encounter with Hawthorne.
Consider, first, the narrative device of withdrawal from the world. It is 
very much a device in Invisible Man—one borrowed from Dostoyevsky’s 
Notes from Underground and Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Elli-
son’s novel begins, and ends, with the protagonist’s hiding underground 
in a basement, “hibernating,” in order to reflect on where and who he is 
after the failure of his various plans. Dostoyevsky’s protagonist, too, goes 
underground, whereas Nietzsche’s Zarathustra ascends mountains to think 
in seclusion. Each of these deployments of withdrawal serves epistemic im-
peratives: each physically figures the remove of abstraction in a world in 
which the two-world framework of appearance and reality has collapsed. 
They serve a horizon of thought in which appearance is reality; all is “so-
cially constructed,” to use the phrase of our time; and there is no outside 
noumenal to provide an Archimedean point and thus God’s-eye view on 
the phenomenal. Despite these foundational realignments, we nonetheless 
persist in the habit of trying to think. How do we do so? Seclusion and tem-
porary withdrawal provide an approximation of the Archimedean remove.
Before making the decision to withdraw and hibernate, the protagonist 
of Invisible Man tells us: “I realized that I couldn’t return to Mary’s, or to 
any part of my old life. I could approach it only from the outside, and I had 
been as invisible to Mary as I had been to the Brotherhood.” To continue his 
life, he would first have to stop and think. “No, I couldn’t return to Mary’s, 
or to the campus, or to the Brotherhood, or home. I could only move ahead 
or stay here, underground. So I would stay here until I was chased out. 
Here, at least, I could try to think things out in peace, or, if not in peace, 
in quiet.”11 His reflections underground let him explore the conclusion that 
he is an invisible man “simply because people refuse to see me.”12 They see 
instead who they want and presume him to be. “I was never more hated,” 
he concludes, “than when I tried to be honest. . . . On the other hand, I’ve 
never been more loved and appreciated than when I tried to justify and 
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affirm someone’s mistaken beliefs; or when I tried to give my friends the 
incorrect, absurd answers they wished to hear.”13 This crisis of affirmation 
returns the protagonist to his grandfather’s deathbed instructions to “agree 
’em to death and destruction.”14 His grandfather is sharing a strategy of re-
sistance—one that enters into what is being seen by the hegemonic white 
gaze and strives to subvert this dominance. What is of interest here, for my 
argument, is the turn back to the past to understand a present predicament 
of sight and insight (and of blindness).
Tacking back and forth between the opening chapters and conclusion 
of the book, the protagonist tells us “the end was in the beginning.”15 Try-
ing to understand his present prompted what Toby and Tommo understood 
as “a right-about retrograde” in his thinking. He boomeranged. He had to 
return to and systematically recover and revise the meaning of his grand-
father’s mysterious words. “On his deathbed,” we are told, “he called my 
father to him and said, ‘Son, after I’m gone I want you to keep up the good 
fight. I never told you, but our life is a war, and I have been a traitor all 
my born days, a spy in the enemy’s country ever since I gave up my gun 
in Reconstruction. Live with your head in the lion’s mouth. I want you to 
overcome ’em with yeses, undermine ’em with grins, agree ’em to death 
and destruction, let ’em swoller you till they vomit or bust wide open.’” The 
family was shocked by his sudden vehemence. “They thought the old man 
had gone out of his mind. He had been the meekest of men. The younger 
children were rushed from the room, the shade drawn and the flame of the 
lamp turned so low that it sputtered on the wick like the old man’s breath-
ing. ‘Learn it to the younguns,’ he whispered fiercely; then he died.”16
“But my folks,” the passage continues, “were more alarmed over his last 
words than over his dying.”17 They told the children not to speak of it, but the 
protagonist thought of it as he won awards and praise from whites. He was 
seemingly following his grandfather’s advice; he was being meek and good 
and hardworking; but “the old man had defined it as treachery” and as war 
and not as goodness.18 Underground, in his seclusion, he was still uncertain 
and pondered his grandfather’s meaning: “Weren’t they their own death and 
their own destruction except as the principle lived in them and lived in us?” 
Are whites to be fought for their own good or for the good of the whole? Isn’t 
it for both? “Was it that we of all, we, most of all had to affirm the principle, 
the plan in whose name we had been brutalized and sacrificed . . . because 
we were older than they in the sense of what if took to live in the world with 
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others?”19 How should we understand this effacement of the progressive 
world picture: this recognition of the putatively primitive as more advanced 
and more mature? Was his grandfather suggesting that he was more mature 
as a citizen, even though as a former slave his citizenship had only recently 
been won? Can how to live as an excluded minority at the margins of the 
republic be separated from how to live in the republic as a whole? Does citi-
zenship, for everyone, require masquerade? “Who knows,” Ellison writes, 
“but that, on the lower frequencies, I speak for you.”20
Predating Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky, Melville’s protagonist also with-
draws and consequently thinks against the trend of his time: first in captivity 
with the Typee and then in a British prison in Omoo. It would be imprecise, 
however, to say that Melville’s Tommo withdraws in order to think. He is 
instead allowed a vantage for critical reflection by the situations of remove 
in which he finds himself. The device of withdrawal seems less devicelike 
in Melville’s first novels: the physical remove is part of the central narrative 
and reads as less authorially figured. But despite this seeming naturalness, 
Melville’s stories accomplish the epistemic work of the more overtly de-
ployed structure of Invisible Man. Remove from the world allows a critical 
perspective. Shipping itself, throughout Melville’s writing, provides this re-
move and a vantage point outside the everyday and hegemonic from which 
to think.21 But in the earliest novels the remove of the texts is more pro-
found: from mainland civilization, through the liminal world on board the 
ships moving between mainlands, and into the culture of another world. 
Inhabiting the world of the Marquesan Islanders compels disapproval of 
the values and practices of Melville’s home world. In Typee and Omoo, for 
example, his criticisms of the missionaries are stringent and widely recog-
nized.22 The protagonist insists that his captors in Typee, living in isolation, 
are more Christian than the Christians who hope to find and convert them 
(Typee, 238). An example of this would be the care with which Tommo is 
fed. He was unable to master the technique of wrapping the gooey staple of 
the island diet around his finger. So Kory-Kory, who was his attendant, fed 
him. “He brought us various kinds of food; and, as if I were an infant, in-
sisted upon feeding me with his own hands” (Typee, 109). And throughout 
Omoo, Melville presents the missionaries, the “mickonaree,” as colonials 
more interested in their own comforts than in spreading the good news 
(Omoo, 494–506, 508). Following these observations, it seems only sensible 
in Moby-Dick when Ishmael joins Queequeg and prays to his companion’s 
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idol. “And what,” he asks, “do I wish that Queequeg would do to me? Why, 
unite with me in my particular Presbyterian form of worship. Consequently, 
I must unite with him in his; ergo I must turn idolator” (Moby-Dick, 849). 
This pluralizing of the sacred troubles the assumption of progress, just as 
the pluralizing and confounding of maturity and infancy do. Dimensions of 
modern worship compel engagement of the pagan form, and this engage-
ment boomerangs back on and contradicts the injunctions meant to shore 
up monotheism. Again resonating with Invisible Man, is it the principles of 
Christianity like the principles of the republic that matter here? And how 
do we see the principles of our own world when we find a way, momentarily 
at least, to desituate ourselves?
Let us consider, further, the temporal structures of Melville’s and El-
lison’s travelogues as an unhinging of the metaphysical frame of reference 
and thus of the onto-theology of progress. Hannah Arendt understands the 
remove from everyday activity as calling forth and enabling a dimension of 
self—as, that is, enacting what she terms the thinking ego poised between 
past and future. Unexpected clashes between past and future, and by exten-
sion between savage and civilized, create a space of remove. Arendt is ex-
plicating Nietzsche’s as well as Kafka’s descriptions of thinking when there 
is no outside to thought: no promise of a better future, or of a noumenal 
realm of any sort. Instead, the past pushes forward against the future, and 
the future pushes back on the past, for this is the experience of the thinking 
ego and not of the biographical or biological self moving in a linear pattern 
from birth to death. The thinking ego looks back and selects from the past 
to make sense of the present moment and push forward.23 In Kafka’s ver-
sion, the past and future are two antagonists colliding against each other in 
thought: “The first supports him in his fight with the second, for he wants to 
push him forward, and in the same way the second supports him in his fight 
with the first, since he drives him back.”24 For Nietzsche the collision where 
past and future meet is titled the Augenblick—the blink of an eye, which is 
also translated as the gateway “Now”25 or the gateway “Moment” in Zara-
thustra.26 Nietzsche saw the demise of progress and the two-world frame of 
reference as a crisis. He feared that the loss of our faith in progress, in rela-
tion to thinking, would stymie action: “Alas, the time is coming when man 
will no longer shoot the arrow of his longing beyond man.”27 But in Arendt’s 
formulation of the condition and problem, “man lives in this in-between, 
and what he calls the present is a life-long fight against the dead weight of 
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the past, driving him forward with hope, and the fear of the future (whose 
only certainty is death), driving him backward toward ‘the quiet of the 
past.’”28 And it is for Arendt a fight to be taken up: it is how we shoot beyond 
ourselves. As Ellison’s protagonist tells us, thinking is a prelude to action: 
“a hibernation is a covert preparation for a more overt action.”29 When we 
withdraw and think, we prepare to muddle along in the face of confusion, 
“certain defeat,” and the uncertainty of the future. We look back and revise 
and push onward and revise again.
In Invisible Man Ellison rewrites and performs variations on scenes 
from throughout Melville’s work. The sermon “Blackness of Blackness” in 
the book’s prologue takes us inside the all-black meetinghouse Ishmael 
peered into, and walked past, in Moby-Dick.30 Taking us into the mind of 
his protagonist, Ellison takes us into what Melville calls the “hive of sub-
tlety” that was Babo’s head staked on a pole beckoning his former master, 
Benito Cereno, to follow him toward death.31 Ellison riffs on an earlier mo-
ment in the tragedy of the revolt in his presentation of one of the many dis-
comforting, and tragic, scenes in Invisible Man. As a college student, the 
protagonist takes Mr. Norton, a white trustee, into the black quarters and 
then to a juke joint filled with black inmates from an asylum. “They were 
supposed to be members of the professions toward which at various times I 
vaguely aspired myself,” he explains, “and even though they never seemed 
to see me I could never believe that they were really patients.”32 In that they 
are “crazy,” they are outside of and reflecting on the world the protagonist 
is trying to fit himself into: “Sometimes it appeared as though they played 
some vast and complicated game with me and the rest of the school folk, a 
game whose goal was laughter and whose rules and subtleties I could never 
grasp.”33 Overcome on many fronts, Mr. Norton repeatedly asks his chaper-
one for a “little stimulant,” and they encounter the patients while in search 
of whiskey.34 The protagonist will be expelled from college because of these 
events. We are reminded of Benito Cereno being handled with much more 
skill by Babo, “who, with one hand sustaining his master, with the other 
applied a cordial” (Benito Cereno, 700–701). The slaves had taken over the 
ship, and it was a ruse to make the American Captain Delano believe that 
the Spanish were still in control. Don Benito, too, needed repeated sips of 
a little stimulant to get through his performance. An exchange between the 
two captains after the revolt fails is one of two epigraphs at the beginning 
of Invisible Man. “‘You are saved,’ cried Captain Delano, more and more 
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astonished and pained; ‘you are saved: what has cast such a shadow upon 
you?’” And Don Benito, who in Melville’s story lies melancholy and dying, 
responds, “The negro” (Benito Cereno, 754).
Ellison will later title an essay “The Shadow and the Act” and explore 
seeing and what an audience is ready to see. He asks what has happened 
to the public, the American public, if it is ready to see a black character in 
charge and never humiliated in a 1949 film of Faulkner’s Intruder in the 
Dust. What has come out of the shadows? And how are such revelations 
performed? What remains hidden?35 Benito Cereno is a point of reference 
throughout Ellison’s work, but he recasts and redirects the shadows Melville 
presents in this story. He recasts, in other words, the revelations and con-
cealments preoccupying Melville. Invisible Man is about how to act when 
the shadows of white supremacy obscure one’s way. Ellison does not simply 
peep into the mind of Babo, or into the all-black meetinghouse; he writes 
from within the position of subjugated exclusion and reveals the unseen (or 
speaks the unspeakable unspoken from the position of the silenced). White 
supremacy is the question, too, in Typee and Omoo as well as Benito Cereno. 
Both of the earlier texts are about contact between the Marquesan Island-
ers and colonial powers from Europe and America. Once again, those on 
the margins of empire, in the shadows, have something to teach those at the 
hegemonic white center. The cultures are interwoven in Omoo—the English 
jail, for example, the “Calabooza Beretanee,” is manned by Tahitian jailers 
who are delightfully lax. The prisoners “cheerfully acquiesce” to their author-
ity (Omoo, 443–449). And in the confrontation held at bay in Typee—the 
islanders are not colonized in this story—we see the horizon of contact as 
well. In this text, however, their world is hegemonic and they hold the repre-
sentatives of European and American power captive, the representatives of 
empire are their guests. White power is feared—they fear the French—but 
it is not in control in Typee. Melville’s writing and thinking begin inside the 
Polynesian meetinghouse—inside the Ti and Taboo groves—of the other 
as dominant rather than dominated. Tommo was in the shadows there and 
struggled to speak where “the edge of the world” was its own center.
States of Artifice
When Melville writes Tommo and Toby into the world of the Marquesan 
Islanders, he is equipped with state-of-nature theory. He knows his readers 
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will gaze through this lens as they peep with him at Polynesian life, and he 
plays with multiple reversals of the notion that civilization progresses from a 
more primitive state of nature.36 Melville uses these references to challenge 
the historical trajectory of modernities that see themselves as progressing 
from a preconceived past; and his account will not be a simple reversal of 
savage and civilized. He does not present the encounter as a return to an 
Edenlike grace. The primitive will be allowed its own cultivation and will 
assume and act on its own dominance. Contrasting the islanders with the 
beginnings of discord and inequality through sexual competition in Rous-
seau’s “Second Discourse,”37 Melville writes that “you might have seen a 
throng of young females, not filled with envyings of each other’s charms, 
nor displaying the ridiculous affectations of gentility, nor yet moving in 
whalebone corsets, like so many automatons, but free, inartificially happy, 
and unconstrained” (Typee, 152). He seems to naturalize their goodness 
in passages like this, but these allusions to canonical stories are not mere 
reversals or rebuttals that risk reconstructing narratives of progress or 
decline. Melville eschews these trajectories and naturalizing motifs. He, 
unlike Rousseau, situates his savages securely in their own artifice—they 
are language users, they are together in society. He presents not their inno-
cence but their civilization as admirable. How are these seemingly perfect 
persons cunning and controlling? And how is Melville not reducing them to 
mere noble savages? They are lovely people—to look at and to be with—but 
they do hold Tommo and Toby captive. And they shrink a head or two here 
and there. They distinguish between friend and enemy; they cannot always 
decide who is which or how to treat a friend; and that is what makes them 
just like every “us” across the globe.
Melville notes that “the strict honesty which the inhabitants of near-
ly all of the Polynesian Islands manifest towards each other, is in striking 
contrast with the thieving propensities some of them evince in their inter-
course with foreigners.” They are not angels, but quite human, in contact 
with other civilizations. “It would almost seem that, according to their pe-
culiar code of morals, the pilfering of a hatchet or a wrought nail from a 
European is looked upon as a praiseworthy action. Or rather, it may be pre-
sumed, that bearing in mind the wholesale forays made upon them by their 
nautical visitors, they consider the property of the latter as a fair object of 
reprisal” (Typee, 236). They are an alternative center. They stage and enact, 
and try to conserve and maintain, a picture of their world. Rather than view 
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self- and world disclosure as a historical project predicated on assumptions 
of progress, the islanders practice these tasks as daily dimensions of politics. 
In contrast to Kennan Ferguson’s argument in this volume, my contention 
is that Melville does not naturalize the Typee even though they have main-
tained their isolation in the first novel. Instead, states of artifice meet states 
of artifice. They frame us as much as we frame them. Let us consider how 
Tommo and his companion, Toby, encounter the islanders—or, rather, how 
they encounter Tommo and Toby.
The American companions are fugitives who have jumped ship togeth-
er “clandestinely.” Shipping itself is a removal from the world of everyday 
experience, as noted above; and now abandoning their duties to go adven-
turing on the island will instantiate an even further remove. Toby is an 
assumed name, and he would not tell his real name to anyone on the ship 
(Typee, 43). But Tommo and Toby were companionable. They each “had 
evidently moved in a different sphere of life” from their other shipmates. As 
Tommo explains, Toby’s “conversation at times betrayed this, although he 
was anxious to conceal it” (ibid., 44). They both had a shared class under-
standing of being wronged by unacceptable treatment from their ship’s cap-
tain: they were not being properly fed, the sick were not being cared for as 
they should be. Sensitive to the illegality and moral weight of leaving their 
posts, Tommo insists that the horrors of the ship were worth risking the 
dangers of terrain and cannibals to escape. He worries, though, about the 
possibility of “falling in with a foraging party of these same bloody-minded 
Typee, whose appetites, edged perhaps by the air of so elevated a region, 
might prompt them to devour one” (ibid., 43).
To escape their posts, Tommo and Toby plan to flee the bay where 
their ship was docked. They climb the mountains ringing the island and 
wait for the ship to leave. They would be able to spy its departure from 
this vantage point, and they were sure the mountains would be filled with 
abundant fresh fruit. They are wrong about finding fruit, however. They 
push up and down over high points and chasms in search of water and food. 
Starving, they realize they will have to climb down into the valleys where 
the islanders live, protected from the sea, and shipping, by the mountains. 
There is a problem, though, of reputation. Tommo and Toby know they 
could happen on the Typee or the Happar—they fear the Typee and very 
much dread an encounter with these most ferocious cannibals they have 
heard about so often. They forestall entering the valley because of this fear. 
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They follow paths that become dead ends. At one high vantage, where a 
path ends at the edge of a cliff, Toby asks if “every one that travels this 
path takes a jump here, eh?” (Typee, 59). At times Tommo prompts Toby 
onward; but at another time, when Tommo is despairing, Toby encourages 
him. Toby wakes up one morning energized and insists they are going to go 
back over the ascents and descents they have already traversed and return 
to and enter a settlement they had seen earlier. They will not return to the 
bay yet, but they will attempt this right-about retrograde. They are starv-
ing and tired, and Tommo is injured, so they advance toward the “crown-
ing beauty of the prospect”—toward, that is, a view of the populated valley 
before them. These passages are proto-Nietzschean—stylistically and epis-
temically—and they signal confusions and consternations that complicate 
the distinction between tragedy and comedy. In passages that prefigure the 
narrative in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Tommo and Toby are physically and 
emotionally exhausted by climbing and descending, by hoping and then de-
spairing. They overcome adversity by carrying on through their despair. 
Tommo, at least, is transported out of his everyday experience and ready 
to see and hear and think differently. “Over all the landscape,” he reports, 
“there reigned the most hushed repose, which I almost feared to break lest, 
like the enchanted gardens in a fairy tale, a single syllable might dissolve the 
spell” (ibid., 64–65). They prod themselves on, with hope, saying they will 
find the Happars in the valley and not the feared and bloody Typee.
Of course they descend to the Typee, but they do not find the fierce 
people forecasted by their reputation. And during this first meeting, they do 
not find the countenances they expect from simple savages. “One of them 
in particular,” Tommo explains, “who appeared to be the highest in rank, 
placed himself directly facing me; looking at me with a rigidity of aspect 
under which I absolutely quailed. . . . Never before had I been subjected to 
so strange and steady a glance; it revealed nothing of the mind of the savage, 
but appeared to be reading my own.” We could read these lines as an en-
counter with the inscrutable primitive. Or, by contrast, we could note that 
Tommo is surprised by being made an object of study. In this initial inter-
view, the chief refuses a gift of tobacco. “He quietly rejected the proffered 
gift, and, without speaking, motioned me to return it to its place.” Tommo 
was in no position, yet, to give and to have a gift honored by receipt. He is 
not allowed to frame the situation. “Was this act of the chief a token of his 
enmity? Typee or Happar? I asked within myself. I started, for at the same 
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moment this question was asked by the strange being before me.” Exchang-
ing a glance of trepidation with Toby, “I paused for a second and know not 
by what impulse it was that I answered ‘Typee.’ The piece of dusty statu-
ary nodded in approval, and then murmured ‘Mortarkee?’ ‘Mortarkee,’ said 
I, without further hesitation—‘Typee mortarkee.’” And, having announced 
the Typee to be good: “What a transition! The dark figures around us leaped 
to their feet, clapped their hands in transport, and shouted again and again 
the talismanic syllables, the utterance of which appeared to have settled 
everything” (Typee, 89–90). Did he get lucky? Or had Tommo entered into 
the world of the Typee enough to know what the right answer would be? 
Had he sufficiently left behind the strictures of his own world’s certainty?
The principal chief raged against the Happar and all joined in. The 
rovers were fed and cared for, they were treated with respect as guests, and 
they made fast friends. Now in a position to reciprocate his host’s congenial-
ity, now allowed to meet on a more equal footing, the protagonist too takes 
the name we know him by in this text. The chief “gave me to understand 
that his name was ‘Mehevi,’ and that, in return, he wished me to commu-
nicate my appellation. I hesitated for an instant, thinking that it might be 
difficult for him to pronounce my real name, and then with the most praise-
worthy intentions intimated that I was known as ‘Tom.’” But this name the 
chief could not say. “‘Tommo,’ ‘Tomma,’ ‘Tommee,’ everything but plain 
‘Tom.’ As he persisted in garnishing the word with an additional syllable, I 
compromised the matter with him at the word ‘Tommo’: and by that name 
I went during the entire period of my stay in the valley” (Typee, 90–91).
After first meeting and helping care for Tommo and Toby when they 
entered the village, Chief Mehevi appears to them the next day in full 
warrior gear. Tommo is awestruck, and he does not recognize him. After 
Tommo and Toby had been attended to and visited by many people of the 
valley, “a superb-looking warrior stooped the towering plumes of his head-
dress beneath the low portal, and entered the house. I saw at once that he 
was some distinguished personage, the natives regarding him with the ut-
most deference, and making room for him as he approached” (Typee, 96). 
But it wasn’t merely the natives who were affected by his status. “His as-
pect,” Tommo reports, “was imposing”: “The splendid long drooping tail- 
feathers of the tropical bird, thickly interspersed with the gaudy plumage of 
the cock, were disposed in an immense upright semicircle upon his head, 
their lower extremities being fixed in a crescent of guinea-beads which 
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spanned the forehead. Around his neck were several enormous necklaces of 
boars’ tusks, polished like ivory, and disposed in such a manner as that the 
longest and largest were upon his capacious chest” (ibid., 96–97).
When they make eye contact, when Tommo meets “the strange gaze” 
he had met the preceding night and sees past the facade of power, he imme-
diately knows that the warrior is Mehevi. “On addressing him, he advanced 
at once in the most cordial manner, and, greeting me warmly, seemed to 
enjoy not a little the effect his barbaric costume had produced upon me” 
(Typee, 98). Note not only Mehevi’s conscious self-disclosure, but also his 
congenial awareness of the power of appearance as the Typee participate in 
the construction of their own reality.
Another warrior—taboo, but thus allowed to travel and carry news 
among the tribes of the valley and the outside world as well—also toyed 
with and relished his presentation of self when visiting the Typee. After 
walking in and pointedly ignoring Tommo, he later cordially discussed the 
rationale of his comportment with him, for he could speak English. “When 
I asked the now affable Marnoo why it was that he had not previously spo-
ken to me, he eagerly enquired what I had been led to think of him from his 
conduct in this respect.” Tommo tells him he had thought him a great chief, 
unaffected by seeing a white man. “At this declaration of the exalted opin-
ion I had formed of him, he appeared vastly gratified, and gave me to un-
derstand that he had purposely behaved in that manner, in order to increase 
my astonishment, as soon as he should see proper to address me” (Typee, 
167). Note how straightforwardly, and unabashedly, Mehevi and Marnoo 
effect artifice. Melville does not naturalize them. They use presentation 
of self—they manipulate emotion and perception with it—but they do not 
pretend that appearance is anything more than appearance. This is not, by 
any means, to say that appearances are not real. But these self-presentations 
for Mehevi and Marnoo are not ultimate truths, nor are they hiding ulti-
mate truths. They are, like Tommo’s assumption of his name, facilitating 
communication and part of being in a world. Mehevi and Marnoo are dis-
closing a world through self-disclosure. It is one in which they have elevated 
status, and they communicate this as they engage and acknowledge their 
white guest. By contrast, Tommo, because he is an outsider, often struggles 
and misfires as he attempts to fit himself into their world. Yet both sides 
work at communication and make a world together. It is striking, actually, 
how much understanding there is between the Typee and their subaltern 
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visitors. They meet not as natural and civilized, but instead as form of life 
vis-à-vis form of life, as states of artifice in contact with each other without 
the assumption of a world-historical hierarchy.
“It’s a Mutual, Joint-Stock World”
When Toby and Tommo are questioned by the Typee during their first night 
in the village, they are asked about the “movements of the French, against 
whom they seemed to cherish the most fierce hatred” (Typee, 94).38 And 
the next day, when he is speaking with Mehevi, “that which engaged his at-
tention was the late proceedings of the ‘Franee,’ as he called the French, in 
the neighboring bay of Nukuheva.” They were able to communicate to the 
chief that there had been six warships in the bay when they left it. “When 
he received this intelligence, Mehevi, by the aid of his fingers, went through 
a long numerical calculation, as if estimating the number of Frenchmen 
the squadron might contain” (ibid., 98). It is very much “as if,” though, for 
Tommo, and there is guessing on both sides until much later, when the 
English-speaking Marnoo arrives. With limited shared language, Toby and 
Tommo try to communicate that they need medicine from the Europeans 
for Tommo’s leg. The Americans always worry that their indulgent hosts will 
suddenly be the cannibals they expected and eat them. But Mehevi and all 
remain steadfast in their role as hosts. Tommo is assigned a servant because 
he is lame. “I could not but be amused at the manner in which the chief 
addressed me upon this occasion,” Tommo tells us, “talking to me for at 
least fifteen or twenty minutes as calmly as if I could understand every word 
that he said. I remarked this peculiarity very often afterward in many of the 
other islanders” (ibid., 100). Their assumption of their own hegemony was 
very strange to Tommo—surely, they must have thought, he will learn the 
language like every other child does. The Typee, however, were even more 
strange to Toby. They irked him in a way that they did not discomfit Tommo. 
He wanted to leave, to get help for Tommo’s leg, and simply to escape, but 
he was rebuked. “As soon as we succeeded in making the natives under-
stand our intention, they broke out into the most vehement opposition to the 
measure, and for a while I almost despaired of obtaining their consent. At 
the bare thought of one of us leaving them, they manifested the most lively 
concern” (Typee, 120; emphasis added).
Toby persists and tries to leave, but he is attacked by Happars and 
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must come back. Leaving again, he promises to return with medicine, but 
he does not. What happens to him remains mysterious in the main body of 
the text, and Tommo fears that Toby has been killed. He decides to hide his 
own desire to leave after his request is angrily denied by Mehevi. He too 
will masquerade in his encounters with the Typee. But Tommo will share, 
rather than disparage and reject, their world. And he will not let them ne-
gate his past and his prospects.
Tommo will delight his hosts “by conforming to their style of dress” for 
a celebration (Typee, 192). He will court Fayaway and be allowed to violate 
the taboo on women in boats and take her sailing (ibid., 159). But he will 
disappoint his hosts and not be tattooed because he still plans to return to 
his own world. He will agree with them, and join them to an extent, but 
he will have his limits. After offering to have his arm rather than his face 
drawn on, he is angrily rebuffed by the Typee. He saw their desire to tattoo 
and make him a member of their group as a new danger. “I now felt con-
vinced that in some luckless hour I should be disfigured in such a manner 
as never more to have the face to return to my countrymen, even should the 
opportunity offer” (Typee, 255; emphasis in original). To share worlds does 
not, and cannot, require wholesale capitulation of one world to the other 
unless we assume a better world that should be progressed toward and real-
ized. I write without this epistemic certainty, and Melville does so as well. 
In contrast to Ferguson, I am arguing that tattooing Tommo’s face would 
have rendered him, in Ellison’s terms, invisible. Recall Ellison’s protagonist 
telling us, “I’ve never been more loved or appreciated than when I tried to 
‘justify’ and affirm someone’s mistaken beliefs; or when I tried to give my 
friends the incorrect, absurd answers they wished to hear.”39 Tommo did 
not give his Typee friends what they wanted. By saying no, he refuses to 
deny the world and past from which he came, and he refuses to relinquish 
his hopes and prospects. He refuses to deny himself because others cannot 
see him. He emerges from both worlds, rather than from one or the other.
John Bryant notes that Melville “depicts, with clarity, the bafflement 
of the encounter between western and Pacific minds.”40 And he is right: the 
failures of understanding are many, and certainty is elusive. But to hope for 
too much certainty is to proceed with the assumptions of what is in Typee 
the marginalized modern. In All Things Shining, Hubert Dreyfus and Sean 
Dorrance Kelly explore what Karl Jaspers identified as the Axial Revolution 
across world religious systems, the idea “that there is a good beyond what 
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   58 10/29/13   10:57 AM
“The End Was in the Beginning” 59
we can find in the everyday conception of human flourishing; that there is 
a transcendent good that is the nature of the Divine.” Dreyfus and Kelly 
make a case for inhabiting everyday flourishing without recourse to this 
form of the real and find resources for their project in the story of Ahab’s 
pursuits. Instead of the truth of the whale, they argue with Melville in Mo-
by-Dick the possibility “that there is no meaning to the universe hidden 
behind its surface events, that the surface events themselves—contradic-
tory and mysterious and multiple as they may be—are nevertheless all the 
meaning there is.” Mehevi and Marnoo, with their easily revealed ruses of 
self-presentation, comprehend the importance and sufficiency of the sur-
face. Dreyfus and Kelly find this stance in Ishmael’s ability “to live in these 
surface meanings and find a genuine range of joys and comforts there, with-
out wishing they stood for something more.”41 The allure of exploring Mel-
ville’s ability to dwell at the surface—rather than a transcendent level—as a 
religious question is strong, and it is the line of thought Hawthorne followed 
in his assessment of Melville’s concern with “providence and futurity.” He is 
never passive in his embrace of the contradictory and mysterious: “He can 
neither believe, nor be comfortable in his unbelief; and he is too honest and 
courageous not to try to do one or the other.”42 But Typee suggests that an 
origin of Melville’s embrace of the indeterminate surfaces of everyday expe-
rience was political as well as theological, an outcome of living experience 
in the island polity. What Bryant sees as confusion is indicative of the ways 
in which Melville’s Typee does not respond to, and satisfy, the two-world 
metaphysical framing. Melville lets confusion be. In the travelogue that is 
Typee, Melville reports on living a minority experience among self-satisfied 
actors who are trying to conserve their way of life. As William Spanos claims 
of Moby-Dick and the works that follow it, Typee too “de-structures” the 
Enlightenment comportment Heidegger terms the “age of the world pic-
ture” and reminds us that there are worlds, rather than the world, in which 
we flourish.43 There are many ages, rather than the progressive age—many 
world pictures, rather than the world picture. Letting go of the assump-
tion of progress and allowing, for the moment at least, the hegemony of the 
Typee world, what can we understand? What surfaces meet? How do they 
meet? And how do they fail to cohere? What can we see and not see?
In Typee the mystery of why Toby is allowed to escape and Tommo is 
not remains unresolved. We do know that Toby never gave himself over to 
the world of his captors, and hosts, in the way that Tommo did. Whereas 
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both fear the sudden souring of hospitableness, Toby with vivid supposi-
tions assumes they are being fed so assiduously to be fattened for consump-
tion, and he worries they are being fed “baked baby” (Typee, 116–117). 
Toby is the figure of unreconstructed imperialism in the text. Alternatively, 
Tommo thinks “the horrible character imputed to these Typee appeared 
to me wholly undeserved” (ibid., 119). The absence of violence is the first 
sign that their reputation is strategic, that it is spread to save the Typee 
from the French. This interpretation is further substantiated by Mehevi’s 
concern with “the Franee,” and then later during Marnoo’s visits after Toby 
has fled. Reporting to the Typee on the colonial forces surrounding them, 
Marnoo fell “back into an attitude of lofty command, exhorted the Typee 
to resist these encroachments; reminding them, with a fierce glance of ex-
ultation, that as yet the terror of their name had preserved them from at-
tack, and with a scornful sneer he sketched in ironical terms the wondrous 
intrepidity of the French, who, with five war-canoes and hundreds of men, 
had not dared to assail the naked warriors of their valley” (ibid., 165). So 
it seems Tommo cannot leave and report how wonderful and peaceful the 
Typee actually are. Was letting Toby escape a mistake that will not be made 
again? Or is it something else? Mehevi threatens Marnoo’s life and safety 
for simply asking if Tommo can go; Marnoo’s status would be converted 
from friend to enemy. The aim of their elaborate ruse, the projection of fe-
rocity, is an attempt to conserve their world.
Tommo ultimately escapes, and in large part did so because he made 
good friends with his host the old Marheyo. “When I thought of the loved 
friends who were thousands and thousands of miles from the savage island 
in which I was held captive, when I reflected that my dreadful fate would 
forever be concealed from them, and that with hope deferred they might 
continue to await my return long after my inanimate form had blended with 
the dust of the valley—I could not repress a shudder of anguish” (Typee, 
281). But as he felt this anguish, he was being watched over with sympathy 
by Marheyo, who understood his longing for “home” and “mother.” “Fre-
quently suspending his employment, and noticing my melancholy eye fixed 
upon him, he would raise his hand with a gesture expressive of deep com-
miseration, and then moving towards me slowly would enter on tip-toes, 
fearful of disturbing the slumbering natives, and, taking the fan from my 
hand, would sit before me, swaying it gently to and fro and gazing earnestly 
into my face.” Marheyo saw Tommo’s face. Poised between savage and civi-
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lized—much like Arendt’s thinking ego poised between past and future—
Melville’s protagonist has become of both worlds. He could not be of either 
one or the other.
Just beyond the pi-pi, and disposed in a triangle before the entrance 
of the house, were three magnificent bread-fruit trees. . . . It is strange 
how inanimate objects will twine themselves into our affections, espe-
cially in the hour of affliction. Even now, amidst all the bustle and stir 
of the proud and busy city in which I am dwelling, the image of those 
three trees seems to come as vividly before my eyes as if they were ac-
tually present, and I still feel the soothing quiet pleasure which I then 
had in watching hour after hour their topmost boughs waving in the 
breeze. (Ibid., 282)
He is poised between friends and friends, Pacific island and Ameri-
can city, past and future. Whatever the reason for keeping him captive, his 
friend Marheyo, who saw through his masquerade of happiness, let him 
go when the time came. Their friendship was a point of contact, another 
surface, cutting across and through the strategic surface of the Typee’s de-
fenses. And Tommo tacked, and still tacks even as we read of him now, back 
and forth between revisions of revised past and future longings. There are 
always shadows. A mutual, joint-stock world is never monolithic and always 
the outcome of living, not merely lived, experience.
Conservation and Even Destruction
We have read Melville through Ellison with a focus on Typee, and now let 
us reorient and read Ellison through our reading of Melville’s first novel. 
There we have learned that the pleasures and problems of collectivity are 
not easy surfaces to adventure along or to protect from adventurers. We 
have seen the savages resist the civilized with cultivated strategies. And 
we also know that the Typee were playing in the face of certain defeat. By 
recognizing the cultivation of the islanders before they are colonized, I do 
not mean to suggest that they will not be colonized. The islands will be 
secured by imperial forces. And this is how we American savages advance 
our hopes and prospects now as well. Heavily armed against others and 
among ourselves, we parse friends and enemies internationally and let our-
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selves be made into enemies of each other. It is a wonder that we can make 
friends and act on any sort of interconnectedness. But we do. Consider, for 
example, scenes in Invisible Man—during a riot—that replay the reversals 
of status Tommo experiences as guest and as captive of the Typee. I want to 
suggest that the protagonist’s “hibernation”—his remove from the ordinary 
presumptions of his world—begins in these passages rather than with the 
move underground. These events knock him out of time and space. He will 
tack back and forth between leading and being led and be surprised by 
his own demotion to equality with those he has been trying to help. When 
the assumptions of progress supporting such hierarchies are relaxed, just 
as when Tommo’s were, the meanings of actions are transfigured and the 
dominated find moments in which to rule. The presumed leader learns to 
follow by learning to see that which was formerly concealed. Citizens meet 
as citizens.
The riot is precipitated by the death of a black youth who was a leader 
in the Brotherhood but had left the party. Clifton was shot while resisting 
arrest. The protagonist delivers a speech at his funeral that helps incite Har-
lem, and the chaos reveals to him—as the youth must have realized—that 
the party had been using its black members for other “revolutionary” ends. 
Whatever the party’s plans and prospects, Harlem explodes.
Stumbling into the melee, the protagonist is grazed by a bullet and 
befriended by a man in the crowd, Scofield, who tells him: “Man, you lucky 
you ain’t dead. These sonsabitches is really shooting now.” He “looked at 
the thin man, feeling a surge of friendship. He didn’t know me, his help 
was disinterested.”44 Scofield gets him a drink and takes him along looting 
with a group of men who know each other. And there the protagonist meets 
Dupre. “He was a man who nothing in my life taught me to see, to under-
stand, or respect, a man outside the scheme until now.”45 Dupre is a man 
who is very able—at leading and at doing—and he is seizing his chance. He 
does not fit the protagonist’s progressive vision of the American dream. He 
is a poor man, with hope and a plan despite limited prospects—invisible to 
the protagonist of the novel until now. The protagonist has to give up his 
own advancement, his status, to see. The friends are grabbing shirts and 
“Dobbs hats.” They are looting as if it were “a praiseworthy act,” to recall 
the Marquesans pilfering from the Europeans (Typee, 236). And then the 
plan is proposed.
“Dupre looked down at me and kicked something—a pound of butter, 
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sending it smearing across the hot street. ‘We fixing to do something what 
needs to be done,’ he said. ‘First we get a flashlight for everybody. . . . And 
let’s have some organization, y’all. Don’t everybody be running over ev-
erybody else. Come on!’” They are going to burn down the tenement they 
live in. “I felt no need to lead or to leave them,” the protagonist tells us; he 
“was glad to follow, was gripped by the need to see where and to what they 
would lead.”46 They were acting in concert. They all took buckets of “coal 
oil,” kerosene, and went to the building outfitted with their flashlights. De-
spite being trained to lead by the Brotherhood, the protagonist tells us: “It 
didn’t occur to me to interfere or to question. They had a plan.” And they 
were going to see it through to the end. “Already I could see the women and 
children coming down the steps.”47 Dupre’s pregnant wife tries to stop him 
and the others, but he refuses her. “‘Now git on out the way, Lottie,’ he said 
patiently. ‘Why you have to start this now? We done been all over it and you 
know I ain’t go’n change. . . . My kid died of the t-bees in that death trap, but 
I bet a man ain’t no more go’n be born in there,’ he said.”48 They had a small 
and ultimately doomed hope and prospect, but they acted nonetheless. The 
tragedy of the action is not to be denied here. They destroyed their home. 
But they did so triumphantly.
After helping them, the protagonist runs off thinking he needs to stop 
the Brotherhood. He still believes that they planned and are in some way 
exercising control of the riot. Despite the spontaneous organization that he 
sees unfolding before his eyes, he is still caught up in and trying to make 
sense of a narrative of history unfolding. He is in a new world, but still of his 
former world. He is happy and exhilarated by this unexpected encounter, 
but he cannot let himself capitulate to it. He thinks the Brotherhood would 
let Harlem burn for their ends, and that is probably the case. But Harlem 
was already ready to explode. When the protagonist was grasping to under-
stand what was happening, what was going on, Dupre tried to school him 
out of his overschooled immaturity: “‘Damn who started it,’ Dupre said. ‘All 
I want is for it to last for a while. . . . Don’t nobody know how it started,’ 
Dupre said. ‘Somebody has to know,’ I said.”49
But Dupre is right. Again, the putative primitive has read the surfaces 
of possibility and acted on them. A world-historical perspective does not 
have to be ready to hand. The rioters do not need to have knowledge of the 
precise spur to action. There are many spurs waiting to aggravate, and the 
actors are ready to reveal who they are and disclose their world, even if to 
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do so requires destruction. They spoke. Ellison’s adventurer heard them. 
And as he joins with them in the event, in the moment, he learns to unlearn, 
as Tommo did among the Typee. The rioters each and all manifested their 
humanity and acted collectively. As citizens, they briefly saw each other’s 
faces.
Uncertainty frustrates, and I have purposefully aggravated the reader of 
this essay by narrating rather than defining dissipation of the assumption 
of progress in Melville’s and Ellison’s texts. But I could not have done oth-
erwise in this attempt to delineate the functions of progress in encounters 
between “the savage” and “the civilized.” To embrace dissipation is to em-
brace dispersal—multiple and overlapping perspectives, movement across 
surfaces—and I did not want to lie by pretending an Archimedean remove 
at odds with my own argument. The assumption of progress is pervasive 
and relentless in our thinking and practices, and we cannot simply grab hold 
of it and escort it offstage. Instead, we have explored master narratives of 
progress and seen them unhinged. We have found smaller and innumerable 
assumptions of progress at issue as well: we hope and act, succeed and fail, 
and try again. Melville’s protagonist did not find the primitives he expected, 
and Ellison’s protagonist was not able to lead after all. Both are upended by 
the dominance of those whom they initially assume to be their inferiors. But 
without insisting on the richness of the impoverished lives of Dupre and 
Scofield, and without insisting on the cultivation of the savages Mehevi and 
Marheyo and Marnoo, we do not see and hear them. Can we go so far as to 
see “their” modernity in competition with “our” modernity? If the reader 
cannot envision Melville’s savages as moderns, and see Ellison’s destructive 
looters as citizens, let me then define this blindness as the assumption of 
progress this essay targets.
I am not thinking here of Ahab’s modernity, which strives to find a god-
like truth with final answers to replace the tattered Christian God, but a 
perspectival modernism granted us as gift by the recession from the world 
of God as guarantor. Machiavelli and Nietzsche are the canonical emissar-
ies of this perspectivism, but Arendt, Dreyfus and Kelly, Spanos, Ellison, 
and Melville explore this modernity as a world of possibilities to be indulged 
rather than—or at least as well as—feared. Whereas Dreyfus and Kelly 
ascribe a pantheism to Melville, I have argued that he presents us with a 
rigorous temporal and ultimately spatial pluralism. To unhinge assumptions 
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of progress is to change the ways we think and act. And Melville’s experi-
ence in the Typee polity, related to us through the adventures of Tommo, 
disrupted his assumptions of hierarchy and hegemony. Taboo emerges on 
this perspectival reading as simply saying no as all cultures say no to some-
thing. Tommo’s refusal to be tattooed, too, is simply saying no.50 From the 
perspective of the South Seas as center of the world, Queequeg’s selective 
engagement with Christianity is a parallel example. He left Father Mapple’s 
chapel before the benediction and returned to his room to worship his own 
idol (Moby-Dick, 831, 846–849).
Melville does not describe an elementary relativism, nor does Ellison, 
in which we are either in one world or in another. The surfaces of past and 
future, old and new, meet and create new surfaces when we are in multiple 
worlds of revelation and concealment, of shadow and of act. By insisting on 
the modernity of the Typee, I do not want to suggest that we erase colonial-
ism, as if a world-historical reverse-discrimination argument is in order. Op-
pression happened and is happening. But if we savages are to help ourselves, 
we need to take the equality of the other, and thus each other, as at least 
the thought of a possibility. We have to embrace the fact that we are domi-
nated, and that we dominate, when we act in concert. Acting on that would 
be an act of democratic maturity: an end we can sketch the beginnings of 
among the not-yet-colonized Typee and in Ellison’s well-ordered mob. Such 
acts could separate out, for a moment at least, the principles and practices 
of republics in contrast to the actualities of empires. Perhaps we could then 
consciously and deliberatively, even if provisionally, decide what we want to 
conserve and what we want to destroy. Compared to the passive sacrifice of 
ourselves and others to the “progressive” flow of so many haphazardly pos-
ited American futures, that might be mortarkee.
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3Chasing the Whale
Moby-Dick as Political Theory
George Shulman
What we notice in stories is the nearness of the wound to the gift.
—Jeanette Winterston
My aspiration in this essay is to read Melville’s Moby-Dick; or, The Whale as 
a work of—not simply as a supplement to—political theory. By its dramatic 
form and content, Moby-Dick tells a story about politics and about theory; 
and through it, so will I.1 Just as ancient tragedians were interlocutors to the 
polis, dramatizing inescapable heteronomy, haunting pasts, and irremedi-
able conflict to a community avowing self-rule, so Melville retells dominant 
romances of liberal emancipation and national redemption as tragedy-in-
the-making. Whereas Sophocles created an alter-city—what James Baldwin 
called a disagreeable mirror—Melville is among American literary artists 
who conjure fictional worlds elsewhere—on a whaling ship or a raft—to il-
luminate enigmas closer to home. His novel exalts what he calls “democratic 
dignity” while dramatizing what prevailing political rhetoric of democratic 
self-rule finds unspeakable: American freedom is premised on multiple 
forms of domination and forgetting. But he composes a tragedy because his 
depiction of derangement in the American practice of democracy includes 
the paradox that democratic aspirations are inherently entangled in the risk 
of domination. Though theorists often assume celebratory or critical posi-
tions toward the democratic, and so cannot engage what is complex and 
poignant in its meaning, Melville avowedly remakes tragedy to enact what 
is noble, horrific, and self-defeating in the project of political self-rule.
I do not think Moby-Dick is only a tragedy; it is truly a genre-busting 
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work, but I emphasize how it is an “alter-world,” like Thebes in Greek trag-
edy, a fictional space or place at once related to and removed from “reality,” 
in which to stage a tragedy—at once modern and American—of democratic 
dignity. Like works of canonical political theory, therefore, it should be seen 
not as a direct representation of the social world, but as a form of mediation 
by which a political community can reflect on its core axioms, constitutive 
practices, and fateful decisions, and so also as an artful speech act. Such acts 
are fraught because they engage audiences whose background conditions—
cultural grammars and historical traumas—are disavowed, unspoken. This 
is why rationalist approaches to persuasion fail, and why experiments with 
fiction and genre matter to political theory. For as readers professing demo-
cratic ideals are positioned as witnesses of tragedy in an alter-world, they 
can identify with and yet gain distance from its characters and the fate they 
coauthor, and in this way readers may reflect on their own history and nar-
rative horizon, circumstances, and choices.2
By attending not only to what is said by characters and narrator, but 
also to how the text orients readers, we can see Melville reshape tragedy 
for a democratic (and American) audience. Characters can and do argue 
perspectives, but the novel personifies and enacts arguments in ways that 
viscerally render their pathos and meaning. Moreover, while characters 
speak in the unequivocal terms of prophecy, the text creates experiences of 
fraught ambiguity; readers must credit the inescapability of the questions 
that characters ask, the credibility of their answers—and how they create a 
tragedy. In sum, my central intuition is that the text does not so much philo-
sophically advocate a “tragic perspective” on politics or life as dramatize a 
“tragedy” its audience blindly coauthors.3
This distinction between the tragic and tragedy warrants further intro-
duction here, though I must earn it by the reading that follows. We should 
begin with the inherited meanings of the genre of “tragedy” that Melville 
revises: it dramatizes the nobility and defeat of human efforts to know or 
master their world, the elemental powers suffusing it, or themselves as sub-
jects. For Nietzsche tragedy is thus the “Apollonian” form by which citizens, 
having contacted the senseless power of “Dionysian” energies, are enabled 
to affirm art, boundaries, and action in new ways. In Plato’s Republic re-
gimes thus are ruined by an excess of their animating eros—freedom in 
democracy—whereas for Aristotle tragic heroes are destroyed by a flaw 
inseparable from their virtue. In Hegel, tragedy dramatizes how conflict-
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ing values or rival gods divide cities and dismember protagonists, because 
choosing one means grievous loss of another. The genre also defeats a dem-
ocratic and enlightenment “romance” of mastering temporality: tragedy de-
nies the pastness of a past that instead haunts the present. In each regard 
we can imagine Aristotle’s hope that tragedy yields catharsis of “pity and 
terror” about the vita activa.
It is no wonder, therefore, that Melville takes up tragedy to drama-
tize the vicissitudes of democratic dignity, but among academics a genre 
that creates certain experiences—of conflict, excess, haunting, and self-
destruction—has become a philosophic perspective. As Eric Bentley noted 
fifty years ago, “In the twentieth century there has been a tendency to 
dehydrate tragedy and make of it an ideological scheme only, a ‘tragic view 
of life.’ As such it has advocates, and the scheme of thought reveals itself as 
a mere polemic: the idea of tragedy is being used as a stick to beat some-
one with. In America that someone is usually the Liberal . . . accused of 
undue rationalism and optimism.” The tragic is thus a rhetorical device 
in literary and theoretical polemics that includes readings of Moby-Dick 
by cold war and more recent literary critics. I will dispute them because 
Bentley’s deeper point inspires me: “the tragic” is a kind of “knowingness” 
that forecloses the experiences dramatically rendered in and as tragedy; 
“the tragic” is a conclusion about the meaning of a structure of experience 
called tragedy, though the genre does not dictate the lesson of the experi-
ences it performs but releases audiences to the burden and freedom of 
judgment and action.4
It may seem impossible to “dehydrate” a whaling story, but we do if 
we make it “an ideological scheme only.” For even readers who call it a 
tragedy typically juxtapose a pathological Ahab and an admirable Ishmael, 
who models the democratic values that Ahab only betrays. Some cold war 
critics thus made Ahab personify the ideological extremist or totalitar-
ian and identified Ishmael with a pluralism tied to the democratic—and 
“American.” For others, Ahab embodied “destructive Emersonianism” as 
an excess linked to American individualism. Later, Ahab personified the 
ugly truth of Promethean modernism, Enlightenment rationalism, mascu-
line aggression, American nationalism, or ideas of (even democratic) sov-
ereignty, which must mean domination. Since 9/11, some likewise argue, 
the national subject became a wounded Ahab, symbolized a monstrous evil 
threatening freedom, and organized politics as a crusade to kill it. In con-
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trast, critics repeatedly take Ishmael to model a needed—even redemp-
tive—turn toward an ethos of finitude valuing the ordinary, horizontal, 
proximate, local.
In my reading, Melville does not condemn Ahab to endorse Ishmael, 
partly because he does not resolve the meaning of the other key character, 
the whale. By making it a symbol both of nature’s ambivalent meaning and 
(after Hobbes) of reified human power, he depicts Ahab’s “monomania” 
both as mad and as a valid expression of “democratic dignity” opposing 
the powers—cosmic and political—that injure it. No wonder a crew of 
“renegades and castaways” identify with his injury and rage and embrace 
his plot to kill the whale.5 Together they dramatize not only how American 
nationalism takes imperial form, or only the bond between Lockean lib-
eralism and the crusades against despotic power that recurrently organize 
American politics, but also how admirable desires for freedom (and justice) 
are readily enmeshed in domination. Ahab models not only an imperial or 
Promethean pathology we can avoid or overcome, but a democratic para-
dox we must undergo. That is because he performs aspects of democratic 
politics and theorizing that are at once crucial and dangerous: he sym-
bolizes objects that threaten democratic values and practices, he creates 
plots to imagine opposition, he affirms aggression, and he seeks to mobilize 
counter-sovereignty.
If I risk a certain perversity in defending Ahab, my rejoinder is that 
splitting Ahab and Ishmael means choosing Ahab’s dichotomizing mode of 
practicing theory and politics. The only real alternative to the pathologies 
represented by Ahab—for they are real dangers—is to own and rework, 
not disavow, the suffering, longings, ambitions, and arts he personifies. To 
read the novel not as a melodrama, or as a philosophic treatise defending 
a single (even “tragic”) point of view, but as a tragedy is to experience the 
mutually constituting tension between “Ahab” and “Ishmael” as modali-
ties of democratic life, at once incommensurate and necessary. By making 
every position plausible and problematic, the text leaves readers not with 
a self-evident message, but with a challenge of political judgment for how 
we theorize our circumstances and make them conditions of action. Posi-
tioned as witnesses of a tragedy, we are called to judge if we are enacting 
what we witness, and if so, what choices remain in our hands. Moby-Dick 
enacts and so bequeaths the difficulties in conceiving and practicing dem-
ocratic dignity.6
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Forms of Address: Between Job and Ishmael
To see how Moby-Dick engenders an experiential apprehension of tragedy 
in American political life, let us begin with how the novel addresses readers: 
in the final epigraph we are addressed by the survivor, who informs Job that 
all he values is lost; but this messenger becomes the narrator, who begins, 
“Call me Ishmael.” Framing the novel, these forms of address position read-
ers in a tragedy. We must begin at the end to understand the beginning.
As the Pequod sinks, we are told of a grand gesture of human defiance: 
Tashtego, the Indian harpooner, perches on a topmast, “his red arm and a 
hammer hovered backwardly uplifted in the open air, in the act of nailing 
[Ahab’s] flag faster and yet faster to the subsiding spar.” A sky hawk “taunt-
ingly” pecks at the flag, but its wing is caught by his hammer, so that “the bird 
of heaven, with archangelic shrieks, and his imperial beak thrust upwards, 
and his whole captive form folded in the flag of Ahab, went down with his 
ship, which, like Satan, would not sink to hell till she had dragged a living 
part of heaven along with her.” But then we witness human insignificance: 
“now small fowls flew screaming over the yet yawning gulf; a sullen white 
surf beat against its steep sides; then all collapsed, and the great shroud of 
the sea rolled on as it rolled five thousand years ago” (636–637). We have 
been prepared to feel disturbed by human evanescence and futility, inspired 
by defiance until the end, and maybe satisfied by the symmetry that Ahab’s 
predatory (modern, imperial, masculine, American) ship is sunk by its prey. 
Perhaps we take both pleasure and relief in the idea that the apocalyptic end, 
which Ahab sought, has arrived for us to witness. But of course this end is not 
the end; we read an epilogue whose epigraph quotes the book of Job—“And 
I only am escaped alone to tell thee”—as if to refuse oblivion the last word.7
This epigraph makes the end a beginning, for readers holding the book 
are addressed here by that messenger; we are positioned here as Job, given 
the message of catastrophic loss that initiates his grief, rage, and struggle 
with his god. The sinking is to initiate our own Jobian moment, as if our 
own world were lost with that ship, even while we survive. The novel ex-
plicitly invokes the biblical text closest to Greek tragedy, but this reference 
also connects readers to Ahab, who has been modeled as a Job figure. The 
catastrophic consequences of his response to his own grievous injury, it is 
suggested here, now initiate our own Jobian crisis, if we accept the novel 
as a message. But how to construe it? To grasp Ahab’s theory about suffer-
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ing, his defiant plotting, and the destruction he causes, to see how we are 
implicated, and to imagine how we might depart from his fate, we need to 
see how he echoes and yet departs from Job.8
Despite Christian efforts to moralize the text, Job vividly rejects the He-
brew theodicy that, by construing human suffering as punishment for sin, 
justifies God. Though a theodicy thus “humanizes” creation by attuning it to 
human aspirations for sense and justice, Job insists that God is indifferent to 
humans. But he also regrets and resents his life, wishing he had not been born. 
Granting his demand for an encounter, God speaks “out of the whirlwind”:
Do you dare to deny my judgment?
Am I wrong because you are right?
Is your arm like the arm of God? . . .
Unleash your savage justice.
Cut down the rich and mighty . . .
Pluck the wicked from their perch.
Push them into the grave.
Throw them, screaming to hell.
Then I will admit that your own strength can save you. . . .
Will you catch the Serpent [“Leviathan” in the King James version]
with a fishhook . . .
Will he come to terms of surrender
and promise to be your slave? . . .
Will merchants bid for his carcass
and parcel him out to shops?
Will you riddle his skin with spears,
split his head with harpoons?
Go ahead: attack him:
you will never try it again.
Look: hope is a lie:
you would faint at the very sight of him . . .
Who under all the heavens could fight against him and live?
. . . Power beats in his neck,
and terror dances before him. . . .
No one on earth is his equal—a creature without fear.
He looks down on the highest.
He is king over all the proud beasts.9
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   75 10/29/13   10:57 AM
76  George Shulman
God’s leviathan here symbolizes the divine and demonic power of a 
creator and creation whose aliveness are “beyond good and evil,” inscruta-
ble, and indifferent to human longings for justice. God’s performance (and 
the poet’s ravishing poetry) affirms this boundlessly creative power, but also 
the validity of Job’s protest. Like Greek tragedy, the text enacts conflict 
between human (political) and divine (aesthetic, ontological) perspectives, 
incommensurate yet crucial to value.10
Melville represents Ahab as Job’s heir in his anguish and outraged 
protest at an inhuman universe. In his famous review, “Hawthorne and 
His Mosses,” Melville noted how “philosophers” devalued Shakespeare as 
“merely a dramatist,” when his “dark” characters reveal “the very axis of re-
ality” by “insinuating the things we feel to be so terrifically true that it were 
all but madness for any good man, in his own proper character, to utter or 
even hint of.” As King Lear, “tormented into desperation . . . tears off the 
mask and speaks the sane madness of vital truth,” so Ahab, maybe imitat-
ing Hamlet, addresses a whale head: “You have seen such horrors as would 
make Abraham an infidel”—as if to mock any ethical rationalism. Musing 
that “the ancestry and posterity of Grief go further than the ancestry and 
posterity of Joy,” he imagines that if we “trail the genealogies of . . . high 
mortal miseries” to reach “the sourceless primogenitures of the gods,” we 
will see “that the gods themselves are not for ever glad. The ineffaceable, 
sad birth-mark in the brow of man, is but the stamp of sorrow in the sign-
ers” (519). Ishmael affirms this melancholy wisdom: “The mortal man who 
hath more of joy than sorrow in him, that mortal man cannot be true—not 
true, or undeveloped” (477). Against an emerging utilitarian culture, Ahab 
invokes the persisting capacity for violent harm, and what we still call “de-
praved indifference,” in nature and human affairs.11
But between Job and Ahab stands the modernity of Hobbes and Marx, 
who signal how Ahab departs from Job. For they took up God’s challenge to 
Job: saving themselves by “their own right arm,” by poesis and praxis, they 
become modern Prometheans who displace God. After Hobbes, leviathan 
signifies not natural-sacred alterity, but the state as a reified institution and 
imagined community, “the political body” as an invented compact, an arti-
fact open to remaking or failure. It is an object of fantasy inside us, as we are 
inside it as a worldly power authored by us yet independent of our will. The 
“reality” of this whale is both intersubjectively constituted and recalcitrantly 
other, at once a material object and fantastic fiction, whose estranged power 
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and charged meaning elicit and organize our love and hate. In turn, then, 
Marx protests how human beings “become the playthings of alien power” 
lodged in gods, states, and capital; they must reclaim the power they alien-
ate to the worldly leviathans they author. Because redemption means killing 
the whales in which they mistakenly misplace their sovereignty, they must 
proudly affirm their equality and aggression to forge a counter-sovereignty.
Melville’s Ishmael announces this faith early on, for as he surveys the 
crew and officers to suggest why no one stopped—and so many embraced—
Ahab’s hijacking of the ship, he openly positions us toward the aspirations 
and disaster he will render. The first mate, Starbuck, is a truly decent man, 
but his “sort of bravery . . . cannot withstand those more terrific, because 
more spiritual terrors, which sometimes menace you from the concentrat-
ing brow of an enraged and mighty man.” If Ishmael here notes “the incom-
petence of mere unaided virtue or right-mindedness,” he also grants how 
the crew is “morally enfeebled” by the other two officers (222). “Scarce 
might I have the heart” to depict such “sorrowful; nay shocking” failure, he 
says, but “man, in the ideal, is so noble, and so sparkling, such a grand and 
glowing creature, that over any ignominious blemish in him all his fellows 
should run to throw their costliest robes.” Though men “seem detestable as 
joint-stock companies and nations . . . that immaculate manliness we feel 
within ourselves . . . remains intact though all outer character seems gone” 
(146).
This “we” comprises only men, whose sense of dignity is masculinized 
as he celebrates not “the dignity of kings and robes, but that abounding 
dignity which has no robed investiture. Thou shalt see it shining in the arm 
that wields a pick or drives a spike; that democratic dignity which, on all 
hands, radiates without end from God; Himself! The great God absolute! 
The center and circumference of all democracy! His omnipresence, our di-
vine equality!”(146). Equality is here incarnated as an inherent dignity in 
those lacking other “investiture.” Or, rather, this god of equality dignifies 
those without title to rule by birth, wealth, or learning, and so also dignifies 
any aspect of life deemed ordinary, not only labor.12
Ishmael prays that he can imbue a “shaggy” Ahab and “mongrel” crew 
with the stature of tragedy because he, too, worships equality:
If, then, to meanest mariners, and renegades, and castaways, I shall 
hereafter ascribe high qualities, though dark; weave around them trag-
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ic graces if even the most mournful, perchance the most abased among 
them all shall at times lift himself to the exalted mounts; if I shall touch 
that workman’s arm with some ethereal light; if I shall spread a rain-
bow over his disastrous set of sun; then against all mortal critics bear 
me out in it, thou just Spirit of Equality, which has spread one royal 
mantle of humanity over all my kind! Bear me out . . . thou great demo-
cratic God! who didst not refuse to the swart convict, Bunyan, the pale 
poetic pearl; Thou who didst clothe with doubly hammered leaves of 
finest gold the stumped and paupered arm of old Cervantes; Thou who 
didst pick up Andrew Jackson from the pebbles . . . [and] thunder him 
higher than a throne! Thou who, in all thy mighty earthly marchings, 
ever cullest thy selectest champion from the kingly commons, bear me 
out in it, O God! (146–147)13
Ishmael here invokes the iconography of Jesus, and the examples of Bu-
nyan and Cervantes on the one hand, and of Andrew Jackson on the other 
hand, to exemplify “election” by the “great democratic God” of equality. 
Ahab and Ishmael as narrator are such “champions” culled from the “kingly 
commons.” Despite grievous flaws, they champion the “abounding dignity” 
in people and practices devalued by aristocratic prejudice, bourgeois pro-
priety, or hierarchical discourse. Ishmael thus writes to “bear out” a god 
who affirms what is “grand and glowing” in human beings, to entitle and 
encourage them to dispute distinctions of rank, presumptions of incapacity, 
and expectations of both possibility and impossibility. He must dramatize 
an excess he links to false prophecy, and the failure in “valor” of those who 
succumb to it, yet in a way that affirms their faith in equality.
Imagine, then, that Melville casts his Ahab as the heir of Job: he sur-
vives traumatic injury, denies it was random bad luck, and links God to evil, 
but this “grand, ungodly god-like man” also plots defiant, violent action to 
vindicate democratic dignity. He is thus an avatar of anti-theist (democratic, 
revolutionary) modern politics, and the Hebrew king whose insatiable de-
sire for land and power symbolizes the self-destruction of a chosen people. 
In both regards, the epigraph implies that our own world went down with 
the Pequod. But if we digest how Ahab departed from Job, and how he is 
a “representative man” for us, we might imagine how to depart from him. 
That depends on analyzing the identity of the messenger and the form of 
his message.
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By luck, Ishmael had witnessed from a distance how the ship, smashed 
by Moby Dick, was sucked down in a vortex, and he was saved when it 
ejected the coffin that his lover, Queequeg, had once made. Floating on it, 
the survivor says he was picked up by the “devious-cruising” Rachel, whose 
name evokes the wife of Jacob, the patriarch renamed Israel. Jeremiah calls 
Israel a “Rachel” weeping for her children when they are exiled to Babylon 
by a just God punishing their idolatrous infidelity. The epilogue concludes 
by noting how that ship “only found another orphan.” This last word in 
Moby-Dick mirrors its first words, “Call me Ishmael.”
But who is Ishmael? He was Abraham’s first son, conceived with the 
bondswoman Hagar when Sarah was barren but cast out of the household 
without Abraham’s blessing. As his name means “God will hear,” he is 
saved from dying in the wilderness by God’s angel, who says both that he 
will found a nation and that he will be a “wild” man whose “hand shall be 
against every man, and every man’s hand shall be against him.” The Bible 
links him to Canaanites and Egyptians, whereas Isaac, conceived by Sarah, 
gains the blessing as the next founding father of God’s “chosen people.” In 
America whites call themselves Isaacs; as the chosen people and good sons 
of Founding Fathers, they claim title to dispossess or enslave others they 
call Ishmael.
So when the narrator says, “Call me Ishmael,” he implicitly addresses 
readers as Isaacs and offers a counteridentification. Partly, he signals that he 
stands with—or in ethnographic humility, not against—the pagans, “savag-
es,” and “cannibals” whose polytheistic worship Isaacs call idolatry. Partly, 
he signals rejection of the white supremacy that ranks white over red and 
black. Partly, he signals affirmation of aspects of human being that the en-
franchised associate with those they cast out: wild, savage, and inscrutable 
are words he repeats like a mantra, as if to remind us of what and not only 
whom Issacs disavow, just as his wedding to Queequeg denies their sexual 
norms. Lastly, members of the two dominant American political parties 
(Whig and Democrat) called those who formed antislavery third parties 
Ishmaelites. Agonal by chosen name, our narrator stands with those cast out 
by ruling conventions, though he resists idealizing a counterworship. Af-
firming “doubt of all things earthly and intuitions of some things heavenly,” 
he is “neither believer nor infidel but a man who regards both with equal 
eye” (423).
The messenger addressing Job at the end has renamed himself Ishmael 
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and begins his story by positioning readers as Isaacs, to whom he offers not 
an emancipatory national romance, we come to realize, but the testimony 
of the sole survivor of a catastrophe. His text of witness makes us witness 
the destruction of an American whaling ship and its monomaniac captain, 
American officers, and multinational crew. If his testimony succeeds, we 
will have learned what is at stake: the meaning and fate of a self-declared 
democracy allied, maybe fatally, with slavery, imperial expansion, and an 
industrial civilization in violent war with nature.
His testimony is not accusing, however, but reparative and reconstruc-
tive; as we can grasp only at the end, he writes to make meaningful and 
to come to terms with a catastrophe he participated in making, was trans-
formed by undergoing, and miraculously survived. Partly, then, his testi-
mony tries to understand and make credible what he calls the “monomania” 
of Ahab and the support of a crew, including his earlier self. Partly, he 
represents the experiences that altered his assumptions about life and the 
Christian-capitalist civilization that enfranchised him. In sum, he narrates 
the transformation he signals by addressing us as Ishmael, as if to show how 
identification is not a sign of fated ethnoracial descent, but a political choice 
to resist or rework prevailing our inherited or presumed subjectivity. Read-
ers who identify as elect may, in turn, claim Ahab’s story as their own and 
perform their own shift from lucky survivor to critical witness.14
But the epigraph announcing destruction to Job can be construed in 
two different ways. By one interpretation, there is consolation, and other 
more obvious political resources, in the idea of a survivor and his testimony. 
For if catastrophe could not be averted in the story, in the world beyond the 
text a prophetic witness, who testifies to the danger of self-destruction by a 
republic bent on empire and invested in slavery, and who models a saving 
counteridentification, suggests the possibility of forestalling what otherwise 
will be a fate we coauthor. By a reading perhaps more faithful to the Job 
poem and the genre of tragedy, however, the catastrophe already has hap-
pened. We are summoned not to forestall it, but to accept its irreversible 
actuality as the condition of action now.15
After World War I, for example, D. H. Lawrence claimed that Moby-
Dick announced the self-destruction of the European tradition of “ideal-
istic half-ness” that, in religious and secular forms, separated spirit from 
matter, soul from body, and subject from object. Until we accept that the 
European project has died, and by our own hand in pursuing it, he argues, 
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we will produce “post-mortem effects” rather than a new form of life. Sim-
ilarly, Tocqueville had addressed French aristocrats, and James Baldwin 
would address whites, about refusing to face the end of regimes that enfran-
chised only them. Postmortem effects are counterrevolution and fascism in 
Europe, and culture war and defensive nationalism in the United States. 
For each critic, a possibility for new possibilities requires making “doom” a 
condition of action.16
But Melville, by contrast, simply depicts a textual sinking whose am-
biguous worldly meaning—has it happened or can it be averted in the world 
beyond the text?—is not resolved. This ambiguity contrasts with his char-
acters, who speak forms of prophecy. Ahab announces both Moby-Dick’s 
certain meaning and that his plot of revenge will succeed. “The prophecy 
was that I should be dismembered; and —Aye! I lost this leg. I now proph-
esy that I will dismember my dismemberer.” Calling himself “the prophet 
and the fulfiller,” he boasts “that’s more than ye, ye great gods, ever were” 
(201–202). His confidence mirrors Elijah, who prophesies Ahab’s wounding 
and his death, and Father Mapple, who praises prophets for resisting evil 
no matter the cost. Granted, Ahab is a Promethean who claims a power (to 
fulfill prophecy) that Elijah and Mapple must leave to their God. But the 
issue of false prophecy goes to the core of politics: can audiences (the crew, 
or readers of the book) judge unequivocal yet opposing prophecies that de-
fine the whale, announce what time it is, and declare what is to be done? If 
forms of prophetic address foreclose gaps between word and world, inten-
tion and act, present and future, event and its meaning, Melville reopens 
them through testimony whose meaning, enigmatic as the whale, we must 
decipher and compose but cannot complete. Such testimony is given form 
as a tragedy; for as Charles Olson claims, Ishmael is less a narrator than “the 
chorus through whom Ahab’s tragedy is seen.”17
Framing the Tragedy: Fates, Scripts, and Protagonists
Looking back, Ishmael speaks as a witness, but he uses metaphors from 
drama to voice his questions about the meaning of his voyage. He imagines 
the world as a stage and presumes that motives are embedded in scripts and 
so in fates: he jokes, “Doubtless, my going on this whaling voyage formed 
part of the grand programme of Providence that was drawn up a long time 
ago” (29). He imagines the poster:
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Grand Contested Election for Presidency of the United States.
WHALING VOYAGE BY ONE ISHMAEL.
BLOODY BATTLE IN AFFGHANISTAN.
We are struck by its uncanny timeliness—our era also seems framed by a 
disputed presidential election and war in Afghanistan, while a monoma-
niacal crusade mediates the global and national. Calling “the Fates” “stage 
managers,” he wonders why they “put me down for this shabby part in a 
whaling voyage,” but adds, “I think I can see a little into the springs and 
motives which being cunningly presented to me under various disguises, 
induced me to set about performing the part I did, besides cajoling me into 
the delusion that it was a choice resulting from my own unbiased freewill 
and discriminating judgment” (29).
One “motive” is escaping a “damp drizzly November in my soul,” which 
was so bad that going to sea “is my substitute for pistol and ball,” as if life on 
land is a soul death prompting suicide (25). A second is that all humans seem 
attracted to the sea, which he calls “the image of the ungraspable phantom 
of life; and this is the key to it all” (27). A third is “the overwhelming idea 
of the great whale himself. Such a portentous and mysterious monster” em-
bodies a desire to “explore forbidden seas” and “barbarous coasts.” Drawn 
by “wild conceits” of opening “the great flood-gates of the wonder-world” 
(29–30), he would escape the death-in-life of imprisonment on land by en-
acting a pursuit of knowledge. But motives are scripted, and here he voices 
(in highbrow tones) the imperial romance of the frontier myth, which prom-
ises rebirth by contacting the forbidden, savage, and sublime. “America” as 
an imagined community is formed by just this association of alterity with 
freedom: no wonder he imagines his adventure a destiny made manifest! 
As he realizes, this regenerative promise recruits men discontented in the 
father’s house to battles that—as Melville claims about whaling—extend 
the civilization whose imprisoning grip they mean to slip. He thus retells 
as tragedy the myth of new frontiers and the “delusions” of “free will” it 
supports.18
So the Pequod is an American ship, with the same number of crew-
men as states, and its nation-building project subverts the distinctions—be-
tween civilized and savage, free and slave—that authorize it. As the Pequot 
tribe, exterminated in King Philip’s War, were infamous for brutality, so 
the crew mans a “cannibal” craft. Each officer commands a whaleboat and 
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   82 10/29/13   10:57 AM
Chasing the Whale 83
harpooner: Starbuck of New England directs Queequeg, a Pacific Island-
er; short, chubby Stubb, a Southerner, stands on the shoulders of Dagoo, 
an African; and Flask, a Westerner, commands Tashtego, an Indian. The 
1846 Mexican War thus joined northern and southern wings of Jacksonian 
“democracy” to pursue what Alan Heimert calls “the imperial sublime,” 
an “image of greatness” appealing to “the American passion for the grand, 
the vast, and the marvelous.” As the Pacific replaces the prairie, whaling 
ships—“sweatshops of the Pacific,” says Charles Olson—prefigure the in-
dustrialization and worldwide extension of American power. An ordinary 
voyage thus mediates geopolitics and national elections; because his per-
sonal choices bespeak (and then expose) the myth of freedom offered by 
his industrializing Christian culture, Ishmael’s minor role takes him to the 
deranged center of American life.19
Melville makes a tragedy from the avowedly “shabby”—in the words of 
Tocqueville, “petty and paltry” as well as “anti-poetic”—stuff of democracy. 
When Ishmael muses, “Ahab, my captain, still moves before me in all his 
Nantucket grimness and shagginess,” he promises, “I must not conceal that 
I have only to do with a poor old whale-hunter like him; and, therefore, all 
outward majestical trappings and housings are denied me. Oh, Ahab, what 
shall be grand in thee” must be “plucked at from the skies, and dived for in 
the deep, and featured in the unbodied air!” But what is “grand” in a cham-
pion culled from the common (179)?20
First are “over-bearing” qualities of mind and a “determinate, unsur-
rendurable wilfulness, in the fixed and fearless, forward dedication of that 
glance” (155). Second, he speaks for the core faith of “the democracy,” as 
Jacksonians called it. That means, says Ahab, “I’d strike the sun if it in-
sulted me. For could the sun do that, then could I do the other; since there 
is ever a sort of fair play herein, jealousy presiding over all creations. But 
not my master . . . is even that fair play. Who’s over me? Truth hath no 
confines” (197). Though immersed in the “impersonal, a personality stands 
here. Though but a point at best . . . yet while I earthly live, the queenly 
personality lives in me, and feels her royal rights” (563). Therefore, “not 
white whale, nor man nor fiend can so much as graze old Ahab in his own 
proper and inaccessible being” (623). Because he affirms the striving to 
persevere in all things but refuses to revere any limit (even fairness) to a 
freedom he deems regal, his sense of entitlement entails a grand—readily 
inflated—sense of grievance at every symbol of limitation. In turn we are 
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led to ask: does his monomania about the whale that injured him therefore 
reflect a hubris inherent in democratic dignity as such? An excess or pa-
thology owing to a contingent, remediable understanding? The ambiguous 
connection between democratic dignity and monomania is thus the basis of 
the tragedy Melville tells.
In the novel’s central chapters Melville uses stage directions and a 
script format (character names, colon, spoken lines) to set a dramatic form 
of scenes, dialogues, and monologues. The “Quarter-Deck” chapter begins 
“Enter Ahab; then all” to stage Ahab recruiting the crew to his project. 
They cry out assent, except Starbuck. “I am game for his crooked jaw, and 
for the jaws of Death, too, Captain Ahab, if it fairly comes in the way of the 
business we follow; but I came here to hunt whales, not my commander’s 
vengeance. How many barrels will thy vengeance yield even if thou gettest 
it, Captain Ahab? It will not fetch thee much in our Nantucket market.” 
Ahab says, “Come closer . . . thou requirest a little lower layer,” and he de-
clares, “If money’s to be the measurer, man, and the accountants have com-
puted their great counting-house the globe, by girdling it with guineas . . . 
then, let me tell thee, that my vengeance will fetch a great premium here,” 
as he “smites his chest.” Starbuck is horrified: “Vengeance on a dumb brute 
. . . that simply smote thee from blindest instinct! Madness! To be enraged 
with a dumb thing, Captain Ahab, seems blasphemous” (196–197; emphasis 
in original).
Starbuck sees blasphemy because Ahab invests malevolent agency in a 
dumb brute and because he takes vengeance out of God’s hands; Ahab con-
firms it. Refusing to subject human aspiration to the calculation of accoun-
tants, he also rejects criteria of profitability compared to his own valuation 
of what matters. Ahab supplants capitalist logic, which hunts all whales, by 
the logic of revenge (and erotic love) that focuses on one. Those who hired 
him “were bent on profitable cruises,” says Ishmael, whereas “he was intent 
on audacious, immitigable, and supernatural revenge.” The “calculating” 
Quaker owners—one is named Bildad, Job’s “false comforter”—noted his 
change after losing his leg, but “for those very reasons” deemed him “better 
qualified . . . for a pursuit so full of rage and wildness as the bloody hunt of 
whales” (158). The worldly asceticism of Christian Isaacs would join profit 
to the service of God, but acquisition must draw energy from “lower layers” 
they imagine they can master. Ahab, however, has other plans. His wound-
ing has led him to reject the sovereignty of their God and market as well 
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as their family values. He is the dark double of capitalist Christian society; 
baptizing his harpoon to the devil, not God, he mocks its deceptive pieties 
and exposes its monomaniac core.21
But “hark ye yet again—the little lower layer,” Ahab repeats, to explain 
the ambition animating his hunt and inspiring his crew.
All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard masks. But in each 
event—in the living act, the undoubted deed—there, some unknown 
but still reasoning thing puts forth the mouldings of its features from 
behind the unreasoning mask. If man will strike, strike through the 
mask! How can the prisoner reach outside except by thrusting through 
the wall? To me, the white whale is that wall, shoved near to me. Some-
times I think there’s naught beyond. But ’tis enough. He tasks me; he 
heaps me; I see in him outrageous strength, with inscrutable malice 
sinewing it. That inscrutable thing is chiefly what I hate; and be the 
white whale agent, or . . . principal, I will wreak that hate upon him. 
(197)
The material world of visible appearances is devalued as a “pasteboard 
mask,” both false and unsatisfying, but hated as a “wall” whose “unreason-
ing” materiality imprisons him by resisting his will. Behind it he posits “an 
unknown but reasoning thing” animated by “inscrutable malice” he experi-
ences as real and suffers. Hating inscrutability as much as malice, he would 
“strike through”—to experience and master if not know—the invisible 
power driving the visible world.22
Whereas God displayed his leviathan to Job, for whom appearances 
do not wall off or mask a hidden (divine or demonic) reality, but rath-
er embody it, Ahab inherits a Cartesian universe splitting an animated 
subject from a material world reduced to deadened pasteboard by the 
absence of divine presence. Rather than accept this dismembering divi-
sion, he posits a hidden and animating but demonic core, and in this way 
reanimates the world as a meaningful (albeit demonic) whole and reunites 
humans with it, albeit in enraged struggle. At this ontological level he pro-
tests the visible-invisible and subject-object splits constituting modernity, 
and he plots overcoming them by a violent apocalypse. He would human-
ize the world, so it is ruled by and for men, not by hidden demonism and 
inscrutable gods.
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In retrospect, Ishmael describes how Ahab crosses from a “wisdom 
that is woe” to a “woe that is madness” (478):
He came to identify with [the whale] not only all his bodily woes, but 
. . . that intangible malignity which has been from the beginning; to 
whose dominion even the modern Christians ascribe one-half of the 
worlds. . . . All that most maddens and torments . . . all the subtle de-
monisms of life and thought; all evil, to crazy Ahab, were visibly per-
sonified, and made practically assailable in Moby Dick. He piled upon 
the whale’s white hump the sum of all the general rage and hate felt by 
his whole race from Adam on down; and then, as if his chest had been 
a mortar, he burst his hot heart’s shell upon it. (219; emphasis added)
Against Starbuck’s view of Ahab as a paranoid attributing malevolent 
purpose to a dumb brute, Ishmael pointedly notes that the conduct of the 
whale was widely seen as “unexampled, intelligent malignity” (218). Grant-
ing how Ahab’s hatred was fueled by a “morbid” character, Ishmael still 
credits both the malevolent agency of the whale and how humans must 
symbolize what “maddens and torments” them. Jobian Ahab rages at the 
injustice of arbitrary suffering and the indifference of gods or life to it, but 
by “personifying” evil, he gives suffering a “cause,” that is, an explanation, 
and a “practically assailable” target the crew can “strike.” Grievance at “life” 
is irremediable and so paralyzing, but it is generative—of political plots and 
action, and so of tragedy—when mediated by the whale.
Melville shows how Ahab’s allegory and defiance resonate politically: 
he elicits Starbuck’s “enchanted, tacit acquiescence”; he “shocked” into the 
other mates the “same fiery emotion accumulated in the Leyden jar of his 
own magnetic life” (199); and the crew respond to his “heaven-insulting 
purpose” as an affirmation that dignity entails enmity toward whatever 
power denies it (143). Looking back, Ishmael sees “this grey-headed, un-
godly old man, chasing with curses a Job’s whale round the world, at the 
head of a crew . . . of mongrel renegades, and castaways, and cannibals” who 
seemed “specially picked and packed by some infernal fatality to help him 
to his monomaniac” as well as “supernatural revenge” (221–222).
Each is an Isolato “not acknowledging the common continent of men,” 
for each inhabits “a separate continent of his own” (151). Atomized in Toc-
queville’s sense, they are “federated along one keel” because, “aboundingly 
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responding to his ire,” they are so “possessed” that “his hate seemed al-
most theirs” (151, 222). His “irresistible dictatorship” is plebiscitary (178). 
Because they join him “to lay the world’s grievances before that bar from 
which not very many . . . ever come back” (151–152), he credibly can say to 
himself, “My cogged circle fits into all their various wheels” (201), and say 
to them, “I do not order ye; ye will it” (199). As Heimert infers, “Whoever 
willfully defies authority, Melville seems to say, when he stands in open 
rebellion, will find response in the democratic soul.” As captain and crew 
become head and heart of a political body, democracy becomes a dramatic 
protagonist. But what is the tragedy?23
Democratic Dignity as Excess
One answer to this question is that excess or pathology in Ahab’s conception 
of democratic dignity is revealed as he crosses over from the wisdom that is 
woe to the woe that is madness. As George Kateb defines it, “Dignity resides 
in being, to some important degree, a person of one’s own creating, making, 
choosing, rather than in being merely a creature or a socially manufactured, 
conditioned, manipulated thing.” Ahab thus reveals the structure of feeling 
and ideological grammar whereby equality invests people in ideas of self-
determination and, by extension, Tocqueville (though not Kateb) argues, in 
ideas of popular sovereignty.24
For Tocqueville equality fosters a subject who seeks “the reason of 
things for oneself and in oneself alone,” and who therefore would “strike 
through the form to the substance”; it is but a step to Ahab’s quest to strike 
through visible appearances to grasp the underlying truth they seem to 
mask. Tocqueville also argues that equality creates subjects who feel “they 
owe nothing to any man, expect nothing from any man” and “imagine that 
their whole destiny is in their own hands”; it is a step to what Quentin 
Anderson later called an “imperial self” (and nation!). As Starbuck notes, 
“Ahab would be a democrat to all above” but “lords it over all below” be-
cause, when knowing is a form of mastery and agency is the exercise of sov-
ereignty, others are mere obstacles or instruments, and life seems endlessly 
insulting in its reminders of our finitude.25
Here is the inversion whereby democratic dignity, practiced as what D. 
H. Lawrence calls “masterlessness,” is wed to resentment and entangled in 
domination. In Nina Baym’s apt phrase, a “melodrama of beset manhood” 
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then scripts national politics: democratic dignity is a masculine fantasy of 
self-sufficiency that mobilizes men’s aggression against symbols of emas-
culation, while excluding actual women from the circle of their “we.” They 
enact melodrama, not tragedy, because Ahabian self-reliance pathologizes 
human incompletion and interdependence. Monomania thus appears when 
the dream to have no master encounters resistance, which men demonize as 
an intentionally enslaving, symbolically charged, yet “practically assailable” 
object that they kill to regain freedom.26
Political leaders thus tell melodramatic stories about democracy to 
address a national subject in gendered terms. In Michael Rogin’s account, 
rights-bearing white men recurrently protest enslaving power and soul 
death by scripting a “political romance” in which idealized freedom is en-
dangered by monstrous threats. Attributing difficulty not to the core market 
and familial institutions of liberal society, but to their subversion, reformers 
emplot “countersubversive” crusades to redeem liberalism and its emanci-
patory promise. Killing antiliberal objects—such as evil empire, big govern-
ment, or terrorism in recent history—offers personal and political rebirth 
by calling forth the heroic agency, capacity for sacrifice, and national unity 
that self-declared sons lament they have lost.27
Rogin’s Melville dramatizes such melodramatic romance as a problem-
atic monomania that he links to every important position in antebellum po-
litical life. Ahab surely evokes Jacksonian expansionists, who hoped to bury 
sectional conflict over slavery by joining southern and northern whites in a 
war against the territorial limits and savagery that obstructed their Mani-
fest Destiny. (Like Ahab with his hickory harpoon, they would unify a crew 
and fulfill what they prophesied.) But by 1850, as Melville wrote Moby-
Dick, this romance intensified division, so that Ahab also bespeaks both 
John Calhoun, who attacked the national state as a monstrous threat to the 
freedom to own slaves, and the abolitionist Theodore Parker, who attacked 
the Union for protecting a “hydra-headed slave power conspiracy.” Their 
romances of idealized liberty risked dismembering the Union. Rogin thus 
concludes, “Ahab derived from no single source alone,” but is “a reproach to 
and culmination of” every voice in the antebellum political world.28
Ahab thus personifies an imperialist national subject mobilizing mul-
tinational subalterns in a global project that promises freedom but entails 
domination and generates self-destruction. In this regard, Melville sustains 
the critics who identify America with the Hebrew king. Within the national 
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frame, the disturbing connection of freedom and domination also marks 
movements of reform that construe dignity as masterlessness. But we miss 
Melville’s own “lower layer” if “Ahab” means only a pathological view of 
freedom. He enacts a tragedy because his claim to exemplarity bespeaks 
crucial (not only pathological) aspects of a democratic ethos, and of our-
selves. Identifying with or as him then becomes a step toward gaining criti-
cal distance on dangers that inhere in what we value.
The Tragedy in Democratic Dignity
In what ways, then, does Melville suggest that Ahab is exemplary of demo-
cratic dignity? One answer to this question lies in how we are positioned to-
ward him by the ontological and political dimensions of the text. One frame 
dramatizes how we make meaningful and engage the elemental sublime 
forces of life called Dionysian by Nietzsche. In this mythic or cosmic frame, 
he becomes a “grand, ungodly god-like man” who survives traumatic injury 
by wedding rigid allegorizing about life to enraged, violent action. Critics 
thus take him to personify the resentful pathologies of the will to truth, or 
of an inflated autonomy derived from liberal individualism, Enlightenment 
reason, Promethean modernism, or modern patriarchy. Insofar as his idea 
of masterlessness denies human finitude, he does enact resentment of what 
Nietzsche calls fundamental prerequisites of life. Insofar as his vision of 
malignity projects one determinate meaning onto nature, he seems trapped 
within the fiction of deep truth he posits. Typically, critics then praise the 
contrary orientation of an Ishmael who affirms human finitude, forswears 
projects to know or master being, and embraces visible, sensuous material-
ity.29
But this either-or makes two mistakes. First, Ishmael sees Ahab’s vi-
sion of depravity as credible, the wisdom of woe. Nor does Melville simply 
pathologize Ahab’s melancholy or rage. As Eric Bentley notes: “Margaret 
Fuller once said that she accepted the universe, and Thomas Carlyle com-
mented, ‘Gad, she’d better!’ But . . . the tragic poets were on her side. Car-
lyle’s remark is pure cynicism. He sees man as puny and the universe as a sort 
of Frederick the Great. . . . In reasoning thus, Carlyle misses the something 
that is everything. The king can only kill the soldier, he cannot dictate his 
attitude. Margaret Fuller did not have to accept the universe. Prometheus 
did not accept it either. . . . What is it to ‘accept’ the universe?”30 Even if we 
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   89 10/29/13   10:57 AM
90  George Shulman
must “accept” that feelings of vulnerability, terror, and rage are inescapable, 
there remains a choice about our attitude toward them. Melville’s tragedy 
dignifies, even exalts, and not only faults, the attitude Ahab lives out.31
Second, therefore, simply to endorse Ishmael’s contrary stance toward 
being is to avoid the very ambiguities about “attitude” that a tragedy must 
render viscerally. The text renders “as a real presence a mystery that lies be-
yond its own powers of explanation,” Richard Brodhead argues, so we can 
feel life’s inscrutability and Ahab’s urgent insistence on making it meaning-
ful, as well as life’s cruelty and so the pathos of his protest. Only if we allow 
ourselves to suffer (as in undergo) his injury and longing can we grasp both 
the truth in his optic and posture and the difficulty of resisting his insis-
tence on fixed meaning and dignity as mastery. But a “knowingness” about 
the right (“tragic”) attitude toward life precludes this surrender to Ahab, 
which is in fact, though paradoxically, a condition of gaining real distance 
from him.32
At the same time, this novel-as-tragedy unfolds in a political dimension 
that also does not resolve the meaning of Ahab’s example. Like Freud on 
paranoia, Melville depicts monomania as a defense that rescues Ahab from 
the traumatic helplessness and collapse of libido that followed his injury; in 
political terms, as Ahab moves from paralysis to dramatic action by linking 
wound to a cause and grievance to a project, he performs C. Wright Mills’s 
axiom that politics links “private grievance” to “public cause.” Unable to see 
meaning emerging immanently in ordinary life, he imposes a transcendent, 
allegorical meaning on it; because visible appearances seem “pasteboard,” 
he posits an organizing truth behind them. Marxism, populism, or femi-
nism—not only a “paranoid style” on the right—thus link visible world and 
invisible powers, and make appearances meaningful, by a deep truth nam-
ing “practically assailable” causes of suffering and enslavement. For this rea-
son Eve Sedgwick aptly linked “strong” theory on the left to what Melanie 
Klein named “the paranoid-schizoid position.”33
Ahab thus dramatizes how political rhetoric and theory invoke whales 
to signify the material and symbolic aspects of reified power, to protest its 
sovereignty and malignity. In turn, one can argue, such monomania jus-
tifies counter-sovereignties that weld people professing democratic aspi-
rations into a despotic (and depoliticized) unity. But a survivor linked to 
Indians and slaves then may signal Melville’s hope that democratic dignity 
can be saved from a dream of masterless freedom and joined instead to the 
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“mortal inter-indebtedness” Ahab scorned (527). Melville then may echo 
Tocqueville: given modern heterogeneity, those who endorse the whole-
ness, inviolability, or sovereignty of a national or political subject will pro-
duce despotism. Moby-Dick in effect contrasts a Marxian or populist Ahab, 
whose melodramatic plot promises to unify an atomized or divided society, 
to a Tocquevillean Ishmael for whom dismemberment is the inescapable 
basis of political freedom. If we are led to “regret the world of reality” by 
fictions of redemptive purpose, as Tocqueville claims, then giving them up 
is the key condition for cultivating arts of association grounded in palpable 
(“horizontal”) bonds and discrete projects with concrete others. But Mel-
ville’s tragedy complicates such a postnational romance.34
For if we say a whale named Moby-Dick also survives, the defeat of 
Ahabian monomania leaves not an ethically chastened democratic dignity, 
but a Leviathan “megastate.” If “the whale” signifies the symbolic and ma-
terial power of a state tied to capital, why must Ahab accept dismembering 
damage to the personal and political body? If he models a tension between 
democratic dignity and the worldly powers that injure it, then democratic 
life may be underwritten (not only jeopardized) by his claim to judge what 
is real to and best for him, his claiming of authority to name what denies 
that dignity, and his determination to “bear out” his view by mobilizing ac-
tion in concert.
Melville’s ambiguity about the whale as a political object is therefore 
crucial to finding Ahab in our own political practices: as democratic dig-
nity is a project of knowledge that analyzes the ruling powers that work 
through or behind appearances as common sense interprets them, so we 
depict “global capital,” “neoliberalism,” or “the state” as charged objects. As 
Ishmael wonders if the whale reveals blank indifference rather than inten-
tional malignity, so we debate whether we vainly project intentionality to 
secure culpability. A tragedy implies that democratic projects cannot avoid 
conceiving collective objects as “practically assailable causes” to hold to ac-
count and remake or destroy. Given the independent power of such whales, 
moreover, practices of freedom can no more be severed from counter-sover-
eignty, and from the domination it risks if not entails, than from indignation 
and aggression. As democratic dignity is both enacted and endangered be-
cause it must “charge” whales with meaning and assail them, so we are im-
pelled to ask how we conceive and challenge “practically assailable causes.”
In ontological and political dimensions, then, Melville does not de-
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mean or endorse Ahab’s vision, partly because he never resolves the mean-
ing of the whale. The onto-frame does not teach acceptance (rather than 
resentment) of life, while the political frame endorses mutiny against (not 
obedience to) any sovereignty. Rather, the text conjures affect and choice 
in each frame, mediating the other in complex ways. Sustaining these ten-
sions is one way he creates tragedy. A second way is implicating characters 
who seem antithetical. Consider then how he positions us with Ishmael, 
not as separate from Ahab, but as a chorus digesting a fraught but fruitful 
relationship.
Though “Ahab’s quenchless feud seemed mine” (223), Ishmael now 
discerns another motive: “It was the whiteness of the whale that above all 
things appalled me.” An absence of color, this blankness denotes the “in-
scrutability” and “indifference” in “the heartless voids and immensities of 
the universe,” which “stab us from behind with the thought of annihila-
tion.” This “colorless all-color atheism” also reveals that colorful appear-
ances are our projection. Indeed, “nature absolutely paints like the harlot 
whose allurements cover nothing but the charnel-house within.” Accord-
ingly, “though in many aspects this visible world seems formed in love . . . 
the invisible spheres were formed in fright” (230–231). Ahab paints nature 
with a color—Melville says elsewhere “blackness ten times black”—but a 
colorless void of constitutive nothingness is Ishmael’s real horror. Still, “not 
ignoring what is good, I am quick to perceive a horror, and could still be 
social with it—would they let me—since it is but well to be on friendly 
terms with all the inmates of the place one lodges in” (30). How then does 
Ishmael (as a narrator) redeem his participation (as a character) in hunting 
rather than befriending horror?35
First, he embraces a pluralistic polytheism to engage a universe whose 
protean excess sustains multiple moods, optics, ways of life. Second, he re-
jects Ahab’s investment in seeing darkness and seeking mastery: “Look not 
too long in the face of the fire . . . when its redness makes all things look 
ghastly . . . give not thyself up, then, to fire, lest it invert thee, deaden thee; 
as for the time it did me. There is a wisdom that is woe; but there is a 
woe that is madness” (477–478). Third, he embraces the sensuous, material 
world, and interdependence among the incomplete beings he embeds with-
in it: when “my own individuality was now merged in a joint stock company,” 
“my free will had received a mortal wound” because “another’s mistake or 
misfortune might plunge innocent me into unmerited disaster and death.” 
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But he also finds pleasure in a “Siamese connexion with a plurality of other 
mortals” (365).
Opposing what F. O. Matthiessen calls Ahab’s “destructive Emerso-
nianism” and its “relentless rejection of the claim of the ordinary,” Ishmael 
lets go of the frontier myth that opposed “slavish shore” to freedom. “By 
many prolonged, repeated experiences, I have perceived that . . . man must 
eventually lower, or at least shift, his conceit of attainable felicity; not plac-
ing it . . . in the intellect or the fancy; but in the wife, the heart, the bed, 
the table, the saddle, the fire-side, the country” (469). Ironic, not pious, 
toward these, he also has become forbearing—even cynical—toward the 
life that injures him: “There are certain queer times and occasions in this 
strange mixed affair we call life when a man takes this whole universe for a 
vast practical joke, though the wit thereof he but dimly discerns, and more 
than suspects that the joke is at nobody’s expense but his own.” Even death 
consists of “jolly punches in the side bestowed by the unseen and unac-
countable old joker. . . . There is nothing like the perils of whaling to breed 
this free and easy sort of genial, desperado philosophy, and with it I now 
regarded this whole voyage of the Pequod, and the great White Whale as 
its object” (265). Calling life a joke, not a tragedy, he endorses a philosophy 
that is genial, not embittered or fanatic, and desperado, refusing the claims 
to authority that justify obedience in the name of defiance.36
In 1983 Rogin argued that Ishmael flees not only political romance, but 
politics, as his sentimental education means retreating to “attainable felicity” 
and irony in a private realm whose “slavish” conventionality once drove him 
to sea—or into political projects. Now, we might say that Ishmael reimagines 
politics in relation to an everyday life he has learned to accept as the only 
real ground of political possibility. Seeking alternatives to rationalism, we may 
echo his turn from the Ahabian—Promethean, modernist, paranoid—aspira-
tions of what Sheldon Wolin called “epic” theory, which would depict society 
as a whole and its systemic derangement. If Ahab can be said to dramatize 
the derangement in such accounts of derangement, we turn to the nonsover-
eign, aleatory, and local as we profess to reimagine (not escape) politics. The 
radically democratic then appears not in plots of revolutionary transcendence 
to transform a whole, but as felicitous breaks in practices of daily life. Maybe 
the appeal of architectonic theory receded with sixties radicalism: as worldly 
shifts from hope to disappointment made epic theory seem hubristic and im-
perial, vain in both senses, of course theorists now echo Ishmael.37
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But Melville writes a tragedy: Ahab is the “dark character” who utters 
“the sane madness of vital truth” that a utilitarian or neoliberal culture 
leaves unspoken; Ishmael learns how this truth is destructive when its 
limitations are denied, but his reparative ethos turns us toward the hor-
rors Ahab sees as well as those he creates: “It is well to be on friendly 
terms with all the inmates of the place one lodges in.” What are “friendly” 
terms?
If “Ahab” connotes theorizing that posits a cause of suffering and a 
political project to address it, can we ever simply exorcize him, or, as Pros-
pero says of Caliban and Shakespeare implies of Prospero, must we “own 
this dark thing” as a needful but dangerous aspect of our practice? After 
all, theorists (and citizens) contesting forms of domination must conceive 
and poeticize plots, though it is best to expose their seams in ways wounded 
Ahab truly could not. He collapsed the difference between art and life, the 
grave danger from which few of us are immune. Still, to think that Melville 
could disown Ahab is to imagine his novel without a plot. Indeed, in Ahab’s 
passionate poetry to mobilize the crew, and in his driven but skillful plot-
ting of the Pequod’s path to a climactic encounter with the whale, does he 
not represent crucial aspects of Melville’s art, and of political mobilization 
more broadly? As Ahab says his plot is the “keel” of the ship, his story is the 
keel of Melville’s novel; and as his poetry moves the crew, Melville moves 
his readers—albeit by a story that ends by killing off Ahab and sinking the 
ship. Even to endorse Ishmael’s turn to the ordinary, Melville must narrate 
the epic arc of that shift in scale.38
But Ishmael’s bond to Ahab is deeper than the formality of the perfor-
mative contradiction that makes Ishmaelian ethos depend on epic narra-
tive and paradigm shift. Just consider how the survivor becomes the genial 
desperado addressing us: he is turned from conventionality not only by his 
marriage to Queequeg, but also by Ahab’s defense of the “queenly person-
ality” against domination, by his insistence that his wound be meaningful, 
and by his willingness to risk his life for the truth he lived by. Ishmael is 
attracted to the aggression in Ahab’s intention to avenge—say rectify—the 
injustice he resents, and so to his defiance of cosmic and worldly authority. 
Ahab’s transgressive energy is thrilling and liberating, like a whale breach-
ing. Carry this claim further: at first melancholic and suicidal, cut off from 
the energies of life, Ishmael requires, and is even saved by, Ahab and his 
plot. Rogin thus notes, “The failure of the observer to rejoin the living world, 
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and to join it together,” is what draws Ishmael to participate in the hunt.”39 
Leaving his own dismembered condition as an observer of life, bodiless, 
bloodless, he rejoins the world as a participant, first with Queequeg and 
then “welded” with other Isolatoes in a political project with admittedly 
disastrous results.
To follow the sequence in Nietzsche’s “Three Metamorphoses,” he 
begins as “the camel” suffering the despair created by dutifulness, which 
makes life a desert without nourishment, because it must say “yes” to the 
demands imposed on it. But “in the loneliest desert” a “metamorphosis oc-
curs: the spirit becomes a lion who would conquer his freedom and be mas-
ter in his own desert. Here he seeks out his last master. . . . ‘Thou Shalt’ is 
the name of the great dragon. But the spirit of the lion says, ‘I will.’” The 
Ahabian lion defies the authority-demanding, soul-destroying dutifulness 
and the internal piety seeking that burden. “The creation of freedom for 
oneself . . . is within the power of the lion” because “a sacred ‘No’ even to 
duty” prepares the way “to assume the right to new values,” which is “the 
most terrifying assumption for a reverent spirit that would bear much.” But 
the lion cannot “create new values”; it can only open space for such creation. 
The spirit “must become a child” because in “the game of creation a sacred 
‘yes’ is needed.” Ahab is wed to “no” by his pain and defiance, but Ishmael 
need not be trapped if he finds a “yes” to enfold the lion’s valuable but dan-
gerous negativity.40
Ishmael would have remained a camel bound to pious dutifulness if he 
had not identified with Ahab’s lion, but he also works through that identifi-
cation by experiencing its costs. In turn, to face the dangers in our practice 
of democratic axioms, Ishmael’s testimony must move us to find ourselves in 
Ahab’s view of life’s cruelty, his anguish over injury and longing for integrity, 
his need for an assailable cause and his denial that he imagines the malig-
nancy he attacks, his enraged sense of injustice and his ambition to enact it. 
If we invest in killing the whale, we can experience the meaning of aggres-
sion and its consequences. Melville creates an Ahab who would destroy his 
other, but Melville defeats that wish to reveal the reality surviving it, and, 
likewise, if we surrender to Ahab’s project and suffer its defeat, we experi-
ence both enraged agency and the realities resisting it. If we feel the horror 
Ahab sees, his enraged longing to remedy it, and the horror he makes, we 
can register our loss in his. After Ahab, though, we cannot return to the 
false comfort offered by jeremiads about God’s justice, or by idealizations 
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of democratic sovereignty. How might we rework the democratic dignity 
he enacted and desecrated? One issue is meaning making or plotting, the 
other is aggression and sovereignty, and in neither regard is “Ishmael” a suf-
ficient alternative.41
Reworking Democratic Dignity
Begin with Toni Morrison’s illuminating effort to redeem Ahab. The whale 
is taken to connote nature and the state, she notes, but whiteness, as the 
sovereign category in a regime of domination, is the “singular whale” that 
“transcends all the others.” An abstraction (from color, particularity, and em-
bodiment) that is horrific, whiteness does mean dismemberment: because 
“the trauma of racism is, for the racist and the victim, severe fragmentation,” 
Ahab’s monomania is not reducible to “male” or “adolescent” vengeance 
“over a lost leg.” Rather, he “diverts and converts” a multiracial crew from 
capitalist labor to a revolutionary project. “If, indeed, a white, nineteenth-
century, American male took on not abolition, not the amelioration of racist 
institutions . . . but the very concept of whiteness as an inhuman idea, he 
would be very alone, very desperate, and very doomed. Madness would be 
the only appropriate description of such audacity.” As “the only white male 
American heroic enough to slay the monster that was devouring the world 
as he knew it,” Ahab is her Melvillean hero and avatar.42
There are many reasons to reject Morrison’s reading. Ishmael, not 
Ahab, links horror to whiteness, and to identify Ahab only with abolition 
is to ignore how he also bespeaks Jacksonian expansionists and Calhoun. 
Most important, Melville does not endorse Ahab (as Parker, let alone Jack-
son or Calhoun) but relates all these figures at “a lower layer” to dramatize 
the resentful motivation and Manichean allegory Ishmael calls monomania. 
Melville is not Ahab or Ishmael, and he is both. Still, Morrison’s focus on 
race is revelatory. First, she depicts a structure of reified power and takes 
seriously dismemberment as a trope depicting its psychic effect and politi-
cal meaning. Second, therefore, her Ahab rebels against domination and ab-
straction, not life as such, and she rightly ties Melville to that negativity. For 
Melville declares, “All who say yes, lie,” and affirms those who “speak no! 
In Thunder.” He expresses that “no” in Ahab, but also in his character Babo, 
the black Ahab who leads a slave insurrection in Benito Cereno. Here again 
he dramatizes the integrity in implacable defiance, though also its cost in 
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self-destruction—and mere reversal of master and slave. Morrison affirms 
insurrectionary rage because she sees the whale as a despotic, injurious 
political object, but she elides how Ahab’s assertion of democratic dignity is 
entangled in domination. Can the truth in democratic rage be valued and 
yet contained?43
This possibility appears in the way that James Baldwin affirms the 
truth in Ahabian anger, while rejecting Ahab’s way of living it:
It began to seem that one would have to hold in the mind forever two 
ideas which seemed to be in opposition. The first idea was acceptance, 
the acceptance totally without rancor, of life as it is and men as they 
are: in the light of this idea it goes without saying that injustice is a 
commonplace. But this did not mean that one could be complacent, for 
the second idea was of equal power: one must never . . . accept these 
injustices as commonplace but must fight them with all one’s strength. 
This fight begins, however, in the heart and it now had been laid to my 
charge to keep my own heart free of hatred and despair.44
To accept life as it is “without rancor” means accepting that injustice is com-
monplace, yet he refuses to submit to it. He echoes Morrison’s sympathy 
with Ahab’s rage, but he widens the frame by which to judge it. Given the 
rule of whiteness, he argues, “the image of . . . the ‘nigger,’ black, benighted, 
brutal, consumed with hatred,” is internalized by blacks (and whites). If 
blacks surrender to it, “life has no other possible reality” than “achieving 
their vengeance and their own destruction” by enacting the “nightmare” 
that whites project on them. Instead, he would illuminate “the altogether 
savage paradox” that “the Negro” is “compelled to accept the fact that this 
dark and dangerous and unloved stranger is part of himself forever,” be-
cause “only this recognition sets him in any wise free.” Democratic dignity 
requires this paradoxical, “precarious adjustment,” whereby our darkness is 
“exploited” in “ironic” and “honorable” ways.45
To move from Morrison’s idealization of Ahab by way of Baldwin is 
to suggest the idea of “owning” Ahab’s anger, so we are not in denial of 
its truth, or ruled by it, but use it creatively and honorably. For democrat-
ic dignity requires Ahabian negativity to contest domination by internal 
thou shalts and leviathanic authorities, but it also must credit both the 
danger in defiance and “the claim of the ordinary.” Conversely, a genial, 
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desperado philosophy gains political traction only by acknowledging—not 
disavowing—the frame it draws from the powers and plots conjured by 
Ahabian art.
It is tempting to say, then, that the novel works agonistically; it situates 
us not so much between or above incommensurable positions as in a space 
that emerges (or we create) by undergoing or living their tension. “Instead 
of adhering to a uniform conception of reality and seeking to represent it 
in his fiction,” Richard Brodhead says, Melville “tries out various modes of 
representation and explores different versions of the real.” These are “radi-
cally incommensurate and arranged in such a way that from within one we 
simply cannot see the other,” but because he gives neither the “status of an 
independent actuality,” readers and citizens become “conscious of repre-
sentation as a function of the imagination that creates it.”46 Juxtaposition 
helps us grasp how a democratic politics is at once underwritten and jeop-
ardized by Ahabian energies—and by Ishmaelian virtues. Rather than split 
a “tragic” position from its others, a tragedy shows the value and danger in 
every position, virtue, ideal.
Moby-Dick thus leaves us with the problem of false prophecy, that is, 
of political judgment. It bequeaths to us the task of salvaging the good we 
value from the danger we witness in pity and terror, as we argue over “prac-
tically assailable” causes and fruitful action, for reasons and with results that 
no one discerns clearly, though many claim to. Melville notes only how the 
“measureless self-deception” of prophets and demagogues parallels “their 
measureless power of deceiving and bedevilling” others, but we would add 
that artists also use—and would redeem—this power (360). He exercises it 
partly by affirming the premise of democratic dignity and partly by drama-
tizing its self-destruction, which means by “weaving” “tragic graces”—both 
“mournful” and “exalted”—around “meanest mariners” and the “crazed” 
captain they take as a champion (146). His tragedy of democratic dignity 
thus stages the vicissitudes of this faith, rendering what is noble and danger-
ous in it as a legacy audiences must decide how to bear out.
But the novel reminds us to politically contextualize our own academic 
debates about modern Prometheanism. For Ishmael grasps the danger of 
fire midway in the text, but the ship sails on to destruction. Melville’s trag-
edy impels us to ask: Do we remain on a deadly path, and is it in our power 
to inflect it? Hear Ishmael’s perception as he turns:
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As they narrated to each other their unholy adventures, their tales of 
terror told in words of mirth; as their uncivilized laughter forked up-
wards out of them, like flames in the furnace; as to and fro, in their 
front, the harpooners wildly gesticulated with their huge pronged forks 
and dippers; as the wind howled on, and the sea leaped, and the ship 
groaned and dived, and yet steadfastly shot her red hell further and 
further into the blackness of the sea and the night . . . then the rush-
ing Pequod, freighted with savages, and laden with fire, and burning a 
corpse, and plunging into that blackness of darkness, seemed the mate-
rial counterpart of her monomaniac commander’s soul. . . . Whatever 
swift, rushing thing I stood on was not so much bound to any haven 
ahead as rushing from all havens astern.” (476)
Notes
1. By tracing relationships among tragedy, literature, and theory, my essay 
is deeply indebted to Peter Euben, The Tragedy of Political Theory (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), and Michael Rogin, Subversive Genealogy: The 
Politics and Art of Herman Melville (New York: Knopf, 1983).
2. What Wendy Brown says of theory thus suggests a bond between literary 
art and political theory: “This meaning-making enterprise . . . depicts a world that 
does not quite exist, that is not quite the world we inhabit. But this is theory’s in-
comparable value, not its failure,” because “its revelatory and speculative work” re-
quires “working to one side of direct referents.” Wendy Brown, “At the Edge: The 
Future of Political Theory,” in Brown, Edgework (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 80. In Melville’s words, “It is with fiction as with religion: it should 
present another world, yet one to which we feel the tie.” Theory and literature open 
space between a given world as we are conditioned to perceive it and possibilities 
of living otherwise.
3. To the degree that political theorists make theory mean argument to vali-
date so-called empirical and so-called normative claims, my contrasting approach 
is to explore how Melville dramatizes rather than argues, by creating a fictional 
yet compelling alter-world. To the degree that the political theory canon is “de-
textualized” by severing what a text says from how it makes meaning, and to the 
degree that this canon thus excludes literature, as if theory and literary art were in-
commensurate, I emphasize how “fictionality” and fantasy do crucial truth-telling 
work in both.
4. Eric Bentley, The Life of the Drama (1964; repr., New York: Applause The-
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atre Books, 1991), 278; emphasis in original. My reading must clarify the differ-
ence between “tragedy” and “the tragic,” and also the difference that difference 
makes, and if I dehydrate the text, I have failed.
5. Herman Melville, Moby-Dick; or, The Whale (New York: Library of Ameri-
ca, 2010), 146 (paperback classic ed.); references hereafter are included parentheti-
cally in the text.
6. In addition to Michael Rogin’s Subversive Genealogy, I am especially in-
debted to several readings of the novel: D. H. Lawrence, Studies in Classic Ameri-
can Literature (1923; repr., New York: Penguin, 1990); Newton Arvin, Herman 
Melville (1950; repr., Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972); Richard Brod-
head, Hawthorne, Melville, and the Novel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1976); Eyal Peretz, Literature, Disaster, and the Enigma of Power: A Reading of 
Moby-Dick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); C. L. R. James, Mariners, 
Renegades and Castaways: The Story of Herman Melville and the World We Live 
In (1953; repr., Hanover, N.H.: Dartmouth College Press, 2001); Charles Olson, 
Call Me Ishmael (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
7. In one sense the sinking is a fiction of apocalypse as a final “un-veiling,” while 
in reality, beyond the text, life goes on. The fiction offers readers the satisfaction of 
an end, but the real calamity may be that “it is going to continue and continue,” as 
the sign of a bedraggled homeless man in a New Yorker cartoon declared. The very 
fiction of a traumatic event may deny the ongoing-ness of the “crisis ordinary,” as 
Lauren Berlant puts it in Cruel Optimism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011). 
She depicts “not ‘the waning of affect’ but the waning of genre. Life can no longer 
be lived phantasmatically as melodrama, as Aristotelian tragedy spread to ordinary 
people, as a predictable arc that is shaped by acts, facts, or fates.” As a result, she 
also rejects the idea of extraordinary evil. Berlant, “Thinking about Feeling His-
torical” in Emotion, Space, and Society 1, no. 1 (2008): 7.
8. On Job (as well as Jonah), see Ilana Pardes, Melville’s Bibles (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008).
9. From Stephen Mitchell’s translation, The Book of Job (1987; repr., New 
York: HarperCollins, 1992).
10. In Eric Santner’s words, “The world in which we find ourselves has ultimate, 
though also ultimately inscrutable, semantic power. . . . Something is always ap-
pearing from the ground of being that imposes itself on us with the sheer force of 
its validity, even if it finally has no safely construable significance.” Ahab and Job 
seek a determinate meaning. Slavoj Žižek, Eric L. Santner, and Kenneth Reinhard, 
The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Thinking (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 2005), 94.
11. Melville links the “power of blackness” in Hawthorne to “that Calvinistic 
sense of innate depravity and Original Sin, from whose visitations, in some shape 
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or other, no deeply thinking mind is always and wholly free. For in certain moods, 
no man can weigh this world without throwing in something somehow like Origi-
nal Sin, to strike the uneven balance.” See Melville, “Hawthorne and His Mosses,” 
in Moby-Dick, Norton Critical Ed., 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 2002), 522. As 
Dostoevsky created Ivan Karamazov to protest a creation rife with innocent suffer-
ing, but also to dramatize what it means to “reject” life on those (or any) grounds, 
so Ahab shows the validity, and baleful consequences, of Melville’s own grief and 
rage.
12. Note the resonance with Jacques Rancière’s views of the demos and of 
democracy.
13. To depict Shakespeare’s genius as unapproachable, Melville asserts, is to 
contradict the assumptions of one who would “carry republican progressiveness 
into literature as well as into life.” Though many doubt the emergence of such 
genius among us, “great geniuses are parts of their time; they themselves are the 
times.” They will appear in vernacular forms that go unrecognized, just as “it is of 
a piece with the Jews, for while their Shiloh was meekly walking in their streets, 
they were still praying for his magnificent coming, looking for him on a chariot who 
was already among them on an ass.” Melville, “Hawthorne and His Mosses,” 524.
14. It is important to credit that identification as an Ishmael has always been 
a crucial trope in the dominant culture, ever since members of the Boston Tea 
Party dressed as Indians. The enfranchised can shift identity, to occupy tempo-
rarily the position of outcasts, red or black, who remain marked subjects fixed in 
social place. Since antebellum days, artists and countercultural critics have used 
this cross-dressing to protest bourgeois society. Do they simply invert and so sus-
tain the fantasies embedded in the racial sign? Do they merely use the meaning 
of the other for their own purposes, or do they politically address racial hierarchy? 
In the literature on Moby-Dick, however, only C. L. R. James questions Ishmael’s 
professed identity, calling him an “intellectual Ahab” who equivocally oscillates 
between attachment to Ahab and to the crew. James does not identify Ishmael with 
the crew, but rather sees Ishmael as a political liberal, one who is unwilling to fully 
identify with workers and subalterns, whose multinational and multiracial charac-
ter in fact represents the only alternative to the Ahab-Ishmael dyad, an alternative 
Melville dramatized but could not explicitly endorse. James, Mariners, Renegades 
and Castaways, 40–41.
15. According to Slavoj Žižek, “We should first perceive it [disaster] as our 
fate, as unavoidable, and then, projecting ourselves into it, adopting its standpoint, 
we should retroactively insert into its past . . . counterfactual possibilities (‘If we 
had done this and that, the calamity we are now experiencing would not have oc-
curred!’) upon which we then act today. We have to accept that, at the level of pos-
sibilities, our future is doomed, that the catastrophe will take place, that it is our 
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destiny—and then, against the background of this acceptance, mobilize ourselves 
to perform the act which will change destiny itself and thereby insert a new possi-
bility into the past. Paradoxically, the only way to prevent the disaster is to accept it 
as inevitable. . . . What this means is that one should fearlessly rehabilitate the idea 
of preventive action. . . . If we postpone our action until we have full knowledge 
of the catastrophe, we will have acquired that knowledge only when it is too late. 
That is to say, the certainty on which an act relies is not a matter of knowledge, but 
a matter of belief.” Žižek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce (New York: Verso, 2009), 
151; emphasis in original.
16. Lawrence, Studies in Classic American Literature, 170. Lawrence’s Mel-
ville apprehended “the terrible fatality. Doom. Doom! Of what? The doom of our 
white day. . . . His white soul, doomed. His great white epoch, doomed. Himself, 
doomed. The idealist, doomed. The spirit, doomed.” How? Because “monomaniacs 
of the idea” will be destroyed by the effort to master “the deepest blood-nature” 
of life. Calling the Pequod “the ship of the white American soul,” Lawrence puts 
Ahab among the “fanatics” of “white mental consciousness,” who recruit “the dark 
races and pale to help us, red, yellow, and black, east and west, Quaker and fire-
worshiper, we get them all to help us” in “this ghastly maniacal hunt of ourselves, 
which is our doom and suicide” (ibid., 169). In 1954, after Hitler, Stalin, and Hiro-
shima, C. L. R. James takes up Lawrence’s themes while detained on Ellis Island 
by a Leviathan National Security State. “The voyage of the Pequod is the voyage 
of modern civilization seeking its destiny . . . heading for a crisis which will be a 
world crisis, a total crisis in every sense of that word. . . . That which was madness 
in a book one hundred years ago is the living madness of the age in which we live. 
. . . We shall conquer it or it will destroy us.” See James, Mariners, Renegades and 
Castaways, 19, 34, 12.
17. Olson, Call Me Ishmael, 57.
18. We hear his Emersonian assumption that knowledge depends on experi-
ence: “There is no earthly way of finding out precisely what the whale really looks 
like” except “by going a whaling yourself; but by so doing, you run no small risk 
of being eternally stove and sunk by . . . this Leviathan.” Like Nietzsche, he links 
living death to landlocked imprisonment, and philosophy to life-giving explora-
tion of infinite seas: “The port would fain give succor; the port is safety, comfort, 
hearthstone, supper, warm blankets, friends, all that’s kind to our moralities. But 
. . . know ye . . . that mortally intolerable truth: that all deep, earnest thinking is but 
the intrepid effort of the soul to keep the open independence of her sea; while the 
wildest winds of heaven and earth conspire to cast her on the treacherous, slavish 
shore[.] But as in landlessness alone resides the highest truth, shoreless, indefi-
nite as God—so, better is it to perish in that howling infinite than be ingloriously 
dashed upon the lee, even if that were safety!” (136).
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19. Alan Heimert, “Moby-Dick and American Political Symbolism,” American 
Quarterly 15, no. 4 (Winter 1963): 506; Olson, Call Me Ishmael, 23. As Michael 
Rogin says, “Ahab and his crew do not escape into nature. The Pequod brings 
with it the interracial society, structure of authority, and industrial apparatus of 
nineteenth-century America” (Subversive Genealogy, 108). Start with whaling it-
self: whale oil was a central commodity in the emerging industrial order, crucial 
to lighting homes and cities. (Fossil fuel, discovered in 1859 in Pennsylvania, had 
displaced whale oil by 1890.) In 1846 over 900 whaling ships worked what was 
called the fishery; 735 originated in the United States, mostly in New Bedford or 
Nantucket (these figures from Olson, Call Me Ishmael, 20–25). The text shows the 
violent industrial production by which nature is made a commodity for market. 
Horrific violence on sentient creatures is a condition of civilized life: we “butcher” 
whales “to light the gay bridals . . . of men” and “illuminate the solemn churches 
that preach unconditional inoffensiveness by all to all.” This murderous labor is also 
mortally risky: “For god’s sake,” Ishmael urges, “be economical with your lamps” 
because “not a gallon you burn, but at least one drop of a man’s blood was spilled 
for it” (Melville, Moby-Dick, 282). In other words, the hinge of the cosmic and po-
litical dimensions of the novel is not only “the whale” as a confounding symbol, but 
also a plot depicting the commodification of nature by exploited industrial labor.
20. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 2 vols. (1835–1840; repr., 
New York: Vintage, 1990), 2:74, 318.
21. For C. L. R. James, Ahab is a critic of capitalist-industrial civilization, yet 
“Melville’s whole point is to show the intimate, the close, the logical relation” of 
Ahab’s madness “to what the world has hitherto accepted as sane and reasonable, 
to the values by which all good men have lived” (James, Mariners, Renegades and 
Castaways, 13).
22. Commentators are divided on Ahab’s motivation: Is the problem his desire 
to know what no mortal can, and his rage that he cannot? Or is his problem his 
claim to know the nature of nature, the one determinate meaning of life?
23. Heimert, “Moby-Dick and American Political Symbolism,” 526. We note 
how the young Marx calls philosophy “the head” and the proletariat “the heart” 
of one collective body seeking a revolution so that “man revolves about himself as 
his own true sun.” Karl Marx, “Contribution to the Critique,” in The Marx-Engels 
Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), 65, 54.
24. George Kateb, The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 90.
25. Melville’s Ahab parallels Tocqueville’s account of democratic dignity. First, 
Ahab personifies the precepts of the Cartesian philosophy that democrats practice: 
“to evade the bondage of system and habit, of family maxims, class opinions, and, 
in some degree, of national prejudice; to accept tradition only as a means of infor-
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mation, and existing facts only as a lesson to be used in doing otherwise and doing 
better; to seek the reason of things for oneself and in oneself alone. . . . As everyone 
shuts himself up tightly within himself and insists upon judging the world from 
there,” he “readily conclude[s] that everything in the world may be explained, and 
nothing in it transcends the limits of the understanding” (Democracy in America, 
2:3–4). Second, the ideal of equality seems to exalt not only acquisitive individu-
alism, but a romantic view of integral subjectivity. Third, democratic social con-
ditions link subjectivity to freedom as an absolute sovereignty that Tocqueville 
describes as rupturing the continuity of generations and the web of relationships 
making community. Nature, other persons, or communities appear as illegitimate 
limitations of personal or popular sovereignty. “The woof of time is every instant 
broken and the track of generations effaced” as the citizens in a democratic era 
feel “they owe nothing to any man, expect nothing from any man; they acquire 
the habit of always considering themselves as standing alone, and they are apt to 
imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands.” Such self-reliance has the 
worldly effect of “hiding his descendants and separating his contemporaries from 
him; it throws him back forever upon himself alone and threatens in the end to 
confine him entirely within the solitude of his own heart” (Democracy in America, 
2:99). As Ahab curses “mortal inter-indebtedness,” so citizens “must be reminded 
that they live with others” and indeed that they are impotent if alone and power-
ful only if acting in concert. Refusing this political truth, however, democratic 
dignity creates allegories of evil that attribute the absence of an idealized free-
dom to malevolent powers that hold men captive. As C. L. R. James later argued, 
therefore, “The society of free individualism gives birth to totalitarianism and is 
unable to defend itself against it” (Mariners, Renegades and Castaways, 54). Like 
Tocqueville and Marx, James’s Melville depicts the paradoxical inversion whereby 
liberal modernity promises emancipation and progress but produces despotism 
and barbarism.
26. Lawrence, Studies in Classic American Literature, 9; Nina Baym, “Melo-
dramas of Beset Manhood: How Theories of American Fiction Exclude Women 
Authors,” American Quarterly 33, no. 2 (1981): 123–139. On melodrama, see 
Peter Brook, The Melodramatic Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1976); Bentley, The Life of the Drama; and Elizabeth Anker, Orgies of Feeling 
(Durham: Duke University Press, forthcoming). In Lacan’s terms, dismember-
ment signifies castration as the separation that makes humans incomplete. Lack is 
the “traumatic kernel” of every subject, disavowed by fantasies of wholeness and 
the evil power that ruins it. If it could be removed, we would be whole again. But 
claims about disavowed traumatic kernels typically disavow actual traumas, a ten-
sion that Melville sustains.
27. For Tocqueville acquisitive and individualistic daily life is “anti-poetic” be-
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cause it cannot support figurations of the ideal. But for people in a democratic era, 
a vibrant “source of poetry” is available in “the grand image of themselves” as a na-
tion (Democracy in America, 2:74). He thus depicts atomized liberal men seeking 
and finding a redemptive meaning (and political unity) in a poetry that abstracts 
from the palpable bonds he calls “the real and true” to project an ideal nation and 
“monsters” that threaten it. Authors and audiences, he argues, are joined by a taste 
for abstraction and idealization that is both literary and political: “Each citizen is 
habitually engaged in the contemplation of a very puny object: namely himself. . . . 
When he has been drawn out of his own sphere, therefore, he always expects that 
some amazing object will be offered to his attention; and it is on these terms alone 
that he consents to tear himself for a moment from the petty complicated cares 
that form the charm and excitement of his life. . . . Authors, on their part, . . . inflate 
their imaginations, and expanding them beyond all bounds, they not infrequently 
abandon the great to reach the gigantic. By these means they hope to attract the 
observation of the multitude” (Democracy in America, 2:77).
28. Rogin, Subversive Genealogy, 130. Heimert cites Andrew Jackson, who 
called the national bank a “huge sea-serpent” whose “leviathan folds” envelop the 
republic, and who promised that “the bank is trying to kill me but I will kill it.” 
Heimert also cites a critic of Theodore Parker: “He is possessed with inveterate 
monomania, which presents to his diseased mind all objects under one image. He 
is haunted by a specter . . . and this phantom he pursues with reckless speech of 
a wild huntsman, trampling on every obstacle to his headlong course” (Heimert, 
“Moby-Dick and American Political Symbolism,” 517). Accordingly, Rogin argues, 
“The relationship between American politics and American literary art is very 
nearly the reverse of that normally proposed.” For “if by realism is meant sensitiv-
ity to class and social constraint,” American political rhetoric is not realist. In turn, 
the absence of realist politics shapes literary form: to render inflated language, de-
monized objects, allegorical symbolism, melodramatic narrative, Melville forgoes 
realistic mimetic strategies; Rogin, Subversive Genealogy, 19. The Parker quote is 
from Rogin, Subversive Genealogy, 136.
29. For two powerful statements of the argument radically juxtaposing Ahab 
to Ishmael, see F. O. Matthiessen, American Renaissance: Art and Expression in 
the Age of Emerson and Whitman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941); and 
Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelley, All Things Shining (New York: Free 
Press, 2011).
30. Bentley, The Life of the Drama, 283. As Brodhead says, Melville depicts “a 
world so fully inhuman that Ahab’s rite of cosmic defiance seems like a noble and 
necessary response” (Hawthorne, Melville, and the Novel, 151). If accepting the 
universe in every regard and moment is the highest good, however, then rage is 
simply the symptom of a nonacceptance to reject and overcome. The alternative is 
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to accept rage as an understandable response to some aspects of life. The political 
question, therefore, is not so much if we are enraged, but how we explain it and 
channel it, and how we judge the explanations and actions of others. In a certain 
sense, acceptance may signal disconnection from the reality of a situation, not un-
justifiable resentment. 
31. There are credible reasons for the crew to assent to the hunt. They pile on 
the whale the grinding difficulty of life and the endlessly sacrificial—and violent—
human labor needed to sustain it. Melville depicts pastoral harmony and human 
conviviality, but he sees inescapable enmity between humans and nature as well as 
the “sharkish” qualities joining them.
32. Brodhead, Hawthorne, Melville, and the Novel, 129.
33. C. Wright Mills, “Private Troubles, Public Issues,” in Mills, Power, Politics 
and People, ed. Irving L. Horowitz (New York: Ballantine, 1963), 395. In “Para-
noid Reading and Reparative Reading,” in Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, 
Performativity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
argues that “paranoia has by now candidly become less a diagnosis than a prescrip-
tion. In a world where no one needs to be delusional to find systematic oppression, 
to theorize out of anything but a paranoid stance has come to seem naive, pious, 
or complacent” (125–126). In what Klein calls the paranoid-schizoid position, 
theorists anticipate—look for and find—injustice and systemic harm, partly be-
cause organized harm is ubiquitous and partly because aggression is split off from 
awareness and projected outward. Strong theory invests meaning, but in negatively 
charged and polarized ways. In contrast, Sedgwick uses Klein to argue that to in-
habit “the depressive position” is to repair the worldly damage aggression causes, 
partly by reclaiming disowned parts of the self, and partly by refusing polarizing 
ways of thinking and acting. By assuming that complexity defeats any claim to 
grasp a whole whale, and by assuming inescapable ambivalence in oneself, impu-
rity in each object of attachment, and imperfection in every norm and act, we turn 
from psychic splitting, intellectual dichotomy, melodramas of victimization, and 
heroized political antagonism. This depressive position is “no less acute, no less re-
alistic, no less attached to a project of survival, and neither more nor less delusional 
or fantasmatic” than the paranoid position, Sedgwick insists, but involves “a differ-
ent range of affects, ambitions, and risks” (Touching Feeling, 150). She encourages 
theorists on the left to turn from the paranoid to the depressive position, a move 
I associate with Ishmael. But as she notes that politics is likely to require both 
positions, or to occur at their intersection or in the interval between them, so I am 
arguing that Melville does not and cannot simply reject Ahab. Also see Sedgwick, 
“Melanie Klein and the Difference Affect Makes,” South Atlantic Quarterly 106, 
no. 3 (Summer 2007): 625–642.
34. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 2:78.
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35. “What the white whale was to Ahab, has been hinted at; what, at times, he 
was to me as yet remains unsaid.” The “at times” suggests that he does not have 
only this one view, but that it is crucial to dramatize: “But how can I hope to ex-
plain myself here; and yet . . . explain myself I must, else all these chapters might 
be naught” (Melville, Moby-Dick, 159).
36. Matthiessen, American Renaissance, 512. Ahab “cannot understand that 
the meaning he sees is a product of his imagination,” Brodhead claims, whereas 
Ishmael “generates meanings from within the processes of actual experience, en-
tertaining these not as final truth but for the sense they make of that experience” 
(Hawthorne, Melville, and the Novel, 156). Ahab claims purposeful causality and 
intentionality, and so follows fixed fates on “iron rails,” but Ishmael sees the preva-
lence of chance, mocks intentionality, notes the wayward, and aspires to attainable 
felicity. Ahab openly claims authority, but Ishmael parodies all forms of authority; 
Ahab is grim and audacious, while Ishmael is sly and exuberant; Ahab is consumed 
by one idea, while Ishmael is digressive, open promiscuously to many; Ahab at-
tacks, while Ishmael disarms, to “make friends with horror.” Inclusionary, Ishmael 
sees the violence but also the beauty in nature and human capacities for idiocy and 
savagery as well as care, grief, and wonder.
37. Sheldon Wolin, “Political Theory as a Vocation,” American Political Science 
Review 63, no. 4 (1969): 1062–1082.
38. In the political theory canon, Hobbes is not the only figure whose visionary 
capacity is tied to wounded rage. In The Tempest, the embittered Prospero wields 
(but finally snaps) a wand that represents the generative but problematic power 
of words and images to bewitch people and organize their lives. In More’s Uto-
pia, the character Morus depicts politics on a stage and counsels using “indirect 
philosophy” to work with and within a ruling script, whereas Hythlodaeus insists 
we must make a new play or remain captive to the “madness” normalized by the 
one now dominant. Ahab dramatizes what is problematic in what Wolin calls an 
architectonic mode of theorizing, but as Wolin notes, a political theory invested 
in the ordinary is “in a bind: it wants to be local and restricted, but structures of 
power—political, economic, and cultural—are national and global. To theorize 
the inside one must theorize the outside.” Sheldon Wolin, “What Time Is It?” 
Theory & Event 1, no. 1 (1997), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/.
39. Rogin, Subversive Genealogy, 111.
40. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1885), trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (1954; repr., New York: Penguin, 1996), 26–27.
41. Melville’s text uses Ahab’s aggression to enact what D. W. Winnicott calls 
“successful destruction,” when an enraged child mentally or internally destroys its 
other, but survival of that other enables the child to experience both its subjectiv-
ity and the fact that reality is outside it. Infantile omnipotence (Lawrence says 
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masterlessness) is defeated as aggression is both affirmed and limited, and as the 
border between inside and outside is felt, so the outside is experienced as real, 
independent of the self and its projections. Because the other credits but contains 
the child’s anger, the child discovers the world’s resilience, and its own. Likewise, 
Melville’s text is a “holding” environment as identification with Ahab engenders an 
experience of democratic subjectivity and of the world as an independent reality. 
On the use of Winnicott’s idea, see Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love (New 
York: Pantheon, 1988).
42. Toni Morrison, “Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-American Pres-
ence in American Literature,” Michigan Quarterly Review 28, no. 1 (Winter 
1989): 15–18. Her Ahab plays the prophet depicted by Father Mapple, whose ser-
mon on Jonah Ishmael hears before he ships out. The prophet is “to preach truth 
to the face of falsehood,” for “delight” is only “to him . . . who against the proud 
gods and commodores of this earth, ever stands forth his own inexorable self. . . . 
Delight is to him, who gives no quarter in the truth . . . and destroys all sin though 
he pluck it out from under the robes of Senators [e.g., Daniel Webster, advocate 
of the Fugitive Slave Act] and Judges [Lemuel Shaw, Melville’s father-in-law, who 
ruled it constitutional]. Delight . . . is to him who acknowledges no law or lord, but 
the Lord his God, and is only a patriot to heaven” (Melville, Moby-Dick, 75).
43. Melville, “Hawthorne and His Mosses,” 522. American artists respond very 
differently to Ahab’s anger. The director John Huston sounds like Morrison: “Ahab 
speaks for Melville, and through him he is raging at the deity. This point . . . was 
never commented on by any critic who saw the picture, even by those who cham-
pioned it. They failed to recognize that the work was a blasphemy. The message 
of Moby-Dick was hate. The whale is the mask of a malignant deity who torments 
mankind. Ahab pits himself against this evil power. Melville doesn’t choose to call 
the power Satan, but God.” Critics expected him to portray Ahab “as a raging 
madman,” but he “rejected that.” Joseph Persico, “Interview with John Huston,” 
American Heritage 33 (May 1992): 13. In contrast, Laurie Anderson confessed 
that she could not deal with this anger when she made the story into an opera. 
See Samuel Otter’s “Leviathanic Revelations,” in Ungraspable Phantom: Essays 
on Moby-Dick, ed. John Bryant, Mary K. Bercaw Edwards, and Timothy Marr 
(Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2006).
44. James Baldwin, “Notes of a Native Son,” in Notes of a Native Son (1955; 
repr., New York: Bantam, 1979), 95.
45. Baldwin, “Many Thousands Gone,” in Notes of a Native Son, 29–34.
46. Brodhead, Hawthorne, Melville, and the Novel, 125.
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Susan McWilliams
When scholars talk about the dilemmas of American political life in Moby-
Dick, they tend to focus on the dilemmas faced by the ship’s crew: the 
narrator who wants us to call him Ishmael, Starbuck, Stubb, Flask, and so 
on.1 Captain Ahab, in the literature, is largely approached as a monarchical 
or autonomous force—someone who comes in and exposes the weaknesses 
of the American polity by imposing on it, from above or outside. For C. L. 
R. James, for instance, Ahab is the “embodiment of the totalitarian type,” 
a man “by nature a dictatorial personality” who is thus able to manipulate 
a relatively incompetent and incoherent crew.2 Michael Rogin describes 
Ahab as the sole founder of a new, artificial Leviathan, who draws “on his 
destructive intimacy with nature, on the savage’s instinctual power, and 
on a transforming, technological magic” to control the ship’s sailors—thus 
symbolically changing the nation by reversing the course and mission of 
John Winthrop’s Arbella.3 John Alvis sees Ahab as a Caesarist demagogue 
who successfully subjugates a crew that lacks the religious or intellectual 
fortitude to resist him.4 To others Ahab represents not any type or group of 
human beings per se but, rather, large and impersonal social forces: indus-
trial capitalism, high Calvinism, modern warfare technology, and so on.5 
And a fair number of writers have approached Ahab as if he is either evil or 
the devil incarnate.6 All these approaches, and others like them, draw atten-
tion to the ways in which Captain Ahab stands apart, or stands differently, 
from the ordinary American or the American population en masse. In most 
assessments of his character, in other words, Captain Ahab is portrayed in 
some critical way as not one of us: foreign in the literal sense, foreign in the 
psychological sense, or both. Ahab seems to most to represent behavior that 
is beyond the bounds of ordinary sympathy and outside the strictures of 
everyday society.
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It is true that in some ways the book supports this kind of reading; early 
on in the book, Melville has Captain Peleg describe Ahab as a “grand, ungod-
ly, god-like man,” a description on which many commentators have seized.7 
And of course the great spectacle of Ahab’s demise invites us to focus on 
the extraordinary size of his excesses and his flaws. But this familiar cast on 
the name Ahab leaves at least something to be desired, since in many ways 
Melville goes out of his way to stress that Ahab is not an impersonal or oth-
erworldly force at all but an ordinary human being, someone who “responds 
humanly to other characters” and whose recognizably human qualities more 
than balance out his most extreme behaviors.8 For instance, just seconds 
after Peleg describes Ahab in those semidivine terms, he backtracks, empha-
sizing the extent of Ahab’s “humanities.” Ahab, he says, is a “good captain” 
and a “good man” with a good family; “he has a wife—not three voyages 
wedded—a sweet, resigned girl,” says Peleg, and “by that sweet girl that old 
man has a child.”9 If Ahab seems strange or alien at first glance, we quickly 
learn that he harks from a place much closer to home.
More specifically, Melville stresses the extent to which Ahab is not a 
foreign force but part of a well-established class of American citizens, with 
long roots in the nation’s history. Those roots are part occupational; early in 
Moby-Dick Melville cites one of Daniel Webster’s addresses to the Senate, 
an address in which Webster describes Nantucket whaling as one of the 
oldest and most estimable American industries, one that deserves “public 
encouragement.”10 More fundamentally, those roots are genealogical. Mel-
ville even intimates that Ahab shares a bloodline with Benjamin Franklin; 
“better than royal blood,” Ishmael says, Nantucketers like Ahab have the 
blood of the American Founders in their veins.11 Peleg underscores this 
genealogy in his discourse on Ahab; he tells Ishmael that, although Ahab 
has the name of a biblical king, “Ahab did not name himself”; in other 
words, if he seems aristocratic, it is by a kind of accident, and only a mat-
ter of appearance. Ahab, he emphasizes, is no noble; he is a Quaker, born 
and raised in that most egalitarian of early American religions. Shortly 
thereafter, when Ishmael foreshadows the story he is about to tell, a story 
of “meanest mariners” in which “men may seem detestable” and be marked 
by “ignominious blemish,” he insists that even the tale’s darkest charac-
ters are meant to be understood in the light of “democratic dignity,” in 
“that abounding dignity which has no robed investiture.” Even “the most 
mournful, perchance the most abased, of them all,” Ishmael says, should 
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be approached in the “Spirit of Equality,” in service to a “great democratic 
God.”12
It is worth considering Ahab along the lines that Ishmael suggests in the 
foregoing passage—not as an embodiment of impersonal force, tyranny, or 
pathology, but rather without any kind of “robed investiture.” Such a reading, 
as Ishmael indicates, allows us not just to see Ahab in a new light but also to 
see Melville’s more general teachings about the broader potential for demo-
cratic flourishing in the United States. I believe that the text more than justi-
fies this kind of reading, not only for the reasons I have already suggested, 
but also because of a signal fact that has often gotten lost in treatments of 
Ahab’s character. That is: two of Ahab’s most definitive characteristics—his 
isolation and his desire for domination—do not differentiate him from the 
other characters in the book but rather underscore how much he is like them. 
Among the Pequod’s crew in particular, those traits are the rule rather than 
the exception, a fact that helps explain why the crew members are so quick 
to adopt Ahab’s way of thinking: in large measure, it is already their own.13 
Moreover, in various places Melville suggests that those qualities, which 
many have rightly identified as the integral components of Ahab’s character, 
are decidedly or distinctively American qualities—that is, qualities that are 
endemic to the American population. If Ahab is noteworthy in these regards, 
then, it is largely because Americans as a whole are noteworthy in these re-
gards. (For a view that complements this argument even as it diverges from 
it, see George Shulman’s excellent contribution to this volume.)
What’s more, in the opening pages of Moby-Dick Melville twice calls 
our attention to the idea that, rather than treating Ahab’s character as odd 
or singular, he will treat it as a reflection, albeit a distilled or exaggerated 
one, of the character of the society that surrounds him. Early on, Ishmael 
notes that on a whaling ship the captain “gets his atmosphere at second 
hand from the sailors on the forecastle.” “He thinks he breathes it first; 
but not so. In much the same way do the commonality lead their leaders in 
many other things, at the same time the leaders little suspect it.”14 Before 
Captain Ahab is introduced, Melville already has suggested that he is not 
the sole or preeminent source of the atmosphere on the ship; his very breath 
is recycled from the lungs of the crew. It seems that even when we think 
he is in charge, or when Ahab himself thinks that his behavior is leading 
the direction of the ship, it may be in fact a lagging indicator of other, more 
widespread social phenomena.
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But perhaps Melville’s most clever hint along these lines appears 
among the book’s prefatory “extracts.” There he includes a line of Oliver 
Goldsmith’s that has been modified to read: “If you should write a fable 
for little fishes, you would make them speak like great whales.” As Mel-
ville presents it, the quotation suggests that in stories meant to instruct, the 
key characters are going to be exaggerated, made to appear bigger or more 
dramatic than their counterparts in real life. If you would create a story 
about a whale to instruct a school of fish about themselves, by the same 
principle you would create a story about “a mighty pageant creature” to in-
struct a school of ordinary citizens about themselves.15 You would exagger-
ate your character to better draw attention to a more pedestrian subject.16 
But Melville’s implication particularly stands out if you compare his modi-
fication of the line to what Goldsmith actually said, since in the original 
that meaning is absent: “Why, Mr. Johnson, [writing fables] is not so easy 
as you seem to think; for if you were to make little fishes talk, they would 
talk like WHALES. ”17 Melville transforms the quotation so that it takes on 
a more general and imperative tone, one that indicates his own approach; it 
suggests that when we see whales or other imposing figures (like Ahab) in 
the book, we are to understand that they are speaking to, and about, much 
more ordinary selves.
In this essay I focus on the ways in which Ahab is an ordinary self, or 
an ordinary American citizen, by the standards of Moby-Dick. Although 
we might not be inclined to think of them as average or “normal” quali-
ties, Ahab’s isolation and desire for domination are presented in the book 
as qualities that are widespread in the population, and qualities that have 
a great deal to do with one another. We can, to this extent, understand 
Ahab as an exaggerated caricature of the American character, a caricature 
that—in Ahab’s grand decline and defeat—sets into relief what Melville 
considered to be a great danger for and within American political life, and 
perhaps modern, mass democratic life more broadly.
By looking at Ahab in that light, I argue that in Moby-Dick we can 
see Melville worry that the United States is weakened by what he calls its 
“Isolato” culture: a culture in which norms and circumstances conspire to 
isolate individuals from one another. In such a culture, Melville thinks, the 
idea of independence becomes so overemphasized that the fact of human 
interdependence becomes dangerously underemphasized. In such a culture 
individuals become increasingly incapable of forging the most basic inter-
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personal connections, and they become more broadly incapable of engaging 
in public discussions about the direction of their common life; they become, 
in the simplest case, bad citizens. To that extent Melville echoes Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s fear that American democracy inclines toward a kind of indi-
vidualism that breeds a stance of political indifference and enervates pub-
lic life. But Melville suggests further that in an Isolato culture individuals 
who feel cut off from each other—and from deliberative political possibili-
ties—tend to understand their options for action solely in terms of violence 
and domination. The grand threat of an Isolato culture is that when the 
individuals within it act, they tend to act with a kind of brutality that is self-
denying and ultimately self-destroying. If we read Ahab’s story as a story 
of American character, what we read is a story about a particular kind of 
modern democratic self-delusion: a kind of self-delusion that emanates from 
certain individualist conceits of democratic life, but which culminates in a 
desperate struggle for dominance that stands to destroy a democratic citi-
zenry in the end.
The Life of Solitude
Almost every description of Ahab in Moby-Dick, from the beginning of the 
book to the end, turns on Ahab’s solitude. It is clear that even before his 
first encounter with Moby Dick, Ahab was a solitary man, not inclined to 
spend much time with others. As a sea captain, he has long been known for 
his profound detachment; though he has always been a great egalitarian, a 
person in whom “there seemed not to lurk the smallest social arrogance,” 
Ahab has never been able to talk to other people. For instance, unlike 
other captains, Ahab does not forbid discussion at his dining table, but at 
mealtimes he himself falls dumb, unable to participate in any conversation 
with others. As Ishmael puts it: “Socially, Ahab was inaccessible. Though 
nominally included in the census of Christendom, he was still an alien to 
it. He lived in the world, as the last of the Grisly Bears lived in settled 
Missouri. And as when Spring and Summer had departed, that wild Logan 
of the woods, burying himself in the hollow of a tree, lived out the winter 
there, sucking his own paws.”18 Ahab’s insularity is one of his definitive and 
most shaping qualities.19
But even though the extent of Ahab’s isolation is striking, among the 
characters in Moby-Dick it is hardly unusual. One of the first things that 
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Ishmael emphasizes, and then reemphasizes again and again, is that nearly 
everyone in his story is what he calls an “Isolato.” Almost all on the Pequod, 
he says, are Isolatoes, “not acknowledging the common continent of men, 
but each Isolato living on a separate continent of his own.” And in this re-
gard the crew of the Pequod is itself only a reflection of a broader culture; on 
the American shore, Ishmael notices how even men who have extensive and 
meaningful common histories will sit around at a “social breakfast table” in 
an awkward silence, “looking round as sheepishly at each other as though 
they had never been out of sight of some sheepfold among the Green Moun-
tains.” The same isolationism persists in church, where Ishmael describes 
the parishioners “purposely sitting apart from the other” in silence, “insular 
and incommunicable,” preached to by a minister who stands before them 
in his own “physical isolation.” Even the loquacious Captain Peleg strikes 
Ishmael as fundamentally “insular” and “distrustful” of others.20 On land 
and at sea, almost everyone Ishmael encounters is an Isolato, just like Ahab.
Tellingly, almost all the characters in Moby-Dick who do not seem to be 
Isolatoes are not American citizens.21 Ishmael is struck by how easily Que-
equeg, the “uncivilized” cannibal from the South Pacific, is able to make a 
heartfelt proclamation of deep and abiding friendship. “In a countryman,” 
Ishmael reflects, “this sudden flame of friendship would have seemed far 
too premature, a thing to be much distrusted.” But for Queequeg, “those 
old rules would not apply.” Melville’s suggestion here is clear: among Ameri-
cans, deep human connections are so unusual that they are suspect; keep-
ing interpersonal distance is the norm. Some kind of social isolationism is 
the peculiar national standard. Melville underscores this point even more 
forcefully by comparing the atmosphere on American whaling ships to that 
on foreign whaling ships. In contrast to the Isolato culture of the American 
whaling ship, Ishmael wonders at the “abounding good cheer” and sociabil-
ity of an English whaling ship, a ship filled with “eating, and drinking, and 
laughing.” And those “famous, hospitable ships” of the English, he says, are 
meager in their sociability compared to Dutch whaling ships, where “high 
livers” are “flooded with whole pipes, barrels, quarts, and gills of good gin 
and good cheer.” The character of whaling ships, he concludes, are “inci-
dental and particular” to the countries that launch them.22 By the same 
logic, it seems that Ahab’s character, at least as far as his habits of solitude 
go, is incidental and particular to the country that launched him.
Although many scholars have tried to tie Ahab’s isolated ways to other, 
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more particular conditions—that he is an orphan, that he is a Quaker, that 
he is a whaler, that he is a captain, that he has been disabled—Melville 
makes clear that none of those may be regarded as a definitive “cause” of 
his solitude.23 Characters in the book who were not orphaned are called 
Isolatoes; characters in the book who are not Quakers are called Isolatoes; 
women and children and others who never set foot on whaling ships fit the 
description of Isolatoes; all the crew members on Ahab’s ship who do not 
share his rank are Isolatoes; and people who are not disabled are called 
Isolatoes. Even if we may regard all those particular qualities as aggravating 
the habits of solitude that shape Ahab’s life, none can be considered to rep-
resent a singular, causal link. Perhaps to underscore the point, the book also 
introduces at least a couple of foreign whaleship captains who share Ahab’s 
rank and profession—and who even have lost limbs to Moby Dick!—but 
who do not seem to share Ahab’s tendency toward social isolation and in-
sularity.24 In highlighting Ahab’s habits of solitude when emphasizing his 
Americanness, Melville suggests that the two are deeply connected.
In fact, Melville repeatedly implies a link between American life and 
social isolation. The Pequod, peopled by Isolatoes, is just like “the Ameri-
can army and military and merchant navies, and the engineering forces 
employed in the construction of the American Canals and Railroads,” says 
Ishmael. In each case, he explains, the population is made up of people 
whose ancestry is international, but who have landed in a single place and 
find themselves engaged in common work. Yet even as they daily toil and 
strive together, they live without “acknowledging the common continent 
of men.” They act as if they still live on independent islands, although they 
all now sleep on the same piece of land. They have been “federated along 
one keel”—the language of “federation” is telling, of course, another in-
dication that Melville is focused on the United States—but they remain 
separate, each in a place of isolation and solitude. For Americans, who are 
all somehow detached from their ancestry and tied to different histories, 
detachment has become the normal way of life. This way of life finds itself 
expressed throughout the American nation, and in its whaling ships. Mel-
ville again signals this in a prefatory “extract” that he modified from an 
original text, this time James Rhodes’s Cruise in a Whale Boat: “It is gen-
erally well known that out of the crews of Whaling vessels (American) few 
ever return in the ships on board of which they departed.”25 In the original 
text, the word “American” is absent.26 Again, Melville misquotes to make 
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his own meaning clear: that detachment and separation—not to mention 
some amount of disloyalty—are the marks of the American whaleship in 
particular, and the marks of American life more generally.
In a funny way, then, Melville echoes Ralph Waldo Emerson’s asser-
tion a decade earlier that a signal “sign of our times” in the United States is 
a set of norms and circumstances that isolate individuals from one another. 
In this environment, Emerson says, “everything that tends to insulate the 
individual” is valued and protected, and the idea that “help must come from 
the bosom alone” is accepted across the board.27 The picture that Melville 
draws of American citizens in Moby-Dick is a kind of Emersonian paradise 
in those terms, a society in which individual insulation is the standard mode 
of being. But in Melville’s telling, quite opposed to Emerson’s well-known 
vision, a society in which solitude is the standard becomes a society of peo-
ple whose way of thinking about themselves is deeply problematic.
Disdaining Dependence
Specifically, Melville suggests that in a society where solitude is a way of 
life, and the idea of solitude is valued, the fact and idea of human interde-
pendence are concomitantly devalued. No one exemplifies this more than 
Captain Ahab, who is humiliated by and furious about his injury in large 
part because it has made him tangibly dependent on others. He needs doc-
tors to help tend to his wounds; he needs a carpenter to craft and repair his 
false leg; he needs other crew members to assist him in climbing ladders 
during the ritual of “gamming” that takes place when two whaleships meet 
each other at sea. Without others, Ahab is quite literally without a leg to 
stand on. This state of things infuriates him. At one point, while waiting 
for the carpenter to fix his false leg, Ahab makes the nature of his most 
pressing complaint clear. He yells, “Here I am, proud as a Greek god, and 
yet standing debtor to this blockhead for a bone to stand on! Cursed be that 
mortal inter-indebtedness which will not do away with ledgers. I would be 
as free as air; and I’m down in the whole world’s books.”28 What Ahab says 
he hates about his injury, more than anything else, is the way in which it 
seems to have turned him into a dependent creature. For Ahab, a man who 
has long been habituated to a norm or standard of solitude, being so obvi-
ously dependent on other people seems a humiliation. Ahab’s life of solitude 
has prepared him to mistrust all interdependence, even or especially his 
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own, and his mistrust along those lines is one of his signature qualities.29 
Having spent a life in which his insularity has helped define his identity and 
status, Ahab experiences his visible dependence almost as if it is a loss of 
his humanity. For him, being human means being able to live a life apart.
But, notably, Ahab is not the only Isolato on the ship who is troubled by 
the idea and fact of his dependence on others. Ishmael, for instance, becomes 
quite anxious when he finds himself tied to Queequeg by a monkey rope as 
they work to insert the ship’s blubber hook into a recently caught whale. 
Hitched to Queequeg, Ishmael begins to panic. “I seemed to distinctly per-
ceive that my own individuality was now merged in a joint stock company 
of two,” he recalls later. “My free will had received a mortal wound.” With 
no way to “get rid of the dangerous liabilities which the hempen bond en-
tailed,” Ishmael reports feeling their mutual dependence to be “so gross an 
injustice” that it could not possibly be sanctioned by Providence. Although 
he eventually comes to terms with the situation, he never forgets that first 
reaction: his association of interdependence with danger, degradation, and 
injustice. He remarks elsewhere that once you have cultivated an idea of 
“man, in the ideal,” as a “grand and glowing creature” set apart from oth-
ers, then the idea of men as “joint stock-companies”—that is, interdepen-
dent beings who share risk and liability—“may seem detestable.”30 In other 
words, Ishmael says, when you are used to the idea of humans as heroically 
independent creatures, the idea of humans as interdependent creatures 
seems decidedly second-rate. For those ensconced in Isolato ways of being 
and thinking, interdependence becomes disdainful, and dependence be-
comes equivalent to dishonor.
The moments during which Ishmael and Queequeg are linked by a 
monkey rope are even more telling, though, because Queequeg—the non-
American who alone seems to resist the Isolato culture of the ship—does 
not seem to be bothered by the experience in the least. While Ishmael is 
busy convincing himself that the situation represents a mortal blow to his 
free will, Queequeg goes about his business. Undisturbed by the idea of 
being tied to another, Queequeg is able to act with what others on the ship 
consider unparalleled calmness and bravery. Throughout the book, in fact, 
Melville stresses both the fact that Queequeg thinks differently about inter-
dependence than the other men on the ship, and the fact that his different 
thinking gives him a kind of strength and ability to act that the Isolatoes 
lack. For instance, before they board the Pequod, Ishmael and Queequeg 
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wind up in a minor altercation that ends when a man gets blown off a dock 
and begins to drown. While all the Americans at the scene stand and watch 
in horrified silence, Queequeg dives into the water and saves the flailing 
man. After the rescue, the American bystanders want to fawn over his brav-
ery, but Queequeg just asks for a glass of water and stands at the edge of the 
crowd. Ishmael watches Queequeg in this pose and says that he “seemed 
to be saying to himself—‘It’s a mutual, joint-stock world, in all meridians. 
We cannibals must help these Christians.’”31 Again, then, Melville associ-
ates Queequeg’s distinctiveness with his acceptance of the idea that it is a 
“mutual, joint-stock world”—that is, a world in which all humans are inter-
dependent and liable for each other. And Melville underscores that this dis-
tinctive outlook has something to do with the fact that Queequeg remains a 
“cannibal”; he has not been Americanized.32
Queequeg, in contrast to Ahab and the other men on the Pequod, does 
not experience his own dependence as either disturbing or paralyzing. Even 
when an illness brings him to death’s door, and he becomes almost totally 
dependent on other members of the crew to keep him alive, Queequeg re-
mains calm and good-spirited. He even asks the ship’s carpenter to fashion 
him a coffin that will resemble those used on his native island. Quite unlike 
Ahab, who rages and roils when the carpenter works on a project that signi-
fies his frailty and dependence, Queequeg seems nothing but grateful to 
the man who has so worked on his behalf. And later, when he recovers from 
his illness, Queequeg is not bothered—as other men on the ship are—by 
the frailty and dependence that the coffin signifies; rather, “with a wild 
whimsiness,” he turns it into a sea chest. Queequeg both acknowledges his 
own interdependent status in the world and does not fear or lament it. And 
critically, it is at this moment in the story that we learn that Ahab is both 
mystified by and envious of Queequeg. Ishmael describes Ahab watching 
Queequeg on the dock, as if the latter’s body spoke “a mystical treatise on 
the art of attaining truth.” Staring at Queequeg, Ahab exclaims, “Oh, devil-
ish tantalization of the gods!”33
For Ahab, Queequeg is alluring because he represents an appealing 
way of being; he embodies the possibility of ailing and depending on others 
without suffering humiliation.34 Put another way, Ahab knows that Que-
equeg possesses a critical quality that he, Ahab, does not. And he also seems 
to know that this quality enables Queequeg to have, even in moments of 
total dependence, a kind of spiritual clarity or contentment and a kind of 
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inner strength. But Ahab has trouble learning what, according to Ishmael, 
Queequeg has to teach: the idea that every individual has a “Siamese con-
nexion with a plurality of other mortals,” and to acknowledge that is the first 
step toward an “unappalled” life of courage and contentment. According to 
Ishmael, Queequeg demonstrates that though acknowledging interdepen-
dence is frightening because it involves the acceptance of human frailty—
since it forces you to realize that “if your banker breaks, you snap; if your 
apothecary by mistake sends you poison in your pills, you die”—it also is 
liberating in that it brings you closer to the truth of the human condition. 
Queequeg’s “good cheer,” so unusual on the ship, comes from his apprecia-
tion of human interdependence.35 It is a lesson that Ahab seems unable to 
learn. Committed to habits of isolation and a kind of thinking that idealizes 
solitude, he tends to resist even the idea of his own interdependent human 
condition.
Melville underscores the idea that for Ahab—and, indeed, for his fel-
low American Isolatoes—the way of thinking that accompanies the habit 
of solitude is a way of thinking that both neglects and devalues the idea of 
human interdependence. Further, in Moby-Dick this proves to be a way 
of thinking that is less than desirable: a way of thinking that brings nei-
ther knowledge nor strength nor spiritual contentment. Melville associates 
the Isolato way of thinking with anxiety, paralysis, and rage. This stands in 
contrast to the bravery, wisdom, and contentment that Melville associates 
with the acceptance of human interdependence. By this token, if Emerson 
is right in thinking that Americans are wedded to the idea of human inde-
pendence, Melville worries that Americans are dangerously divorced from 
the fact of human interdependence. And the result of that divorce may well 
be a nation that drowns in rage and anxiety. For Melville the Isolato model 
that seems to define American thinking leads down an unfavorable path; 
his descriptions of Ahab’s rage and desolation, and his bewildered envy of 
that foreign harpooner, begin to make that clear.
The Desolation of Solitude
To be fair, at some moments Ahab seems to come close to recognizing the 
limitation of the way he thinks and the cost that his Isolato ways have im-
posed on him. In one of Moby-Dick’s most memorable scenes, in a chapter 
titled “The Symphony,” Ahab laments his life to Starbuck, and what he 
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laments in particular is the “the desolation of solitude it has been.” His 
life, he says, seems to have forced a burdensome isolation on him, one that 
has compelled him to exist “against all natural lovings and longings.” As he 
sheds a tear, he describes living without any kind of close or extended hu-
man companionship. It is a kind of “Guinea-coast slavery,” he tells Starbuck, 
to be so solitary in the world. He imagines, he says, that his “one small 
brain” and “one single heart” are “turned round and round in this world, 
like yonder windlass,” with nothing to grasp, and nothing to which they may 
be fixed.
At one point in this set of pained reflections, Ahab even implores Star-
buck to look into his eyes—“let me look into a human eye,” he says; “it is 
better than to gaze into sea or sky; better than to gaze upon God”—so that 
he might finally find some human connection. The eye is the “magic glass,” 
he tells Starbuck, and he hopes that looking into his first mate’s eyes may fi-
nally bring him some true communion, some sense of connection to others, 
and some sense of being at home in the world. “Close!” he yells to Starbuck. 
“Stand close to me.” Starbuck obliges and, as his eyes meet Ahab’s, begins to 
speak of his own “loving” and “longing” in the world. But at that, Ahab looks 
away—“like a blighted fruit tree,” Ishmael says, casting “his last, cindered 
apple to the soil.” Ahab turns away from Starbuck, and Starbuck promptly 
runs off. Finding his first mate gone, Ahab crosses the deck “to gaze over 
on the other side,” where he stares at the “two reflected, fixed eyes in the 
water there.”36 He begins the final chase for Moby Dick the next morning.
There are a couple of critical things to notice about this passage, which 
I agree with many others is pivotal within Moby-Dick.37 The first is that this 
attempt at human connection, despite Ahab’s heartfelt plea for it, is not in 
the end successful. It culminates not in an embrace, not in any profession of 
mutual interdependence or purpose—not in any kind of human together-
ness. It ends with Starbuck stealing away and Ahab staring into the ocean, 
both men seeming more isolated than ever. Despite what both Ahab and 
Starbuck acknowledge in that moment as a basic human need for connec-
tion with others, they cannot achieve it. It is a grim and foreboding failure, 
one underscored by the description of Starbuck as “blanched to a corpse’s 
hue with despair” as he hurries off the deck.38
To that end, this chapter of the book encapsulates Melville’s idea that 
people who have become habituated to a life of isolation might not be able 
to overcome that isolation in any meaningful way, even when desperation 
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or necessity demands it. If this is as close as two Isolatoes may get to sound-
ing in true harmony—a suggestion Melville makes by titling this chapter 
“The Symphony”—it is clear how poorly they do.39 Their voices do not 
come together in a pleasing or brilliant consonance; they remain separate 
and halting, reaching a discordant end. These Isolatoes are unable to find 
a common sound, even when they search for it. The conclusion is grim, but 
it is a common refrain in Melville’s writing. None of Melville’s Isolatoes—
in Moby-Dick or elsewhere—succeed socially or find human connection, 
despite their desire or need to do so.40 The individual who has become so 
isolated suffers a kind of distortion over time, a distortion that renders him 
or her incapable of full access to the human community.41
In the exchange between Ahab and Starbuck, Melville offers a hint 
about how he understands the nature of that distortion and what it entails. 
When looking into Starbuck’s eyes, Ahab calls them a “magic glass.” But 
in those words, what sounds like a poetic tribute to human communion 
is actually a disturbing revelation: earlier in the voyage, Ahab describes a 
“magician’s glass” as something that “to each and every man in turn but mir-
rors back his own mysterious self.” What Ahab actually sees in Starbuck’s 
eyes—what any human might literally see, looking in another’s eyes—is his 
own reflection. Ahab experiences the eyes not as the window to another’s 
soul but as a mirror to his own. It is by that account no wonder that when he 
turns away from Starbuck, he turns to stare into the sea. His view there is 
the same; indeed, early in Moby-Dick Ishmael says that Narcissus was tor-
mented by “the same image” that “we ourselves see in all rivers and oceans”: 
our own.42 The particular distortion of Ahab’s vision is that he has become 
so isolated that he cannot see, in an almost literal way, outside himself. And 
Starbuck’s vision is not much better. His first response, when Ahab looks 
into his eyes, is to start talking about himself: his own yearning, his own 
loneliness, his own desire to return to Nantucket. Starbuck, too, is an Iso-
lato, and, in his own way, he has trouble reaching outside his inner being. It 
is not merely that these men devalue interdependence, intellectually speak-
ing; it is also that they have trouble expressing their interdependence and 
acting with that interdependence in mind, practically speaking.
What Ahab can speak, as he does in this exchange, is the language of 
“Guinea-coast slavery.” The great irony of the master of the ship—whose 
rule depends on enforcing his authoritarian, almost totalizing control over 
others—claiming a position of enslavement is not to be missed.43 Especially 
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   121 10/29/13   10:57 AM
122  Susan McWilliams
in nineteenth-century America, this is not an innocent linguistic inver-
sion.44 It suggests at the very least a kind of political blindness, an inability 
to see outside the self. (This is not a blindness of Ahab’s alone; at the be-
ginning of the book Ishmael speaks in similarly problematic terms when 
he asks, “Who ain’t a slave?”)45 That he would call his own isolation an 
enslavement demonstrates his neglect of the very proximate existence of 
actual slaves. Ahab’s isolation corresponds, in Melville’s telling, with a 
failure to understand the most evident political dynamics of his time and 
place—largely because he does not seem to be able to acknowledge the 
reality of anyone’s position other than his own. And, of course, that kind of 
neglect of the experience of others itself provides support for the legal and 
political institution of slavery.
Through this exchange, Melville develops the notion that Ahab’s iso-
lation—and the isolation of others on the Pequod—is not just a kind of 
material fact but involves the development of a particular way of seeing. 
It is a way of seeing that lacks the quality of mutual recognition, the very 
quality that Ralph Ellison, among others, has singled out as essential to the 
maintenance of any democratic covenant in general, and to “the ethical 
authority of American law” in particular, since mutual recognition involves 
an acknowledgment of the common humanity that justifies democratic citi-
zenship.46 Both Ahab and Starbuck, having lives in which social isolation 
is a norm, have adjusted their vision accordingly and adjusted it in a way 
that makes it difficult if not impossible for them to see each other in full. 
Each has been thrown back on himself enough to be confined, to borrow 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s phrase, “within the solitude of his own heart.”47 In 
another, each man sees only himself, just a reflection of his solitary pains. 
This makes effective communication and joint action difficult at best, since 
both depend on some recognition of others and of the common continent 
of humanity.
This way of seeing is endemic on the Pequod. As Melville presents it, 
it is the way of seeing that develops among people who assume their own 
isolation from others, and who by some degree of circumstance and choice 
have long been divorced from a sense of commonality. It finds no clearer 
example than when Ahab nails a gold doubloon to the mainmast, announc-
ing that he will award it to the first sailor who spots Moby Dick. The dou-
bloon comes from Ecuador, and it is an unremarkable coin in that it has a 
border announcing its provenance and an artistic design of national signifi-
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cance in the middle.48 But every single man on the ship, when looking at the 
doubloon, reads himself and his own story into the coin’s design. As each 
person on the ship comes by to look at the gold coin, it becomes clear that 
the doubloon merely reflects the aspirations and attachments of the person 
who gazes on it.49 No one on the Pequod speaks with anyone else about the 
coin, not to compare interpretations of the design and certainly not to re-
flect together about what the doubloon’s presence itself might signify for the 
voyage as a whole. Melville portrays the crew members as locked into their 
solitary worlds, confined mostly to conversation within their own heads. 
Here, as elsewhere in the novel, the characters do not engage in discussions 
with one another so much as they give speeches to themselves.50
Of course, in their failure to come together to see what the doubloon 
might mean for them as a community, the Isolatoes on the Pequod demon-
strate one of the reasons that their voyage ends in such spectacular failure. 
By looking and speaking only within themselves, they neglect the chance to 
develop a more holistic, communal sense of the state of the ship—a sense 
that might come from more interpersonal connection and communication. 
This kind of failure is first made clear in Moby-Dick when Ahab announces 
his intention to pursue the white whale; there are varying degrees of dis-
comfort among the crew, but no man on the crew discusses his hesitations 
with another.51 Melville even separates the reactions of different crew mem-
bers into different chapters and headings, drawing attention to the extent of 
their mutual isolation. In a community of Isolatoes, it seems, there is a pre-
dictable reluctance to engage in the kind of shared discussion and public de-
liberation that may exert an informing or even moderating force on policy. 
Presuming that they, too, have developed habits of seeing and thinking that 
lack the quality of mutual recognition, they may even be unable to imagine 
such a public or common discussion in the first place. Many are able to run 
from Ahab, quite literally—they run apart “in a terror of dismay” when he 
reasserts his plans later in the book—but none is able to communicate with 
another or translate his dread into some kind of organized response.52 This 
impotence gets worse over time; monologues become more frequent as the 
story progresses, gradually replacing dialogue and multivoiced conversation 
almost entirely.53 Again, on this count, Melville’s Isolatoes sound a great 
deal like Tocqueville’s description of the kind of American individualism he 
feared; in “the habit of always considering themselves as standing alone,” 
Americans constitute a populace who live divorced from the public sphere, 
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disconnected from the political.54 They fail to act well as interdependent 
beings because they fail to see each other as interdependent beings.
Notably, despite the emphasis in thinkers like Tocqueville and Win-
throp on the potential for religion to furnish the kind of spirit of inter-
dependence that the men on the Pequod lack, their common Christian 
background does little to furnish them with the sense of community they 
need.55 Not only is their worship on land defined by its “insular and incom-
municable” rituals marked by “physical isolation,” as I discuss above, but 
also Melville suggests that their religiosity at sea is more reminiscent of 
some “Christian hermit of old times” whose worship takes place only in 
the context of a much more powerful—definitive—separation from society 
at large.56 Stubb make this point powerfully clear when he shouts, “That’s 
Christianity!” in response to a speech by the ship’s cook, the thrust of which 
is that, just as it is hopeless to keep sharks from being sharks, it is hopeless 
to keep men from their own sharklike inclinations.57 It is a speech that sug-
gests that self-restraint and democratic self-governance are nearly impos-
sible. Melville presents the “Christianity” of the crew, then, as something of 
a farce; whatever truly Christian sentiments they once harbored have been 
overpowered by the isolating (and ultimately self-absorbing) forces of their 
lives. Again and again, despite an ancestral religion that insists on treating 
the other as self, the men on the Pequod are stymied by their repeated fail-
ures even to engage each other.
Among the crew, perhaps the greatest failure along these lines is Star-
buck’s, which Melville describes in meticulous detail. Even when Starbuck 
thinks of trying to stop Captain Ahab, he never considers sounding out any-
one else on the ship or looking for others who might agree with him, much 
less trying to enlist anyone else’s help (and Melville makes clear that there 
are at least some other people on the ship who would aid his cause).58 Star-
buck feels so isolated—“I stand alone here upon an open sea,” he cries—
that he thinks his only option is to commit a ghastly crime: to sneak into 
Ahab’s cabin and shoot him. But he rejects that course of action, under-
standably reluctant to become a murderer.59 Yet, having made the decision 
that private violence is beyond him, he goes no further. He neglects to think 
about the possibility of any common or public option for resisting Ahab. 
Rather, he effectively throws up his hands, giving himself up to whatever 
might happen. Having decided that he cannot stop Ahab by himself, with 
violence, Starbuck comes to believe that he can do nothing.
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In some ways, Starbuck’s feelings of terrible disconnection bring this 
analysis back to an earlier point, since they echo the feelings of terrible dis-
connection that Ahab expresses when he bewails the isolations of his own 
life. Each man is accustomed to imagining that he stands alone in the world. 
But standing alone has, by definition, a lonely element to it. Thus, Ahab says 
that at times he imagines himself as a tiny being, tossed around in a cold 
universe by the winds of chance. And Starbuck despairs of the cruel hand 
that fate has dealt him, as he imagines himself entirely alone, in the middle 
of the yawning and watery Pacific. Although the two men seem often set 
in a kind of opposition, they share in the Isolato’s lament. It is the lament 
of the man who is cut off from any sense of common human action or pur-
pose, hampered by a disdain for the idea of human interdependence, a fail-
ure to fully recognize others, and an inability to forge meaningful human 
connection.
Moreover, it is telling that, during the moment in which he feels this 
kind of disconnection most acutely, Starbuck contemplates murderous vio-
lence. Believing that he is alone in the world, he understands his ability to 
act to be limited to the most naked kind of brutality. He believes, in short, 
that the only way he might connect with the world enough to change it is by 
imposing on it by force. Though Starbuck does not go down that path, his 
sense of the set of actions available to him is telling. It seems difficult and 
almost unnatural for him to contemplate collective or deliberative action, 
but it seems effortless for him to consider the path of inaction on the one 
hand, and the path of violent, dominating action on the other.
The Drive to Domination
Of course, those are precisely the two paths of action that Ahab believes 
are available to him when it comes to the white whale. As he says over and 
again, in his mind the only two options are between doing nothing and 
risking the lives of the entire crew to kill the white whale. He cannot—and 
will not—consider any other possibilities for more moderate or deliberative 
action, as he makes most clear when he tells Starbuck that the decision to 
pursue Moby Dick is his alone. He can choose either inaction or domina-
tion, he says, and points a musket at Starbuck’s head to indicate that he has 
chosen the latter path.60 Ahab’s sense of his own options mirrors Starbuck’s 
sense of his options, and it draws further attention to the fact that Ahab’s 
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way of thinking is not unusual on the ship he commands. Melville indicates 
that if collective or deliberative joint action seems difficult or even unnatu-
ral to Isolatoes, they have little trouble imagining action that is violent or 
domineering. Isolatoes tend either toward the path of inaction—exhibiting 
the kind of indifference to the public sphere that Tocqueville feared—or 
toward the path of action through undeliberative force.
Needless to say, Ahab chooses the path of domination and force. But 
tellingly, he justifies his choice time and again by arguing to the crew that 
it is only by force that men can overcome their isolation and solitude. Men 
live behind “pasteboard masks,” he says, and the only way to escape the soli-
tary confines of living behind the mask is to “strike through the mask” with 
some kind of violent action. “How can the prisoner reach outside except 
by thrusting through the wall?” he asks.61 For Ahab, who assumes human 
isolation, choosing violence is superior to choosing inaction because at least 
violence—even destructive violence—may have the potential to transform 
or even overcome the pains and limitations of human isolation. Dominating 
someone forges a kind of connection with him, albeit a nonideal one. And 
sharing in an act of domination does the same. But perhaps more impor-
tant, violence seems to hold out the possibility for one individual to assert 
a singular place in the world, to transcend the boundaries of the isolated 
self. Ahab’s thinking along these lines is what one critic has called “bad 
transcendental thinking,” but it is the kind of transcendental thinking that 
Melville posits as natural, or at least probable, for the Isolato.62
Melville stresses this when he has Ahab say, as some of the crew mem-
bers begin to rally to his cause, that they all must join in because “stand 
up amid the general hurricane, thy one tost sapling cannot.”63 The image 
Ahab uses is revealing, largely because it is almost exactly the language 
he uses to describe the desolation of his own solitude. But this time, Ahab 
locates himself on the side of the hurricane gales. For Ahab, the world 
seems a place of impersonal forces that exert power by domination. And 
in such a world, the individual can have power only to the extent that he 
can become—or, to a lesser extent, become part of—a dominating force. 
The alternative is to be subject to the whims of an impersonal world, to 
be dependent and therefore, in Ahab’s mind, humiliated. Unable to come 
to terms with the fact of human interdependence, Ahab can conceive of 
the world only as a struggle for domination, in which the central dynamic 
is to humiliate or be humiliated.64 In such stories one is either dominant 
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or humiliated, rendered either powerful by the use of force or impotent 
by inaction.
To be certain, Ahab’s well-documented quest for domination is an at-
tempt to reassert his own individual power, to “prove” that his evidently 
disabled and dependent condition is only a kind of illusion. If, by killing the 
white whale, Ahab were able to triumph in a battle over nature itself, he 
would be able to reclaim the old fantasy of himself as an independent pres-
ence in the world.65 His attempt to achieve a kind of cosmic transcendence 
by force is an attempt to make a definitive statement of independence. This 
is clear in the language he uses when, partway through the journey, he starts 
worshipping fire.66 Ahab announces that he is modeling himself after fire; 
he, too, will seek to reassert control over his own destiny through destruc-
tive force and domination. In addition, he says, he worships fire because fire 
is a “hermit immemorial”—a solitary figure exerting independent force in 
the world, even in the face of “unanticipated grief.” For Ahab, fire seems to 
embody the possibility of existing in the world on essentially independent 
terms, overcoming setbacks and losses without needing any help; fire seems 
to him to demonstrate that such independence can come only through the 
pursuit of a kind of destructive domination. Ahab even announces that the 
flames are his “fiery father,” the representation of his “genealogy.”67 He has 
chosen to follow the path of fire, as he understands that path to exist.
Quite obviously, in making this proclamation Ahab demonstrates the 
extent to which his self-knowledge has become distorted; he quite literally 
disowns his human forebears. His claim represents an attempt to distance 
himself from his species and shows the extent to which his way of thinking 
has led him to disdain humanity altogether—even his own.68 Here Melville 
indicates the extent to which Ahab’s aspirations to independence (and his 
accompanying disdain for the idea of interdependence) have distorted his 
thinking. Ahab’s desire to be an independent power in the world, a desire 
that he believes can be realized through the destructive domination of oth-
ers, amounts in the end to a desire to be something other than human. As 
Catherine Zuckert has indicated, such a desire in fact represents an abroga-
tion of responsibility; he would rather take his whole ship down than admit 
his own mortal limits and the limits of his understanding.69 Ishmael under-
scores this when he opines that any person who takes his bearings from a 
fire is suffering from an “unnatural hallucination” of lies. “Look not too long 
in the face of the fire, O man!” he cries. If Ahab has become an exemplar of 
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“madness,” Ishmael suggests, it is because his way of seeing the world cul-
minates in hallucinatory thinking. But, notably, Ishmael says this after relat-
ing his own experience of staring too long into the flames of the tryworks 
on the ship; he thus makes clear that the temptations of fire watching—the 
temptations of hallucination and destructive action—are not temptations to 
Ahab alone. It is easy, on the Pequod, to want to stare into the fire and to 
embrace all it represents.70
Again, it is important to realize that Ahab’s way of thinking—albeit 
exaggerated—is not exceptional on the Pequod. As a number of critics 
have noticed, the Pequod’s crew seems inclined to violence from the be-
ginning, always seeking domination through a kind of unrestrained and 
even totalizing warfare.71 Virtually the only time Melville describes a long 
conversation within the crew itself, it culminates in a brutal knife fight. 
Even the Quakers among them are “fighting Quakers,” Ishmael says; they 
are “Quakers with a vengeance” who seek not consensus but domination.72 
They alternate between periods of inaction and periods of naked aggres-
sion, with, as I have mentioned, little conversation in between—and when 
they do have conversations, it is often only after they have recently killed 
a whale.73 To the extent they have a common life, that life is organized 
not around mutual recognition but around mutual violence. Their behavior 
suggests a general belief in the idea that domination by force is the primary 
if not only course of action available in the world—at least, the only action 
besides inaction.
Moreover, as Zuckert has argued, Ahab represents the aim of modern 
science, with its emphasis on the conquest and mastery of nature.74 He would 
assert his mastery over nature not just in spite of but because of his aware-
ness that nature is in fact the master of men, an inclination that Melville 
stresses is common among whalers.75 “But a moment’s consideration will 
teach, that however baby man may brag of his science and skill,” he writes, 
“yet for ever and for ever, . . . the sea will insult and murder him.” Ahab is 
just one of many who would, by virtue of setting sail, engage this “foe” who 
is likely to consume him in the end.76 All the men on the Pequod are men 
who have a strong desire to exert themselves against a hostile nature.
Ahab’s vision thus has deep resonance within a crew that, on many lev-
els, sees the world in the same terms he does. They, too, seem accustomed 
to thinking in terms of a dichotomy between impotence by inaction and 
domination by force. At that level of fundamentals, Ahab’s way of thinking 
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is the crew’s way of thinking. Many of them are already inclined to pursue a 
risky and violent course in the world. And even those men on the ship who 
have some sense that the violence in Ahab’s plan is ill-advised—men like 
Starbuck, who might be inclined to choose inaction—have trouble resisting 
because they have trouble imagining or actualizing some kind of joint re-
sponse. And, as I have mentioned, they even have trouble recognizing each 
other’s discomfort in the first place; they are too locked into their private 
isolations. Therefore, even though Ahab’s plan reveals itself to be a plan 
based on “measureless self-deception,” as Ishmael suggests, Ahab seems to 
have an equally “measureless power of deceiving and bedeviling so many 
others” because their way of thinking, like his, already inclines to that exact 
kind of self-deception.77 To that degree, it is easy to explain why, as so many 
scholars have noted, it actually takes Ahab very little effort to convince the 
crew to go along with his plan.78 He does not have to convince them as much 
as he has to speak in a language that is already theirs.79
And theirs is a language and way of thinking that, according to Melville, 
is decidedly American. Throughout the book, American ships are depicted 
as most notable for the erratic violence of their pursuits. For instance, Ish-
mael says that only American ships have made a habit of pursuing sperm 
whales to violent ends; “among those whaling nations not sailing under 
the American flag,” most have “never hostilely encountered the Sperm 
Whale.” Ishmael even considers whether the “positive havoc” wreaked on 
sperm whales by American ships alone—American ships, he says, kill thir-
teen thousand sperm whales a year just in the Pacific Northwest—may be 
enough to make the species go extinct. The figure is shocking in part be-
cause Ishmael has just described at length how difficult and risky it is to 
capture a single sperm whale; any reasonable deliberation or calculation of 
risk would dispose a ship’s crew to pursue more mainstream and accessible 
prey. American whaling ships are posited throughout the book as inclined 
toward particularly reckless courses of violent action—nurtured, Ishmael 
speculates, by the “agrarian freebooting impressions” that exist across the 
American nation, even “in the land-locked heart of our America.”80 The 
aggressive spirit of the law of the American whaleship, Ishmael indicates 
elsewhere, is only exaggeration—or maybe even a prophecy—of the na-
tion’s future.81 Melville suggests that in their inclination toward violent ac-
tion, and their willingness to take a violent path rather than to do nothing 
or to consider a more moderate course, the crew members of the Pequod 
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only reflect the general inclinations that exist in the American nation more 
broadly. By that standard, Ahab does not seem like such an outlier.
Nor does Ahab’s “dominate or be dominated” psychology seem so un-
usual when seen against the background of racialized slavery in America, 
which Melville mentions many times throughout the book. The idea that 
one must dominate or be dominated, humiliate or be humiliated, is central 
to the master-slave relationship. Ahab’s own desire to capture “the white-
ness of the whale”—to capture and claim the whitest being in the world—
has evident resonance in a society where whiteness is generally accepted 
as a legitimate reason to dominate others.82 (Here, too, Queequeg, with his 
effortless interracial friendships, stands in the book as a visible alternative 
to the American way of seeing things.)83 In a society that legalizes the en-
slavement of some humans by others on nothing but the basis of skin color, 
the tenor of Ahab’s quest is hardly beyond the pale.
Ahab and the other Isolatoes on the Pequod constitute what Melville 
elsewhere called a “ruthless democracy”—a society in which common ac-
tion seems possible only through destruction, domination, and violence.84 
They seem incapable of considering the more moderate courses of action 
that lie between doing nothing and doing something dangerously violent. 
Melville’s clear suggestion is that this failure emanates from the standards 
of an Isolato culture in which the idea of human interdependence seems 
disgraceful, and deliberative or common action thus becomes difficult. In 
denying or obscuring the interdependent elements of their humanity, Ahab 
and the crew of the Pequod have trouble acting humanely. Caught up in a 
way of life and a way of thinking that put all their emphasis on the human 
individual, they are not good at thinking about themselves as a human com-
munity. That their journey ends with the destruction of their community 
at large is, without doubt, a suggestion of exactly how significant Melville 
thinks their intellectual and cultural failure is.
One of Moby-Dick’s most haunting moments comes near the end of its 
story, when Ahab realizes that he is doomed. “Oh, lonely death on lonely 
life!” he cries, bemoaning his isolation to the last.85 But the folly of his final 
remarks should not be missed. Even in his moment of reckoning Ahab fails 
to see his connection to others of his kind.86 Ahab is dying with dozens of 
other men; they are all going down together. As he has long failed to see 
the extent to which their lives were bound in common, he fails to see that 
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their deaths are in common as well. His final moments crystallize his great 
flaw: his deep inability to recognize the extent to which his life is, in fact, 
inextricably bound to the lives of his crew members.87 Even as he dies, Ahab 
is unable to see or articulate his connection to humanity, in either proximate 
or universal terms.
Ahab’s last minutes crystallize the failure of thought and vision that 
mark his actions throughout the story of Moby-Dick. But they also in large 
measure crystallize the failure of thought and vision that mark the action 
(and sometimes the inaction) of the Pequod’s crew. Throughout the ship’s 
voyage, the men on board repeatedly neglect to recognize their interde-
pendence and fail to see the full range of possibilities available to them for 
common deliberation and action. They accede to Ahab’s vision so readily 
because it is premised on their own way of thinking: a way of thinking that 
dichotomizes inaction and violent action and sees no possibility for public 
or common life in between. They, too, are Isolatoes living lonely lives: lives 
that have schooled them to disdain the idea of interdependence and have 
ill-equipped them for constructive political action.
Indeed, for Melville, the ultimate failure of the Isolato’s way of see-
ing and being in the world is a deeply political failure. Inclined to think in 
terms of the self and disinclined to think in terms of interdependence or 
commonality, the Isolato tends to see opportunity for joint action only in 
the basest and most violent terms. These are not only terms that erode the 
fellow feelings that undergird democratic life, but also terms that reduce 
human interaction to a struggle for dominance in which the idea of equality 
fades into the background. It is perhaps no wonder that a society of Isolatoes 
is also a slaveholding society; Isolatoes are basically impotent when it comes 
to cultivating the mutual recognition that is necessary to sustain democratic 
governance. They tend only to the polarities of private indifference or pub-
lic dominance; as such, they readily submit to the despotism of others or 
become despots themselves.
The real difficulty is, as Melville intimates throughout the book, that 
the Isolato way of thinking emanates from the conditions and conceits of 
modern democratic life itself—most specifically in its American form. In 
Moby-Dick Melville describes a country filled with men and women of var-
ied (and often mysterious) ancestry who have inherited a belief in striking 
out on one’s own—and who still, for understandable reasons, have trouble 
seeing each other as a unified nation. It is a nation that, as Melville depicts 
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it, has come to value independence because the circumstances of American 
life encourage independence. And in such circumstances, even the experi-
ence of making their own laws—Melville emphasizes that American whale-
men are unusual in having been “their own legislators and lawyers”—has 
resulted not in an appreciation of common life, but, rather, in the conviction 
that each man ought to set his own rules by whatever means are available 
to him.88 In Moby-Dick the danger to American democratic life very much 
comes from within American democratic life, and the danger to American 
citizenship very much comes from within the citizenry.
In his most definitive qualities, Ahab is not an outlier on his ship or 
in his nation.89 Rather, he is quite evidently a paradigmatic, if exaggerated, 
caricature of certain tendencies within the American citizenry. If we read 
his story in that light, we see set in relief Melville’s anxieties about what he 
saw as an ascendant Isolato culture in American life—a culture that threat-
ens to undermine the foundations of responsible democratic citizenship. In 
his description of Ahab and the other men on the Pequod, Melville echoes 
Tocqueville’s worry about the extent to which modern democracy—in its 
circumstances and its norms—could isolate the individual, the extent to 
which it “throws him back forever upon himself alone.”90 Like Tocqueville, 
Melville worries about the extent to which such isolation could result in 
a population marked by public inaction and indifference. But in addition, 
Melville worries that when Isolatoes do act, they act out in a violent struggle 
for domination that is destructive and self-defeating. For Melville, at bot-
tom the Isolato way of thinking is hallucinatory, representing a denial of 
the fundamental interdependence of the human community—a denial that 
leads in the end not only to the destruction of democratic ideals but also to 
the destruction of the community altogether.
It is telling, toward that end, that the one moment in which Ahab says 
his “purpose keels up in him” and he considers giving up his quest is the 
moment in which he holds the black cabin boy Pip’s hand.91 Pip, having 
been brought to the edge of death in an accident—and then reminded by 
that sharklike Stubb that he could be sold in Alabama—has become what 
most of the people on the boat regard as insane. And yet he often seems 
saner than the rest. On a number of occasions, Pip’s words suggest that 
he alone among the crew sees the pervasive self-absorption in their chase, 
such as when he suggests that everyone’s obsession with the doubloon is 
only so much navel-gazing; both racially and in his words, he is a constant 
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reminder of the failure of both Ahab and his crew to find any degree of so-
cial cohesion.92 Ahab’s brief recognition of Pip’s humanity indicates that the 
captain—and thus the dangerous political psychology he represents—is not 
incapable of being saved. There is always the potential for the recognition of 
the true inter-indebtedness of the human species, and in that potential lies 
the true hope of democratic life.
And yet in the end, Ahab dies without some final revelation or change 
of heart, suggesting that Melville is not sanguine about the prospects for 
true democratic flourishing in America. Admittedly, Ishmael survives—and 
he survives with a clearer understanding of human interconnectedness both 
at the universal and at the community level. He says he has come to under-
stand how all humans are inextricably bound to a plurality of other humans, 
and that fate is not individual but shared. He declares a new appreciation 
for the interdependence of the “kingly commons.” But Ishmael’s enlighten-
ment comes only after the wholesale destruction of the community of which 
he has been part; although he survives by riding on his friend Queequeg’s 
coffin, his is in fact a rather lonely fate. At the end of the novel, he is picked 
up by another American ship, which finds “another orphan”—another lone-
ly and disconnected soul—to add to the national collection.93
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5“Mighty Lordships in the Heart 
of the Republic”
The Anti-Rent Subtext to Pierre
Roger W. Hecht
In the “Enceladus” section of book XXV of Herman Melville’s novel Pierre, 
the titular hero of the book, Pierre Glendinning, has a dream. Physically 
and morally exhausted from his unsuccessful attempt to write a “great, deep 
book,” Pierre slips into a trance in which “a remarkable dream or vision 
came to him”:1 “The actual artificial objects around him slid from him, and 
were replaced by a baseless yet most imposing spectacle of natural scenery. 
But though a baseless vision in itself, this airy spectacle assumed very famil-
iar features to Pierre. It was the phantasmagoria of the Mount of Titans, a 
singular height standing quite detached in a wide solitude not far from the 
grand range of dark blue hills encircling his ancestral manor” (396–397). 
That a comforting vision of home might arise in Pierre’s tortured mind should 
be of no surprise. After all, he had recently given up his inheritance and his 
family’s wealth and prestige for a life of poverty and artistic frustration in 
the cause of preserving the family’s honor. It is indeed an ironic situation 
in which Pierre finds himself. Raised in an environment where the honor 
of the Glendinning patriarchs was held sacred, Pierre learns that his own 
father may have sired an illegitimate daughter, Isabel, who lives in poverty 
in the shadows of Saddle Meadow, the family estate. Pierre is determined 
to protect both the dignity of his half sister, by publicly acknowledging her 
as a Glendinning, and his father’s reputation and that of the Glendinning 
family name, by shielding him from the charge of illegitimacy. To do so, he 
takes the extreme step of pretending to marry Isabel in order legitimately 
to bring her into the Glendinning family circle, engaging in a deeper level 
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of illegitimacy through implied incest, all at the cost of his mother’s outrage 
and his own impending marriage to Lucy Tartan. Disowned and disinher-
ited, Pierre takes Isabel to the city, where he trades the comfort of rural 
wealth for the misery of urban poverty. His effort to support his new family 
through writing fails. It should be no surprise, then, that in his darkest mo-
ment, Pierre’s tormented mind should find comfort in a vision of the “soft 
haze-canopied summer’s noon” (397) of the home he left behind.
Pierre’s pastoral vision, however, is soon disturbed by new details. The 
pastures and hills, “thickly sown with small white amaranthine flowers” 
that make the hillsides appear “glittering white, and in June still show like 
banks of snow” undermine the ability of the family’s tenant farmers to raise 
their cattle and pay their rents. The flowers are inedible and the land has 
lost its agricultural value, yet the tenant farmers are still beholden to their 
“annual tribute of upland grasses, in the Juny-load; rolls of butter in the 
October crock; and steers and heifers on the October hoof; with turkeys 
in the Christmas sleigh.” In Pierre’s now darkened vision, the desperate 
tenant farmers, perhaps facing evictions from failure to pay their rent, beg 
their landlady, Pierre’s mother, “Free us of the amaranth, good lady, or be 
pleased to abate our rent!” (398).
At first glace, the struggles of tenant farmers may appear to have little 
to do with Pierre’s scandalous family dramas that preoccupied Melville 
for much of the novel and so preoccupied his hostile critics, who roundly 
attacked him for his “sacrilegious speculations” on the “holy relations of 
the family,” his “morbid thoughts” and “provoking perversion,” even going 
so far as to pronounce him “crazy” and “deranged.”2 What could a farmer’s 
complaint have to do with Pierre’s own struggles to find sustenance in 
the city and define himself as a writer of great literature, or his conflicts 
with his powerful mother, or his attempts to protect his family name from 
its association with illegitimacy? As it turns out, the question of fami-
ly legitimacy and the struggles of tenant farmers are in fact very closely 
linked. The tenant farmers’ plea to “abate our rent” alludes to New York’s 
Anti-Rent Wars, which were just winding down at the time Melville was 
composing Pierre. This decade-long struggle between tenant farmers and 
New York landholding families offers an important but usually overlooked 
context for understanding the politics of Melville’s ambitious and chal-
lenging novel.
Tenant farmers on the estates of New York’s largest landowning fami-
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lies—the Rensselaers and the Livingstons—bore a host of complaints about 
leases that they considered “feudal” and “opposed to the spirit of the insti-
tution” of democracy. Beginning in 1839, farmers in the Helderberg hills 
west of Albany began a rent strike to pressure Stephen Van Rensselaer IV 
to renegotiate their leases, with the option to purchase their farms outright. 
Over the next six years, the conflict spread across eleven counties stretch-
ing along the Hudson River valley and throughout the Catskills. The Anti-
Renters adopted a number of different strategies to press their demands, 
including further rent strikes, direct confrontation with authorities, legisla-
tive action, and challenging the legitimacy of the landlords’ titles in court. It 
is this last concern, the legitimacy of family titles, that links Pierre’s family 
struggles with the plight of the Glendinnings’ suffering farmers. Though 
now it is barely recognized as a historical footnote, the Anti-Rent conflict 
resonated both in New York and in national politics in the decades leading 
to the Civil War, speaking to issues involving the expropriation and division 
of property, political and economic privilege, the rights of workers and the 
landless, and the question of who owns the fruits of one’s labors. In Pierre 
references to the Anti-Rent conflict invoke a host of tensions threatening 
American democracy, including the expropriation of land by force from 
the Cherokee and from Mexico, slavery in the South and the exploitation 
of labor in the North, the expansion of political rights for white men and 
the inequality of conditions for women, blacks, and Native Americans, and 
the power of market capitalism to undermine basic institutions, such as the 
family. The Anti-Rent conflict provides the local platform for much of the 
larger social and political criticism scholars have found in Pierre. In this 
essay I will show how the Anti-Renters’ concerns are reflected in Melville’s 
own interrogation of the legitimacy of property as a whole. Melville makes 
the illegitimacy of the Glendinning family titles analogous to the illegiti-
macy of the Glendinnings’ property titles. Just as Melville demystifies prop-
erty relations, exposing the corruption and violence with which property is 
secured and maintained, he demystifies the authority of the Glendinning 
family by exposing Pierre’s father’s past and his mother’s desperate efforts 
to police it in the novel’s present. In doing so, Melville exposes the process 
and consequences of maintaining “mighty lordships in the heart of a repub-
lic”—powerful families whose wealth and power undermine the promise 
of democracy. Melville does not instruct his readers how to challenge these 
“mighty lordships,” but he does help readers understand the stakes of main-
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taining such an ambiguous and paradoxical presence in the heart of a puta-
tive democracy.
The Anti-Rent Wars
The Anti-Rent Wars began in 1839, but discontent among the tenant farm-
ers extends almost to the origins of the leasehold system, which is rooted 
in colonial Dutch and English land grants. Many patentees, such as the 
Rensselaers, built huge family estates modeled after the English manor 
system. The colonial governments granted tens of millions of acres to pat-
entees, some of whom were speculators profiting from the sale of land, 
some of whom chose to lease the land to farmers. By 1776 over two million 
acres were leased to roughly seven thousand tenant families.3 The terms 
of their leases contained numerous restrictions. Farmers were compelled 
to purchase their supplies from manor commissaries, process their grain 
at manor mills, and commit to the landlord a set number of days’ labor 
in addition to paying an annual rent in wheat and livestock, the “annual 
tribute” Melville refers to in Pierre’s dream.4 The Revolution threatened to 
destroy the manor system, especially with the abolition of primogeniture 
and feudal tenures. The New York landlords who sided with the Revolution 
survived the transition by creating ingenious new leases. Some landlords, 
such as the Livingstons, employed life leases, in which the tenant remained 
on the property for the lifetimes of up to three signatories. If a farmer 
included the name of his youngest grandchild, a farm could stay in the 
family for three generations and could, in theory, be renewed for as many 
lives indefinitely. These leases, however, contained many restrictions on the 
tenants’ economic activities.5 The Rensselaers preferred what was called a 
“durable lease” or an “incomplete sale.” Under this kind of lease, farmers 
owned the title to their farms, paid taxes, and had control over their soil, 
but they paid an annual rent of fourteen bushels of winter wheat and four 
fat fowls, in addition to providing a day’s service to the landlord.6 All leases 
also contained a “quarter sale” provision: a 25 percent penalty payable to 
the landlord should the farmer sell his leasehold to someone else. Ostensibly 
the quarter sale was a provision to maintain social stability by preventing 
farmers from speculating on leased lands. In effect, it prevented farmers 
from capitalizing on their improvements to the land (for example, cleared 
land, wells, fences, buildings). One of the few ways farmers could profit 
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from the labor they invested in the land beyond the sale of produce was to 
sell their leases to new farmers with the value of their improvements added. 
The landlords wanted to maintain and control a stable population in the 
communities they owned, and they wanted to keep the value of improved 
lands for themselves. The quarter sale was designed to keep farmers on the 
land by denying them the profits of selling their leases. Melville likens these 
leases to treaty promises made to the Cherokee, binding the farmers to their 
leaseholds “so long as the grass grows and water runs” (16). Rather than an 
assurance of security, these leases were a kind of imprisonment. At the same 
time, farmers suspected the landlords of evicting farmers, then re-leasing 
the cleared land at a higher rent, robbing the farmers of the value of their 
improvements. The quarter sale provision was one of the strongest points 
of contention among the rebelling farmers, who believed that an individual 
has the right to own the products of his labor.7
For as long as the leasehold system had existed, however, farmers 
found ways to resist. Individually, farmers delayed paying the landlords; 
they “wheedled, pleaded, dragged their feet, and ignored rules that propri-
etors sought to enforce” and grumbled about “living in a state of vassalage.”8 
An unsteady peace between landlords and tenants was maintained through 
what the historian Reeve Huston calls “a theatre of benevolence and def-
erence,” in which landlords would offer generosity and leniency to their 
tenants, and the tenants in turn would provide deference to the landlords’ 
social and political status.9 Such public performance only asserted the sense 
of inequality between the two parties and merely muted but did not quash 
the tenants’ resentments. Localized insurgencies and squatter’s movements 
did arise in the decades before and following the Revolution, giving voice 
to the tenants’ doubts about the landlords’ titles and their beliefs that “in-
dependent proprietorship was the natural status of free men, and that as 
long as unimproved land existed, everyone willing to improve it had a claim 
to a portion of it.”10 Through a combination of eviction and use of the state 
militia, these insurgencies were put down.
The turning point came in 1839, with the death of Stephen Van Rens-
selaer III. In his will he divided between his two sons, Stephen IV and 
William, his estate and approximately $400,000 in debt, which roughly 
equaled the amount of unpaid rent owed by his tenants. While William 
continued his father’s policy of leniency, collecting partial rents and of-
fering abatement in the case of extreme hardship, Stephen IV pressed to 
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immediately collect rents. When he refused to meet with a committee of 
tenants to discuss the farmers’ hardships and then rejected their proposed 
terms for renegotiating their leases, the first Anti-Rent War was born. The 
starting point was in the Helderberg hills west of Albany. Tenants initially 
resisted sheriff’s officers issuing warrants to delinquent farmers with such 
long-standing repertoires of popular resistance as harassment, vandalism, 
and threats of personal violence. Over the course of several months, the 
sheriff’s officers attempted to press their warrants with greater force, and 
the farmers pushed back with greater force still. At one point a posse of five 
hundred deputies was met by a force of three thousand farmers armed with 
clubs. This repeated resistance was eventually met with force from the state 
militia; though a shot was never fired, the sheriff was allowed to distribute 
his warrants unobstructed.11 Over the next five years the movement con-
tinued to grow, as Anti-Rent associations formed throughout the leasehold 
district. The more militant farmers persisted in the use of aggressive tactics, 
forming companies of “Indians” dressed in calico robes and leather masks 
to harass authorities and interfere with distress auctions. At the same time, 
the associations pressed their demands in the legislature and the courts.
In the legislature the Anti-Renters argued that the landlords were “an 
aristocracy encouraged and protected by law which enjoyed privilege de-
nied to other men” and that lease clauses that allowed the landlords to seize 
tenants’ property subjected them to “feudal slavery,” which was “inconsis-
tent with a code of equal laws.”12 The Anti-Renters sought legislation that 
would nullify the most odious elements of their leases, especially the quar-
ter sale provision. In the courts the Anti-Renters argued that the landlords’ 
titles were themselves fraudulent, that they should be nullified, and that the 
estates should be broken up and distributed to the tenants, who had earned 
their rights to the land through their labor.13 They argued for the invalida-
tion of the Rensselaers’ titles on several grounds: that the borders of their 
land were never defined; that the English patent to the grant was not prop-
erly executed; that the proprietors of the Rensselaer estate at the time had 
usurped the manor from its rightful heirs; that the size of the manor had 
been fraudulently tripled.14 They claimed other irregularities in the titles of 
other landlords as well. Reeve Huston notes that titles to the leasehold es-
tates were “notoriously weak” and sometimes plagued by “outright fraud.”15 
For instance, Huston describes how Robert Livingston received patents for 
two tracts of land totaling 2,600 acres. Although the two plots were miles 
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apart, they were listed as adjacent on their confirmatory patent. Livingston 
claimed the two plots as well as all the land in between, thus creating the 
160,000-acre Livingston Manor.16 Unfortunately for the tenants, common 
law barred them from challenging their landlords’ titles in court.17 Though 
the title challenge could not be pursued in court, it was an important moral 
challenge to the validity of the leasehold system. If property titles are il-
legitimate, then the social and political systems built on them are equally 
illegitimate.
Legitimacy and the Land
Melville embraces and expands this challenge to titles posed by the Anti-
Renters to consider the effect of property on democracy as a whole. Book 
I of the novel, “Pierre Just Emerging from His Teens,” establishes Pierre’s 
relationship to his estate and to his family circle. There is, however, some-
thing unsettling about both. The description of the land is shrouded in the 
discourse of the picturesque, popularized at the time through gift books 
containing images and articles by such figures as the painter Thomas Cole, 
landscape architect A. J. Downing, and writer E. L. Magoon. This pictur-
esque discourse establishes a moral bond between topography and indi-
vidual character. The viewer of the picturesque, whose taste and education 
enable an elevated relationship with nature, has a greater claim to owning 
the land.18 This is a position advanced by James Fenimore Cooper in the 
Littlepage trilogy of novels, written in defense of the New York landlords. 
“The earth is beautiful,” claims Mordaunt Littlepage, hero of the novel The 
Chainbearer, “but it is most beautiful in the eye of those who have the 
largest stake in it.”19 As Tracy B. Strong notes in his contribution to this 
volume, Melville understands Americans’ tendency to think of their nation 
as innocent, and how this “delusion” helps mask the structures of domina-
tion and the consequences of power. The aesthetic and spiritual discourses 
surrounding Nature are part of the way Americans have affirmed the claim 
to both innocence and power. In parodying the picturesque discourse that 
naturalizes the landlord’s place in the landscape, Melville works to delegiti-
mize the relationship between the land and the landlords. At the same time, 
the Glendinning family, who claims title to own and rule over Saddle Mead-
ows, is riven by illegitimacy that undermines any title it claims to moral 
authority. In exposing both, Melville critiques the powers of the “mighty 
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lordship” class of New York landlords and exposes the dangers they pose 
to republican democracy. Consider first the strange, hyperbolic language 
describing Saddle Meadows:
In the country then Nature planted our Pierre; because Nature intend-
ed a rare and original development in Pierre. . . . She blew her wind-
clarion from the blue hills, and Pierre neighed out lyrical thoughts, 
as at the trumpet-blast, a war-horse paws himself into a lyric of foam. 
She whispered through her deep groves at eve, and gentle whispers of 
humanness, and sweet whispers of love, ran through Pierre’s thought-
veins, musical as water over pebbles. She lifted her spangled crest of a 
thickly-starred night, and forth at that glimpse of their divine Captain 
and Lord, ten thousand mailed thoughts of heroicness started up in 
Pierre’s soul, and glared round for some insulted good cause to defend. 
(19–20)
Samuel Otter notes the “displacements, overstatements, anticlimaxes, and 
the mingling of categories” that permeate Melville’s panegyric.20 On one 
level, such a passage is clearly a parody of picturesque discourse.21 It strains 
to the breaking point the already overstressed language of Emerson’s Nature, 
in which the landscape “satisfies the soul,” and the viewer “is placed in the 
centre of beings, and a ray of relation passes from every other being to him,” 
where heroic acts “cause the place and the bystanders to shine.”22 Nature 
can have these effects because Emerson changes Nature from property to 
a property, “a poetical sense of mind”: “There is a property in the horizon 
which no man has but he whose eye can integrate all the parts, that is, the 
poet. This is the best part of these men’s farms, yet to this their land-deeds 
give them no title.”23 Emerson uses the language of land deeds and titles 
to suggest that Nature’s spiritual powers of poetic self-actualization work 
in spite of property relations, that the love of Nature transcends property. 
Melville’s parody of the discourse of Nature, however, shows us that the 
landscape aesthetic is a function of property. Pierre is no “transparent eye-
ball” intersecting with the forces of the universe; he is the future heir of an 
enormous estate. Whereas Emerson, by aestheticizing Nature, attempts to 
elide the problems of property (commodity is the lowest end of Nature and 
receives the least amount of attention), the beauty of the country appeals 
to Pierre precisely because of its “very long uninterrupted possession by his 
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race” (13). Much of book I is a demystification of property—specifically, the 
property of the large New York estates. Melville establishes Pierre’s intense 
personal and proprietary identification with the landscape, but as he does 
so, he also exposes how an aristocratic culture was established in America, 
the social inequalities it perpetrates, and the violence needed to maintain it.
For Pierre, Saddle Meadows is “a talisman” that makes “the whole 
earthly landscape” and the Glendinning family inextricable: “For remem-
bering that on those hills his own fine fathers had gazed; through those 
woods, over these lawns, by that stream, along these tangled paths, many a 
grand-dame of his had merrily strolled when a girl; vividly recalling these 
things, Pierre deemed that part of the earth a love-token; so that his very 
horizon was to him a memorial ring” (13). The connection between the 
land and Pierre’s family is, in his mind, a fact of Nature, such that “it was 
a choice of fate that Pierre had been born and bred in the country” (19).24 
But, as Melville notes, it is not fate but history that placed Pierre in Saddle 
Meadows. The Glendinnings had held control of Saddle Meadows for gen-
erations, since “the earlier days of the colony” (10), since the time of Pierre’s 
great-grandfather, through a title deeded from “three kings—Indian kings” 
(17) and passed through the family line. The family and property history 
is rife with violence and bloodshed. Beginning with the Indian battle that 
left Pierre’s great-grandfather mortally wounded—who sat “unhorsed on 
his saddle in the grass, with his dying voice, still cheering his men in the 
fray,” which begat the name Saddle Meadows, “a name likewise extended 
to the mansion and the village” (10)—and continuing through the Revolu-
tion, when Pierre’s grandfather “annihilated two Indian savages by making 
reciprocal bludgeons of their heads” (38), the land is marked by violence. 
Melville questions the legitimacy of the Glendinnings’ “long uninterrupted 
possession” of the land by highlighting the expropriation and displacement 
of the Native inhabitants, conducted not only by removing their persons 
but by renaming the place, erasing entirely their presence. The Glendin-
nings’ possession is maintained by subsequent violence, which is not merely 
one of Pierre’s relics of the past. Melville draws a direct line between the 
Glendinning family estate and the recent Anti-Rent War, in which patroons 
sent “regular armies, with staffs of officers, crossing rivers with artillery, 
and marching through primeval woods, and threading vast rocky defiles . . . 
to destrain upon three thousand farmer-tenants of one landlord, at a blow” 
(16). This allusion to the first major conflict of the Anti-Rent Wars exposes 
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the reach of the aristocracy’s power, in which the state serves to protect the 
interest of the landed class and not the interest of the tenants.25
The power of such an aristocracy in a nation that prides itself on its 
democratic institutions is indeed very troubling. Melville points out that 
landed families in America, such as the “oriental-like English planter fami-
lies of Virginia and the South” and “the most ancient and magnificent Dutch 
Manors at the North” (15–16), were not eliminated during the Revolution 
but are still intact. They are, in fact, older, more established, and more natu-
ralized than the “manufactured” peerages in England (15).26 Melville gives 
them a sinister air. The Virginia families are “oriental-like,” whereas the 
Dutch are “steeped in a Hindooish haze” (16). As John Carlos Rowe notes, 
in the nineteenth century Westerners popularly associated the Orient with 
“chaotic and irrational despotism,” violence, arbitrary rule, and moral cor-
ruption.27 Such behavior we will later see displayed by Mary Glendinning, 
Pierre’s mother. Through a paradoxical analogy, Melville links this “orien-
tal,” morally corrupt aristocracy to the corrosion of democracy. It is a po-
litical zombie, springing to life out of death. Comparing a democracy to an 
acid that “produc[es] new things by corroding the old” and noting how ver-
digris is produced through the reaction of acids to copper, Melville exposes 
a paradox of nineteenth-century American politics:
Now in general nothing can be more significant of decay than the idea 
of corrosion; yet on the other hand, nothing can more vividly suggest 
luxuriance of life, than the idea of green as a color; for green is the 
peculiar signet of all-fertile Nature herself. Herein by apt analogy we 
behold the marked anomalousness of America . . . when we consider 
how strangely she contradicts all prior notions of human things; and 
how wonderfully to her, Death itself becomes transmuted into Life. So 
that political institutions, which in other lands seem above all things 
intensely artificial, with America seem to possess the divine virtue of 
natural law; for the most mighty of nature’s laws is this, that out of 
Death she brings Life. (13–14)
In America, it seems, democracy is not corroding old forms to create new 
forms of government; it is corroding itself, and a landed aristocracy is the 
form this corrosion is taking. John Locke famously claimed that in the be-
ginning “all the world was America,”28 in that the civilized world was once 
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in the “state of Nature” in which all men were “equal and independent” 
because they equally shared in the produce of the earth that God had given 
them.29 For Locke, the basis of this equality is property, which men cre-
ate by applying labor to the earth, creating value in the form of crops and 
other products of improvement. Such improvement, according to Locke, is 
a divine command: “God and his reason commanded [man] to subdue the 
earth, i.e. improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something 
upon it that was his own, his labour. He that in obedience to this com-
mand of God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed 
to it something that was his property, which another had no title to, nor 
could without injury take from him.”30 What assured equality under this 
system is that the size of a man’s possession was to be limited by “what 
he could make use of.” If a man produced more than he and his family 
could use, the surplus would spoil, which would offend God. So long as 
one man’s possession did not inhibit his neighbor from enjoying his own 
property, equality was assured. Such land and political equality are key 
to the Jeffersonian “fee-simple empire” of independent yeoman farmers, 
a central icon of the American ideal. Because of money, however, Locke 
allows for the limitless accumulation of property. “It is plain,” Locke states, 
“that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of 
the earth.”31 So rather than establishing equality, property creates its op-
posite. The verdigris, whose green color is a “signet,” a sign of Nature, not 
Nature itself, suggests not only the “luxuriance of life,” but luxury, the 
manifestation of excessive wealth, which is a morally corrosive force. It is 
worth noting that verdigris is a poison. So here Melville exposes a paradox 
underlying American politics: whereas Europeans engage in revolutions to 
tear down their “artificial” aristocracies to pursue their dreams of equal 
rights, America, despite its claims to democracy, has been developing an 
aristocracy and making it seem like a natural product of the republic itself: 
“In America, the vast mass of families be as the blades of grass, yet some 
few there are that stand as the oak; which instead of decaying, annually 
puts forth new branches; whereby Time, instead of subtracting, is made to 
capitulate into a multiple virtue” (14).
How is it, then, that an aristocracy can not only survive, but also thrive 
in a democracy? To answer this question, Melville points to the law: acts of 
Congress that expropriate Indian lands, displacing the native inhabitants, 
clearing the territory for white settlement; and leases, with their restric-
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tions and hated quarter sales, those “haughty rent-deeds” that are held by a 
“thousand farmer tenants, so long as the grass grows and water runs; which 
hints of a surprising eternity for a deed, and seems to make lawyer’s ink un-
obliterable as the sea” (16). Melville’s use of the phrase “so long as the grass 
grows and water runs” points directly to the duplicitous language used by 
President Andrew Jackson to assure the Creek Nation of their safety in the 
Indian Territory west of the Mississippi, linking the displacement of Native 
Americans with the exploitation of the tenant farmers. Just as the govern-
ment (and the Glendinning patriarchs) used the law and violence to clear 
territory of Indians, so too do the patroons use the law and violence to keep 
their tenants in line. But unlike the government, which reneged on its prom-
ise to the Creek that they and their children would live in their new terri-
tory “as long as the grass grows and water runs,” the landlords make sure 
their tenants are “held” to their leases through “lawyer’s ink”—the force of 
law. Though the leases, with their restrictions and quarter sale provisions 
designed to keep tenants on their farms for “a surprising eternity,” suggest 
that the lease obligations are unreasonable, the ink with which they are 
written is as “unobliterable as the sea.”32 The principal argument by which 
the landlords and their supporters defended themselves was the unassail-
ability of the contract. Even if a contract is unfair, it must be enforced.33 
Here Melville suggests how the law works in collusion with the aristocracy 
at the expense of democracy: “Whatever one may think of the existence of 
such mighty lordships in the heart of a republic, and however we may won-
der at their thus surviving . . . yet survive and exist they do” (16–17).
One effect of the survival of “such mighty lordships” is the unchecked 
arbitrary power of the landlord and the immiseration of the tenants. Mary 
Glendinning evicts Delly Ulver, not for failing to meet her rent obligations, 
but for having a child out of wedlock. Mrs. Glendinning assumes this power 
as a right of her possession as an aristocrat, earned through the family’s 
“long uninterrupted possession” of Saddle Meadows.34 James Fenimore 
Cooper, whose Littlepage trilogy of novels gives voice to the landlords’ 
point of view, grants this same authority to oversee and supervise the lives 
of their tenants to the proprietors of large estates by virtue of their taste and 
education. Advised by his parents to build a “substantial” house on his prop-
erty and live alongside his tenants, Mordaunt Littlepage is told, “Nothing 
contributes so much to the civilization of a country as to dot it with a gentry. 
. . . It is impossible for those who have never been witnesses of the result 
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to appreciate the effect produced by one gentleman’s family in a neighbor-
hood, in the way of manners, tastes, general intelligence, and civilization at 
large.”35 For Delly Ulver, the effect is arbitrary eviction and poverty. Mary 
Glendinning takes on the role of judge, juror, and moral arbiter of her ten-
ants. Of Ned, the father of Delly’s child, she declares, “No such profligate 
shall pollute this place” (117). In response to Pierre’s concern about the 
misery of Delly and her baby, Mary Glendinning replies, “The mother de-
serves it,” and that her baby appropriately suffers because “the sins of the 
father shall be visited upon the children to the third generation” (121). In 
the same way that landlords reserve the right to enforce contracts regard-
less of their consequences on the tenants’ lives, Mary insists on the power 
to enforce God’s law regardless of its effect on individuals. Cautioned by 
the Reverend Falsgrave to temper her wrath, suggesting that though the 
consequence of sin is hereditary, “it does not follow that our personal and 
active loathing of sin, should descend from the sinful sinner to the sinless 
child,” Mary retorts, “If . . . we receive the child as we would any other, feel 
for it in all respects the same, and attach no ignominy to it—how then is the 
Bible to be fulfilled?” (121–122). Mary feels entitled to define the moral 
law; she also overrules the authority who might place limits on her power. 
The future impoverishment of Delly and her child is of no concern, so long 
as the estate is no longer polluted.
Mary Glendinning’s outrage over Ned and Delly’s pollution of the sanc-
tity of Saddle Meadows helps expose the problem of profligacy and illegiti-
macy within the Glendinning family, the suppressed consciousness of past 
ill deeds that, once brought to the surface, threatens the family’s reputation 
and authority. The power of the title Glendinning lies in the family geneal-
ogy of heroism, patriotism, culture, and purity. Pierre’s great-grandfather 
and grandfather were war heroes, and his cultivated, gentlemanly father 
maintained a “gentlemanhood” combined with “the primeval gentleness 
and golden humanities of religion.” Training in these “noble qualities” was 
meant to prepare Pierre to take his place as “heir to their forests and farms” 
(11). Yet the family title is as insubstantial as the family’s property titles. As 
John Carlos Rowe observes, every character in Pierre—his ancestors, his 
parents, his half sister, his entire family structure—is revealed to be “inher-
ently illegitimate.”36 Rowe points out that the “history of aristocratic pre-
tension” described by Melville “is designed to mask [the family’s] artificial 
origins, which on close examination generally betray . . . theft, piracy, and 
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military conquest.”37 There is little patriotic about the Glendinning family 
history. The family’s military achievement serves to enlarge the Glendin-
ning family power, not “the ideals of social democracy,”38 but the story helps 
maintain the veneer of respectability and in turn helps authorize the estate. 
By exposing the Glendinnings’ respectability as a veneer only, Melville ex-
poses to interrogation the legitimacy of all the “mighty lordships,” both in 
the North and in the South.
Moral Authority and Aristocracy
In exposing the illegitimacy of family narrative, Melville delegitimizes the 
aristocracy’s public authority. In exposing illegitimacy within the family 
itself—the impropriety of the relationship between Pierre and his mother, 
his father’s infidelity, and the implied incest between Pierre and his illegiti-
mate half sister—Melville shreds the aristocracy’s source of moral author-
ity, revealing a family structure that is unnatural and corrupt to the core. 
Reviewers of Pierre were particularly outraged by the novel’s “monstrously 
unnatural” incest plot.39 The reviewer for the New York Herald chastised 
Melville by proclaiming that “Nature . . . is the proper model of every true 
artist. Fancy must be kept at proper bounds.”40 These reviewers understood 
that the Glendinning family dynamic violated all propriety and precepts of 
the domestic code that dominated nineteenth-century American society. 
The conventions of domesticity made the home the locus of “finer sym-
pathies, tastes, and moral and religious feelings”; it was the natural refuge 
from the unnatural, “calculating world” of trade and commerce.41 The of-
ficial rhetoric of domesticity, expressed in domestic novels and domestic 
instruction books, made the home the center of traditional values and prac-
tices. Maintaining the home was a woman’s “natural vocation,” and she was 
expected to cheerfully inhabit “the shady green lanes” of domestic life.42 
The family estate was likened by domestic promoters to “the aptest earthly 
manifestation of the heavenly kingdom,”43 and the conduct within this 
kingdom—everything from household duties to appropriate sexual relations 
between spouses—was highly regulated through the domestic discourse. It 
is no surprise, then, that the New York Herald found Melville’s violations of 
the “holy relations of the family” so shocking.44
Though the most obvious violation of the domestic code is Pierre’s faux 
marriage to his half sister, Isabel, this expression of incest seems foreshad-
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owed by the unusual intimacy between Pierre and his mother that pushes 
all limits on the natural domestic mother-son relationship. His banter while 
helping his mother “finish [her] toilette” casts him simultaneously as a maid-
in-waiting, a helpful brother, and a lover. Putting a bow around her neck 
and crossing the ends at the front, he says, “I am going to try to tack it 
with a kiss, sister,—there!—oh, what a pity that sort of fastening won’t al-
ways hold!—where’s the cameo with the fawns, I gave you last night?—Ah! 
on the slab—you were going to wear it then?—Thank you, my considerate 
and most politic sister—there!—but stop—here’s a ringlet gone romping—
so now, dear sister, give that Assyrian toss to your head” (20–21). Pierre’s 
“lover-like adoration” of his mother is matched on her part by “the proud-
est delights and witcheries” that are possible “for the most conquering vir-
gin to feel.” Pierre’s “inexpressible tenderness and attentiveness” culminate 
for Mary in her own “grand climacteric” (22). The sexual pathology in this 
scene suggests a high degree of corruption within the Glendinning family. 
Pierre’s efforts to rescue Isabel by presenting her as his wife, thus giving 
her the legitimacy of the Glendinning name, only mirror and replicate the 
incestuous behavior performed with his mother. Even Pierre’s impending 
marriage to his betrothed, Lucy Tartan, carries hints of incest. Reminding 
Pierre of his future bride, Mary says, “You, Pierre, are going to be married 
before long, I trust, not to a Capulet, but to one of our own Montagues; and 
so Romeo’s evil fortune will hardly be yours” (25). Though Lucy Tartan 
is not a blood relative of Pierre’s, but the daughter of a close friend of his 
father’s, the implication is that Pierre’s marriage must be within the family 
line—“one of our own Montagues”—not to a Capulet. While it is likely that 
Mary Glendinning probably has class in mind, that Pierre will marry one 
of his own kind, her admonishment strongly suggests that a proper mar-
riage line (one that will protect the property lines) is with another Glendin-
ning. Her words certainly foreshadow Pierre’s faux marriage to Isabel, one 
of Pierre’s own Montagues, indeed.
Mary Glendinning’s vigilant efforts to police Pierre’s sense of the fam-
ily’s reputation, as well as any evidence of illegitimacy in Saddle Meadows, 
indicate that she is fully aware of the threat to the family’s legitimacy. She 
reminds Pierre of his father’s standing, a standard she expects Pierre to up-
hold: “Never rave, Pierre; and never rant. Your father never did either; nor 
is it written of Socrates; and both were very wise men. Your father was pro-
foundly in love—that I know to my certain knowledge—but I never heard 
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him rant about it. He was always exceedingly gentlemanly: and gentlemen 
never rant” (25–26). She further polices her husband’s image by keeping 
the chair portrait, a painting executed by the elder Pierre’s cousin that, ac-
cording to “a very wonderful work on Physiognomy,” revealed that “he was 
secretly in love” with a “French young lady” (96), out of sight. She displays 
instead a portrait that she thinks “correctly” conveys his “finest, and noblest 
combined expression” (88), but not necessarily his true self. Evicting Ned 
and Delly, however, does little to suppress suggestions of her own family’s 
illegitimacy; rather, it brings it closer to the surface. When Pierre attempts 
to broach the issue indirectly, asking the Reverend Falsgrave seemingly 
rhetorical questions, Mary Glendinning attempts to redirect the subject. 
When Pierre asks, “Should I honor my father, if I knew him to be a seduc-
er?” Mary responds, “Pierre, Pierre! There is no need of these argumenta-
tive assumptions. You very immensely forget yourself this morning” (124). 
Pierre’s interrogations lead to Mary’s evasions. Once Pierre leaves the room, 
Mary quickly returns to her original purpose of evicting Ned and Delly, as 
if evicting them will make all questions of illegitimacy go away and secure 
the future of all the Glendinnings’ moral and property titles.
Evicting Ned and Delly does not, of course, erase the issue of illegiti-
macy. Nor do Pierre’s efforts to preserve his father’s good name and Isabel’s 
legitimacy by keeping the truth of her origins from Mary Glendinning (to 
preserve her feelings) while pretending to marry Isabel to include her in 
the ranks of the Glendinning clan. Rather, the enormity of the illegitimacy 
within the Glendinning family is so great that the family collapses from the 
weight of its contradictions. In honoring both his father’s and Isabel’s repu-
tations, Pierre loses his place as the legitimate heir of Saddle Meadows. In 
her outrage over Pierre’s actions, Mary Glendinning disowns him; the shock 
of it eventually kills her. Pierre’s later murder of Glen Stanly, the newly es-
tablished heir of Saddle Meadows, in the streets of New York City and his 
subsequent suicide in the Tombs put an end to the Glendinning line. The 
marriage between Pierre and Isabel is “fictitious” (207), a ruse designed 
to lend legitimacy to a relationship that is, at its base, illegitimate. Ficti-
tious too are any of the family’s other claims to legitimacy, be they moral or 
political.
In Pierre’s dream in book XXV the vision does not linger on the 
complaining farmer very long; it drifts over the hillsides, where the view 
changes from the “delectable” picturesque bower to a “Titanic” sublime 
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mountainscape, in which “frequent rents among the mass of leaves revealed 
horrible glimpses of dark-dripping rock, and the mysterious mouths of wolf-
ish caves” (398). Eventually, the vision settles on a pile of rocks that Pierre 
had christened Enceladus, “the most potent of all the giants, writhing from 
out of the imprisoning earth” (400). In Greek mythology, Enceladus was a 
giant, son of Gaia and Uranus, who warred against the Olympian gods along 
with the other Titans. Wounded by a spear thrown by Athena, Enceladus 
was buried under Mount Etna in Sicily. Pierre recalls an expedition of col-
legians who took it upon themselves to excavate this rock formation to see if 
it was “a daemonic freak of nature, or some stern thing of antediluvian art” 
(400). By the time the collegians gave up on their task, they had revealed a 
formation resembling the Titan’s “mighty chest, . . . his mutilated shoulders, 
and the stumps of his once audacious arms.” More important, they uncover 
“his shame” (401). Though that shame could be seen as Enceladus’s defeat 
and the helplessness of being trapped under the earth, the shame could 
be the shame of incest: “Old Titan’s self was the son of incestuous Coelus 
and Terra, the son of incestuous Heaven and Earth. And Titan married his 
mother Terra, another and accumulatively incestuous match. And thereof 
Enceladus was one issue. So Enceladus was both the son and grandson 
of incest” (402). Pierre identifies with Enceladus because of his “reckless 
sky-assaulting mood,” by which he attempted “to regain his paternal birth-
right” and failed. The tales of incest also bind Pierre and the half-buried, 
raging Titan. Perhaps the Enceladus figure points to what we are to make 
of “mighty lordships in the heart of the republic.” Enceladus was a potent 
giant, but where we find him in America is pinned to the ground, his arm a 
mere stump, his torso mutilated. Nature “performed an amputation” on the 
Titan, leaving him “impotent.” By the time Melville composed Pierre, the 
New York landlords were in steep decline. In 1846 Anti-Rent activists were 
instrumental in electing John Young governor. In turn, Governor Young 
pardoned three men convicted of the murder of Osman Steele, the deputy, 
and proposed legislation to test the landlords’ titles.45 The constitutional 
convention that same year also abolished quarter sales and perpetual leas-
es.46 By 1852 the Rensselaer family, driven to bankruptcy from the pressures 
of the Anti-Renters’ rent boycott, had sold their estate to land speculators.47 
Other major landlords, feeling similar pressures, began selling off their es-
tates to their tenants.48 In New York the landed aristocracy had become 
nearly as impotent as Enceladus. Melville never tells his readers what to 
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make of these “mighty lordships,” but Enceladus could be a hint. America’s 
incestuous Titans, the feudal landholding families, may collapse, like the 
Glendinnings, into mere stumps, entombed under the weight of their own 
contradictions. What Melville doesn’t give us, however, are Olympians to 
toss mountains on top of them. That would be the role republicans must fill.
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6Melville and the Cadaverous 
Triumphs of Transcendentalism
Shannon L. Mariotti
Generations of scholars have tried to solve the puzzle of Melville’s relation-
ship with transcendentalism. There are many hints that Melville’s writings 
engage transcendental ideas in general and the works of Emerson and 
Thoreau in particular. This is not surprising, given that Emerson, Thoreau, 
and Melville (along with Hawthorne and Whitman) were often grouped 
together as rising figures making a name for American literature, had com-
mon friends and acquaintances, and published in some of the same venues. 
Emerson, Thoreau, and Melville were connected through figures in the 
literary world such as Horace Greeley, of the New York Tribune, and es-
pecially Evert Duyckinck, editor of the Literary World.1 There were more 
personal connections as well, most significantly Nathaniel Hawthorne: he 
was a close friend to Melville and, as a onetime Concord resident, was also 
well acquainted with Emerson and Thoreau.2
But though it’s difficult to escape the sense that some of Melville’s writ-
ings respond to Emerson or to Thoreau, there is less scholarly consensus on 
what he seems to be saying about them. In addition, because of the paucity 
of biographical details about Melville’s life, extensive letters, or journals, 
characterizing his reception of transcendentalism runs longer on possibili-
ties than it does on proof. Some scholars have seen the influence of Emer-
son writ large on Melville’s entire corpus, tracing his use of transcendental 
ideas and images and weighing and measuring his overall attitude toward 
“the sage of Concord” in different ways. Much of this literature follows in 
the footsteps of F. O. Matthiessen, who thought that Melville was both “at-
tracted and repelled” by Emerson: attracted primarily by his views on art 
and creativity and his nonconformism, but repelled by his abstraction, as-
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ceticism, and relentless optimism, as well as his views on fate and necessity.3 
Other scholars have identified particular ways that Melville connects with 
Emerson or Thoreau in specific texts. For example, Melville’s novel The 
Confidence-Man (1857) seems to engage transcendental themes, and schol-
ars have also shown how the characters of Mark Winsome and his disciple 
Egbert may be modeled on Emerson and Thoreau.4 In addition, previous 
scholars have connected Melville’s short story “Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!” with 
Thoreau’s writings.5
But the greatest amount of scholarship on Melville’s reception of tran-
scendentalism focuses on “Bartleby the Scrivener.” Some scholars have con-
nected this text with Emerson’s essay “The Transcendentalist,” a lecture first 
delivered in 1842 and published as part of Nature, Addresses, and Lectures 
in 1849.6 Others link it to “Self-Reliance,” published in Essays: First Series 
in 1841.7 Exploring connections with the other famous Concordian, many 
scholars place “Bartleby” in dialogue with Thoreau’s essay on civil disobedi-
ence.8 Some of the most valuable recent analyses of “Bartleby” have contin-
ued to explore this line of argument, showing how Bartleby, like Thoreau, 
represents the problems of alienating modern mass society,9 explicating how 
the story radically subverts Thoreau’s thoughts on authority,10 or exploring 
how Thoreau is one of the figures captured in Bartleby’s overdetermined 
plurality.11 As Kevin Attell’s contribution to this volume also highlights, 
“Bartleby” has proven especially rich terrain for contrasting interpretations.
Based on an analysis of all the available evidence of connections among 
Melville, Emerson, and Thoreau, this essay intervenes in the existing schol-
arship to make a new argument in a different way. I analyze two stories, 
published in consecutive months—“Bartleby the Scrivener” and “Cock-A-
Doodle-Doo!”—that can be seen as companion pieces in which Melville 
advances a skeptical critique of transcendental practices of awakening. Both 
stories were written in the years immediately following Melville’s introduc-
tion to transcendentalism in 1849: “Bartleby” was published in Putnam’s 
magazine in November 1853, and “Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!” was published in 
December of the same year in Harper’s New Monthly Magazine. In ways 
that are more lamenting and stir pathos in “Bartleby” and more comedic 
and stir amusement in “Cock,” Melville constructs a narrative in which 
characters experiment with transcendental practices of awakening, but in 
ways that lead only to death. As I will show, “Bartleby” engages primarily 
with Emerson’s thought, whereas “Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!” responds to Tho-
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reau. But in different ways, both stories—with lament and longing, as well 
as hilarity and absurdity—register Melville’s skepticism that transcendental 
practices could ever fully address the problems that people face in their 
immediate, material world. Through these narratives, Melville problema-
tizes the theory and practice of self-reliance, the abstracting tendencies 
that might be associated with transcendentalism, and the idea that we can 
awaken to a new morning above and beyond the immediate and particular 
material realm of worldly embodiment, mortality, and suffering.
In “Bartleby” this exploration of the impossibilities and costs of tran-
scendentalism plays out in terms of Emerson’s idealist gaze and his self- 
described visual practice of “focal distancing.”12 Melville began to be 
exposed to Emerson’s ideas in 1849 and 1850, just a few years before he 
wrote “Bartleby.” We know from one of Melville’s letters that he “had only 
glanced at a book of his once in Putnam’s store—that was all I knew of him, 
till I heard him lecture” in 1849.13 But by 1850 he was sufficiently inter-
ested in Emerson to spend part of a visit with Hawthorne reading his essays 
(though he did not actually purchase any of Emerson’s books until more 
than a decade later).14 By the time he wrote “Bartleby,” however, Melville 
was well versed enough in Emerson’s thought to engage his ideas critically, 
though he twisted the transcendentalist’s practices in ways that indicate 
his own skepticism and doubt. For example, Bartleby seems to mimic Em-
erson’s ways of seeing, but for the scrivener this practice is associated only 
with strained eyes and “dead-wall reveries.” Drawing on another Emerso-
nian practice and modeling his advice to “stay at home with the self,” as op-
posed to “travelling,” Bartleby becomes increasingly stationary in the story, 
moving less and less until his immobility makes it hard to tell whether he is 
alive or dead. And, most important, throughout the story, in ways that are 
often connected with these other practices, Melville expresses skepticism 
regarding Emerson’s dismissive attitude toward particularity, embodiment, 
and the material aspects of our immediate lives. Whereas most scholars 
have focused their attention on Bartleby’s most famous statement, “I would 
prefer not to,” my essay draws out the implications of another phrase the 
scrivener repeats: “I am not particular.”
In the companion story to “Bartleby,” Melville uses the themes of death 
and mourning to critique the dangers and delusions of transcendental awak-
ening and morning in an even more extreme, absolute, and certain way. I 
read “Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!” as a parody of the kind of “lusty bragging” 
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that Thoreau trumpets in “Walking” as well as Walden. “Walking” was pub-
lished posthumously, in June 1862, in the Atlantic Monthly, nine years after 
Melville published “Cock.” But we also know that Thoreau was delivering 
lyceum lectures based on “Walking” as early as 1851 and 1852: Melville 
may have heard about these lectures through mutual friends. There are 
also parallels between “Cock” and Walden, and even though Walden was 
not published until 1854, Thoreau was known to be reworking and revis-
ing it for many years before that, and it is not impossible that Melville had 
heard about this work. As we will see, Melville echoes Thoreau’s language 
in several ways. But most significantly, in “Cock” Melville critiques what he 
sees as the folly of Thoreau’s ideas by subversively employing the sounds and 
symbol of the chanticleer: whereas in Thoreau’s writings the cock symboliz-
es morning and the experience of awakening, in Melville’s story it highlights 
the dangers of the delusion that people can transcend the material world 
of pain, suffering, and death. And there are dire political consequences to 
this kind of forgetting: the cock’s crow works like a different kind of “opi-
ate of the masses,” pacifying the characters’ sense of impending crisis and 
enabling them instead to passively accept their material deprivation rather 
than actively working to change it.
Despite similar themes, however, there are striking differences of tone 
between “Cock” and “Bartleby” that seem to reflect the nature of Melville’s 
engagement with Emerson, on the one hand, and with Thoreau, on the 
other hand, and speak to the different ways Melville weighs and measures 
these two thinkers: Emerson is to be taken seriously even if his thinking is 
sometimes deeply flawed, although Thoreau may merit only a more comic 
treatment. “Bartleby” is funny at points, but its dominant tone is still one of 
tragedy, whereas “Cock” has a tone of insane hilarity throughout. It’s hard 
not to take “Bartleby” seriously, while it’s hard to take “Cock” too seriously. 
In the broadest terms, then, these two stories represent the two poles of 
Melville’s attitude toward transcendentalism. As Hawthorne famously said, 
Melville could “neither believe, nor be comfortable in his unbelief,” and 
yet “he is too honest and courageous not to try to do one or the other.”15 
In “Bartleby” we see more of the discomfort; in “Cock” we simply see the 
unbelief.
Melville’s critique of transcendentalism is different in “Bartleby” in 
large part because of how the bourgeois lawyer is framed as an unreliable 
narrator. The lawyer is presented to us as a conventional man who obeys the 
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same forms of authority that Bartleby prefers not to recognize. So we feel 
sympathy for how the scrivener might be misunderstood, and we become 
suspicious of the lawyer’s critical reading of Bartleby. In this way, the story 
contains an element of uncertainty about its own critique of transcendental-
ism and is itself uncomfortable with the skepticism that is displayed toward 
Bartleby’s practices throughout the story. In “Bartleby” we sense Melville 
trying to believe, but failing: ultimately, he constructs a narrative that per-
forms his own uncomfortable, stubborn unbelief in transcendentalism. But 
in “Cock” it is more uncomplicated: Melville honestly doesn’t believe in 
Thoreau’s brand of transcendentalism. Whatever compelled him about Em-
erson doesn’t extend in the same way to Thoreau. Taken together, however, 
these two stories give us the fullest picture of Melville’s reception of the two 
figures most closely associated with transcendentalism.
“Bartleby” and Emerson’s Transparent Eye-Ball
To understand Melville’s critical engagement with Emerson we must first 
analyze the key aspects of his transcendental theory and practice of self-
reliance that are at work in “Bartleby.” Emerson understands self-reliance 
through two related practices, both of which are part and parcel of his en-
actment of transcendentalism: borrowing Emerson’s own phrases, we might 
call the first practice “staying at home” and the second, a visual practice, 
“focal distancing.” Both concepts designate ways of moving past immediate 
particularity and connecting with the universal: this motion of moving up 
and over, of transcending the immediate material particularity that sur-
rounds us and projecting ourselves toward a realm of more distant universal 
ideals characterized by “truth,” “reason,” and a balancing “compensation,” 
defines Emerson’s practice of transcendentalism. Emerson tends to present 
particularity as a disagreeable thing to be overcome through processes of 
abstraction by which we move past the things that immediately surround us 
in the foreground of our lives and tap into the universal that is the pathway 
to the transcendental. Emerson sees the world in terms of two realms: there 
is the world that surrounds us, the “buzz and din” of the material realm 
characterized by “disagreeable particulars,” a realm of confusion, super-
ficiality, alienation, and conformity.16 Throughout his writings, Emerson 
adds to this list of “disagreeable appearances” that we should strive to see 
beyond: men and women and their social life, poverty, labor, sleep, fear, 
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fortune, tragedy, moaning women, hard-eyed husbands, swine, spiders, 
snakes, pests, madhouses, prisons, enemies, government, social art, luxury, 
“every establishment, every mass.”17 He contrasts “the inharmonious and 
trivial particulars” with the “musical perfection” of “the Ideal journeying 
always within us, the heaven without rent or seam,” and in his writings this 
transcendental realm variously goes under the name of Universal Spirit, 
Universal Mind, Consciousness, Genius, Aboriginal Self, Over-Soul, Spiri-
tual Laws, Reason, or God.18
Paradoxically, because of the way that Emerson thinks the universal 
exists deep within us as well as in a more distant realm beyond the things 
that immediately surround us, we can access it by moving beyond particu-
larity in two different ways. First, we can access the universal by remaining 
stationary and “staying at home” with the self to move beyond the particular 
contexts of our own lives, falling back into our aboriginal self, abandoning 
ourselves to childlike intuition, and tapping into this shared Universal Spirit 
flowing within all humans. Self-reliance is not about searching outside our-
selves, but about developing confidence in the universal that lies within 
each of us, to connect with a more timeless and eternal strain of genius. As 
Emerson notes, “Thus all concentrates; let us not rove; let us sit at home 
with the cause,” and “So let us always sit. . . . All men have my blood, and 
I have all men’s.”19 Emerson advocates staying with the self as a pathway to 
greater self-confidence and self-trust, because he thinks there are worlds 
within each of us and we can travel within ourselves. As he says, “The soul 
is no traveler; the wise man stays at home.”20 Here we are, says Emerson, 
“and if we tarry a little, we may come to learn that here is best . . . and the 
Supreme Being, shall not be absent from the chamber where thou sittest.”21 
In this way, his injunctions to keep our seats evoke Buddhist practices of 
seated meditation, in which one tries to avoid flying off into distraction and 
instead hone one’s powers of concentration: Emerson’s advice to sit at home 
with the self seems sympathetic to this kind of meditation, in which one 
strives for a kind of awakening by settling and grounding the self.
But if one pathway to transcendence involves falling back into the ab-
original universal self, another involves focusing our gaze above and beyond 
the things that immediately surround us in order to visualize the universal. 
Visual practices enable us to focus our gaze on the more harmonious ideal 
realm of compensation that Emerson thinks exists above and beyond the 
“buzz and din” of the confused, superficial, material world. For Emerson, 
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if you can see past such things and “conform your life to the pure idea in 
your mind,” a “correspondent revolution in things” will occur, and the “tem-
porary,” “disagreeable appearances” will “vanish” and “be no more seen.”22 
In one famous passage from Nature, Emerson describes a moment of tran-
scendent vision when he leaves the material realm so fully that he becomes 
vision itself, at one with the Universal Spirit: he rises above the streets and 
the village and is uplifted into “blithe air” and “infinite space,” the “tranquil 
landscape,” the “distant line of the horizon”: “I become a transparent eye-
ball. I am nothing. I see all. The currents of the Universal Being circulate 
through me; I am part or particle of God. . . . In the tranquil landscape, 
and especially in the distant line of the horizon, man beholds somewhat as 
beautiful as his own nature.”23 In such moments, “the eye of Reason opens.” 
Emerson consistently uses images of distant horizons, landscapes, stars, the 
cosmos, and the sky to describe this universal realm on which we should 
focus our gaze. Emerson says we are too “near-sighted”—meaning that we 
see well only what lies close by us in an immediate way—and advocates this 
practice of focal distancing so we can learn to see that more distant realm 
clearly. Otherwise, Emerson asks, “of what use is genius, if the organ is too 
convex or too concave, and cannot find a focal distance within the actual 
horizon of human life?”24
What was Melville’s attitude toward these ideas? Melville’s critique of 
Emerson, as it plays out in “Bartleby,” takes place against a backdrop of 
sympathy for the transcendentalist’s noble fight against the force of conven-
tion. This is part of what accounts for the story’s pathos. As the narrative 
progresses, Bartleby increasingly takes on the qualities Emerson encourag-
es: self-reliance, self-trust, and an unconventional reliance on his own pref-
erences and intuitions. Melville admired these aspects of Emerson’s work. 
Indeed, his marginal comments in his copy of Emerson’s Essays, First and 
Second Series are most laudatory when Emerson speaks of honesty, self-
trust, unconventionality, and the poetic imagination. For example, when 
Emerson writes, “Self trust is the essence of heroism,” Melville writes next 
to it, “This is noble.” Next to a passage where Emerson is critical of our 
conventionality, Melville agrees: “Nothing can be truer or better said.”25 In 
“Illusions” Emerson writes, “I look upon the simple and childish virtues of 
veracity and honesty as the root of all that is sublime in character. Speak 
as you think, be what you are, pay your debts of all kinds.” Next to this, 
Melville applauds him: “True & admirable! Bravo!”26 At another point he 
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simply exclaims, “Bully for Emerson!—Good.”27 As additional testaments 
to his admiration, after hearing Emerson lecture for the first time in Febru-
ary 1849, Melville wrote a letter to Evert Duyckinck, saying, “I have heard 
Emerson since I have been here. Say what they will, he’s a great man.”28 A 
month later, in a March 3 letter to Duyckinck, Melville famously compli-
ments Emerson as a fellow “thought-diver” of intellectual daring and origi-
nality: “I love all men who dive. Any fish can swim near the surface, but it 
takes a great whale to go down stairs five miles or more.”29
But ultimately, as Melville insisted to Duyckinck, he himself did not 
“oscillate in Emerson’s rainbow,” and he was also skeptical of the man who 
seemed to be “full of transcendentalism, myths & oracular gibberish.”30 
Melville’s marginal comments are far more critical of Emerson’s relentless 
optimism. For example, next to a passage where Emerson describes evil 
as only temporary rather than absolute, Melville writes, “He still bethinks 
himself of his optimism—he must make that good somehow against the 
eternal hell itself.”31 In “Prudence” Emerson writes, “Trust men, and they 
will be true to you; treat them greatly and they will show themselves great, 
though they may make an exception in your favor to all their rules of trade.” 
Melville responds: “God help the poor fellow who squares his life according 
to this.” In the same work Emerson writes: “The drover, the sailor, buffets it 
[the storm] all day, and his health renews itself at as vigorous a pulse under 
the sleet, as under the sun of June.” Melville responds, “To one who has 
weathered Cape Horn as a common sailor what stuff all this is.”32
How do Melville’s skepticism, his doubt, and his reservations play out 
in “Bartleby”? Melville critiques Emerson’s theory and practice of tran-
scendental awakening by having the scrivener parody these themes of self-
reliance, of focal distancing past particularity toward universals, and of 
sitting at home with the self.33 Bartleby comes to take on more and more of 
the qualities that Emerson evokes as pathways to a kind of transcendental 
awakening. But Melville seems critical of what Sharon Cameron has called 
Emerson’s “impersonal,” portraying Bartleby as excessively self-reliant, im-
possibly abstracted and detached from the human world.34 The outcome 
that greets the man who would prefer not to is quite different from the 
one Emerson anticipates and Bartleby seems to meet only with tragedy, not 
transcendence, and death, not awakening. Melville’s story ultimately indi-
cates that a wholly unconventional life is not a human life at all: it leads only 
to the “cadaverous triumph” of death.
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We should remember that the story itself seems to signal the moment 
when Bartleby’s process of transcendence and awakening begins. Bartleby 
starts out as an extremely industrious copyist. Indeed, he works at a furi-
ous pace initially and also seems to partake in all the usual processes of 
cross-checking that are expected of all the scriveners: “At first, Bartleby 
did an extraordinary quantity of writing. As if long famished for something 
to copy, he seemed to gorge himself on documents. There was no pause 
for digestion. He ran a day and night line too, copying by sun-light and by 
candle-light” (“Bartleby,” 642). But then Bartleby begins to change. Like 
Jesus, resurrected and arising from death, “It was on the third day, I think,” 
that Bartleby begins to undergo a process of transcendental awakening: the 
lawyer calls to Bartleby and is met with his reply, in a “mild, firm voice”: “I 
would prefer not to” (ibid., 643).
Does Bartleby decide to stop copying others’ words as a way of follow-
ing Emerson’s advice that “imitation is suicide”? In a radically self-reliant 
way, Bartleby places himself outside the pull of all forms of conventional 
authority and, as Emerson encourages, acts fully on the basis of his own 
intuition. Bartleby doesn’t refuse, protest, or say no, all of which would still 
place him within the parameters of the lawyer’s doctrine of assumptions: 
even though he would be rejecting those assumptions, he would still be act-
ing on the basis of their logics. In a way that is not tinged by ressentiment 
or a sense of victimization, Bartleby simply asserts his own preferences with 
a “cadaverously gentlemanly nonchalance,” and with the seeming expecta-
tion that his assertions will have at least as much authority as the lawyer’s 
assumptions (“Bartleby,” 650; emphasis in original). As the lawyer real-
izes, “He was more a man of preferences than assumptions” (“Bartleby,” 
659). On the third day Bartleby places himself wholly outside the realm of 
copying the conventions of others, rejecting what the lawyer calls “common 
sense” and acting in a radically and—as Melville will show—impossibly 
self-reliant way.
We get a deeper sense of how Melville uses the figure of Bartleby to 
critique Emersonian transcendentalism by analyzing a short phrase that he 
repeats three times: “I am not particular.” The lawyer asks Bartleby if he 
would like a clerkship and he replies, “No, I would not like a clerkship; but 
I am not particular” (“Bartleby,” 666). Then the lawyer asks if Bartleby 
would like to be a bartender. He replies, “I would not like it at all; though, 
as I said before, I am not particular” (ibid., 667). Finally, the lawyer asks 
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Bartleby if he would like to travel to Europe as a companion to entertain 
“some young gentleman with your conversation,” to which Bartleby replies, 
“Not at all. . . . I like to be stationary. But I am not particular” (ibid.).
Bartleby seems to have awakened to Emerson’s universal realm, which 
lies over and above the immediate material world of particularity, becoming 
like Emerson’s “transparent eye-ball.” In that famous passage from Nature, 
Emerson says: “I become a transparent eye-ball. I am nothing. I see all. The 
currents of the Universal Being circulate through me.”35 But in Melville’s 
story this transcendence is portrayed skeptically. Though the narrator him-
self may be unable to understand Bartleby’s process of awakening, it is un-
deniable that the story constructs the scrivener as less and less recognizably 
human and less attached to the world of humans. The narrator describes 
him as a “pale and motionless young man” and a “poor, pale, passive mor-
tal” who only grows more and more insubstantial throughout the story as 
he increasingly loses his grounding in the ordinary material world. Bartleby 
doesn’t seem to have any needs, desires, or human appetites. There was not 
“any thing ordinarily human about him” (“Bartleby,” 643). Bartleby is like 
an impersonal spirit, an outline of a person, blank, not filled in, “like a very 
ghost,” as the lawyer says (ibid., 648). If Bartleby becomes like a “transpar-
ent eye-ball” who has moved into the Universal Spirit, in Melville’s story 
this primarily means that he becomes wholly detached from the only things 
that matter, from humans and the world itself, a figure who simply “seemed 
alone, absolutely alone in the universe” (ibid., 657).
Bartleby doesn’t even fulfill that most basic appetite of hunger in nor-
mal ways, but subsists wholly on gingersnaps. As the lawyer discovers, the 
office boy, nicknamed “Ginger-Nut” because of his love for these small, 
spicy cookies, keeps Bartleby supplied with this unusual form of sustenance. 
Bartleby never drinks beer, tea, or coffee “like other men” and “never eats 
a dinner, properly speaking; he must be a vegetarian, then; but no, he never 
eats even vegetables, he eats nothing but ginger-nuts” (“Bartleby,” 646). To-
ward the end of the story, when Bartleby has been imprisoned for vagrancy, 
his detachment from convention extends even to refusing to eat a meal: 
though the lawyer has provided money for his dinner, Bartleby refuses it, 
saying, “It would disagree with me; I am unused to dinners” (ibid., 670).
Bartleby’s strange diet becomes even more interesting when we real-
ize that Melville once linked Emerson with gingerbread. In one of his let-
ters, Melville mockingly defends Emerson against Duyckinck’s criticisms of 
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his asceticism: “You complain that Emerson tho’ a denizen of the land of 
gingerbread, is above munching a plain cake in company of jolly fellows & 
swiging off his ale like you & me.”36 But Melville says, “My dear Sir, that’s 
his misfortune not his fault. His belly, Sir, is in his chest, and his brains 
descend down into his neck, and offer an obstacle to a draughtful of ale or 
a mouthful of cake.”37 Melville’s critique of Emerson comes through in the 
depiction of this pale figure who is also more brain than belly. Bartleby, like 
Emerson, seems to be a denizen of the land of gingerbread, but this ends 
badly for him: when he is in the Tombs and his one food source is cut off, he 
may simply have starved to death.
Ultimately, for all his admiration of Emerson, Melville found an ele-
ment of absurdity in the abstracted, ascetic quality of his thought and in his 
detachment from the rough-and-tumble conditions of the material world. 
Melville captures this critique in a kind of summarizing marginal comment: 
“This is admirable, as many other thoughts of Mr. Emerson’s are. His gross 
and astonishing errors & illusions spring from a self-conceit so intensely in-
tellectual and calm that at first one hesitates to call it by its right name. An-
other species of Mr. Emerson’s errors, or rather, blindness, proceeds from 
a defect in the region of the heart.”38 Not only is Emerson, in Melville’s 
view, more mind than body, but he is also more about the intellect than the 
heart. In Melville’s view, for all of Emerson’s insight, there is also a profound 
“blindness” to his perspective. Indeed, Melville’s skepticism about Emer-
son’s transcendental mode of vision plays out in “Bartleby.”
Eyes and vision figure prominently in “Bartleby,” but in a way that re-
flects Melville’s concerns about Emerson’s tendency to look up and over 
“disagreeable particularity” and to “dispose” of “the most disagreeable 
facts.” Indeed, we know from Melville’s marginalia that he was especially 
critical of this aspect of Emerson’s thought. For example, in “The Poet,” 
Emerson writes: “Also, we use defects and deformities to a sacred pur-
pose, so expressing our sense that the evils of the world are such only to 
the evil eye.” In response, Melville expresses frustration: “What does the 
man mean? If Mr. Emerson travelling in Egypt should find the plague-spot 
come out on him—would he consider that an evil sight or not? And if evil, 
would his eye be evil because it seemed evil to his eye, or rather to his sense 
using the eye as an instrument?” In another part of “The Poet” where Em-
erson writes that the poet, because he can “reattach things to nature and 
the Whole,” thus also “disposes very easily of the most disagreeable facts,” 
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Melville underlines this and comments: “So it would seem.”39 But Melville 
registers his skepticism about Emerson’s visual practice most fully through 
Bartleby’s “dead-wall reveries.”
There is not much worth looking at in the lawyer’s office, and yet after 
he begins his process of supposed awakening, Bartleby spends much of his 
time staring at the walls, an appropriate thing to do given that his work-
place is on Wall Street. The lawyer’s chambers are bounded by a white 
wall on one side—“This view might have been considered rather tame than 
otherwise, deficient in what landscape artists call ‘life’”—and in the other 
direction, his “windows commanded an unobstructed view of a lofty brick 
wall, black by age and everlasting shade; which wall required no spy-glass 
to bring out its lurking beauties, but for the benefit of all near-sighted spec-
tators, was pushed up to within ten feet of my window panes” (“Bartleby,” 
636). As the lawyer notes, “For long periods he would stand looking out, 
at his pale window behind the screen, upon the dead brick wall” (ibid., 
652). The lawyer will hear only silence and motionlessness and know that 
“behind his screen he must be standing in one of those dead-wall reveries 
of his” (ibid., 653). Bartleby seems to represent Emerson’s “transparent eye-
ball,” which is “nothing” but “sees all,” but in Melville’s story, even when we 
appreciate how this portrayal is mediated through the lawyer, it still just 
takes the form of staring at a brick wall. The scrivener may be trying to take 
Emerson’s advice to avoid being “near-sighted,” to look past his immediate 
realm and focus his gaze on the more harmonious distant horizon that lies 
beyond it. But in Melville’s story something that Emerson sees as a pathway 
to awakening seems like a dead end.
Eyes and vision figure into the story in another way as well. In his 
misguided way, the lawyer at one point thinks he has “solved” the problem 
of Bartleby’s preference not to: maybe it’s because his eyes are strained by 
copying! The lawyer worries that Bartleby’s furious copying in the first few 
days of his employment ruined his eyesight. This echoes Emerson’s fear for 
his own eyesight, a constant worry of his after he contracted what seems 
to have been uveitis, a rheumatic inflammation of the eye, in 1825. Emer-
son refers to his persistent fear of losing his eyesight in the famous passage 
about the transparent eyeball in Nature, where he writes that he feels “that 
nothing can befall me in life,—no disgrace, no calamity, (leaving me my 
eyes,) which nature cannot repair.”40 The lawyer’s concern with Bartleby’s 
eyesight may allude to Emerson’s concerns with losing vision, both literally 
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and in terms of the practice of focal distancing. As the lawyer says, “I looked 
steadfastly at him, and perceived that his eyes looked dull and glazed. In-
stantly it occurred to me, that his unexampled diligence in copying by his 
dim window for the first few weeks of his stay with me might have tempo-
rarily impaired his vision” (“Bartleby,” 656). But after several days of rest, 
Bartleby still will not copy: “Whether Bartleby’s eyes improved or not, I 
could not say. To all appearance, I thought they did. But when I asked him 
if they did, he vouchsafed no answer. At all events, he would do no copying” 
(ibid.). Indeed, the lawyer persists in thinking that the problem is all about 
Bartleby’s eyes, even after he has abandoned Bartleby and moved to a new 
office. Returning to try to coax Bartleby to leave the old office, the lawyer 
asks: “How would a bar-tender’s business suit you? There is no trying of the 
eyesight in that” (ibid., 667). The lawyer’s own conventional subject position 
might prevent him from understanding Bartleby. But given the inscrutabil-
ity of the scrivener’s dead-wall reveries, in this instance the lawyer can be 
forgiven for thinking the problem with Bartleby might be physical. This is 
another way that the story performs a kind of uncertainty about the cri-
tiques of transcendentalism that the narrative itself advances.
There is also a more macroscopic way that the story abstracts away 
from, and shifts the reader’s line of sight away from, the material context 
of the story. Just as Emerson lists “disagreeable” particular things that are 
then glanced over, so does Melville give hints of the immediate conditions 
that make up Bartleby’s context. After all, the story is subtitled “A Tale of 
Wall-Street.” But the material and ideological conditions of Wall Street are 
never the focus of the story: they are always only a subtitle, a subtext. Fol-
lowing Emerson’s line of sight, the story seems to direct our attention away 
from these conditions and to portray Bartleby as a transcendental character 
abstracted from all particularity. But scholars have worked to redirect our 
attention to Bartleby’s immediate historical context, unearthing the hidden 
ideology of capitalist production in the story, reminding us of the scrivener’s 
alienating conditions of employment, that his job is on Wall Street working 
for a lawyer associated with John Jacob Astor, that his firm is located near 
a place where there were recently labor strikes, that he may be living in 
the lawyer’s offices because he is actually homeless, and the list could go 
on.41 But despite all the minor chords these elements strike in the story, the 
major key works to portray Bartleby as somehow disconnected from this 
larger material context, perhaps because of the way it is narrated through 
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the eyes of the unreliable narrator, the bourgeois lawyer who is himself 
clueless about the conditions of his laborers. This deflection of immediate 
material conditions represents another way that Melville critiques transcen-
dentalism’s abstraction.
Bartleby’s detachment, his preference not to participate in worldly ac-
tivities, is also captured by his motionlessness and by his static residence 
in his “hermitage.” From the very first word used to describe Bartleby, the 
overriding characteristic that defines him is his lack of movement. He is 
characterized by a “great stillness,” and the lawyer first describes him as 
“a motionless young man” who “never went anywhere” (“Bartleby,” 642, 
646). He is a “fixture”: “Like the last column of some ruined temple, he 
remained standing mute and solitary in the middle of the otherwise de-
serted room” (ibid., 658). Even when Bartleby is imprisoned in the Tombs, 
he takes up the same stationary habits he displayed in the office: “He slowly 
moved to the other side of the inclosure and took up a position fronting the 
dead-wall” (ibid., 670). While he is in the lawyer’s chambers, Bartleby stays 
mostly in his “hermitage,” which is how the area behind the green screen is 
described throughout the story. Bartleby “sat in his hermitage, oblivious to 
every thing but his own peculiar business there” (ibid., 646).
The scrivener’s retreat from activity and movement, as well as the 
world of relationships, obligations, and conventions, registers Melville’s 
skepticism about Emerson’s counsel to explore the universe within the self, 
to find the Supreme Being in the chamber where you sit. We know from his 
marginal comments that Melville was critical of Emerson’s praise of self-
reliance when it also extended to disparaging the benefits to be gained from 
studying other cultures and simply “staying at home with the self.” Writing 
of Americans going to Europe in search of culture, Emerson queried, “You 
do not think you will find anything which you have not seen at home?” and 
Melville responded, “Yet, possibly, Rome or Athens has something to show 
or suggest that Chicago has not.”42 Even though the lawyer might not fully 
understand Bartleby’s motives, the scrivener’s life appears deeply impover-
ished by most conceivable measures.
Melville’s uncomfortable unbelief in Emerson’s transcendental prac-
tices, his state of simultaneous attraction and repulsion, is captured most 
concisely in Bartleby’s “cadaverous triumph.” If Bartleby demonstrates the 
momentarily disruptive power that an assertion of preferences can have—
throwing a wrench in the machinery of custom—his wholesale protest 
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   175 10/29/13   10:57 AM
176  Shannon L. Mariotti
against all conventions, his radical form of self-reliance, also places him be-
yond human society and outside the world. For Melville, there is ultimately a 
deep poverty and futility attached to transcendental practices of awakening: 
there is no life at all wholly detached from the obligations and conventions 
that condition our human and worldly existence. As other scholars have 
noted, the ultimate end that Bartleby meets—dying in the prison known 
as the Tombs and surrounded by high walls—is foreshadowed by the pale 
existence he leads in the lawyer’s office.43 The man who used to work in the 
“Dead Letter office”—“Dead letters! Does it not sound like dead men?” 
(“Bartleby,” 672)—lived a life that increasingly resembled a death. Indeed, 
the lawyer initially thinks Bartleby is just sleeping when he finally does die.
“Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!” and Thoreau’s Chanticleer
Melville’s connections with Thoreau are far less direct. We don’t have any 
proof that Melville ever met Thoreau, though it seems that he was at least 
familiar with some of Thoreau’s works. We know that Melville borrowed A 
Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers from Evert Duyckinck. We 
also know that parts of Thoreau’s A Yankee in Canada appeared in Putnam’s 
the same year as “Bartleby,” published anonymously, though “Thoreau’s 
authorship could have been an open secret, as Melville’s anonymous author-
ship frequently was.”44 But this is the nature of the evidence linking Melville 
with Thoreau: there is only speculation, hearsay, and gossip, and much of it 
reflects the same mocking, lighthearted, and comical tone of “Cock” itself.45
There is an anecdote about Melville and Hawthorne that indicates the 
jesting quality that the two might have used in speaking about Thoreau. In 
March 1851, Hawthorne visited Melville at his farm in Pittsfield, Massa-
chusetts. Years later Thomas F. Wolfe recounted an anecdote he had heard 
from Melville about this visit: “March weather prevented walks abroad, so 
the pair spent most of the week in smoking and talking metaphysics in the 
barn,—Hawthorne usually lounging upon a carpenter’s bench. When he 
was leaving, he jocosely declared that he would write a report of their psy-
chological discussions for publication in a book to be called ‘A Week on a 
Work-Bench in a Barn,’ the title being a travesty upon that of Thoreau’s then 
recent book, ‘A Week on Concord River.’”46
But if this story is mocking and lighthearted, it is also familiar and 
even affectionate, not malicious. Indeed, Hawthorne probably portrayed 
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Thoreau in more positive ways to Melville. Hawthorne was a fan of Walden 
and “found it one of the few works he could recommend while in England 
as having original ‘American characteristics.’”47 As Hershel Parker writes, 
“A good deal of Melville’s early impressions of Thoreau came from Haw-
thorne, as did his impression of Emerson the man. The previous year at 
the red cottage they had talked about Emerson, but now they talked about 
the Concord man who had climbed Greylock—‘the most unmalleable fel-
low alive’ although a good walking companion, Hawthorne had decided 
long before.”48 This unmalleability actually seems to have been a point of 
sympathy between Thoreau and Hawthorne, given that Hawthorne later 
described himself to his soon-to-be wife using the exact same terms: as 
Hawthorne wrote to Sophia, “I am a most unmalleable man.”49 Ultimately, 
Hawthorne “felt himself in fuller sympathy with [Thoreau] than with Em-
erson.”50 Duyckinck also “had strong opinions about Thoreau, and over the 
period of four years, probably found occasion to express some of them to 
Melville.”51 But Duyckinck did not hold a very high opinion of Thoreau at 
all and published a negative review of A Week on the Concord and Mer-
rimack Rivers in the Literary World that mocked Thoreau: “He depre-
cates churches and preachers. Will he allow us to uphold them? Or does he 
belong to the family of Malvolios, whose conceit was so engrossing that it 
threatened to deprive the world of cakes and ale?”52 Reflecting the domi-
nant mood of the day, Duyckinck thought of Thoreau “as a cranky imitator 
of Emerson.”53
Melville’s treatment of Thoreau in “Cock” bears the marks of both 
these influences.54 The disposition of “unmalleability” that Hawthorne liked 
is not so far from the unwavering and self-righteous commitment to rising 
above the world of cakes and ale that Duyckinck abhorred in Thoreau. Tho-
reau’s absolutism forms the basis for the critique that Melville makes of 
Thoreau in “Cock”: as we will see, the characters of this story do not waver 
from their single-minded pursuit of transcendence and awakening even as 
their lives fall apart, even as death and destruction pile up as a result of 
their neglect of their human finitude and worldly embeddedness. In “Cock” 
Melville emphasizes the costs of an unmalleable disposition.
We get our first clue that “Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!” critically engag-
es Thoreau through the story’s pairing of the crowing of the chanticleer 
with the theme of “morning,” being “awake,” and arising from the “doleful 
dumps,” all of which are recurrent themes in Thoreau’s writings. For exam-
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ple, in the “Where I Lived and What I Lived For” chapter of Walden, Tho-
reau makes one of many connections among the chanticleer, morning, and 
awakening: “As I have said, I do not propose to write an ode to dejection, 
but to brag as lustily as chanticleer in the morning, standing on his roost, if 
only to wake my neighbors up.”55 We see more images of the rooster in the 
“Sounds” chapter: Thoreau speaks of walking in the winter woods, which 
resound with the crowing of the cock: his “health is ever good, his lungs are 
sound, his spirits never flag.”56 Thoreau is invigorated by the sound: “Who 
would not be early to rise, and rise earlier and earlier every successive day 
of his life, till he became unspeakably healthy, wealthy, and wise?”57
In “Walking” we see more references to the cock’s crow and the way 
it can lift our spirits and stimulate our own awakening. As Thoreau writes, 
“Unless our philosophy hears the cock crow in every barn-yard within our 
horizon, it is belated. That sound commonly reminds us that we are grow-
ing rusty and antique in our employments and habits of thought.”58 Unlike 
us, it seems, the cock, according to Thoreau, “has not fallen astern; he has 
got up early, and kept up early, and to be where he is, is to be in season, in 
the foremost rank of time. It is an expression of the health and soundness of 
Nature, a brag for all the world—healthiness as of a spring burst forth—a 
new fountain of the Muses, to celebrate this last instant of time.”59 Thoreau 
also speaks of being uplifted from the “doleful dumps,” which is also a re-
current phrase in “Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!” As Thoreau writes, “The merit 
of this bird’s strain is in its freedom from all plaintiveness. The singer can 
easily move us to tears or to laughter, but where is he who can excite in us a 
pure morning joy? When, in doleful dumps, breaking the awful stillness of 
our wooden side-walk on a Sunday—or perchance a watcher in the house 
of mourning—I hear a cockerel crow far or near, I think to myself there is 
one of us well at any rate, and with a sudden gush return to my senses.”60
Another sound, beyond the crowing of the chanticleer, figures promi-
nently into both Thoreau’s writings and Melville’s short story: the whistle 
of the railroad. We might draw parallels between Thoreau’s references to 
the railroad in the “Sounds” chapter of Walden and Melville’s repeated ref-
erences to the train in “Cock,” not just in terms of how each portrays the 
whistle itself but in the language each uses to depict the transfer of goods 
brought by the train. The call-and-response language that Thoreau uses to 
relate the exchange of commodities is also echoed in “Cock.” Thoreau de-
scribes how the sounds of the locomotive echo through the woods: “Here 
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come your groceries, country; your rations, countrymen! Nor is there any 
man so independent on his farm that he can say them nay. And here’s 
your pay for them! screams the countryman’s whistle.”61 In another passage 
Thoreau writes, “And hark! here comes the cattle-train bearing the cattle 
of a thousand hills, sheepcots, stables, and cow-yards in the air, drovers 
with their sticks, and shepherd boys in the midst of their flocks, all but the 
mountain pastures, whirled along like leaves blown from the mountains 
by the September gales.”62 These sounds of the cock and of the railroad, 
the two primary sounds that echo throughout Thoreau’s writings, both 
figure prominently in “Cock,” as the narrator brags lustily about his own 
awakening.
But Melville imports the symbols, sounds, and sights that appear 
throughout Thoreau’s writings to mockingly and bitingly critique them. 
Melville’s story begins with the narrator in a very depressed state. Unable 
to sleep, he goes outside early one morning and looks around him at a land-
scape that seems in ruin and decay: “All round me were tokens of a divided 
empire” where old and new, dying and growing, mingled together (“Cock,” 
1203). Whereas the transcendentalist would view nature as a unified and 
harmonious whole, Melville here emphasizes breakage, division, decay, and 
death. The narrator describes two locomotive crashes in which his friends 
died, but he mockingly questions the transcendentalist idea of the universe 
as a balanced whole where even bad things are part of the workings of fate 
and part of a larger, compensatory unity: “Yet what’s the use of complain-
ing,” he asks. “Don’t the very heavens themselves ordain these things—else 
they could not happen?” (ibid., 1204). Even the cows come in for some 
criticizing: in contrast to Thoreau’s usual raptures about Nature, the nar-
rator looks at the beasts coming out of the barn into the pasture and says, 
“What a miserable-looking set, to be sure!” (ibid., 1206). The narrator goes 
on to rail against the railroad: “Great improvements of the age! What! to 
call the facilitators of death and murder an improvement! Who wants to 
travel so fast? My grandfather did not, and he was no fool” (ibid., 1205). An-
other passage follows the pattern of the “Sounds” chapter of Walden, which 
Melville renders in an even more exclamatory style: “Hark! Here comes 
that old dragon again . . . snort! puff! scream!—here he comes straight-bent 
through these vernal woods, like the Asiatic cholera cantering on a camel. 
Stand aside! here he comes, the chartered murderer! the death monopoliz-
er! judge, jury, and hangman all together, whose victims die always without 
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benefit of clergy. For two hundred and fifty miles that iron fiend goes yelling 
through the land, crying ‘More! more! more!’” (ibid.).
But then the mood changes completely and the more philosophical 
critique of Thoreau’s practice of awakening begins on the level of substance, 
not just style. Throughout the story, the cock has the power to shake the 
narrator out of his melancholy. He hears the most magnificent crow from a 
rooster that he has ever heard, which lifts him completely from his negative 
and depressed state. He experiences what Thoreau might call morning, no 
matter what the clocks say: “Hark! By Jove, what’s that? . . . Hark again! 
How clear! how musical! how prolonged! What a triumphant thanksgiving 
of a cock-crow! . . . Why, why, I begin to feel a little in sorts again. It ain’t 
so very misty after all. The sun yonder is beginning to show himself: I feel 
warmer. Hark! There again! Did ever such a blessed cock so ring out over 
the earth before!” (“Cock,” 1206). The narrator thinks that the bird “plainly 
says—‘Never say die! ’” and feels his “blood bound”: “I feel wild. What? 
Jumping on this rotten old log here, to flap my elbows and crow too? And 
just now in the doleful dumps. And all this from the simple crowing of a 
cock. Marvelous cock!” (ibid., 1206–1207; emphasis in original).
But it is through this repeated pattern of events that Melville critiques 
Thoreau. Something terrible happens, the narrator falls into the doleful 
dumps, but then he hears the cock crow and his spirits are lifted up and 
over the material realm of decay, decline, and debt: “If at times I would 
relapse into my doleful dumps, straightway at the sound of the exultant 
and defiant crow, my soul, too, would turn chanticleer, and clap her wings, 
and throw back her throat, and breathe forth a cheerful challenge to all the 
world of woes” (“Cock,” 1215). And yet for Melville, these experiences of 
exhilaration and transcendence are just delusions that cannot defeat death. 
Indeed, these momentary spiritual lifts may even hasten the onset of nega-
tive conditions because, while held in thrall to the crowing of the cock, the 
characters in the story fail to attend to their immediate world concerns, 
such as finding ways to sustain and care for sick bodies and pay the bills. 
It becomes clear that the narrator is in debt, but his fascination with these 
momentary experiences of transcendence and awakening pacify any sense 
of concern and quell any motivation to work toward changing his worldly 
conditions. His spirits aren’t even dampened by the creditor to whom he 
owes money, who comes to dun him. The narrator glibly asks the bill col-
lector to roll up the bill so he can light his pipe with it (ibid., 1208). “‘My 
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friend,’ said I, ‘what a charming morning! How sweet the country looks! 
Pray, did you hear that extraordinary cock-crow this morning? Take a glass 
of my stout!’” (ibid., 1209).
The dun keeps coming to the narrator’s door with bills, but no matter. 
The narrator has a hefty mortgage on his house and is forced to take out 
another mortgage to pay more debts, but no matter. The dun commences a 
civil process against him and serves him with the document rolled up in his 
cigar, but no matter (“Cock,” 1215). Nothing matters anymore: the cock’s 
crow causes him to transcend this dismal material world: “Arrived home, I 
read the process, and felt a twinge of melancholy. Hard world! Hard world! 
. . . Hark! like a clarion! yea, like a jolly bolt of thunder with bells to it—
came the all-glorious and defiant crow! Ye gods, how it set me up again! . . . 
Plain as cock could speak, it said: ‘Let the world and all aboard of it go to 
pot. Do you be jolly, and never say die. What’s the world compared to you? 
What is it, anyhow, but a lump of loam? Do you be jolly!’” (ibid., 1216). The 
bird’s crow causes the narrator to abstract away from what Emerson would 
call the “disagreeable particulars” that surround him in the world. The cock 
gives him “reinvigorated spirits” and a “dauntless sort of feeling.” He thinks 
over all his problems but still feels “as though I could meet Death, and in-
vite him to dinner, and toast the Catacombs with him, in pure overflow of 
self-reliance and a sense of universal security” (ibid., 1210). These last few 
words regarding self-reliance and universal security, it nearly goes without 
saying, are strongly marked with the imprint of transcendentalism.
The same dynamic whereby people become deluded about their des-
perate material conditions because of the euphoria they experience when 
the cock crows becomes even more pronounced when the narrator actually 
meets the rooster. One day, while sitting and “reading Burton’s Anatomy 
of Melancholy,” the narrator learns that Merrymusk, the poor man who 
comes to split his wood, is the owner of the bird. Soon the narrator visits 
Merrymusk’s hovel to see this magnificent cock and tries to buy him from 
the woodcutter, who calls the bird Trumpet. But the desperately poor man 
won’t sell him at any price. Indeed, the cock’s crow seems to be all that 
is keeping the whole family alive. Everyone in the family is sick and near 
death, but they are all hysterically happy all the time and completely igno-
rant of their terrible material circumstances, because they get to listen to 
the chanticleer all day. The sick wife and the four sick children lie in bed 
together beyond a curtain that divides the room. Trumpet lives in the house 
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and keeps coming into the sickroom to hop on the bed and crow. The narra-
tor asks Merrymusk if it’s a good idea to have the cock crowing all the time 
in a sickroom, but Merrymusk insists it revitalizes them all: “Don’t you like 
it? Don’t it do you good? Ain’t it inspiring? Don’t it impart pluck? Give stuff 
against despair?” (“Cock,” 1222). The children’s “little sickly” voices plead 
for Trumpet to sound again, and the roof shakes as he crows. The cock 
jumps on the sickbed: “All their wasted eyes gazed at him with a wild and 
spiritual delight. They seemed to sun themselves in the radiant plumage of 
the cock. ‘Better than a ’pothecary, eh?’ said Merrymusk. ‘This is Dr. Cock 
himself’” (ibid., 1223). The narrator asks Merrymusk if there is any hope 
for his wife’s recovery: “Not the least.” What about the children then? “Very 
little.” The narrator muses, “It must be a doleful life, then, for all concerned. 
This lonely solitude—this shanty—hard work—hard times” (ibid.). But no, 
Merrymusk insists, it’s not so bad at all because he has Trumpet, who crows 
through the darkest moments. With this in mind, the narrator goes home, 
rejoicing, inspired by the cock crowing, and finds that nothing bothers him 
anymore, either. He has to take out another mortgage on his plantation, and 
some of his relatives die. But all he does is buy more beer, some stout and 
porter. He doesn’t wear mourning for his dead family members but, out of 
respect for the dead, “for three days drank stout in preference to porter, 
stout being of the darker color” (ibid., 1224).
In the final scene of the story, awakening and death are wrapped up 
in each other in the most dramatic fashion. Everyone is mortally ill: “the 
whole house was a hospital.” Merrymusk lies on a heap of old clothes on 
the floor. And yet Merrymusk, his wife, and the children insist they are fine 
and keep asking the cock to crow: “Crow, Trumpet.” “All well” turn out to 
be Merrymusk’s last words: “His head fell back. . . . Merrymusk was dead” 
(“Cock,” 1224). The cock now continues hopping about the house, crowing, 
as the family continues dying off one by one. The wife listens to the cock 
crow, then dies, and the cock crows once again. Trumpet then perches on 
the bed where the dead wife and her children lie and the “pallor of the 
children was changed to radiance.” The cock jumps up onto the children’s 
bed and crows over and over again, “bent upon crowing the souls of the 
children out of their wasted bodies.” Finally, “They were dead. The cock 
shook his plumage over them. The cock crew. It was now like a Bravo! like 
a Hurrah! like a Three-times-three! hip! hip! He strode out of the shanty” 
(ibid. 1225). The narrator follows the cock out of the hovel, and then the 
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bird “flew upon the apex of the dwelling, spread wide his wings, sounded 
one supernatural note, and dropped at my feet. The cock was dead” (ibid.). 
The narrator buries them all together and plants a stone on their gravesite. 
And the story ends with wild crowing: the narrator notes, “Never since then 
have I felt the doleful dumps, but under all circumstances crow late and 
early and with a continual crow. cock-a-doodlE-doo!—oo!—oo!—oo!—
oo!—” (ibid. 1226). In this way “Cock” ends with an even more cadaverous 
triumph than “Bartleby.” The landscape is littered with corpses, but it still 
resounds with the lusty bragging of the chanticleer, taken up by the narrator 
himself after the cock itself expires.
The experience of morning doesn’t prevent mourning, though the 
Trumpet of awakening might sound throughout that process, and the path 
of transcendentalism still leads to the grave. And indeed, despite the comic 
tones of the story, Melville makes a sharp critique of the dangers of these 
delusions of transcendence. As long as the characters hear the call of morn-
ing, they ignore the world around them and their material and human lives 
worsen. As long as they are uplifted into this illusory euphoria of awakening, 
they don’t work toward any productive change of the material and ideologi-
cal conditions of their lives. Poverty figures prominently in the story, both 
in the narrator’s debt and the family’s desperate sickness. But none of them 
displays any critical awareness of the causes of this desperation or seems 
motivated to work toward changing these conditions, because of the opiate 
of the chanticleer and the delusion of awakening to a morning beyond this 
world. This is the ultimate critique Melville makes of both Emerson and 
Thoreau: in his view, transcendentalism fosters a kind of quietistic, compla-
cent, passive, and comfortable disposition that makes us think we can rise 
above our own bodies, human needs, material conditions, and worldly con-
ventions. But for Melville there is no escaping these aspects of life except 
through death. In fact, in his parodies of both Emerson and Thoreau, trying 
to practice these forms of transcendental awakening leads only more direct-
ly to death, given the ways that they entice his characters, from Bartleby to 
Merrymusk, to move above and beyond immediate material particularity in 
ways that lead to the neglect of the body, of relationships, of obligations, of 
humanity, and of the world itself.
But as “Cock” also demonstrates, Melville tends to lump Emerson and 
Thoreau into the same category in a way that blurs important distinctions 
between them, ascribing to Thoreau the same practices and transcending 
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aims that he seems to critique in Emerson.63 Instead, if Emerson’s practices 
aim to transcend the immediate particularities of the material world, Tho-
reau’s practices aim to descend into it. If Emerson’s moments of awakening 
come through transcending the immediacy of the here and now, moving 
up and over material particularities, then Thoreau’s moments of awaken-
ing come from digging more deeply into those immediate particularities. If 
Emerson is properly understood in terms of these transcending motions and 
visual practices, Thoreau is really more of a “descendentalist,” moving down 
and more deeply to be awakened by the world immediately around him. 
In these ways Melville actually has more sympathies with Thoreau than 
he himself seems to have appreciated, and both Melville and Thoreau are 
similarly critical of Emerson’s abstract idealism in similar ways. But Melville 
is not attentive to these distinctions, unsurprisingly perhaps, given how the 
conventional wisdom of the day said that Thoreau was a weak imitator of 
Emerson and given how Melville might have known about Thoreau primar-
ily through hearsay and the gossip of mutual acquaintances, whereas we 
know he actually did read Emerson’s work and hear him lecture.
Cadaverous Triumphs and Mourning Morning
Melville seems sensitive to many of the same problems that Emerson and 
Thoreau are concerned with, but deeply skeptical of the lusty bragging 
about transcendence and awakening that he hears from them. Melville 
seems attracted by these thinkers’ emphasis on creative originality and 
unorthodox self-trust and compelled by the call both Emerson and Thoreau 
issue to engage in practices intended to awaken to a morning beyond the 
conventional authorities of their day. He seems to find Emerson especially 
attractive in this regard, while not taking Thoreau quite as seriously. Mel-
ville wants to affirm the critiques of convention and authority that Emerson 
and Thoreau advance, to sympathize with the feelings of alienation and 
estrangement that both convey. But he can’t share their optimism: Melville 
criticizes transcendental theory and practice as a dangerous and deluded 
denial of our necessarily embodied and embedded condition in a world of 
pain and suffering. In “Bartleby” and “Cock,” any transcendence of this 
world is a transcendence unto death, and any illusion of triumphant awak-
ening is ultimately cadaverous.
A passage from “Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!” captures Melville’s reluctant 
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doubt nicely. The narrator describes how world affairs of late have been 
characterized by some “rascally despotisms” being “knocked on the head” 
by “high-spirited revolts” while some “high-spirited travelers” have also 
been “knocked on the head.” Likewise, the narrator’s “private affairs were 
also full of despotisms, casualties, and knockings on the head,” and the 
world forced him into a “toiling posture” that “brought my head pretty well 
earthward, as if I were in the act of butting it against the world.” But rather 
than asserting that these hard material realities can be overcome, Melville’s 
narrator says he “marked the fact, but only grinned at it with a ghastly grin” 
(“Cock,” 1203). All in all, Melville seems to think that we do have the ca-
pacity to revolt and knock the rascals and despots of the world on the head, 
but nothing we do can awaken us from or transcend the pain and suffering 
of our immediate material world: nothing we do can protect us from just 
being knocked back on the head in response.
Notes
I am grateful to Jason Frank, Walt Herbert, Elizabeth Stockton, Isis Leslie, and 
David Rando for their careful reading and helpful suggestions, all of which greatly 
strengthened the essay. Thanks to Susan McWilliams and the other participants of 
the APSA panel titled “American Tragedy: The Political Thought of Herman Mel-
ville.” Finally, Wouter Van Erve valuably contributed to this project as my research 
assistant during the summer of 2010.
1. Duyckinck corresponded with both Thoreau and Melville and was once 
a good friend to Melville, though they later had a falling-out, seemingly because 
Duyckinck was deeply critical and skeptical of Emerson and began to see too 
much transcendentalism in Melville’s writing. Duyckinck was also probably famil-
iar with Thoreau’s anonymous contributions to various magazines and journals, 
and his own paper printed a review of A Week on the Concord and Merrimack 
Rivers. Duyckinck also had one of the best private libraries in the country at the 
time, and Melville borrowed books from him, including Thoreau’s Week, “because 
Duyckinck told him there was a section on Mount Greylock in it.” Hershel Parker, 
Herman Melville: A Biography, vol. 1, 1819–1851 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1996), 740. See also Parker, Herman Melville: A Biography, vol. 2, 
1851–1891 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). Horace Greeley 
was another common acquaintance: Greeley “had known Melville’s brother Gan-
sevoort rather well” and “began using his New York Tribune to ‘get Thoreau’s name 
before the public and create an audience for him’ as early as 1848.” Hershel Parker, 
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“Melville’s Satire of Emerson and Thoreau: An Evaluation of the Evidence,” Amer-
ican Transcendental Quarterly 7, no. 2 (1970): 65.
2. Nathaniel Hawthorne was one of Melville’s closest friends and also one of 
the writers he most admired. But Hawthorne also represented a strong connec-
tion to Concord and to Emerson and Thoreau, renting Emerson’s family home in 
Concord and writing Mosses from an Old Manse there, which Melville read along 
with its allusion to Thoreau in the dedication. In addition, Hawthorne and Thoreau 
were walking and boating partners, and Hawthorne even purchased the small boat 
Thoreau built, The Lilypad. Elizabeth Peabody, Sophia Hawthorne’s sister, was 
another point of connection: for example, she edited the volume titled Aesthetic 
Papers, in which Thoreau’s “Resistance to Civil Government” was first published.
3. Matthiessen sees Melville’s writing as a “reaction” to Emersonian transcen-
dentalism. F. O. Matthiessen, American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the 
Age of Emerson and Whitman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), 184. 
Others amplify the attraction angle and downplay the repulsion, such as Perry 
Miller, who argues that both Moby-Dick and Pierre are to the end “‘defiantly’ and 
‘unrepentantly’ Transcendental.” Perry Miller, “Melville and Transcendentalism,” 
Virginia Quarterly Review 29 (Autumn 1953): 556–575. In more recent variations 
on this theme, John Williams discusses Mardi, Redburn, White-Jacket, and Moby-
Dick to argue that these works derive their force from the “white fire” of tran-
scendentalism and to show how Melville responded to, absorbed, and transformed 
ideas and images from Emerson. John B. Williams, White Fire: The Influence of 
Emerson on Melville (Long Beach: California State University, Long Beach, 1991). 
Similarly, Michael McLoughlin argues that Melville saw self-reliance and noncon-
formity in a positive light in his early “Transcendental novels of the sea,” but he 
then developed an increasingly antitranscendentalist philosophical position in his 
later works. Michael McLoughlin, Dead Letters to the New World: Melville, Em-
erson, and American Transcendentalism (New York: Routledge, 2003).
4. In a 1946 piece tracing Melville’s reception of transcendentalism in this 
novel, Egbert Oliver argues that the character Mark Winsome, the mystic, parodies 
Emerson “with pointed directness” to criticize Emerson’s view on the beneficence 
of Nature, his cold intellectualism and asceticism, his indifference toward poverty, 
and his lack of compassion, and he asserts that his disciple, Egbert, is “explicitly 
based” on Henry David Thoreau. Egbert S. Oliver, “Melville’s Picture of Emerson 
and Thoreau in The Confidence-Man,” College English 8, no. 2 (November 1946): 
61–72. For different reasons, Hershel Parker is also persuaded that Mark Win-
some represents a satire on Emerson’s sense of man’s innate goodness and thinks 
evidence can be marshaled to argue that Egbert the disciple is a caricature of Tho-
reau. Parker, “Melville’s Satire,” 3. Elizabeth Foster also argues that Winsome is a 
portrait of Emerson, though she disagrees that Egbert caricatures Thoreau: Foster 
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thinks that both Winsome and Egbert represent Emerson’s philosophy; Winsome 
represents the metaphysics and the abstract philosophy, and Egbert represents the 
ethics and the practical effects. Melville, The Confidence-Man, ed. Elizabeth S. 
Foster (New York: Hendricks House, 1954), lxix.
5. In a 1948 piece Egbert Oliver argues that Thoreau’s A Week on the Concord 
and Merrimack Rivers was the “source” for “Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!”—motivating 
Melville’s satire and furnishing the language, symbols, and details of the story. 
Egbert S. Oliver, “‘Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!’ and Transcendental Hocus-Pocus,” New 
England Quarterly 21, no. 2 (June 1948): 204–216. William Bysshe Stein agrees 
that “Cock” is a satire on Thoreau, but he argues instead that it was “directly” 
inspired by “Walking” and that Melville “was thinking of” this essay when he com-
posed his short story. William Bysshe Stein, “Melville Roasts Thoreau’s Cock,” 
Modern Language Notes 74 (March 1959): 218–219. Sidney Moss, however, dis-
agrees with the thesis that “Cock” is a satire on Thoreau, seeing it instead as a 
comedic celebration of life and arguing that, at the time, Thoreau wasn’t even well 
known enough to be parodied. Sidney Moss, “‘Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!’ and Some 
Legends in Melville Scholarship,” American Literature 40, no. 2 (May 1968): 192–
210. Hershel Parker disagrees with Moss on these points and thinks Melville was 
indeed on occasion satirizing transcendentalism, but he also valuably reminds us 
that “with such contextual arguments we are always partly at the mercy of what 
record, if any, chances to survive.” Parker, “Melville’s Satire,” 66.
6. Christopher W. Sten, “Bartleby the Transcendentalist: Melville’s Dead Let-
ter to Emerson,” Modern Language Quarterly 35 (1974): 30–44. For example, 
Sten argues that “a comparative examination” suggests that Melville had read “The 
Transcendentalist” and speculates that he “read it with care.” First, Sten contends 
that Melville used Emerson’s depiction of the idealist in this essay as a model for 
the spiritual Bartleby, who shuns the material world. Second, Melville used Emer-
son’s “materialist” as a model for the lawyer, an agent of the economic institutions 
of Wall Street. And finally, Melville used Emerson’s “self-dependence” as a model 
for Bartleby’s ethics: Emerson’s “I do not wish” statements are seen as a model 
for Bartleby’s refusals. Ultimately, Sten sees the figure of Bartleby as Melville’s 
critique of Emerson’s transcendentalism: the scrivener’s extreme rejection of the 
material world and “his attempt to be absolutely free, pure, and self-reliant—leads 
to his premature death,” which shows how a “seemingly innocent ethical theory, 
even the apparently healthy ‘American’ one of self-reliance, can in practice be 
quite deadly” (ibid., 39). But, though this would seem to be the centerpiece of 
his argument, Sten also notes that it is “difficult to detail the similarities between 
Melville’s portrayal of Bartleby and Emerson’s portrayal of the idealist because 
Bartleby, virtually speechless and impassive, gives us little from which to intuit 
his philosophical position” (ibid., 36). Still, he goes on to say, “Bartleby’s ethics, 
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like his metaphysics, are evidently those of the Transcendentalist, for he is simi-
larly ‘self-dependent’” (ibid., 38). My own argument is somewhat in sympathy with 
Sten’s, but whereas Sten bases his argument on parallels between Emerson’s refus-
als and Bartleby’s refusals, I show how Melville’s engagement with Emerson plays 
out through a critique of transcendental practices of awakening, such as “sitting at 
home,” the visual practice of “focal distancing,” and abstraction generally.
7. Francine Puk also argues that Emerson’s transcendental doctrines were 
“uppermost in Melville’s mind when he wrote ‘Bartleby,’” but she thinks the 
“source” essay was actually “Self-Reliance”: for her, Melville’s story “rebuts” and 
“refutes” Emerson by critically exploring the destructive consequences of a radical 
application of his dictum that “what I must do is all that concerns me, not what 
people think.” Francine S. Puk, “Bartleby the Scrivener: A Study in Self-Reliance,” 
Delta 7 (1978): 7–20.
8. Egbert Oliver sees Thoreau as the “source” for “Bartleby” and thinks that 
the scrivener’s aloofness, withdrawal, and noncooperation are modeled on Tho-
reau’s passive resistance and refusals. Egbert S. Oliver, “A Second Look at ‘Bar-
tleby,’” College English 6 (1945): 431–439. Similarly, Robert Morseberger argues 
that it “seems almost inevitable” that Melville had Thoreau’s work “distinctly in 
mind” in writing his story because Bartleby’s denial “has an affirmative quality, as 
it did when Thoreau refused to pay taxes to a government that supported slavery 
and war.” Robert Morseberger, “‘I Prefer Not To’: Melville and the Theme of With-
drawal,” University College Quarterly 10 (January 1965): 25. Frederick Busch sees 
“Bartleby” as a tale of modern political alienation, in which Bartleby carries out 
the threat of passive resistance and disobedience that Thoreau articulates in “Civil 
Disobedience.” Frederick Busch, “Thoreau and Melville as Cellmates,” Modern 
Fiction Studies 23 (Summer 1973): 239–242.
9. Michael Rogin’s Subversive Genealogy: The Politics and Art of Herman 
Melville (New York: Knopf, 1983) is significant for my purposes, given some key 
similarities but sharp differences between our interpretations of “Bartleby.” Rogin 
undertakes a reading of “Bartleby” that is situated in the economic, political, and 
historical context of modernization. For Rogin, following György Lukács’s analysis 
of the “modern hero,” Bartleby’s absence of personal history and particular quali-
ties and his inability to enter into relationships or have contact with the world situ-
ate him in modernity and mark him as an inhabitant of the American mass society 
that Tocqueville feared. Rogin asserts, “The power of Melville’s short story comes 
from its abstractness. By resituating Bartleby historically, we can see it as a com-
ment on the historical triumph of abstraction” (ibid., 194). Rogin shows how the 
“failure of political reforms, alluded to in Bartleby, confines the scrivener and his 
employer in the office they share. Economic relations replace political dreams,” 
and Bartleby’s employer is “master over a refractory slave” who first copies him and 
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then “withdraws his labor,” appropriating the “lawyer’s identity by refusing to copy 
him” and thus gaining a “cadaverous triumph” over the lawyer (ibid.). But Rogin 
also sees the scrivener as Melville’s critical psychological analysis—and subver-
sion—of Thoreau’s civil disobedience and passive resistance. Rogin sees Bartleby’s 
“I prefer not to” as an echo of Thoreau’s “I simply wish to refuse allegiance.” Ul-
timately, Rogin sees Bartleby as an inverted copy of Thoreau that Melville uses 
to expose “the passive aggression which lies behind nonviolent resistance” and to 
highlight the pure negativity of Bartleby’s position and its resistance to coloni-
zation, but also its ultimately destructive consequences (ibid., 195). I agree with 
Rogin that “Bartleby” highlights a deep tension between the abstracting tenden-
cies of modernity and immediate material particularity, but I see this dynamic 
playing out in a different way in the story. If Rogin views Melville as critically 
engaging the abstracting tendencies of modernity through the figure of Bartleby 
and his lack of particular qualities—“I am not particular,” the scrivener insists 
several times—I also see this concern with abstract universals and material par-
ticularity as part and parcel of Melville’s critical engagement with Emerson’s own 
transcending idealist gaze, which itself bears some features of the violent tenden-
cies that Rogin associates with modern industrialism. Thus, our concern with the 
way themes of abstraction are criticized in the story is sympathetic, but Rogin and 
I make different arguments about how Melville undertakes these challenges and 
how they relate to his reception of transcendentalism. If Rogin sees the figure of 
Bartleby as a subversion of Thoreau and his practice of civil disobedience, I see 
Melville as engaging these concerns with abstraction through a parallel between 
Bartleby and Emerson.
10. Gregory Jay also sees Melville’s “Bartleby” as a subversion of Thoreau’s 
“Civil Disobedience” that takes shape around the very different ways each text 
responds to the problem of authority. For Jay, Thoreau also refuses the author-
ity of the state, the conventional economy, and mainstream society, but in a way 
that is fraught by a gender anxiety that fears emasculation and asserts manhood 
through disobedience, thus still working within the conventions of authority he 
aims to subvert. In contrast, Bartleby’s negation is more radical and wholesale, 
and his “withdrawal from writing and his refusal to copy may well be read as a 
willed disobedience to every prescription in his culture’s ‘general text.’” Gregory S. 
Jay, America the Scrivener: Deconstruction and the Subject of Literary History 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 21.
11. Branka Arsić makes seven and a half wholly different interpretations of what 
might be going on in this short story, linking Bartleby to passivity, the impersonal, 
melancholy and madness, drugs, addiction, sexuality, ethics, and friendship. Im-
portantly, Arsić doesn’t try to pin Bartleby down, to categorize him, but sees the 
story as open to all these sometimes competing and even contradictory possibili-
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ties; she does, however, briefly discuss the links between Bartleby and Thoreau, 
though they are not a focus of her argument. Branka Arsi, Passive Constitutions: 
7½ Times Bartleby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
12. I explore Emerson’s practice of “focal distancing” in greater depth and ana-
lyze different implications of this idealist gaze elsewhere. See Shannon Mariotti, 
“The Death of the First-Born Son: Emerson’s ‘Focal Distancing,’ Du Bois’ ‘Sec-
ond Sight,’ and Disruptive Particularity,” Political Theory 37, no. 3 (June 2009): 
351–374; Mariotti, “Emerson’s Transcendental Gaze and the ‘Disagreeable Par-
ticulars’ of Slavery: Vision and the Costs of Idealism,” in A Political Companion to 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Alan M. Levine and Daniel S. Malachuk (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 2011); and Mariotti, Thoreau’s Democratic With-
drawal: Alienation, Participation, and Modernity (Madison: University of Wis-
consin Press, 2010).
13. Parker, Herman Melville: A Biography, 1:618.
14. Sophia Hawthorne wrote in a letter to her sister Elizabeth that one morning 
Melville “shut himself into the boudoir & read Mr. Emerson’s Essays in presence 
of our beautiful picture.” This picture was an engraving of Raphael’s The Transfor-
mation, a gift from Emerson. Looking at this picture, Hershel Parker notes, also 
“occasioned some stories from Hawthorne, and especially from Sophia, about their 
stay in the Old Manse in Concord and their acquaintance with Emerson and his 
followers, such as Thoreau and the young William Ellery Channing.” Ibid., 776.
15. Also cited in Andrew Delbanco, Melville: His World and Work (New York: 
Knopf, 2005), 252–253.
16. I discuss the following texts in my discussion of Emerson: Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, “The Transcendentalist,” in Nature, Addresses, and Lectures, vol. 1 of 
The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Alfred R. Ferguson (Cam-
bridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971); Emerson, “Experience,” 
in Essays: Second Series, ed. Joseph Slater (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1983); Emerson, “Self-Reliance” and “Heroism,” in Essays: First 
Series, ed. Joseph Slater (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1979); Emerson, Nature, in Ferguson, Nature, Addresses, and Lectures.
17. Emerson, “Transcendentalist,” 203.
18. Emerson, “Experience,” 41.
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20. Ibid., 46.
21. Emerson, “Heroism,” 152.
22. Emerson, Nature, 45.
23. Ibid., 10.
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Silence and Stasis
Bartleby among the Philosophers
Kevin Attell
The Stoic [placed felicity] in philosophic pride,
By him called virtue; and his virtuous man,
Wise, perfect in himself, and all possessing,
Equal to God, oft shames not to prefer,
As fearing God nor man, contemning all
Wealth, pleasure, pain or torment, death and life,
Which when he lists, he leaves, or boasts he can,
For all his tedious talk is but vain boast,
Or subtle shifts conviction to evade.
—John Milton, Paradise Regained
Is there a single short story of the American nineteenth century that has 
generated as much critical commentary over the last half century, and from 
such a wide range of disciplinary perspectives, as “Bartleby the Scrivener”? 
To mention just a few examples: Bartleby the impassive employee has been 
seen as an alienated proletarian laborer and his inertia in the law office 
as a figure for a revolutionary disruption of commerce and the capitalist 
system; Bartleby and his employer have been traced to various real people, 
including Melville’s friends Eli James Fly and George J. Adler and several 
of the many lawyers in Melville’s family; Bartleby has been read as an ironic 
portrait of Thoreau in his civil disobedience, of Emerson and his aloof 
transcendental sages, and of Melville himself, the maniacally prolific writer 
(his entire career as a novelist lasting only twelve years) who eventually fell 
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into silence and a dull desk job (see, for example, Shannon L. Mariotti’s 
essay in this volume); Bartleby has been cast as an existentialist antihero; 
he has played Oedipus to the lawyer’s Laius in psychoanalytical readings; 
he has served as a case study in anorexia, catatonia, and schizophrenia; 
deconstructive critics have seen the scrivener as an allegorical figure for 
différance, the unstoppable movement and displacement within signifying 
systems that undermine all appeals to stable meaning; and in its narrative of 
mysterious suffering and final self-sacrifice, Bartleby’s story has been read 
as a Passion or imitatio Christi.1 Bartleby, that is to say, has been many 
things to many people, a sort of Galatea, as J. Hillis Miller suggests in his 
book Versions of Pygmalion, with all the ambivalences that that object of 
desire entails.2
Perhaps more curious than this explosion of critical interest is the 
great fortune—possibly greater than that of any other single text in Amer-
ican literature—“Bartleby” has enjoyed among European philosophers 
over the last thirty years. That “Bartleby the Scrivener” is in some way 
a philosophical story has of course been an axiom of the critical com-
mentary for quite some time. And indeed, as the epigraph to this essay 
suggests, Bartleby’s signature phrase—“I would prefer not to”—might 
plausibly be read as an oblique reference, via Milton, to the same Stoic 
philosophy alluded to even more elliptically by the bust of Cicero that 
momentarily occupies Bartleby’s gaze in the lawyer’s office.3 Limiting 
oneself, however, to major contemporary Continental theorists who have 
commented on the tale, one must list Maurice Blanchot, Gilles Deleuze, 
Jacques Derrida, Giorgio Agamben, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 
and Slavoj Žižek. And here Galatea becomes a Rorschach test, as com-
mentary on “Bartleby” affords the occasion for these thinkers to present 
key ideas from their own conceptual repertoires as well as elliptically po-
lemicize with one another.
Out of this constellation of philosophical readings of “Bartleby” two 
main lines of interpretation emerge. On the one hand, there is the question 
of language and the withdrawal of language (or language of withdrawal) 
represented by both Bartleby’s signature phrase and his eventual silence; 
on the other, there is the question of human action or labor and its disrup-
tion or reformulation in Bartleby’s mechanical repetition as a copyist and 
final unwillingness to do even this. Two rubrics, then, and two negations: 
language and silence, labor and stasis.
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Language and Silence
Gilles Deleuze
Deleuze’s essay “Bartleby; or, The Formula” first appeared in 1989 as an af-
terword to a French translation of “Bartleby,” “The Encantadas,” and “The 
Bell-Tower,” and it was later revised and republished in Critique et clinique 
in 1993. As the title of the piece suggests, Deleuze’s central point of con-
cern is what he calls Bartleby’s “formula,” that is, his signature phrase. He 
begins the piece, however, by setting out some general reading protocols, 
namely, that “Bartleby” is neither a metaphorical nor a symbolic tale but 
rather a “violently comical text,” and that as a comical text it is absolutely 
literal.4 The tale, he writes, “means only what it says, literally. And what it 
says and repeats is I would prefer not to.”5 Though this opening gesture 
is made quickly, it is worth emphasizing how important this concept of 
literality is for Deleuze’s reading and for the argument he ultimately makes 
for the politically disruptive power of Melville’s text. For it is here that we 
are notified that what follows will be a reading of Bartleby’s formula as a 
linguistic-syntactic operation. The “violence” of Bartleby’s comedy is the 
linguistic—literal—violence that this formula wreaks on all hegemonic and 
majoritarian linguistic and political formations, whether they be those of—
in expanding concentric circles—the law office, Wall Street, New York’s 
Halls of Justice, America, or the West. As Deleuze points out, Bartleby’s 
preference not to do anything but copy, and eventually not even to copy 
at all, disrupts the smooth functioning of the law office; it confounds the 
attorney, provokes the other employees to near violence, and even causes 
the attorney to move his offices to another location when Bartleby obsti-
nately will not leave after being fired. And the operator or focal point of this 
disruptiveness is, of course, the formula “I would prefer not to.” “Without a 
doubt,” he writes, “the formula is ravaging, devastating, and leaves nothing 
standing in its wake.”6
Why does the phrase wreak such havoc? Deleuze argues that the 
famous phrase functions as an “agrammatical formula,” that is, as a con-
struction that lies at or just beyond the limit of a set of syntactically- 
grammatically correct expressions. Though Bartleby’s “I would prefer not 
to” is not in fact ungrammatical or incorrect, Deleuze nevertheless notes 
that there is a “certain mannerism, a certain solemnity” in the phrase, and 
that the attorney and his other employees find it “queer” and do not—or 
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claim not to—ever use it.7 The phrase seems indeed to ring oddly in the 
hearers’ ears, and in this sense, Deleuze argues, it “has the same force, the 
same role, as an agrammatical formula,” standing by analogy as the “limit 
of a series such as ‘I would prefer this. I would prefer not to do that. That is 
not what I would prefer . . .’”8
There are two distinct frames within which Deleuze situates the dis-
ruptive power of Bartleby’s quasi-agrammatical formula, though they can 
each be seen as a modulation or recalibration of the other. They might be 
called the linguistic frame and the literary frame. On the one hand, De-
leuze analyzes the ambiguous logical or propositional status of the formula 
itself, emphasizing the difficulties involved in assigning it any clear linguis-
tic status as an utterance. On the other hand, the unease that the formula 
produces at the level of the sentence stands as an example or metonymy 
of the unease Melville’s entire literary practice produces in the field of 
English-language literature. This latter is a question of what Deleuze calls 
“minor literature,” and it will, for Deleuze, place Melville squarely within 
a tradition that also includes, among others, Beckett, Celine, Artaud, and, 
above all, Kafka.
First, let us take the linguistic frame. At the level of the statement, 
Deleuze argues, the disruptive power of the formula lies in its being an ut-
terance that cannot be easily placed in any system of either (1) propositional 
and representational truth or (2) performative speech. In the first case, as a 
statement concerning two possibilities (that is, what would be preferred and 
what would not be preferred), Deleuze notes that it is neither an affirmation 
nor a negation. Unlike, say, “I do not want to” or “I refuse to,” or even “I would 
rather,” Bartleby’s formula never settles on any affirmation—including, and 
especially, the affirmation of his preference solely to keep copying: “You 
will not?” asks the lawyer; “I prefer not,” replies Bartleby (“Bartleby,” 648; 
emphases in original). Indeed, Bartleby never states a preference for copy-
ing, and soon enough that activity, too, gets swept up into the space of in-
activity that is Bartleby’s defining gesture. In a sense Bartleby’s eventual 
ceasing even to copy is already written into the formula, which “not only 
abolishes the term it refers to, and that it rejects, but also abolishes the other 
term it seemed to preserve, and that becomes impossible. In fact, it renders 
them indistinct.”9 As a statement the formula “excludes all alternatives, and 
devours what it claims to preserve no less than it distances itself from every-
thing else. . . . [It] hollows out a zone of indetermination that renders words 
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indistinguishable, that creates a vacuum within language [langage].”10 What 
is expressed in the formula, then, is not a will for the negative or a nihilism, 
but something even stranger, something that entails no will at all. In the 
formula we see “not a will to nothingness, but the growth of a nothingness 
of the will. . . . Pure patient passivity, as Blanchot would say. Being as being, 
and nothing more.”11 “I would prefer not to” is the index of a patience and a 
passivity beyond even the dialectic between passivity and activity, between 
choosing to and choosing not to.
Blanchot invokes Bartleby as a figure for such a radical passivity in The 
Writing of the Disaster (1980), in which he anticipates in a very condensed 
form Deleuze’s analysis of the formula’s neither-active-nor-passive gram-
matical construction. And like Deleuze, Blanchot proposes that Bartleby’s 
phrase expresses a patience and a passivity that are more radically neu-
tral than merely the negation of any given positive activity. Indeed, being 
bound by our philosophical tradition to thinking of passivity as simply the 
“contrary of activity” is, for Blanchot, a defining characteristic of the “ever-
restricted field of our reflections,” beginning, presumably, as early as the 
principle of noncontradiction.12 By contrast, Blanchot’s reflections, here and 
in many other texts, are tasked with the thinking of a nondialectical and 
nonoppositional negativity, of a patience that “opens me entirely, all the 
way to a passivity which is the pas [‘not’] in the utterly passive, and which 
has therefore abandoned the level of life where passive would simply be the 
opposite of active.”13
In this sense, Blanchot introduces the insight that Deleuze will later 
develop, in that he identifies in the grammar of Bartleby’s formula, which 
has “none of the simplicity of a refusal,” precisely this step beyond refusal or 
will-to-the-negative and into the radically neutral.14 He writes: “This is the 
core of refusal which Bartleby the scrivener’s inexorable ‘I would prefer not 
to’ expresses: an abstention which has never had to be decided upon, which 
precedes all decisions and which is not so much a denial as, more than that, 
an abdication. . . . ‘I will not do it’ would still have signified an energetic 
determination, calling forth an equally energetic contradiction. ‘I would 
prefer not to . . .’ belongs to the infiniteness of patience; no dialectical inter-
vention can take hold of such passivity.”15 This “pure patient passivity,” then, 
is the strange ontological ground, neither positive nor negative, out of which 
the peculiar grammar of Bartleby’s formula arises. To what is Bartleby re-
ferring when he says, “I would prefer not to”? It is true that at first it is to 
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correcting his copy, but as the formula eventually overtakes every specific 
option presented to Bartleby, it becomes evident that the radical though 
“not particular” (“Bartleby,” 667) negation of Bartleby’s quasi-agrammatical 
phrase encompasses all specific references and propositions, that is to say, 
the entire logic of symbolic representation itself. This, on Deleuze’s reading, 
is the first way in which the formula hollows out a zone of indetermination 
or vacuum within language.
In addition to upsetting the notion of a propositional model of linguis-
tic truth, however, the phrase is equally disruptive of the logic of the speech 
act, as analyzed most famously by J. L. Austin in How to Do Things with 
Words. In this text Austin makes a fundamental distinction between what 
he calls the “constative” function of language—broadly speaking, the use of 
language to make statements—and the “performative” function. Performa-
tive utterances are not statements of fact or descriptions of states of affairs; 
rather, they are acts of language—speech acts—that by virtue of their own 
taking place bring about facts or states of affairs. Performative speech acts, 
then, cannot be evaluated as either true or false on the model of a proposi-
tional or constative statement, and for this reason Austin instead proposes 
the notions of “felicity” and “infelicity.” The infelicitous speech act is not 
a false utterance but one that does not work; it “misfires” and is therefore 
voided or vitiated.
The specific nature of Austin’s criteria for the felicitous speech act is 
directly relevant for Deleuze’s reading of Bartleby’s formula, and this is 
because a speech act can be felicitous only if it is uttered under certain 
necessary conventional conditions.16 The point to emphasize here is not 
the completeness or imperviousness of Austin’s “felicity conditions” but the 
way the logic of the performative blurs the distinction between words and 
things. Instead of the word either accurately or inaccurately representing 
the thing, in the performative act we have a functional interdependence 
of the spoken word and the seemingly extralinguistic world in which it is 
embedded. Performative utterances are not true or false; they either work 
or do not work depending on whether they are uttered properly in certain 
necessary conventional socio-politico-linguistic conditions.
This, Deleuze argues, is the second linguistic logic that Bartleby’s 
formula unsettles, and it is perhaps in its disruption of the performative 
function of language that the formula most directly enters into that “pas-
sive resistance” that the lawyer claims “so aggravates an earnest person” 
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(“Bartleby,” 646). In stubbornly reiterating his formula, Bartleby views with 
complete indifference all the conditions necessary for the speech act to 
function and thus severely undermines not only the logic of the speech act 
itself, but all the conventions of the social contract. As Bartleby’s repeated 
response to every command, order, request, pronouncement, and promise 
of the lawyer, the formula seems to neglect and thus short-circuit all the 
social and conventional presuppositions that are required for the felicitous 
speech act to take place. Bartleby is the attorney’s employee; his context is 
the law office; he has a professional, economic, social, contractual relation 
to the lawyer, his boss; and yet his obstinately repeated formula demolishes 
everything the lawyer might reasonably expect of his employee as a result 
of his speech acts.17
The lawyer in fact rightly interprets why his speech acts misfire. He has 
wrongly believed that Bartleby is a full participant in the act, that he and 
Bartleby have assumed the same conventions, and that a new state of affairs 
(say, Bartleby’s dismissal and departure) would be smoothly ushered in by 
the felicitous performative. As the lawyer complacently muses to himself 
after calmly firing Bartleby, “Without loudly bidding Bartleby depart—as 
an inferior genius might have done—I assumed the ground that depart he 
must; and upon that assumption built all I had to say” (“Bartleby,” 658; 
emphasis in original). Yet when that procedure turns out to have failed, the 
lawyer is quick to pinpoint the reason: “My procedure seemed as sagacious 
as ever,—but only in theory. How it would prove in practice—there was the 
rub. It was truly a beautiful thought to have assumed Bartleby’s departure; 
but after all, that assumption was simply my own, and none of Bartleby’s. 
The great point was, not whether I had assumed that he would quit me, but 
whether he would prefer so to do. He was more a man of preferences than 
assumptions” (ibid., 658–659). All the way up to and including the ultimate 
performative utterance that an employer holds in reserve—namely, “You 
are fired!”—“the formula,” Deleuze writes, “stymies all speech acts, and at 
the same time, it makes Bartleby a pure outsider [exclu] to whom no social 
position can be attributed. This is what the attorney glimpses with dread: 
all his hopes of bringing Bartleby back to reason are dashed because they 
rest on a logic of presuppositions according to which an employer ‘expects’ 
to be obeyed, or a kind friend listened to, whereas Bartleby has invented a 
new logic, a logic of preference, which is enough to undermine the presup-
positions of language as a whole.”18
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Bartleby’s response to the lawyer’s speech brings the performance, so 
to speak, to a crashing halt. The “doctrine of preference” implicit in his for-
mula cannot be assimilated to what Melville calls “the doctrine of assump-
tions” (“Bartleby,” 660), the presuppositional and conventional logic of the 
performative function of language, just as that very same utterance eludes 
any constative statement of preference for one thing over another. Thus, 
when viewed through the lens of either propositional logic or the pragmat-
ics of the speech act, Bartleby’s formula stands outside both constative and 
performative “grammar” and chips away at the very foundation of every 
linguistic category. As both constative and performative “agrammaticality,” 
the formula impassively, disruptively sits there, like Bartleby himself on the 
banister, as a radically indeterminate linguistic event, bringing language as 
a whole face to face with its prereferential, preperformative, perhaps prelin-
guistic presuppositions.
This linguistic frame for Deleuze’s reading of the story is preliminary 
to his analysis of the tale’s literary frame. The uncomfortable linguistic sta-
tus of the formula is centrally important to Deleuze’s reading because it 
leads to his argument concerning the “foreign” languages that “minor lit-
eratures” open up within major languages and literatures: “The formula at 
first,” he writes, “seems like a bad translation of a foreign language,” but, in 
fact, the truth is something like the inverse of this hypothesis: “Perhaps it 
is the formula that carves out a kind of foreign language within language.”19 
This suggestion alludes directly to an argument put forth by Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari in their 1975 monograph Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature.
For Deleuze and Guattari minor literature is a writing that creates 
something like an estrangement of language within the major language, a 
peculiar literary practice that they argue must be the starting point for any 
consideration of nonhegemonic writing. Deleuze and Guattari schematize 
three of its key characteristics, all of which will later be evoked in Deleuze’s 
reading of Melville. In minor literatures, they argue, (1) “language is af-
fected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization,” that is to say, writers 
of a major language who are either displaced from the rich native soil of that 
language or are not members of the dominant ethnic or national identity 
of its speakers operate a deterritorialization on the language; (2) “every-
thing in them is political” because, in contrast to major literatures, wherein 
the social milieu serves as a seemingly neutral and unproblematic backdrop 
against which individual or private concerns can be dramatized and nar-
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rated, the situation of minor literature is “completely different; its cramped 
space forces each individual intrigue to connect immediately to politics”; 
and (3) “everything takes on a collective value” because the impoverished 
conditions under which the minor author works mean that his or her autho-
rial activity and expression are expropriated and subsumed into the collec-
tive.20 Minor literature, in short, is a recognizable type of avant-garde or 
experimental literature, one whose experiments are determined by these 
specific conditions of lexical-syntactic impoverishment, lack of psychologi-
cal interiority, and authorial collectivity or impersonality. And without hav-
ing to follow Deleuze and Guattari too far into their own system or their 
reading of Kafka’s texts, one can see clearly enough how this concept of 
minor literature works directly against what are traditionally some of the 
most valorized notions about great literature: its verbal richness, its psycho-
logical depth, and the personal genius of the individuals who write it.
This is the “literary” background for Deleuze’s suggestion that Bar-
tleby’s agrammatical formula is the utterance of some sort of foreign lan-
guage—an American English—within English. “Is this not,” he asks 
rhetorically, “the schizophrenic vocation of American literature: to make 
the English language, by means of driftings, deviations, de-taxes or sur-
taxes (as opposed to the standard syntax), slip in this manner? To introduce 
a bit of psychosis into English neurosis?”21 With its urban law office setting, 
its symmetrically organized clerks, Turkey and Nippers, its figure of patri-
archal authority in the lawyer, the tale “starts off as in an English novel, in 
Dickens’s London.”22 But Bartleby arrives, “contaminates everything” with 
his utterance, breaks this scene to pieces, and institutes the fractal geom-
etry of a minor literature: “Everything began à l’anglaise but continues à 
l’américaine. . . . The American patchwork becomes the law of Melville’s 
oeuvre, devoid of a center, of an upside down or right side up.”23
In this overturning of the English novel by the American, Deleuze sees 
an analogy—in fact, something more than an analogy—to the American 
revolutionary project at its most radical, thus drawing a parallel between 
American literary and political form, both of which take on the shades of 
the “minor.” He writes that “what Kafka would say about ‘small nations’ is 
what Melville had already said about the great American nation: it must 
become a patchwork of all small nations.”24 It is a universal political project 
whose exemplary figure may indeed be the patchwork itself, “the American 
invention par excellence, for the Americans invented patchwork, just as the 
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Swiss are said to have invented the cuckoo clock.”25 This last comment may 
be a joke at the expense of the Swiss, but the point being made is about 
all of Europe (or at least the major powers), with its political imaginary so 
rooted in blood and soil. Though its promise may not ultimately have been 
met, America nevertheless “sought to create a revolution whose strength 
would lie in a universal immigration, émigrés of the world.”26 And in terms 
that may be debatable but are nevertheless defensible (and perhaps even 
orthodox), this is the way Deleuze understands the early American political 
imagination: “Even before their independence, Americans were thinking 
about the combination of States, the State-form most compatible with their 
vocation. But their vocation was not to reconstitute an ‘old State secret,’ a 
nation, a family, a heritage, or a father. It was above all to constitute a uni-
verse, a society of brothers, a federation of men and goods, a community of 
anarchist individuals, inspired by Jefferson, by Thoreau, by Melville.”27
Though as big as a continent, this is the foreign country where Mel-
ville’s “minor literature” is written, written as if in a foreign language within 
the English canon. And while Bartleby’s mutism—his broken and unre-
sponsive speech—has often been read as a sort of pathology, his formula 
here stands instead as a radical cure for the America of 1853 (or 1989): 
“Even in his catatonic or anorexic state, Bartleby is not the patient, but the 
doctor of a sick America, the Medicine-Man, the new Christ or the brother 
to us all.”28
As intimations of a new community, a new type of sociality, a new eth-
ics, Bartleby and his formula assume in Deleuze’s reading something like 
the contours of a philosophical self-portrait, a gesture that is shared to some 
degree by all the thinkers discussed in this chapter. Let us now turn to 
Derrida, who also reads in Bartleby’s reluctance to respond a figure for an 
ethical-political problem, namely—and paradoxically—responsibility.
Jacques Derrida
Like Deleuze, Derrida in his discussion of Bartleby in The Gift of Death 
(1990) is most interested in the grammar of Bartleby’s utterance, and he 
suggests in very similar terms that the phrase is like what Deleuze has 
termed agrammaticality.29 Bartleby’s equivocal phrase, he argues, may not 
state anything determinate, but it nevertheless “doesn’t say absolutely noth-
ing. I would prefer not to looks like an incomplete sentence. Its indetermi-
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nacy creates a tension: it opens onto a sort of reserve of incompleteness; it 
announces a temporary or provisional reserve, one involving a proviso. Can 
we not find there the secret of a hypothetical reference to some indecipher-
able providence or prudence?”30 There are two claims being made here for 
the formula: (1) that the indeterminacy of the statement’s modality itself 
constitutes the statement’s reference, and (2) that the referent of this inde-
terminate grammatical openness is some sort of providence or prudence. 
Both these cryptic claims become clearer when they are placed in the 
context of Derrida’s extended discussion of one of the most fundamental, 
and shocking, episodes in the Scriptures. Deleuze is not the first to draw 
an analogy between Bartleby and Christ, but Derrida is probably the first 
to draw one between Bartleby and Abraham, particularly Abraham in the 
terrible episode of the near sacrifice of Isaac on Mount Moriah. Indeed, 
Derrida’s Bartleby appears only briefly at the end of his long reading of this 
episode and stands there more or less as a modern proxy for Abraham.
Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac is especially disconcerting because it is 
presented as an archetypal example of a moral or ethical dilemma, indeed 
as perhaps the moral or ethical dilemma, insofar as it places in irreducible 
conflict Abraham’s responsibility to God, on the one hand, and his responsi-
bility to his beloved son (and everyone else in his family, for that matter, or 
even every other person on earth) on the other. Abraham obeys God, hon-
ors his duty to obey God’s command, and consents to commit a terrible act, 
and yet, unlike, say, Agamemnon, he is “never considered a hero. He doesn’t 
make us shed tears and doesn’t inspire admiration: rather stupefied horror, 
a terror that is also secret.”31 Terror, secret, responsibility, alterity: these are 
the coordinates of Derrida’s discussion of Abraham’s sacrifice, which the 
following few pages will review before returning to Bartleby’s indetermi-
nate phrase, which for Derrida is fundamentally a repetition or modulation 
of Abraham’s almost total silence while undertaking the terrible task of of-
fering God the gift of his son’s death.
Upon receiving his command, Abraham keeps his intention to sacrifice 
Isaac a secret, but he keeps this secret in a very specific way. As Derrida 
notes (following Kierkegaard’s reading of the episode), Abraham offers a 
“strange reply” to Isaac when he asks his father where they will find the 
lamb for the sacrifice.32 “It can’t be said,” he writes, “that Abraham doesn’t 
respond to him. He says God will provide. God will provide a lamb for the 
holocaust ([‘burnt offering’] Genesis 22:8). Abraham thus keeps his secret 
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   204 10/29/13   10:57 AM
Language and Labor, Silence and Stasis 205
at the same time as he replies to Isaac. He doesn’t keep silent and he doesn’t 
lie. He doesn’t speak nontruth.”33 And yet in his, to say the least, evasive 
reply, Abraham does not quite speak the truth, either. His utterance lies on 
the border between truth and untruth, between speaking and not speaking, 
and by not entering fully into the sphere of speech, by not communicating 
to others the terrible fact of his decision to kill Isaac, Abraham commits a 
transgression that is both linguistic and ethical. In fact, in the terms of Der-
rida’s discussion, the two are one and the same: “Because, in this way, he 
doesn’t speak, Abraham transgresses the ethical order. . . . By keeping the 
secret, Abraham, betrays ethics.”34 But what exactly does Derrida mean by 
the ethical order here? And why is the refusal to speak a betrayal of ethics?
At issue is a distinction (again from Kierkegaard) between the “singu-
lar” and the “general,” the latter being the proper sphere of ethics insofar 
as it roughly corresponds to what we might call the “social,” or at least the 
sphere in which individual singularities share a common space. And the 
medium of that sharing—in a sense, the substance of that common space 
itself—is language. By speaking (and this necessarily means speaking to 
others), the individual enters into and acknowledges the domain of the gen-
eral at the same time he or she renounces the absoluteness of his or her 
singularity. Language puts the self in relation to others, and in this sense it 
is the ethical medium par excellence. The general is the space of common-
ality made both possible and necessary by language, and it is precisely what 
is disrupted by Abraham’s refusal to speak and reveal his secret. Derrida 
writes: “To the extent that, in not saying the essential thing, namely the 
secret bond between God and him, Abraham doesn’t speak, he assumes 
the responsibility that consists in always being alone, retrenched in one’s 
singularity at the moment of decision. . . . But as soon as one speaks, as 
soon as one enters the medium of language, one loses that very singularity. 
. . . Speaking relieves us, Kierkegaard notes, for it ‘translates’ into the gen-
eral.”35 By revealing his secret, Abraham would, in this sense, be shirking 
his responsibility to God by seeking a very tempting “relief” in the sphere of 
the ethical, where reasons might be given, where justifications might be of-
fered, where forgiveness might be sought, where, in short, Abraham might 
confront this terrible divine imperative by bringing it out into the open. But 
Abraham refuses to speak, refuses to respond to Isaac. Derrida’s question 
for Abraham here is the same one the baffled lawyer asks Bartleby: “Why 
do you refuse?” (“Bartleby,” 644; emphasis in original). Why does Abra-
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ham withdraw from what would seem to be, at the very least, his ethical 
responsibility?
Derrida’s argument plays on two apparently distinct and indeed in-
compatible senses of the term responsibility. On the one hand, there is 
the intimate responsibility that one is bound to as a solitary individual, a 
responsibility that is one’s and one’s alone and that cannot be mitigated or 
collectivized by any appeal to others (say, in the form of asking for advice or 
approval or assurance that one is making the right decision). On the other 
hand, there is the etymological sense of responsibility, the responsibility 
before others with whom one has a more or less mutual and symmetrical 
(and ultimately linguistic) relation—a relation that is at base a responsibility 
to respond to the other. It is this latter responsibility that Abraham evasively 
betrays when he answers-without-answering Isaac’s question. Abraham is 
caught between two responsibilities, each of which appears to be a betrayal 
of the other.
In this characteristic gesture, Derrida identifies and puts pressure on 
an irresolvable aporia in this keyword for so many of the Western philosoph-
ical tradition’s accounts of ethics. And it is precisely this aporetic impasse 
that is dramatized in the story of Abraham and Isaac, which, on Derrida’s 
account, “can be read as a narrative development of the paradox that inhab-
its the concept of duty or of absolute responsibility. This concept puts us 
into relation (but without relating to it, in a double secret) with the absolute 
other, with the absolute singularity of the other, whose name here is God.”36 
It is worth emphasizing Derrida’s identification of one of this story’s pro-
tagonists—namely, God—with absolute otherness or the absolute other, for 
God or the absolute other serves a very specific logical function in this text’s 
analysis—or better, deconstruction—of the ethical category of responsibil-
ity.37 What then is the role and significance of Abraham’s secret bond to this 
absolute and singular other, which seems to be in fatal conflict with his ethi-
cal bond to others “in general”? What does it mean, precisely, to say that 
God is the absolute other? Obeying God’s command is, the Scripture sug-
gests, an absolute responsibility, but is it not impossible to respond to God?
Indeed, as Derrida notes, Abraham does not respond to God beyond 
the almost tautological and certainly self-reflexive statement “Here I am,” a 
response that, in the asymmetry it establishes with its addressee, suggests 
that insofar as God is the absolute other, he is not of the order of language. 
On one reading—say, a more or less negative theological one—this asym-
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metry would be a result of God’s absolutely unique and transcendent posi-
tion outside even the sphere of positive existence, and certainly outside the 
common space of the general (that is, the world). But in Abraham’s inability 
to respond to God as the absolute other, can we not, Derrida suggests, see a 
situation that is similar or indeed identical to what is the most common ex-
perience of the ethical “in general,” and one that would recast the absolute 
other or God not as a transcendent essence, but as the very otherness that 
distances each of the infinitely numerous finite beings within the space of 
the general?38 Or, in the case of Bartleby, can we not see how, in the space 
behind his green screen, “privacy and society [are] conjoined” (“Bartleby,” 
642)? The general—as the sphere of responsibility and responsiveness—
proves, in truth, to be no less essentially characterized by the impossibility 
to respond to the other, since for every singular other (loved ones, friends, 
peers, pets) to whom I am able to respond and be responsible, there are 
countless others to whom I cannot and never will be able to respond or act 
ethically.
And what can one say about this? Abraham does not speak about 
his sacrifice, does not offer justifications or reasons; this is his secret, his 
Bartleby-like withdrawal from responsibility “in general” and from the re-
lief, as Kierkegaard puts it, of displacing his responsibility onto the general 
or “ethical.” The general, however, harbors within it something of the abso-
lute and secret, and this is because any single relation or responsibility that 
is acknowledged or met necessarily entails the neglect of infinite others. 
Because I am a finite being, it is impossible for me to respond to the infinite 
number of finite others; the impossibility of the absolute is a constitutive 
element of the general. To choose to save one other is to sacrifice the other 
others—indeed, infinite others. “And I can never justify this sacrifice,” 
writes Derrida. “I must [like Abraham—and by extension Bartleby] always 
hold my peace about it. Whether I want to or not, I will never be able to jus-
tify the fact that I prefer or sacrifice any one (any other) to the other. I will 
always be in secret, held to secrecy in respect of this, for nothing can be said 
about it.”39 Even the most ethical choice boils down, ultimately, to a prefer-
ence, and this “remains finally unjustifiable (this is Abraham’s hyperethical 
sacrifice), as unjustifiable as the infinite sacrifices I make at each moment.”40
What is to be read in the episode of Abraham’s archetypal encounter 
with the transcendent God’s impossible and unanswerable command is for 
Derrida nothing other than the structure of everyday ethical experience, 
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which, though in terms perhaps less hyperbolic, nevertheless reproduces 
the aporetic and unsettling ethical dilemma of Mount Moriah all the time. 
This is an assertion that Derrida fleshes out in the final moments of the 
chapter, where the distinction between the absolute otherness of God and 
the otherness of others in general finally collapses (or is deconstructed) and 
the transcendence of the divine sphere is presented as nothing other than 
the structure of the profane world (or vice versa, if you wish). On the one 
hand, “God, as wholly other, is to be found everywhere there is something 
of the wholly other,”41 and on the other, “there is no longer any ethical gen-
erality that does not fall prey to the paradox of Abraham.”42 That is the 
secret Abraham keeps when he elusively responds without responding and 
speaks without speaking.
Bartleby’s formula, whether as Deleuze’s quasi-agrammaticality or 
Derrida’s pseudo-incomplete sentence, is, of course, another unresponsive 
response, a statement that borders on senselessness or silence—or at least 
appears to harbor a secret. For Derrida this is a perfect repetition of Abra-
ham’s speaking-without-speaking, whose ultimate referent, so to speak, is 
the aporetic impasse of ethics and responsibility. “Just as Abraham doesn’t 
speak a human language,” he writes,
just as he speaks in tongues or in a language that is foreign to every other 
human language, and in order to do that responds without responding, 
speaks without saying anything either true or false, says nothing de-
terminate that would be equivalent to a statement, a promise, or a lie, 
in the same way Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to” takes responsibility 
for a response without response. It evokes the future without either 
predicting or promising; it utters nothing fixed, determinable, positive 
or negative. The modality of this repeated utterance that says nothing, 
promises nothing, neither refuses nor accepts anything, the tense of 
this singularly insignificant statement, reminds one of a nonlanguage 
or a secret language. Is it not as if Bartleby were also speaking “in 
tongues”?43
For Derrida Bartleby’s secret language brings the canonical language of 
ethics—and especially of ethical responsibility—to an aporetic impasse, 
forcing it to confront, as if in a “dead-wall revery” (“Bartleby,” 656), its 
internal ambivalences and limits. Indeed, for the thinkers I have discussed 
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thus far, as Bartleby’s “ravishing, devastating” formula collapses into agram-
maticality or glossolalia or silence, it brings its hearers and readers—the 
lawyer, us—face to face with the uncertain and fugitive foundations of the 
political-ethical order.
Labor and Stasis
As we move from the question of “language and silence” to the question 
of “labor and stasis,” the dominant voices become Italian. This is perhaps 
not surprising, since in no other western European country was the ques-
tion of labor so central to philosophical debates of the last few decades of 
the twentieth century, a period in which the national philosophical milieu 
was dominated by Marxism and post-Marxism, the most relevant strand of 
which, for the present discussion, was known as Autonomia.44 Autonomia 
is something of a blanket term—and a contested one at that—used col-
lectively to name several related leftist movements in Italy in the 1960s and 
1970s that were distinct from, and to varying degrees hostile to, the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI), at the time the largest communist party in Europe 
and a major force in the Italian parliament. Arising out of and comprising 
workers’ movements, feminist movements, and student movements, Auto-
nomia is a larger phenomenon than can be adequately accounted for here.45 
One particular issue, however—namely, the call for a “refusal of work” 
within the workers’ movement—must briefly be reviewed as a context for 
the Bartlebys of this section.
Though the broad notion of the refusal of work has had many propo-
nents and has gone through a number of modulations within the Marxist 
and anarchist traditions—from Lafargue’s “droit à la paresse” to the Situ-
ationist slogan “Ne travaillez jamais”—it is the formulation of the “strategy 
of refusal” by the Italian Marxist theorist Mario Tronti that most directly 
concerns us here. Though his relation to the party fluctuated, Tronti never 
left the PCI; his thought, however, and in particular the texts collected in 
his 1966 book Workers and Capital, had an enormous influence on the 
autonomist development of the workers’ movement. In a famous phrase 
Tronti asserts, “To struggle against capital, the working class must struggle 
against itself insofar as it is capital.”46 In contrast to the notion that the work-
ing class must reclaim its laboring activity and the fruits of its labor from 
the capitalist class, and in contrast even to the idea of an eventual work-
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ers’ self-management of the entire cycle of production, Tronti’s operaismo 
(workerism) seeks to refuse the notion of “work” at its very core, and this 
is because such a notion has the class relation already written into it. He 
writes: “Productive labour [as distinct from labor power] . . . exists not only 
in relation to capital, but also in relation to the capitalists as a class. It is in 
this latter relationship that it exists as the working class.”47 The working class 
is constituted as such by the conversion of its labor power into “work” in the 
capitalist social formation. “What are workers doing,” Tronti asks, “when 
they struggle against their employers? Aren’t they, above all else, saying 
‘No’ to the transformation of their labor power into labor?”48 This “no,” this 
refusal of work, entails a reconsideration of the very nature of human pro-
ductivity and the human capacity for action. Ultimately, the refusal of work, 
which is to say, the refusal of the conversion of human activity into labor, is 
not an appeal to idleness or passivity, but rather an effort to develop human 
capacities for productivity and self-constitution (at both the individual and 
collective level) in ways entirely free from—autonomous from—the capi-
talist social formation as well as the state form. As Nicholas Thoburn puts 
it, Tronti “proposes that to be alienated from work, its form, function and 
subject, becomes the founding condition of revolutionary politics. Politics is 
hence not the reclamation of work against an ‘external’ control, but a refusal 
of work and the very subject of worker.”49
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
Tronti’s operaismo sets the stage for Hardt and Negri’s portrayal of Bartleby 
as an icon of the refusal of work in Empire (2000), for their Bartleby is an 
equivocal figure in which lie certain implicit critiques of Autonomia and 
workerism, which in turn have a long and dense history in Negri’s writings 
from the 1960s to the 1990s. As they write in a subchapter titled “Refusal”: 
“[Bartleby’s] refusal certainly is the beginning of a liberatory politics, but 
it is only a beginning.”50 To understand this engagement with autonomist 
theory better, we must review the ontology of human labor and production 
that lies beneath Hardt and Negri’s evocation of Bartleby’s passivity and the 
limits of his “refusal.”
Though it also owes a great deal to the Marxian materialist conception 
of history, Hardt and Negri’s ontology of human productivity is grounded 
above all in Negri’s reading of Spinoza, especially in his 1981 book The Sav-
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age Anomaly. In this book Negri lays the groundwork for his Spinozist iden-
tification of being with the ceaseless power of production, a concept that 
in this text derives from the Spinozan figures of potentia and conatus but 
will later be codified in what is perhaps Negri’s signal concept: constituent 
power. He writes, “Production as a constitutive ontology. Spinoza founds 
this possibility of philosophy, or rather of the destruction of philosophy, with 
absolute coherence. Constitutive ontology recognizes production within the 
structure of being. It is not possible to say being, except in terms of produc-
tion.”51 But what is the nature of this production and this productivity?
On the one hand, what is being produced is nothing less than human 
existence itself. As we read in Hardt and Negri’s most recent book, Com-
monwealth, where it is viewed under the lenses of “immaterial labor” and 
“biopolitical production,” this ontology sees in human labor (that is to say, 
human activity as such) “not the production of objects for subjects, as com-
modity production is often understood, but the production of subjectivity 
itself.”52 For Hardt and Negri biopolitical production, in its revolutionary 
and liberated form, is the free, spontaneous, and vital production of human 
existence in a collective praxis (the subject—and indeed object—of this col-
lective praxis is what they term, following Spinoza, the “multitude”).53 Thus, 
the product of this production is none other than the producer, in an auto-
genetic and autarchic dynamic in which the collectivity of humanity—the 
multitude—is a self-constituting artifact.
On the other hand—and this is the more important point for the pres-
ent discussion—this human productivity is ceaseless, unstoppable, exces-
sive, and exuberant. For Hardt and Negri this ceaselessness is central to the 
nature of the human capacity for productive activity, which is “a power of 
self-valorization that exceeds itself, flows over onto the other, and through 
this investment, constitutes an expansive commonality. The common actions 
of labor, intelligence, passion, and affect configure a constituent power.”54 
Just as it is impossible to speak of being without speaking of production, so 
too is it impossible to speak of collective existence without speaking of living 
labor and constituent power. As we read in Negri’s 1992 book Insurgen-
cies (whose translated Italian title is, precisely, Constituent Power), “Living 
labor constitutes the world, by creatively modeling, ex novo, the material it 
touches,” and “constituent power is a creative strength of being. That is, of 
concrete figures of reality, values, institutions, and logics of the order of re-
ality. Constituent power constitutes society and identifies the social and the 
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political in an ontological nexus.”55 The internal articulations among these 
near-synonyms within Hardt and Negri’s argumentation over numerous 
texts need not be mapped in detail here; what is crucial is that in whatever 
guise it assumes, this basic human capacity for productivity is (1) ceaseless 
and (2) ontological. And on both those scores, Bartleby make a gesture in 
the right direction, but he ultimately comes up short; his refusal is “the be-
ginning of a liberatory politics, but it is only a beginning.”56
What then is the step not taken by the scrivener? What is it that Bartle-
by does not do? In short, he does not produce. To be sure, ceasing to work 
for the lawyer is the first step away from his alienation in the capitalist mode 
of production, but he does not then redirect his capacity for production into 
the collective and free praxis that works toward the construction of a “new 
mode of life and above all a new community,”57 which is in turn a “new 
regime of production.”58 For Hardt and Negri Bartleby’s refusal of work is 
“absolute”;59 he remains inert, passive, and alone—in short, a “suicide.”60 
“Bartleby in his pure passivity and his refusal of any particulars presents 
us with a figure of generic being, being as such, being and nothing more. 
And in the course of the story he strips down so much—approximating ever 
more closely naked humanity, naked life, naked being—that eventually he 
withers away, evaporates in the infamous Manhattan prison, the Tombs.”61
This passage shows how the ontological gesture in “Bartleby” is ul-
timately incompatible with the Spinozan “metaphysics of production”62 
valorized by Hardt and Negri, and indeed they write of Bartleby’s self-
immolation precisely as a failure to be fully Spinozan: “As Spinoza says, 
if we simply cut the tyrannical head off the social body, we will be left 
with the deformed corpse of society. What we need is to create a new so-
cial body, which is a project that goes well beyond refusal.”63 In contrast to 
taking on this positive project, Bartleby simply refuses absolutely, and in 
stripping away everything to arrive at “being and nothing more,” Bartleby 
vanishes to a point where the productive capacities of man—the power to 
act—have been jettisoned to arrive at an anterior or underlying pure and 
passive “being as such.” The ontology implicit in “Bartleby,” in short, is 
based on what Hardt and Negri would find to be a mistaken metaphysics, 
one in which pure and passive being precedes production and activity—a 
being that is simply and inertly there. That this is in large part a critique 
of a Heideggerian conception of being—and of the Heideggerian philo-
sophical project of a fundamental ontology64—is perhaps clear enough, but 
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this characterization of Bartleby’s negative and passive inertia is even more 
pointedly and more specifically a polemical rejoinder to Agamben’s reading 
of Bartleby, to which we will now turn.
Giorgio Agamben
“I’m a Spinozan, whereas the ontology and the metaphysics of Agamben 
are Heideggerian,” Negri states in a 2005 interview.65 Agamben’s relation 
to Heidegger, with whom he studied briefly in the late 1960s, is a com-
plex one, but Negri’s claim here is accurate enough. For Negri, Agamben’s 
Heideggerianism entails a reduction of being to a neutral, impassive, and 
impotent bare fact: “being and nothing more.” Whether this is a legitimate 
characterization of Heidegger’s thought itself is a question that must be left 
open here; but it is a mischaracterization of Agamben’s “ontology and meta-
physics” and of what is perhaps the key concept in Agamben’s philosophical 
lexicon, impotentiality. As we will see, it is absolutely true that for Agamben 
Bartleby is a figure for impotentiality, but this is not, as Negri suggests, 
mere passivity.
Agamben begins his 1993 essay “Bartleby, or On Contingency” by noting 
that Bartleby belongs to a literary constellation that includes such dark stars 
as Akaky Akakievich, Bouvard and Pécuchet, Simon Tanner, Prince Myshkin, 
and Kafka’s courtroom clerks.66 But this figure is, he suggests, perhaps only 
a dim outline of the truer image we might get when Bartleby is placed in his 
proper philosophical constellation. The first section of Agamben’s essay, titled 
“The Scribe, or On Creation,” seeks to map out this strange house of the zo-
diac, and in a typically eclectic and erudite survey of Byzantine and medieval 
Christian, Cabbalistic, and Islamic texts, Agamben traces the ways in which 
thinkers from these traditions have commented on the Aristotelian question 
of the passage from potentiality to act (from dunamis to energeia), the pro-
cess by which things emerge out of nonbeing into being—that is to say, the 
question of creation. “This,” Agamben writes, “is the philosophical constel-
lation to which Bartleby the scrivener belongs. As a scribe who has stopped 
writing, Bartleby is the extreme figure of the Nothing from which all creation 
derives; and at the same time, he constitutes the most implacable vindication 
of this Nothing as pure, absolute potentiality.”67 But what is the nature of this 
Nothing and this pure, absolute potentiality? And why is Bartleby’s ceasing to 
write the critical gesture for understanding the act of creation?
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The first and critical assertion Agamben makes about potentiality is its 
constitutive co-belonging—and ultimate identity—with what he calls “im-
potentiality.” The essential intimacy of potentiality and impotentiality is the 
key point in Aristotle’s polemic with the Megarians in book Theta of the 
Metaphysics. Against the Megarian position that all potentialities are al-
ways actualized and that the only potentialities that exist are those that pass 
into act, Aristotle asserts that for there to be potentiality at all, and there-
fore for any sort of change to happen, the potentiality to be or do something 
must also equally entail the potentiality not to be or do that thing. “Every 
potentiality (dunamis),” he writes, “is impotentiality (adunamia) of the 
same and with respect to the same” (Metaphysics 1046a 32). If this were 
not the case, then all potentialities would immediately realize themselves 
as particular actualities and all potentialities-not-to would always have been 
absolute impossibilities, or more simply, there would be only a static and un-
changing actuality. This potentiality-not-to is what Aristotle calls adunamia 
or “impotentiality.” In Agamben’s usage, then, “impotentiality” (impotenza) 
does not mean inability, impossibility, or mere passivity, but rather the po-
tentiality not to (be or do), which is the constitutive counterpart to every 
potentiality to be or do. For Agamben the necessity of an impotentiality in 
every potentiality is the “cardinal point on which [Aristotle’s] entire theory 
of dunamis turns,” and it is on this basis that he develops his own doctrine 
of potentiality.68
The inherently two-sided structure of potentiality-impotentiality means 
that actuality is not just the realization and fulfillment of the potentiality-to-
be, but also the paradoxically negative “fulfillment” of the potentiality-to-
not-be. If it is the case that in the passage to act potentiality modifies itself 
not by simply effacing its impotential side, but rather by turning that side 
back on itself in such a way that it too remains in some way as a constitu-
tive element of the act—that is to say, of being—then the nature of being 
or act needs to be rethought as something more complex than simply the 
realization of positive potentialities. In a way that resonates with the issues 
informing the preceding discussion, Agamben goes about this reevaluation 
of (im)potentiality and act by considering the nature of work, conceived in 
its most fundamental sense as the activity that realizes potentialities.
In the essay “The Work of Man,” Agamben notes that the term ener-
geia—which is derived from the word ergon (“work”; Italian “opera”) and 
literally means “being at work”—“was, in all probability, created by Aristo-
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tle, who uses it in functional opposition to dunamis.”69 In the Nicomachean 
Ethics Aristotle considers the way certain “works” or activities provide the 
criteria for defining certain types of beings. For example, the flute player is 
defined by playing the flute, the sculptor by making statues (and the scriv-
ener by copying). But problems arise when we ask about the human being 
as such. The sculptor clearly produces agalmata, but what is the “work of 
man” as man? Is there no distinct ergon into which the potentiality of the 
human as such realizes itself? This quandary in the Aristotelian argument 
provides Agamben with the basis for his account of the human not as a 
being endowed with this or that particular potentiality or capability (or any 
corresponding “work”) but as a being of “pure potentiality.” Because of the 
impossibility of “identifying the energeia, the being-at-work of man as man, 
independently of and beyond the concrete social figures that he can as-
sume,”70 Agamben suggests that in Aristotle we can discern “the idea of an 
argia, of an essential inactivity [inoperosità] of man.”71 Inoperosità (another 
keyword in Agamben’s vocabulary, and translated variously as inactivity, in-
operativeness, and inoperativity) is the distinctive potentiality of man inso-
far as what characterizes the human as such is not the capacity to do or be 
this or that, but precisely the capacity not to (be or do), a potentiality that 
exists autonomously and indifferently to any particular actuality or “work.” 
Just as actuality must be thought of not merely as the realization of potenti-
ality but also as the “act of impotentiality,” so the ergon and energeia of man 
must be thought of as the work of inoperativity.72 Contrary to the sort of 
misreading we find in Hardt and Negri’s critique of what they see as Agam-
ben’s quietism, then, this does not mean mere passivity, but rather indicates 
a kind of “working that in every act realizes its own shabbat and in every 
work is capable of exposing its own inactivity and its own potentiality.”73
Bartleby’s oddly passive activity, or active passivity, or undecidable po-
sition between passivity and activity is for Agamben the supreme figure for 
this “work of man,” and for this reason he stands as the brightest—or, as 
it were, darkest—star in the constellation of literary-philosophical figures 
with which Agamben opens his essay. Though it is certainly the case that for 
Agamben Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to” establishes the linguistic frame-
work for suspension of the logic of will and necessity, truth and untruth, 
being and nonbeing, the decisive moment in the tale comes when Bartleby 
finally ceases to copy.74 For this is the point at which Bartleby passes from 
being a scrivener who copies, and indeed only copies—that is to say, whose 
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being is defined by his copying—to being a scrivener who does not copy 
but nevertheless retains the potentiality for copying. Bartleby’s paradoxi-
cal “work” after he has ceased to work is to move from the ceaseless and 
determinate actualization of his potentiality-to-copy to an experience of his 
potential-to-and-not-to-copy. As Agamben puts it: “In [his] obstinate copy-
ing . . . there is no potential not to be. . . . This is why the scrivener must stop 
copying, why he must give up his work.”75
Bartleby does not just not work; he has ceased to work. But he has 
certainly not ceased to be capable of that work; indeed, his capability—his 
virtuosity even—as a scrivener is never in doubt. As his formula so insis-
tently puts it, it is not that he cannot work but rather that he prefers not to. 
And this is why his inoperativity (again, not to be confused with inability) is 
a figure for pure potentiality. Bartleby’s nonwork withholds itself from the 
passage into act of which it is fully capable and remains in the mode of a 
pure having, in which what is seized and held is not any ergon or energeia, 
but the potentiality to be or not be, the capacity to pass or not pass into the 
act, which, contra Negri, is the true “a priori of every act of production.”76 
For Agamben, in the moment of not exercising his capacity, Bartleby “writes 
nothing but [his] potentiality to not-write,” and in his inoperativity Bartleby 
has settled into the most fundamental level of creation, the obscure zone in 
which creation, so to speak, happens.77
This in turn is why Bartleby’s work in the Dead Letter office proves so 
decisive for him. In keeping with his optimistic reading of the tale even in 
its sepulchral finale, Agamben writes that the “undelivered letters are the 
ciphers of joyous events that could have been but never took place.” For 
Agamben these letters reveal themselves to be not only “works” but also 
“acts of impotentiality.” They are indeed erga inscribed on the blank sheet 
of paper and thus mark the “passage from potentiality to actuality,” but they 
therefore equally mark the “non-occurrence of something” as well;78 that is 
to say, in the vision of the undelivered letter, the letter that never arrives, 
Bartleby sees not only the ergon of a realized dunamis, but also the possi-
bility that was never realized in any work. And the experience of that point 
of contingency—the suspended moment of potentiality as such—is what 
the scrivener who does not write retrieves in his obscure gesture.
The stakes of such a reconfiguration of our conception of work, of 
thinking of work as the act of impotentiality as well as of potentiality, are 
high. In remaining balanced at the pivot point between potentiality and im-
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   216 10/29/13   10:57 AM
Language and Labor, Silence and Stasis 217
potentiality, Bartleby thus moves toward “the construction of an experience 
of the possible as such”79 and thus “risks not so much the truth of his own 
statements as the very mode of his existence; he undergoes an anthropologi-
cal change that is just as decisive in his subjective history as the liberation of 
the hand by the erect position was for the primate or as was, for the reptile, 
the transformation of the front limbs that changed it into a bird.”80 First 
behind his green screen in the law office, then balanced on the banister in 
the stairwell, and finally in the Tombs, Bartleby situates himself ever more 
securely on this point of contingency, an intervallic space that reveals it-
self, under Agamben’s lens, to be anything but melancholy: “In the end, the 
walled courtyard is not a sad place. There is sky and there is grass. And the 
creature knows perfectly well ‘where it is.’”81 In the figure of the scribe who 
does not exercise his capacity to write (or who exercises his capacity not to 
write) Agamben presents us with a Bartleby who achieves the “restitutio in 
integrum of possibility,”82 which is in turn the starting point for an “anthro-
pological change” that will unite human action with the human’s definitive, 
constitutive, and creative impotentiality.
Slavoj Žižek
The final theorist we will discuss is Slavoj Žižek, who—in terms more explicit 
and imperative than those of any of the theorists discussed above—calls for 
a “Bartleby politics,” which in turn is a synonym for what he perhaps equally 
opaquely calls a “politics of subtraction.” Paradoxically, however, in contrast 
certainly to Deleuze and Agamben, Zižek does not really engage or closely 
read the text of “Bartleby” in the course of his presentation of the politics of 
subtraction.83 Indeed, he seems to take for granted that a sort of constella-
tion of political-philosophical Bartlebys has already come into view and that 
its basic contours are familiar enough to his readers that he can allude to 
it—polemically as we will see—without elaborating on the tale itself. This, 
however, does not mean that he does not stake a particular claim within 
the Bartleby-political debate; in fact, he does. What then does Žižek’s own 
Bartleby politics look like? Perhaps the best way begin to answer this in the 
present context is to examine how Žižek positions his own Bartleby politics 
against that of the two theorists with which this section opened: Hardt and 
Negri.
As noted above, Hardt and Negri see Bartleby’s refusal as a figure for 
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both a thwarted Autonomia and an Agambenian-Heideggerian passivity (as 
they see it), and thus appeal to an immanent Spinozan productivity as the 
step Bartleby must, but does not, take. Though the Agambenian response 
to this is that they misconstrue the nature of potentiality and thus fall into 
a sort of Megarianism, Žižek in The Parallax View suggests that Hardt and 
Negri forcibly, if surreptitiously, attempt to efface any and all negativity 
within the immanent productivity of the multitude. It is a point that has 
great resonances with the Agambenian valorization of the impotentiality 
that inheres within all potentialities, but unlike Agamben, Žižek appeals to 
the force of the negative as it is conceived within the Hegelian-Marxist tra-
dition. In short, one might say that for both Agamben and Žižek, Hardt and 
Negri’s insistently productivist and “active” Spinozism neglects or indeed 
forcibly represses the work of negativity. Contra Hardt and Negri’s view 
that Bartleby’s refusal constitutes “the first move of, as it were, clearing the 
table, of acquiring a distance toward the existing social universe,” Žižek 
suggests that Bartleby’s gesture is instead the index of “a kind of arche, 
the underlying principle that sustains the entire movement: far from ‘over-
coming’ it, the subsequent work of construction, rather, gives body to it.”84 
Žižek’s question concerns the direction of the inquiry, that is, whether at-
tention is directed toward the future resolution and self-overcoming of the 
dialectic or toward the first principle grounding or sustaining it and the 
ways this principle can become intelligible.
This sustaining principle is what Žižek elaborates over the course of 
this text as the “parallax gap,” an irreducible incompleteness of perspective 
or instability of ground, a “minimal difference” dividing everything from it-
self at its most fundamental level, which Žižek acknowledges is very close to 
the Derridean notion of différance but which is also akin to the more clearly 
Hegelian idea of negativity, the driver, as it were, of the dialectic (and I have 
already suggested a proximity to Agambenian impotentiality).85 In contrast 
to a thinking oriented toward the working through of the dialectic toward 
its telos (in either its Hegelian or Marxist modulations)—that is, toward the 
dialectic’s reconciliation with itself in the absolute—“the wager of [Žižek’s] 
book is that, far from posing an irreducible obstacle to dialectics, the notion 
of the parallax gap provides the key which enables us to discern its subver-
sive core.”86 For Žižek, Bartleby’s attitude is not merely an initial abstract 
step toward a second, decisive one of “forming a new alternative order; it is 
the very source and background of this order, its permanent foundation.”87 
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The reason this point is so important for the debate between Hardt and 
Negri and Žižek is that in their conceptualization of an affirmative biopoli-
tics of the multitude, Hardt and Negri seek both to derive the coming im-
manent order of the multitude from within the workings of the dialectical 
unfolding of the capitalist order and to imagine the body of the multitude 
as an immanent absolute positivity. In their vision of the final triumph of the 
multitude’s total biopolitical self-production, Hardt and Negri embrace, in 
Jodi Dean’s words, “an ethics of affirmation that eliminates negativity from 
the political. Politics becomes immanent, part of the nature of things.”88 
Bartleby’s refusal, in this model, is a half measure because it remains stuck 
in negativity and does not reverse itself into positive productivity. But for 
Žižek this final reversal to the immanent and positive productivity of a free 
and unhindered multitude—what Hardt and Negri refer to as “absolute de-
mocracy”—effectively attempts to kick away the ladder of the dialectic that 
led to it, allowing them to imagine an absolute democracy without (or at 
least implicitly without) negativity.
In In Defense of Lost Causes, Žižek further develops this argument 
(and indeed it is in this book that he actually uses the term “Bartleby 
politics”). Here he evokes once again the way that for Hardt and Negri 
Bartleby’s refusal remains stuck at a “suicidal marginal position with no 
consequences,” 89 but he elaborates this dynamic in terms of a critical ten-
sion between the Hegelian categories of abstract and determinate negation, 
categories that he finds implicitly operative in Hardt and Negri’s overtly 
anti-Hegelian thought. Arguing that Hardt and Negri covertly “tak[e] over 
the underlying Marxist schema of historical progress,”90 Žižek proposes that 
for them “Bartleby’s ‘I would prefer not to’ is a Hegelian ‘abstract negation’ 
which should then be overcome by the patient positive work of the ‘deter-
minate negation’ of the existing social universe.”91 In presenting Bartleby in 
these terms, Hardt and Negri unintentionally not only make “the most stan-
dard (pseudo-) Hegelian critical point,” but also reveal a fault line in their 
thinking on the way the positive biopolitics of the multitude arises out of the 
conditions of capital (that is, becomes in-itself) and then finally overcomes 
those conditions (that is, becomes for-itself).92
Biopolitical production promises, for Hardt and Negri, a stage of human 
praxis and production that is finally unsubsumable by capital, insofar as it is, 
in Žižek’s gloss, “‘directly’ socialized, socialized in its very content, which 
is why it no longer needs the social form of capital imposed onto it.”93 This 
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biopolitical praxis of the multitude, in turn, “opens up the possibility of 
‘absolute democracy,’ it cannot be enslaved, because it is immediately, in 
itself, the form (and practice) of social freedom.”94 Žižek, however, points 
again to Hardt and Negri’s implicit assumption of a historical teleology and 
its “wager that one can repeat at the postmodern level the classical Marx-
ist gesture and enact the ‘determinate negation’ of capitalism,” an ultimate 
determinate negation in which the revolutionary dialectic finally comes to 
rest in the immanent self-production of the multitude or general intellect in 
an “absolute democracy.”95
There is much to say about the details of this expansive and often ar-
cane debate, but the central issue here—since Bartleby is a figure for it—is 
the role of negativity in these models of resistance and refusal. Bartleby, for 
Hardt and Negri, does not make it to the last stage because he is stuck in 
negativity—he is negativity—for which there is no clear place in the imma-
nent collective praxis of the multitude, which has more or less overcome the 
dialectic and entered into a new absolute space that, in an important sense 
of the term, would be postpolitical. But for Žižek, not only is this beatific 
vision symptomatic of a current line of leftist thinking that, he argues, is 
animated by a tacit acceptance of the victory of capital and renunciation 
of oppositional (that is, class) politics, but it implicitly operates on an im-
manentist ontology of an absolute that has purified itself of the negative.96
By contrast, Žižek argues for an ontology of irreducible negativity, the 
fundamental level of which, in Žižek’s Lacanian terminology, is called the 
“Real,” which he glosses as “not the inaccessible Thing, but the gap which 
prevents our access to it, the ‘rock’ of the antagonism which distorts our 
view of the perceived object through a partial perspective . . . the very 
gap, passage, which separates one perspective from another, the gap (in this 
case: social antagonism) which makes the two perspectives radically incom-
mensurable.”97 Whether and to what degree this gap is to be identified with 
différance, Lacanian lack, or Hegelian negativity—or any combination of 
these— is a question that lies too far afield from the present discussion, but 
insofar as it is the first principle on which Žižek’s political ontology is based, 
and the principle by virtue of which Žižek distinguishes his Bartleby poli-
tics from that imagined by Hardt and Negri, it marks the stark divergence 
in their conceptions of the nature of the absolute (or, in the precise termi-
nology of the Phenomenology of Spirit’s final chapter, “absolute knowing,” 
the self-arrival of spirit at the end of its journey through history). As Adrian 
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   220 10/29/13   10:57 AM
Language and Labor, Silence and Stasis 221
Johnston puts it, for Žižek “absolute knowing, as the self-relating of pure 
negativity, entails the insight that there is no such position of conclusive 
stability; the reconciliation achieved by absolute knowing amounts to the 
acceptance of an insurmountable incompleteness, an irresolvable driving 
tension that cannot finally be put to rest through the one last Aufhebung.”98
What, then, of Bartleby and of Bartleby politics? Bartleby, in his with-
drawal, short-circuits the traditional progression of sublation by insisting on 
the persistence and, so to speak, presence of the negative in every social or 
indeed ontological formation. Along these lines, Žižek, too, draws attention 
to the fact that Bartleby’s phrase is not really a refusal or straight negation. 
“Bartleby does not negate the predicate; rather he affirms a non-predicate,” 
and in doing so steps into a “new space outside the hegemonic position 
and its negation.”99 In distinction from a politics of resistance or protest, 
which is caught up in a dialectical unfolding that is ceaselessly engaged in 
a chase for its own tail, insofar as it seeks the final negation and reconciling 
Aufhebung, Bartleby’s is a “gesture of subtraction at its purest, the reduc-
tion of all qualitative differences to a purely formal minimal difference,” 
which instead illuminates or makes visible (and, most important, affirms) 
the irreducible parallax sustaining the entire dialectical edifice.100 As Žižek 
summarily puts it, in terms that resonate strongly with the logic of impoten-
tiality proposed by Agamben: “The difference between Bartleby’s gesture 
of withdrawal and the formation of a new order is . . . that of parallax: the 
very frantic and engaged activity of constructing a new order is sustained by 
an underlying ‘I would prefer not to’ which forever reverberates in it—or, as 
Hegel might have put it, the new postrevolutionary order does not negate its 
founding gesture, the explosion of the destructive fury that wipes away the 
Old; it merely gives body to this negativity. The difficulty of imagining the 
New is the difficulty of imagining Bartleby in power.”101
For Žižek and Agamben, in his obscure and minimal existence Bartle-
by is the embodiment, or the placeholder, of a negativity or potentiality that 
exists and persists as such, and does not simply efface itself or disappear in 
the onto-political drama of becoming. The tension Bartleby creates on this 
stage is not that between two opposing or successive positivities, but that 
between all positivities—all “somethings”—and the negativity or “nothing” 
that persists within them, not “the gap between two ‘somethings’ [but] the 
gap that separates a something from a nothing, from the void of its own 
place.”102
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This is the field that Žižek’s politics of subtraction is intended to open 
up and—to borrow a Heideggerian term—dwell in. And in doing so, in 
subtracting or withdrawing itself radically from the dynamic of direct resis-
tance to (but also definition by) the ruling hegemonic power, the subject of 
a Žižekian Bartleby politics seeks to remove the keystone from the politi-
cal edifice, causing it to collapse. “Subtraction is the ‘negation of negation’ 
(or ‘determinate negation’), in other words, instead of directly negating- 
destroying the ruling power, remaining within its field, it undermines this 
very field, opening up a new positive space.”103 Bartleby’s withdrawal for 
Žižek is not a passivity and acceptance of the hegemony of the ruling order, 
but rather a passive aggressiveness whose radicalness renders it more threat-
ening to that order than any direct resistance. As Žižek writes, in a passage 
that visualizes the triumph—if not the precise concrete performance—of 
a politics of subtraction: “Imagine the proverbial house of cards or a pile of 
wooden pieces which rely on one another in such a complex way that, if one 
single card or piece of wood is pulled out—subtracted—the whole edifice 
collapses: this is the true art of subtraction.”104 And Bartleby, on Žižek’s 
reading, is the great virtuoso, and indeed namesake, of this subtractive po-
litical “art.”
Admittedly, this account of Žižek’s Bartleby politics, like that of every 
philosophical Bartleby discussed in this chapter, has focused on what might 
be called the first principles of the philosophical-political argument, cer-
tainly to the neglect of many practical and concrete questions. Whether 
these accounts are more about philosophy than politics is a question that 
will be left open here; nevertheless, in surveying the ways in which Mel-
ville’s foundling scrivener has been adopted by the theorists discussed in 
the preceding pages, one finds that it is indeed at the point of political- 
philosophical first principles that Bartleby tends to intervene, appearing, 
as it were, motionless on the “office threshold, the door being open” (“Bar-
tleby,” 641–642), as if he had always been there, “a perpetual sentry in the 
corner” (ibid., 646). Why is Bartleby so emblematic for these thinkers? The 
answer lies, unsurprisingly, in his impassivity, his neutrality, his negativ-
ity, his preference-not-to—everything that is conveyed in his “mildly ca-
daverous reply” (ibid., 655) to the lawyer. And as the foregoing discussion 
has sought to show, these thinkers’ interpretations and appropriations of 
Melville’s tale, as brilliant and perceptive as they all are, can be read as a 
series of Rorschach tests, in which projected onto the inkblot of the scriv-
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ener (who, unlike Turkey, was never “incautious in dipping his pen into his 
inkstand” [ibid., 637]) we can see illuminated the often obscure conceptual 
cores of their political ontologies.
Or perhaps he is more like a constellation of stars, a clear sparkling B. 
This essay began by noting how Bartleby in the 150 years or so since his 
death has been many things to many people. And so perhaps he would not 
be surprised to find himself cast in this role as a new sign of the zodiac in 
the coelum stellatum of contemporary philosophy.
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All now was turned to jollity and game,
To luxurie and riot, feast and dance.
—John Milton, Paradise Lost
We find ourselves in a time of riots wherein a rebirth of History, as op-
posed to the pure and simple repetition of the worst, is signalled and 
takes shape. Our masters know this better than us: they are secretly 
trembling and building up their weaponry, in the form both of their 
judicial arsenal and the armed taskforces charged with planetary order. 
There is an urgent need to reconstruct or create our own.
—Alain Badiou, The Rebirth of History: 
Times of Riots and Uprisings
Outlandish Politics
Like “Bartleby” or Benito Cereno, Herman Melville’s “The Encantadas; or, 
Enchanted Isles” is part of his 1856 collection The Piazza Tales. Yet rather 
than cohering into a narrative like these other tales, “The Encantadas” is a 
series of “sketches”: they trace variously the topography, geology, and natural 
and political history of the Galápagos and, in so doing, aggregate fragments 
from a variety of source materials. One part Tempest and one part Voyage 
of the Beagle, one part sardonic travel narrative and one part decolonial al-
legory, they resist representational closure or wholeness and gesture toward 
the ongoing, aleatoric processes for which the archipelago became better 
known. Melville invites us to take them in parts and in relation to each 
other, as a world within itself and a world in scattershot, a world just burst 
forth from a volcano, still shrouded in smoke, and an old, weathered world, 
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hesitant to begin again. Gilles Deleuze, in cinematic terms, thus remarks 
that in “The Encantadas” we find “a new perspective, an archipelago-
perspectivism that conjugates the panoramic shot and the tracking shot.”1 
Such an “archipelago-perspectivism” includes the geographical and natural 
historical “shots” that “The Encantadas” comprises, in which the form of 
the archipelago evinces both fragmentariness and ongoing process. The 
archipelago—as a topology, topography, and active trope—allows for an 
alternative or subversive taxonomy2 in which literary and scientific forms 
of representation are rendered multiple and incomplete. They remain, as 
Melville writes in Moby-Dick, “unpainted to the last.”3
An archipelago-perspectivism likewise informs the later sketches that 
deal with the islands’ “human” or political history. They constellate yet an-
other set of Melvillean “Isolatoes”: the explorers (Cowley, Colnett, and Por-
ter), “passing voyagers and compilers,”4 and whalers and tortoise hunters 
who charted and colonized the islands; the West Indian buccaneers and 
pirate-utopians who used them as a safe haven, or “sea Alsatia” (“Encanta-
das,” 792); the irascible Dog-King and diabolical Hermit Oberlus, who used 
their “darksome glens” (ibid., 806) for their dark designs; the Chola widow, 
Hunilla, for whom the islands serve as a stage for her silent tragedy; and, 
not least, all those “runaways, castaways, solitaries” (ibid., 815) who have left 
behind abandoned abodes, scattered relics, and solemn gravestones—the 
“signs of vanishing humanity” (ibid., 817). Melville’s society in “The En-
cantadas,” “learned in all the lore of the outlandish life” (ibid., 788), thus 
comprises so many “outlandish individuals,” such as Queequeg, so many 
“outlandish strangers” (Moby-Dick, 827, 1027).5 They join the “outlandish 
beings” of the Galápagos—the tortoises, lizards, snakes, salamanders, gray 
albatrosses, “ant-eaters,” and “man-haters”—to form an outlandish collec-
tive, an “incomputable host of fiends” (“Encantadas,” 781).
Put differently, in Melville’s Galápagos, the archipelago serves as 
the topology of a non-identitarian community. It evokes a politics of re-
lation—an “outlandish politics”—that draws together solitaries in their 
differences, yet is open-ended and not governed by a unifying (territorial) 
identity or wholeness.6 Melville’s outlandish politics signifies an unsettling 
otherness that does not perpetuate identity but seeks to estrange it or 
make it extravagant. If, as he writes in Mardi, “all mankind are egotists. 
The world revolves upon an I; and we upon ourselves; for we are our own 
worlds,” he creates compelling scenarios in which isolated selves become 
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confederated to all those “strangers, from outlandish distant climes, going 
clad in furs.”7 Even Bartleby, who seems to merge with his office walls, es-
tranges the spaces he occupies. He’s not your typical New Yorker but a “bit 
of wreck in the mid Atlantic.”8 An outlandish politics knocks the ego world 
off its identity axis. It is a politics that does not consist in an instituted, 
consolidated paternal authority or state-controlled system, but multiplies 
into an “archipelago of brothers, a community of explorers,”9 mutually im-
plicated in the struggle for universal emancipation, the struggle to dis-
solve the paternal function. From the slave insurrection of Benito Cereno 
and the mutinies that hang over Billy Budd, to the series of texts that 
deal manifestly or implicitly with the American Revolution, the Haitian 
Revolution, the South American independence movements, the Revolu-
tions of 1848 and the Italian Risorgimento, and the American Civil War 
and Reconstruction, Melville’s writing bears witness to this struggle and 
the possibilities and perils of the new community it seeks to bring forth.10 
In texts that do not directly recall moments of political rupture, Melville 
interrogates how forms of domination imbricate political, social, or sci-
entific systems, how these systems come to disintegrate, and what novel 
alternatives might be created in their wake. In White-Jacket, for example, 
both the centralizing force of a paternal figure and the micropolitics by 
which paternal power saturates an institution (in terms of naval discipline, 
hierarchy, codes of honor, corporal punishment, colonialism, impress-
ment) come under intense scrutiny in the name of liberty and “The Rights 
of Man.” Melville enacts a multifarious exploration of the politics of the 
fraternal relation, in search of what he calls the “proper fraternal feel-
ing,”11 if not the “infinite fraternity of feeling” he describes in a letter to 
Hawthorne.12 Scenes of brotherly love suffuse his work to the extent that 
philos and eros often become indistinguishable.13 He lauds the “Grand 
Parliament of the best Bachelors in universal London” in his mock sym-
posium, “The Paradise of Bachelors,” yet sets it against the blank stares of 
the factory women in “The Tartarus of Maids” to perform a striking juxta-
position of gender inequality.14 In the prismatic histories of works such as 
Benito Cereno, Israel Potter, and Clarel, there are refracted the symbolic 
shards of the disintegrating fraternal orders of the Old World. In Battle-
Pieces, Melville memorializes the fratricidal convulsions of the Civil War: 
“the strife of brothers” and the “mistrust” of “Fathers” he details in his 
poem “The Armies of the Wilderness”; the “generous boys” who “lie down 
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midway on a bloody bed” in “On the Slain Collegians”; as well as the sur-
vivors who, “1ike castaway sailors,” “at last crawl, spent, to shore” in “The 
College Colonel.”15
Melville’s “The Encantadas” participates in these broader questions 
of revolution and community that animate Melville’s politics. To explore 
how, I will focus primarily here on his two later sketches: “Sketch Sixth: 
Barrington Isle and the Buccaneers,” in which he describes a seventeenth-
century “pirates’ utopia” in the Galápagos in external but predatory rela-
tion to the Spanish Empire, and “Sketch Seventh: Charles’ Isle and the 
Dog-King,” in which he provides a striking dramatization in postrevolution-
ary South America of the dynamics of insurrection and the political ambi-
guities that follow. On the one hand, my contention is that these sketches 
could be put among the broader group of Melville’s works that continue 
to resonate with—if not challenge and reformulate—programs of collec-
tive resistance and give tread to emergent conceptions of nonidentity-based 
community, such as the transnational, the cosmopolitan, or the common. 
Yet, at the same time as Melville’s characters in “The Encantadas” instanti-
ate possibilities of egalitarian collectivity built around insurgency, mutiny, 
and revolution, or become departicularized to void themselves of binding 
identity coordinates, they also adumbrate how the formation of a resilient 
non-identitarian community is not without its attendant risks. Like many of 
his works, “The Encantadas” stages the ambiguities of political power in a 
manner that disallows clear-cut valorizations between order and anarchy, 
the state system and its heterotopic spaces, violence and justice, monar-
chical authority and democratic individuality, libertarian exploitation and 
communist collectivity, if not utopia and dystopia. Even if they provide an 
alternative to settled colonial identities, characters like the Dog-King and 
Hermit Oberlus are far from egoless utopian saviors, and the pirate-poets 
who make the Galápagos their “bowers of ease” (“Encantadas,” 786) are at 
once murderers and marauders.
The key political question “The Encantadas” raises thus is: What will 
separate the universal fraternity from its diabolical counterpart, the mas-
querade of false brothers?16 Or, more formally: What will inoculate this 
community from the return of paternal power or its concomitant addictions 
to personal identity? As the father is deposed, what will keep a new father 
from emerging and seizing control? As Melville writes in Clarel concerning 
the revolutions in 1848:
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What if the kings in Forty-eight
Fled like the gods? even as the gods
Shall do, return they made; and sate,
And fortified their strong abodes.17
The return of paternal power remains the problematic that emergent collec-
tives face to bring about and sustain themselves against violent expressions 
of counterrevolutionary force. This is the daily struggle in Tahrir Square 
and Wall Street, in Damascus and Athens, on the archipelago of Bahrain 
and anywhere else where new collectives strive for political representation. 
Yet, at the same time, is there not also a “pathology of masterlessness”—a 
mastery of masterlessness that marks the incessant quest for liberty but 
cannot ensure that the flight from tyranny will end in a happy home? It is 
the irony of D. H. Lawrence’s double formula in Studies in Classic Ameri-
can Literature: “‘Henceforth be masterless.’ Henceforth be mastered.”18 Or, 
as Lacan sardonically quipped to the May 1968 revolutionaries: “What you 
aspire to as revolutionaries is a new master. You will get one.”19 Although 
these questions assuredly point to debates outside the scope of this essay, 
what is pressing is to ask what we can learn from Melville for our own “time 
of riots” about the possibilities of new planetary organization, even if found 
scattered on the plutonian shores of the Galápagos.
The Surgings of Revolt
In “Charles’ Isle and the Dog-King,” Melville relates an outlandish history, 
a history that his narrator, Salvator R. Tarnmoor, “gathered long ago from 
a shipmate learned in all the lore of outlandish life” (“Encantadas,” 788). 
In it a “certain Creole adventurer,” for his valor in effecting the “successful 
revolt of the Spanish provinces from Old Spain,” is rewarded by Peru with 
his “pick of the Enchanted Isles” (ibid.). He chooses Charles’ Island, on the 
condition that its “deed must stipulate that thenceforth Charles’ Isle is not 
only the sole property of the Creole, but is forever free of Peru, even as Peru 
of Spain” (ibid., 789). He proclaims himself “Supreme Lord of the Island, 
one of the princes of the powers of the earth.” Upon finding it unsatisfactory 
to rule over a kingdom without any subjects, he invites “subjects to his as 
yet unpopulated kingdom.” Yet these subjects quickly realize the virulent 
paranoia of their new monarch, who fully earns his title, the “Dog-King,” 
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by disbanding his human guard and raising an “army now solely consisting 
of [a] dog-regiment.” “Armed to the teeth,” Melville writes, “the Creole now 
goes in state, surrounded by his canine janizaries, whose terrific bayings 
prove quite as serviceable as bayonets in keeping down the surgings of re-
volt.” The two bodies of the king become merged into the symbolic hybrid 
of a dog-body—not exactly the “merry monarch” one might expect for an 
island named after Charles II. The Dog-King’s “grim dogs” not only become 
a “disciplined cavalry” but are classed above the settlers in the natural-
social hierarchy, “much as, from the ramparts, the soldiers of a garrison, 
thrown into a conquered town, eye the inglorious citizen-mob over which 
they are set to watch” (ibid., 789–790).
Yet, after building a capital city from out of the Galápagos’s lava floors 
and cinders, the pilgrims themselves begin to exhibit their own “untoward 
character.” The Dog-King declares martial law, shooting the “plotters and 
malignant traitors” until realizing, in a hyperbolized moment of Malthusian 
clarity, that through such a “dispensation of justice” he will completely de-
populate his empire. By necessity, he proceeds to lure and capture desert-
ers, castaways, and other desperados to repeople it. These new immigrants 
come to enjoy a “petted” status (not unlike the “foreign-born Praetorians, 
unwisely introduced into the Roman state, and still more unwisely made 
favorites of the emperors”); nonetheless, they break out into a “terrible mu-
tiny” that leads to a bloody slaughter of dogs, the Dog-King’s ignominious 
overthrow, and the proclamation of a new republic (“Encantadas,” 790–
791). The deposed Creole is then sent out, an ironic Napoleon, to a main-
land exile in Peru. There “he watched every arrival from the Encantadas, 
to hear news of the failure of the Republic, the consequent penitence of the 
rebels, and his own recall to royalty. Doubtless he deemed the Republic 
but a miserable experiment which would soon explode” (ibid., 791). Such a 
recall to power never happens, however, because, as Melville relates, “the 
insurgents had confederated themselves into a democracy neither Grecian, 
Roman, nor American. Nay, it was no democracy at all, but a permanent Ri-
otocracy, which gloried in having no law but lawlessness. . . . Charles’ Island 
was proclaimed the asylum of the oppressed of all navies. Each runaway tar 
was hailed as a martyr in the cause of freedom, and became immediately 
installed a ragged citizen of this universal nation. . . . It became Anathe-
ma—a sea Alsatia—the unassailed lurking-place of all sorts of desperadoes, 
who in the name of liberty did just what they pleased” (ibid., 791–792). 
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Melville critics have read the story of the Dog-King as a cautionary par-
able for the fate of postrevolutionary societies. To be sure, the Dog-King—
a successful revolutionary—once given the possibility to rule, cynically 
repeats the very autocratic system he had helped overthrow. History, far 
from a progress of universal emancipation realized in a revolution, seems 
to “stammer” as a brutal repetition of constriction and fragmentation. The 
history of postcolonial South America would seem to bear this out, leading 
Chris Sten to remark: “What is reflected in this brief history is not so much 
the nation building that followed the revolutions of 1808–1826 in South 
America, but the fragmentation that came after, a fragmentation seen not 
just in warlordism but in the breakup of Bolívar’s Gran Colombia and the 
United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata into their earlier constituents, the 
first into Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador, and the second into Argen-
tina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia.”20 In the wake of decolonization, the 
newly formed South American republics became marked by political disin-
tegration, economic depression, and widespread instability.21 Even Darwin, 
whose reflections on South American society punctuate his observations of 
its geology and manifold species, remarked upon visiting postrevolutionary 
Argentina that the stability the government did enjoy was “owing” to the 
“tyrannical habits” of its governors, “for tyranny seems as yet better adapted 
to these countries than republicanism. The governor’s favorite occupation is 
hunting Indians: a short time since he slaughtered forty-eight, and sold the 
children at the rate of three or four pounds apiece.”22 In this atmosphere of 
post-independence “political buccaneering,” there arose local charismatic 
warlords, or caudillos, who set up networks of power and, like seafaring 
pirates, would provide vigilante “stability” for profit.23
The Dog-King consolidates the despotic tendencies of many such fig-
ures, including those of the “liberator” Bolívar, who, “though unwavering in 
his republican convictions, became aware early on of the problem of author-
ity in the new nations he liberated, and he was to move towards ever more 
authoritarian constitutions.”24 Bolívar deeply distrusted popular sovereignty 
and worked to prevent democratic elections, which he thought to be “the 
greatest scourge of republics and [to] produce only anarchy” and insisted 
on a strong, centralized government with “all the stability of monarchical 
regimes.”25 His plan for a unified South America ultimately failed, however, 
which led him to famously surmise: “America is ungovernable. Those who 
have served the revolution have ploughed the sea.”26 Yet Melville’s Dog-
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King probably even more closely resembles General José de Vilamil,27 a 
Creole from New Orleans and hero in the Ecuadorian revolutionary cause.28 
Vilamil served as the first governor of the Galápagos for Ecuador, founding 
a penal colony on Charles’ Island in 1832, which Darwin then visited in 
September 1835. As Darwin records in his Voyage: “This archipelago has 
long been frequented, first by the Bucaniers, and latterly by whalers, but 
it is only within the last six years that a small colony has been established 
here. The inhabitants are between two and three hundred in number; they 
are nearly all people of colour, who have been banished for political crimes 
from the Republic of the Equator.”29 In a more imaginative register—one 
appropriate to the enchanted landscapes of Melville’s Galápagos—the Dog-
King also evokes Shakespeare’s The Tempest and Timon of Athens. Yet, on 
Charles’ Island, Melville’s Prospero has turned misanthrope, and his sprites 
have become an army of dogs; he is at once a Timonist “man-hater” and a 
churlish Diogenes.30
The point, however, is not to pinpoint a particular historical or liter-
ary source (or set of sources) for the Dog-King, but to show how all these 
varied sources, which become animate in his strange hybrid personae, em-
body the paradoxes of the struggle for emancipation. To this end, it is in-
structive to briefly contrast the episode next to Melville’s other characters 
who participated in South American liberation. In White-Jacket, for one, 
Melville describes Jack Chase’s motivation for his initial desertion of the 
Neversink in terms of his revolutionary involvement in Peru: “But with what 
purpose had he deserted? to riot in some abandoned sea-port? for love of 
some worthless signorita? Not at all. He abandoned the frigate from far 
higher and nobler, nay, glorious motives. Though bowing to naval discipline 
afloat; yet ashore, he was a stickler for the Rights of Man, and the liberties 
of the world. He went to draw a partisan blade in the civil commotions of 
Peru; and befriend, heart and soul, what he deemed the cause of the Right” 
(White-Jacket, 365). In the chapter “The Advocate” in Moby-Dick, Ishmael 
credits Nantucket whalemen with opening the Pacific to commerce and 
exacerbating the end of Spanish colonization in South America: “Until the 
whale fisher rounded Cape Horn, no commerce but colonial, scarcely any 
intercourse but colonial, was carried on between Europe and the long line 
of opulent Spanish provinces on the Pacific coast. It was the whalemen who 
first broke through the jealous policy of the crown, touching those colonies; 
and, if space permitted, it might be distinctly shown how from those whale-
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men at last eventuated the liberation of Peru, Chili, and Bolivia from the 
yoke of Old Spain, and the establishment of eternal democracy in those 
parts” (Moby-Dick, 910). In “The Encantadas” Melville rewrites the “glori-
ous intentions” of Jack Chase and the “eternal democracy”31 of the newly 
liberated republics in Ishmael’s ironical description as the malevolent mo-
tives of the crafty Dog-King, and the permanent riotocracy that followed 
in his wake. By replacing the stereotypical freedom-fighting revolutionary 
with his self-interested Dog-King, Melville would seem to make a farce of 
postrevolutionary repetition: the revolution is seemingly permanent only 
insofar as it signifies a permanent substitution of new masters.
The Dog-King could join the distinguished group of postrevolution-
ary figures in Melville’s works who defy easy classification or “ideological 
reductionism.”32 There is Benjamin Franklin, caricatured in Israel Potter 
as an archpatriarch, sly through excessive benevolence.33 There is Garib-
aldi, the Italian patriot, a major figure in Melville’s poems about the Italian 
Risorgimento contained in his late, unfinished Burgundy Club.34 Garib-
aldi, seemingly unrelenting in his emancipatory fervor (to the extent that he 
wanted to destroy the papacy and declined Lincoln’s offer to lead the Union 
forces in 1862 because the president would not abolish slavery), famously 
ceded his revolutionary winnings to the king of Italy for the ultimate cause 
of unification.35 Like these other historical revolutionaries–cum–Melville 
characters, the Dog-King mocks the enlightened “progress” from monar-
chy to republic to which his century of revolutions, and the century before 
him, claimed to bear witness. He does not found a universal republic but 
a “miserable republic.” Despite claims that his kingdom will be free from 
Peru as Peru was from Spain, he does not put an end to systems of colonial 
oppression or prevent the restoration of paternal authority but re-creates 
them in miniature. He becomes a gross hybrid of the emancipatory promise 
of revolution and its terrible failure (for which the repeated counterrevolu-
tionary retrenchments of the French Revolution served for many, including 
Melville, as a haunting model). This duplicity persistently hangs over Mel-
ville’s politics and accents his manifold scenes of insurgency, revolution, and 
mutiny. Insurgents merge with counterinsurgents, liberators become kings, 
and masters cannot be distinguished from slaves, nor misanthropes from 
philanthropists. In the 1850s of “The Encantadas,” the increasingly disunit-
ed United States itself verged on a “miserable republic about to explode.”
Michael Rogin, whose Subversive Genealogy is in many ways still the 
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most potent and sustained work to consider the question of Melville’s revo-
lutionary inheritance, catalogues the duplicitous mutinies through which 
Melville’s political vision becomes dramatized: “The San Dominick slaves 
carry out the only successful mutiny in all of Melville’s fiction. There is near-
mutiny on the Neversink, comic mutiny on the Julia, failed mutiny on the 
Town-Ho, alleged mutiny on the Bellipotent, and desertion from the Dolly. 
The metaphoric slaves on all those ships fail to overthrow their masters. . . . 
Benito Cereno recontains a slave revolt inside a masquerade.”36 Even had 
Rogin included within his survey the successful insurgents who create the 
“permanent Riotocracy” instantiated on Charles’ Island, the list would still 
read like a catalogue of revolutionary failures. Even in the successful mu-
tiny of Benito Cereno, as he asserts, “the slaves overthrew their masters only 
to reenact their own enslavement. Melville fictionalized a mutiny that the 
slaves had fictionalized before him.”37 At the same time, critics should be 
careful not to map this too hastily to a univocal tragic political orientation 
throughout Melville’s writing. Rather, what emerges does not cohere into a 
single, consistent political position. For what is at stake in all these scenes 
of mutiny is Melville’s subtle diagnosis of the structure of the workings 
of revolt—what Robert S. Levine has described apropos of the American 
Revolution in Israel Potter as his ability to “restage” the revolutionary mo-
ment “in all of its sublime multiplicity and confusion, helping us to realize 
how little we know about the trajectories of history even as we discern that 
those trajectories might have gone in different directions.”38 Melville, in ef-
fect, offers simultaneously multiple and dynamic political perspectives—an 
archipelago of political perspectives. He does not seek to resolve them but 
to prompt us again and again to rethink how political situations are formed 
of heterogeneous elements and colliding imperatives, and how new political 
formations are always in the making. To this end, Melville’s work directly 
engaged the contradictory historical forces of the nineteenth century; he 
sought to populate his works with embodiments of these forces, as well 
as with the outcasts, orphans, and insurgents that inhabit the outside of 
nineteenth-century narratives of historical progress, capitalist hegemony, 
and Christian society. This perhaps is Melville’s radical political gesture: to 
stage for his century—if not proleptically for our own—the masquerades of 
power that put on faces of benevolence, charity, or even mere personhood 
to cover grotesque visages of exploitation. If throughout Melville’s work 
there is enacted an “immanent critique” of the deep relational structure of 
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political power, it is not one that demands a shift in totality, but a faithful-
ness to ever-shifting pluralities. As such, Melville’s permanent riotocracy 
joins a series of scenes of resistance across his writing that have collectively 
animated a boisterous mob of writers and philosophers intent on resisting 
still-rampant forms of imperialism and societal control. It is to them that I 
will now turn, shifting focus from the vexed history of the Dog-King to the 
riotous community that replaces him.
Desperado Philosophy
Invoking C. L. R James, Amy Kaplan, in her recent article “Transnational 
Melville,” asks: “Are all [Melville’s] motley crews of mariners, renegades, 
and castaways federated along the keel of destruction? Or do they represent 
other democratic potentialities?” She goes on to conjecture that “the law-
lessness [of the insurgents] bespeaks other kinds of confederating, where 
‘any fugitive would be welcome’ and ‘each runaway tar’ would be ‘installed 
as ragged citizen of this universal nation.’”39 She links Melville’s “permanent 
Riotocracy” to an analogous passage in White-Jacket, a passage that serves 
as her formula of transnationality. There Melville writes, “We sailors sail 
not in vain. We expatriate ourselves to nationalize with the universe.”40 For 
Kaplan this expatriation is not just to leave the father or fatherland, or to 
be reborn into a metaphysical All-ness; it also harbors concrete political 
potential. In a time when catastrophes such as 9/11, Katrina, and the global 
financial crisis have “revealed our shared vulnerability” and “the illusion of 
national sovereignty,” “a transnational approach to literature and culture 
must propose alternatives, [it must] imagine such future modes of confed-
erating.”41
In a passage from Redburn, “America” replaces the universe of White-
Jacket as the alembic of the departicularized community to come: “You 
cannot spill a drop of American blood without spilling the blood of the 
whole world. . . . We are not a nation, so much as a world; for unless we 
may claim all the world for our sire, like Melchisedec, we are without father 
or mother. . . . We are the heirs of all time, and with all nations we divide 
our inheritance” (Redburn, 185).42 On the basis of passages like this one, 
Deleuze celebrates Melville’s characters as instantiations of a political pro-
gram freed of the “Oedipal phantasm.”43 In his Essays Critical and Clinical 
and across his oeuvre, Deleuze adopts figures from the vast orphanage of 
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Melville’s writing as figures of the clash of universal fraternity with paternal 
authority. He charts how the paternal function, “the heart of the representa-
tive system,” becomes dissolved into the immanent strife of “the disorder of 
haecceities.”44 Ishmael is borne up on Queequeg’s coffin amid the wreckage 
of the law of the Father, amid the wreckage of reason. Ahab, by pursuing 
paternal authority and willful preference to their extremes, brings about the 
destruction of this authority. He prefers “to will nothingness rather than not 
will.”45 Moby-Dick’s secret motto, then, as Melville confides to Hawthorne, 
is Ahab’s formula: “Ego non baptizo te in nomine patris, sed in nomine 
diaboli!” (Moby-Dick, 1315). Scenes of paternal overcoming suffuse Mel-
ville’s work: Bartleby’s formula, as Deleuze argues, “strip[s] the father of his 
exemplary speech, just as it strips the son of his ability to reproduce or copy. 
. . . Redburn renounces the image of the father in favor of the ambiguous 
traits of the mysterious brother. Pierre does not imitate his father but reach-
es the zone of proximity where he can no longer be distinguished from his 
half sister.”46 Likewise, the self-abnegating fealty of Billy Budd leaves Cap-
tain Vere, on his deathbed, only to “mutter” to his attendant the name of 
the executed youth. Deleuze’s Melville is a tenacious critic of how forms of 
paternity—even those wearing the masks of “love” (Christian charity, phi-
lanthropy, family identity)—surreptitiously foreclose the fraternal relation. 
“Now what Vere and the attorney demonstrate is that there are no good fa-
thers. There are only monstrous, devouring fathers, and petrified, fatherless 
sons. If humanity can be saved . . . it will only be through the dissolution or 
decomposition of the paternal function.”47 For Deleuze Melville’s confronta-
tions of figures of “Primary Nature” such as Bartleby or Budd with paternal 
authority seek to open a space for a fraternal humanity to come: “To liberate 
man from the father function, to give birth to the new man or the man with-
out particularities, to reunite the original and humanity by constituting a 
society of brothers as a new universality. In the society of brothers, alliance 
replaces filiation and the blood pact replaces consanguinity. Man is indeed 
the blood brother of his fellow man, and woman his blood sister: according 
to Melville, this is the community of celibates, drawing its members into 
an unlimited becoming.”48 The “community of celibates” becomes released 
from the settled rituals of inherited identity by offering an alternative to 
grounded, predetermined relations centered on the paternal bloodline. It 
fosters new, open-ended alliances—new blood pacts between brothers and 
sisters—as if to reinstate the dream of Enlightenment universal fraternity 
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foreclosed by the plutocratic realities of Western democracy, the dream of 
Thomas Paine, Anacharsis Clootz, and Olympe de Gouges. At the same 
time, Deleuze’s community of celibates gestures toward a nonreproductive 
futurity that rejects heteronormative institutions like the family and the 
nation-state as the sine qua non of community, as well as their inherent 
dependencies on concepts of identity such as personhood, private property, 
and territory.
Melville often presents his people to come in the dress of a universal 
citizenry, as an “Anacharsis Clootz deputation from all the isles of the sea, 
and all the ends of the earth” (Moby-Dick, 921), “an assortment of tribes 
and complexions” (Billy Budd, 1353), a masquerade of representative hu-
manity, a “piebald parliament . . . of all kinds of that multiform species, 
man” (The Confidence-Man, 848). C. L. R. James, for his part, finds Mel-
ville’s Anacharsis Clootz formulations to be “decisive.”49 Clootz’s anonymous 
mob becomes synonymous with James’s “meanest mariners, castaways and 
renegades” who constitute the Pequod’s laboring crew. They operate in 
stark contrast to Ahab’s “queenly personality”—a contrast that “Melville 
traces at every level from the basic human function to the philosophic con-
ceptions of society.”50 Federated along the keel of the heterotope of the ship, 
or set loose into the ports of the faceless multitude, Melville’s characters 
participate in the undoing of fixed narratives of nation, class, race, or self-
identity. Donald Pease puts this forcefully, again launching James’s trident 
configuration:
As participants in a transnational social movement, the “mariners, ren-
egades, and castaways” did not belong to a national community. The 
irreducible differences and inequivalent cultural features character-
izing the “mariners, castaways, and renegades” refused to conform to 
a state’s monocultural taxonomy and could not be integrated within a 
nationalizing telos. . . . Forever in between arrival and departure, the 
elements comprising the composite figure “mariners, renegades, and 
castaways” perform a process of endless surrogation. Each term names 
the movement of a “we” that is responsible for its constitution and that 
traces the presence within it of an alterity irreducible to an “I.”51
So if, as Marx writes in The Holy Family, Napoleon “perfected the Ter-
ror by substituting permanent war for permanent revolution,”52 Melville’s 
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renegades in “The Encantadas” perfect the process of decolonization by 
substituting democratic reterritorialization with permanent riotocracy. The 
process of unbelonging, of “endless surrogation,” hyperextends the already 
disjoint revolutionary temporality. It seemingly disallows the reinstitution 
of yet another autocratic regime, at the same time that it prevents anything 
like the “democratic” redistribution and protection of private property en-
acted by the Federalists in the wake of the American Revolution. “Nay, it 
was no democracy at all, neither Grecian, Roman, nor American.” As such, 
it resists the world-historical conjurations of the ghosts of dead Romans, Ro-
man costumes, or Roman phrases.53 It is an insurrection without institution, 
a process of making permanent a series of interruptions to any foundational 
national narrative. The question becomes how revolutionary time might 
become extended (or made permanent) to prevent the return of patriarchal 
forms of power, to hold open new spaces for resistance and communal ar-
rangement.
It is interesting that the Trotskyite C. L. R. James, in his reading of 
“The Encantadas” in Mariners, Renegades and Castaways, does not re-
mark on the phrase “permanent Riotocracy” or on the Dog-King sketch, re-
lating, rather, the hopeless struggle of humanity to the “crowning curse” of 
the Galápagos tortoises, their “straightforwardness in a belittered world.”54 
For James “The Encantadas” does not harbor the revolutionary potential or 
latent modes of confederating that Kaplan recognizes; rather, it encapsu-
lates Melville’s vanquished faith in human progress. As James summarizes: 
“[Melville] takes politics and religion, love, friendship and faith; one by one 
he places them in Las Encantadas and shows how they are destroyed. He 
does not complain. He is even good-tempered, but the destruction is not 
less thorough.”55 Yet the argument here is that, as the “asylum of the op-
pressed of all navies,” the “martyr[s] in the cause of freedom,” or the “ragged 
citizen[s] of this universal nation,” the insurgents who overthrow the Dog-
King indeed form another anonymous mob that models the creation of the 
“world-federation” James envisages on the decks of the Pequod.56 They form 
a new politics of relation that resists allegiance to any nation, fixed site of 
identity, or predetermined spatio-geographical distribution. The law of law-
lessness instead demands a constant reconfederating as new members join 
and others leave. The apparent paradox of this temporary community’s per-
manence is a testament to the resilience of its viable yet flexible system of 
managing its perpetual becoming-other. It is a shifting multiplicity, an open 
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archipelago. Its “ragged citizens” are left unfinished, like the “ragged edges” 
of truth in Billy Budd (1431).
To signify this dis-order, Melville creates the neologism riotocracy. 
Riotocracy perhaps modulates the word rotocracy (connoting the power 
of those in charge of “rotten boroughs”57 and essentially a synonym for 
mobocracy) or could be merely Melville’s fanciful construction to express 
the power of his rioters. In any case, it empowers the double sense of riot 
as both a general unruliness and a carefree abandonment to merriment. 
In Melville’s riotocracy, both Milton’s sense of jollity and Badiou’s sense of 
protest preside. If, as “no democracy,” it also admits to the brute fact that 
for all the liberating revolutions the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
had witnessed, in many cases it has been only permanent aristocracy that 
has prevailed and that has formed the seemingly implacable bases of global 
capitalist modernity. In its externality to the state, Melville’s permanent ri-
otocracy invokes a figure of commonality opposed to the formation of this 
modernity. Its insurgents, “in the name of liberty,” rather, “did just what 
they pleased.” It fits Peter Lamborn Wilson/Hakim Bey’s descriptions of 
a “pirates’ utopia” or “temporary autonomous zone”: “a mini-society living 
consciously outside the law and determined to keep it up, even if only for a 
short but merry life.”58
In the sketch immediately preceding the story of the Dog-King, “Bar-
rington Isle and the Buccaneers,” Melville describes a similar scene of an-
archic cooperation in the Galápagos archipelago:
As a secure retreat, an undiscoverable hiding place, no spot in those 
days could have been better fitted. In the centre of a vast and silent 
sea, but very little traversed; surrounded by islands, whose inhospitable 
aspect might well drive away the chance navigator; and yet within a 
few days’ sail of the opulent countries which they made their prey, the 
unmolested buccaneers found here that tranquillity which they fiercely 
denied to every civilized harbor in that part of the world. Here . . . 
those old marauders came, and lay snugly out of all harm’s reach. But 
not only was the place a harbor of safety, and a bower of ease, but for 
utility in other things it was most admirable. (“Encantadas,” 786)
The Encantadas, as a pirates’ utopia, exist as a place off the grid of state 
control, hidden in “enfolded immensities [that] escape the measuring 
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rod.”59 The enchanting, displacing effect of the Galápagos Islands—as 
shrouded in fog, surrounded by trick currents, given to ocular deceptions—
itself enables the inhabitants to avoid all “entanglements with ‘permanent 
solutions’”; it makes possible such confederations, living under temporary 
articles or no articles at all, off the map, “out of all harm’s reach.” Their 
temporary status is further demonstrated, as Melville continues, quoting 
(or rewriting) from “a sentimental voyager long ago,”60 in that “it is highly 
improbable that the buccaneers ever erected dwelling-houses upon the isle” 
(ibid.). The only permanent trace of their “bowers of ease” is the “romantic 
seats” that evince for Melville’s narrator “[no] other motive than one of pure 
peacefulness and kindly fellowship with nature” (ibid., 787). They join the 
broader community of singularities dispersed across Melville’s writing—the 
loose confederations of landless runaways, castaways, and nomads who sail 
outside the measured grid of state control. Like the outlandish Isolatoes 
who eschew “the common continent of men” in Moby-Dick (921), they seek 
out new commonalities on the romantic seats of their bowers of ease. Out 
of such shared situations, Melville further explores how individualities form 
their “Siamese connexion[s]” with the “plurality of other mortals” (Moby-
Dick, 1135); out of such shared situations, he further enacts his politics of 
the “kingly commons” (ibid., 917).
Like Bartleby or the crew of the Pequod, then, Melville’s riotocrats and 
pirate-utopians in “The Encantadas” could serve as conceptual personae for 
current critical formulations of the “common.”61 The common, to hazard a 
provisional definition, is the inventive, nonhomogenizing activity of produc-
ing not a community of individuals who group themselves along the lines of 
a unified identity, but a composition of singularities in a common relation-
ship.62 The common becomes distanced from any nostalgic gemeinschaft 
whose constitution is based on a continual reinscription of timeless mythoi 
into its own self-identity. It is based not on individuals who share identi-
ties (of which the nation-state is the prime example—Pease’s “monocultural 
taxonomy”), but on singularities who enact an indeterminate, processual 
sharing of differences. The constitution of the common presupposes active, 
open-ended cooperation as its logical condition of possibility and at once its 
outcome, and it thus is oriented toward opening new social relations.
For Cesare Casarino, such scenes of commonality in Melville’s work 
point to a thought of the outside of capitalist modernity and its pernicious 
binaries of identity. In Modernity at Sea, Casarino explores how by turning 
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Melville and Marx into a “cosy loving pair”—or, more specifically, “by read-
ing Melville’s Moby-Dick and Marx’s Grundrisse along and through each 
other.” As Casarino writes: “Moby-Dick and the Grundrisse [are] works 
that attempt to come to terms with the outside of the history of modernity. 
. . . If the history of modernity is above all the history of capitalism, any 
thought of resistance to such a history is above all a thought of resistance to 
capital. To resist capital is to dare to think its outside, and for both Marx and 
Melville, such an outside makes itself felt in history through the explosive 
corporeal potentiality of labor, through a crisis-ridden and joyous collective 
body of potentia.”63 Rather than implicating the Pequod’s crew in a dialec-
tics of class struggle or between master and slave (as C. L. R. James does), 
Casarino posits a dialectical excess constituted by the shared capabilities 
“incarnated in the living flesh of labor.”64 Put differently, both Melville and 
Marx show that the potential productive force of labor in bodies ceases to 
be the dialectical counterpart to capitalism’s demand that the body’s labor 
be commodified. The Pequod’s crew becomes “taken off the clock”65 as a 
pure potentia of collective bodies of labor who model an alternative to capi-
talism by opening new loci of exchange, or new material, corporeal experi-
ments. Such corporeal potentia modulates into “amor potentiae”66 insofar 
as it takes as its experiment the formation of new modes of love and of be-
ing-with. Thus the homosocial relationship between Ishmael and Queequeg 
not only provides a counterforce to reified forms of heterosexual love, but 
serves to break up the complicity of capital with an oppressive heteronor-
mativity. Their love becomes a shared experiment “without any teleological 
horizon”—it is “to live ‘in the place of the other’ . . . to live as potentia and 
multitudo.”67 This leads Casarino past James’s dialectical-materialist and 
homoerotic paean to the body of labor in Moby-Dick—which, according to 
Casarino, “leaves Ahab’s version of the events intact and does not translate 
into an investigation of the crew’s own projects in the novel.”68 Rather, Casa-
rino seeks to find in the Pequod’s crew a “collective body of subjectivity” 
that is “both potentia and multitudo—and as such it implies and needs no 
interiority. This is a subjectivity without subjects.”69
Casarino’s “subjectivity without subjects”—like Deleuze’s community 
of celibates—is an opened-ended, experimental mode of being in common. 
Both Casarino and Deleuze go beyond the picture of fraternity Wilson 
Carey McWilliams develops in his seminal chapter on Melville in The Idea 
of Fraternity in America.70 Whereas McWilliams likewise limns a society 
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of the “Fatherless” in Melville’s writing, he persistently reproduces the 
identity structures that predetermine “particularities.”71 In these alterna-
tive pictures of commonality, “fraternity” becomes not so much “essential 
for the realization of man’s nature”72 (as it is in McWilliams’s terms) as an 
anonym for an open-ended—and indeed genderless—process of becom-
ing freed from cardinal identity constraints like consanguinity, essentialism, 
or monolithic understandings of human nature: all the baptisms in water, 
blood, or fire that confer onto docile singularities the name of the Father. If 
McWilliams’s duty-bound figure of fraternity becomes reducible to a nostal-
gia for the imitatio Christi,73 Deleuze ironically instates a departicularized 
Bartleby as “the new Christ or brother of us all.”74 For Casarino fraternity 
becomes an activation of mutual corporeal potential, at once “crisis-ridden” 
and “joyous.”
A similar critique might be leveled against Rogin, who, despite his ex-
pansive analysis of Melville’s symbolic, societal, and historical implications, 
ironically performs the problematic of paternal inheritance as he endeavors 
to subvert it. Whereas his aim is to understand revolution through Melville’s 
own “double revolutionary descent,”75 his persistent conflation of Melville’s 
writing and his biography serves to neutralize the force of his political ex-
plosiveness by redirecting it back onto speculative episodes in an Oedipal 
family drama. The temptation to biographize, which remains a critical 
reflex in Melville studies, runs the risk of reproducing a heteronormative 
politics and hermeneutical piety organized around the authorial (paternal) 
personality. This is the case with many of the usual loci of Melvillean politi-
cal critique, especially those concerning questions of sexuality, such as the 
sperm-squeezing scene of emancipatory jouissance in “A Squeeze of the 
Hand,” not to mention the Gorgon’s head of the overdetermined relation-
ship between Melville and Hawthorne. These have often led to fetishiza-
tions of Melville’s own sexuality at the expense of sharing in or transferring 
the emancipatory potential for new modes of being-with. Theorists of the 
common pursue a picture of Melvillean fraternity in the other direction: 
one that does not ahistoricize Melville by taking him out of enmeshed his-
torical networks, but emphasizes how Melville offers new “collective bodies 
of subjectivity” and new heterotopic possibilities of relation and distribu-
tions of collective power that might unbind forms of capitalist domination 
that use identity (family, state, ethnicity, “society,” religion, personhood, 
sexuality, ressentiment) as their ideological covers.
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A Paradise of Flowers and a Tartarus of Clinkers
Like Casarino’s laboring crew aboard the Pequod, the pirates who take 
asylum in the Encantadas form an outside to global capitalist modernity, 
or perhaps its inexorable underside. If their collective labor is to “[ravage] 
the Pacific side of the Spanish colonies” and prey on the “opulent countries” 
along the Spanish Main, their collective reward is to “measure their silks of 
Asia with long Toledos for their yard-sticks” and to enjoy the “tranquillity” 
of their Galápagos retreat (“Encantadas,” 786). The islands become a privi-
leged destination, precisely because they are not considered a destination 
for state power at all—like the many pirate utopias of the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries, they exist outside the controlled cartographical space 
of empire and global exchange. As a result, they preempt the foundational 
discourses of the state itself—no Columbus would come to claim this fallen 
earth, to settle it, to cultivate it, or to “civilize” it. When Melville’s narra-
tor at the close of Sketch Seventh naively suggests saving the “shipwrecked 
men” of Charles’ Island, his knowing captain advises them to steer clear, to 
“brace up” and “keep the light astern” (ibid., 792).
If in other sketches, such as “Norfolk Isle and the Chola Widow,” Mel-
ville draws on Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and its reuptake of the Selkirk ty-
pology, here he gestures toward a lesser-known work of Defoe, his General 
History of the Pyrates (1724).76 Among Defoe’s biographies of famous buc-
caneers is a provocatively detailed pirates’ utopia off the coast of Mada-
gascar called Libertalia, a proto-socialist commune, operating much like 
Melville’s Galápagos retreat.
There Defoe describes a multinational “Nest of Pyrates” with “all the 
Necessaries of Life” where captured slaves are set free and the death pen-
alty condemned, where money “was of no Use because every Thing was in 
common, and no Hedge bounded any particular Man’s Property.”77 Even if 
Defoe’s Libertalia would ultimately fail, his pirate-utopians endure not as 
ruthless criminals, but as nonconformists who put under suspicion the pre-
vailing narratives of historical progression and global capitalist expansion 
at the very bases of their eighteenth-century society. Melville’s buccaneers 
in Sketch Sixth, like those in Defoe’s General History, also resist the hasty 
generalization or stereotyping that would determinately incarcerate them 
as outcasts of history. As Melville continues, shortly after the passage cited 
above:
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That the buccaneers perpetrated the greatest outrages is very true; 
that some of them were mere cut-throats is not to be denied; but we 
know that here and there among their host was a Dampier, a Wafer, 
and a Cowley, and likewise other men, whose worst reproach was their 
desperate fortunes; whom persecution, or adversity, or secret and un-
avengeable wrongs, had driven from Christian society to seek the mel-
ancholy solitude or the guilty adventures of the sea. . . . All of the 
buccaneers were not unmitigated monsters. . . . Could it be possible, 
that they robbed and murdered one day, revelled the next, and rested 
themselves by turning meditative philosophers, rural poets, and seat-
builders the third? Not very improbable, after all. For consider the vac-
illations of a man. Still strange as it may seem, I must also abide by the 
more charitable thought; namely, that among these adventurers were 
some gentlemanly, companionable souls, capable of genuine tranquility 
and virtue. (“Encantadas,” 787–788)
Again we witness Melville’s refusal to consolidate into a unified political or 
ideological position. Melville’s marauders become the next day meditative 
philosophers, pastoral poets, if not landscape designers. Like Ishmael’s “ge-
nial, desperado philosophy” through which imperiled sailors learn to laugh 
in the face of death and realize the multiformity of “this strange mixed af-
fair we call life” (Moby-Dick, 1035), or like his algorithm for human mental 
multiformity in The Confidence-Man that “many men have many minds” 
(Confidence-Man, 846), in “The Encantadas” Melville’s premise is that it is 
“not very improbable” that these pirates too will subvert our expectations 
with their own multiformity, for why not, “given the vacillations of man” 
(“Encantadas,” 788)?
What is more, Melville’s archipelago-perspectivism includes the vacil-
lations of these pirates’ utopias themselves. Like Libertalia, Melville’s sea 
Alsatias, despite their claims to permanent impermanency, could not last. 
As is the case with any utopia, Melville’s pirates’ utopias might anamorphose 
into their dystopian counterparts, as the “map” of utopia engraved by Am-
brosius Holbein and used as the frontispiece to the 1518 edition of More’s 
Utopia anamorphoses into a barren skull. This is curiously registered in the 
history of the Galápagos. In 1820 a boat steerer from the Nantucket whaler 
the Essex, a ship always in the back of Melville’s mind, had set a wildfire 
that blackened the whole of Charles’ Island. The Dog-King sketch strangely 
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foretells the autocratic regime of a sugar plantation owner, assassinated in 
1904 by his insurgent workers. The Galápagos has been subject to other 
misanthropes since, from Europeans and Americans seeking refuge in the 
Ecuadorian tax haven (today’s misanthropic pirates’ utopia) to ecotourists 
and their ongoing colonialism. As Melville says, there are “two sides to a 
tortoise” (“Encantadas,” 769). Every paradise of flowers has its tartarus of 
clinkers, as every paradise of bachelors has its tartarus of maids. The utopia 
of escape, of following the line, can become a dystopia of nomadism, the 
liquid modernity of Zygmunt Bauman in which rootlessness has become a 
formula for universal alienation. The pathology of masterlessness becomes 
another form of mastery. The fate of the “Runaways, Castaways, Solitaries” 
Melville describes in the final sketch of “The Encantadas” attests to this: 
“The Enchanted Isles [have] become the voluntary tarrying places of all 
sorts of refugees; some of whom too sadly experience the fact that flight 
from tyranny does not itself insure a safe asylum, far less a happy home” 
(ibid., 816).
For Deleuze the only “real danger” to the “society without fathers” is 
the “return of the father.”78 From this vantage point, he renders insepa-
rable the failures of the “two revolutions, the American and the Soviet, the 
pragmatic and the dialectal”:79 “Just as many Bolsheviks could hear the dia-
bolical powers knocking at the door in 1917, the pragmatists, like Melville 
before them, could see the masquerade that the society of brothers would 
lead to. Long before Lawrence, Melville and Thoreau were diagnosing the 
American evil, the new cement that would rebuild the wall: paternal au-
thority and filthy charity.”80 This paternal authority and charity merge in the 
protean figure of the Melvillean confidence man. “What malignant power,” 
Deleuze asks, “has turned the trust into a company as cruel as the abomi-
nable ‘universal nation’ founded by the [Dog-King] in The Encantadas?”81 
Even if it is not, to be precise, the “Dog-Man” who founds the universal 
nation, we can see Deleuze’s point: that in the wake of the dissolution of 
transcendental paternal sovereignty, immanent fraternity always risks be-
coming a masquerade of false brothers. Melville’s novel The Confidence-
Man, already begun while he was finishing “The Encantadas,” becomes an 
extended exploration of this risk, the duplicity of fraternity. The novel’s key 
term is trust, which is both an expression of human bonding and a cover for 
the dissimulations that inhabit capitalism at every point where money is to 
be made. Confidence might always reveal itself as a con game. The society 
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without fathers can “resort to manipulation” and thus become nourished by 
an “ir-remediable mistrust among particular individuals.”82 We must take 
it on faith that our contracts will not be broken, that our credit will be 
good. As Deleuze asks: “Are these false brothers sent by a diabolical father 
to restore his power over overly credulous Americans? . . . The novel is so 
complex that one could just as easily say the opposite: this long procession 
of con men would become a comic version of authentic brothers, such as 
overly suspicious Americans see them, or rather have already become inca-
pable of seeing them.”83 At the same time, charity might also slip into a form 
of paternalism, a Christian charity, that demands “the fusion of souls in the 
name of [a] great love.”84 For Melville it becomes equally misanthropic to 
love a philanthropist as it is philanthropic to hate a misanthrope.
It is on these fronts that Deleuze locates the struggle for emancipation 
in Melville’s work and the enduring promise of his proto-pragmatism. Mel-
ville not only recognizes the duplicity of fraternity as both a community to 
come and a masquerade. He also works to resist, by means of a pragmatist 
ethics, the “particularities that pit man against man” and, through a radical 
empiricism, any reintegration into wholeness or unity that would serve to 
negate singularity or stymie one’s ability to create oneself and one’s world 
anew. Bartleby, for Deleuze, becomes the most radical of empiricists: the 
hero of both the disintegration of representation and the repartitioning of 
the sensible order in its wake. Melville, Deleuze attests, “is already sketch-
ing out the traits of the pragmatism that will be its continuation. It is first of 
all the affirmation of a world in process, an archipelago.”85 For this to come 
about, the “knowing subject”—the constituted subject of phenomenology 
or the solitary political subject capable of individual agency—will have had 
to become dissolved into “a community of explorers, the brothers of the ar-
chipelago, who replace knowledge with belief, or rather with ‘confidence.’”86 
Deleuze seemingly endows Melville’s federated world with what were to him 
the more attractive features of William James’s “pluralistic universe”: “things 
are ‘with’ one another in many ways, but nothing includes everything, or 
dominates over everything. The word ‘and’ trails along after every sentence. 
Something always escapes.”87 Relations are externalized, as “a wall of loose, 
uncemented stones”;88 truth remains rough and unfinished. The “cement” of 
consolidating paternal authority never hardens to seal off the wall. We might 
rewrite Melville’s formula from White-Jacket along the lines of James’s radi-
cal empiricism as “We expatriate to trans-nationalize in the pluriverse.”
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For Jacques Rancière, however, in his trenchant assessment of De-
leuze’s reading of Melville in The Flesh of Words, this image of the “wall of 
loose, uncemented stones” serves rather as precisely the aporia of an eman-
cipatory politics to be elicited from Melville’s writing. Rancière writes:
Under the mask of Bartleby, Deleuze opens to us the open road of 
comrades, the great drunkenness of joyous multitudes freed from the 
law of the Father, the path of a certain Deleuzism that is perhaps only 
the “festival of donkeys” of Deleuze’s thinking. But this road leads us 
to a contradiction: the wall of loose stones, the wall of non-passage. 
. . . And this wall of loose stones is like those . . . aerial bridges that 
Zarathustra had to cast toward the future, at the risk of seeing them 
resemble the counterfeits that enchanters and fools made of them. But, 
of course, the strength of every strong thought is also its ability to ar-
range its aporia itself, the point where it can no longer pass. And this is 
exactly what Deleuze does here when, in one single gesture, he clears 
the way of Deleuzism and sends it into the wall.89
Given the duplicity of the society of brothers, it is easy to see how Rancière 
might hear in the drunken joyous multitude the incessantly repeating Ye-a! 
Ye-a’s! of a Nietzschean festival of donkeys. For Rancière nomadic thought 
might risk becoming caricatured as a “universal mobilism to which it is so 
easily likened. For universal mobilism is also a quietism, an indifferent-
ism.”90 The question for Rancière in this context remains a pressing one: 
“How can one make a difference in the political community with this indif-
ference?”91 And, given that the “oxymoronic figure” of a wall of loose stones 
is also a roadblock for the people to come, does this interminably postpone 
the promised fraternity?
These will remain, at least for now, open questions. What is at stake is 
whether we will shrink back before this wall as if it were altogether impass-
able, or whether we will find new ways to dismantle it, if not to kick it down. 
The challenge remains to find new ways of being-with that do not become 
totalizing, that can remain incomplete, contingent, and under construction, 
and new ways of perpetually reorganizing the loose, uncemented stones. 
Melville’s outlandish politics, as multivocal, polyvalent, and pluralist (in 
James’s sense), does this as it draws together contradictory forces and rarely 
resolves them into a finished whole or places the crowning “architectural 
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finial” (Billy Budd, 1431). Melville’s politics keeps its “ragged edges” (ibid.). 
This disallows any univocal political position as well as any correspondence 
between his own personal political views and those of the players in his 
work—to the contrary, for example, of Rogin’s claim that Vere’s actions sym-
bolize Melville’s own late accession to authority.92 If the failed promise of 
the French Revolution haunts his work, or if he flirts with a Burkean posi-
tion in Billy Budd, this is not tantamount to a de facto antirevolutionary po-
litical position. If the scroll of Mardi contains a series of formulaic Burkean 
pronouncements, at the same time the cast of Mardi vehemently disclaims 
authorship of them and tears them to “shreds” (Mardi, 1187). Dennis Ber-
thold’s fine comment on Melville’s late works The Burgundy Club and Billy 
Budd may thus hold for his work more generally: “As multivocal, dialogical 
dramas, they are less important as statements of Melville’s actual political 
beliefs than as hermeneutical texts that unmask art’s ideological function, 
exposing the process that transforms emotion into art, event into history, 
and people into icons.”93 That art can draw together contraries so that we 
might better understand complex ideological dynamisms, that we can, 
through this understanding, find new ways to counterforce exploitation and 
the return of paternal power, that we can find new modes of confederating 
without consolidating all the solitaries of our fragmentary world: these are 
perhaps the challenges, but also the hope, that Melville’s writing gives us. 
It is to inaugurate, again and again, as Edoaurd Glissant would say, a new 
“poetics of relation,” and a new politics of relation. In his work resounds the 
promise of pragmatism, the “double principle of archipelago and hope.”94 It 
calls forth to new riots and to new festivals, to a new planetary order and to 
a new humanity.
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9What Babo Saw
Benito Cereno and “the World We Live In”
Lawrie Balfour
The miracle of Herman Melville is this: that a hundred years ago in two 
novels . . . and two or three stories, he painted a picture of the world in 
which we live, which is to this day unsurpassed.
—C. L. R. James, Mariners, Renegades and Castaways: 
The Story of Herman Melville and the World We Live In
Over the bleached bones and jumbled residue of numerous civilizations 
are written the pathetic words: “Too late.”
—Martin Luther King Jr., “A Time to Break Silence”
In 1952, while awaiting possible deportation in a prison on Ellis Island, the 
Trinidadian intellectual and radical activist C. L. R. James wrote a book-
length study of Herman Melville and the totalitarian reach of the cold war 
state. James’s book focuses on Moby-Dick, from which it borrows its title, 
and on Melville’s unfulfilled allegiance to the fate of the Pequod’s polyglot, 
multiracial crew. Though Melville shrinks from embracing democratic 
revolt, James nevertheless looks to him as the poet of the “renegades and 
castaways and savages” who counter the sickness of modern existence with 
their humor and their deep sense of history and who prefigure the mul-
tinational crew of detainees on Ellis Island.1 In Benito Cereno, a novella 
first published serially in 1855 and then as part of The Piazza Tales a year 
later, James discerns both the power of Melville’s democratic art and the 
point of its deterioration into mere “propaganda.” Melville’s narration of an 
American sea captain’s incapacity to comprehend the meaning of an insur-
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rection aboard a slave ship represents “every single belief cherished by an 
advanced civilization . . . about a backward people,” James argues, even if it 
is ultimately a mystery story with a point to prove rather than the inaugura-
tion of something genuinely new.2
James is not alone in finding resources for democratic thinking in Mel-
ville’s fiction and in Benito Cereno specifically. Indeed, Melville has been 
called “one of the principal interpreters of the American obsession with 
race and commitment to racism,” a touchstone for twentieth- and twenty-
first-century artists attempting to conceive the possibilities for and obstacles 
inhibiting multiracial democracy.3 Perhaps most famously, Ralph Ellison be-
gins Invisible Man with an epigraph from the concluding section of Benito 
Cereno: “‘You are saved,’ cried Captain Delano, more and more astonished 
and pained; ‘You are saved; what has cast such a shadow upon you?’” El-
lison omits Captain Cereno’s reply, but it would be familiar to Melville’s 
readers: “the negro.” The ambiguity of that shadow—is it thrown by a single 
black individual, or does it represent a more abstract conception of black-
ness, or both?—conjures a long history in which racialized violence, democ-
racy, and denial intertwine. It also suggests the lasting power of Melville’s 
imaginative destabilization of prevailing fictions of race.4 Accordingly, this 
essay seeks to highlight those dimensions of Benito Cereno that, by reflect-
ing on the political challenges of Melville’s time, most acutely limn the chal-
lenges of democratic life today. I consider how his attention to the rituals 
that cloaked the viciously inegalitarian racial order of the mid-nineteenth 
century in the mantle of civility calls our attention to a regressive politics of 
friendship at work in our “postracial” era.
Melville’s novella recounts a slave revolt on a Spanish ship off the coast 
of Chile in 1799. The ship’s history is revealed largely through the eyes of 
a quintessentially American captain, Amasa Delano, who happens on the 
drifting San Dominick and attempts to rescue the ragged vessel and its 
human cargo and crew. The scene Delano encounters is one of apparent dis-
array, as the blacks and whites on board “in one language, and as with one 
voice, all poured out a common tale of suffering.”5 In his innocence—and 
his confident sense of American superiority not only to the slaves on board 
but also to the Old World Catholics who are the captain and crew—Dela-
no fails to recognize that the disorder he attributes to the Spanish captain 
Benito Cereno’s leadership disguises an elaborate pantomime orchestrated 
by Babo, a Senegalese slave and mastermind of the revolt. It is the slaves 
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who rule, until the moment when Cereno attempts to escape with the de-
parting Delano, Babo pursues him with a knife, and the extent of the insur-
rection is unveiled.
Whereas other commentators have examined Melville’s story as a pow-
erful apprehension that the price of racial domination would soon come due, 
I explore Melville’s prescience about the character of the postrevolution-
ary racial order that would emerge from American slavery. Melville’s ironic 
treatment of the American seaman enables him to disclose, simultaneously, 
what Delano saw and what the slaves would have foreseen. Crucially, the 
latter would have known that the generosity and openness so characteristic 
of the American character were inseparable from an insatiable demand for 
gratitude, that easy friendship could and would at any moment give way 
to cruelty, that white witness to the horrors of slavery could not be disen-
tangled from the pleasures of voyeurism. This does not mean that Benito 
Cereno explores what Elizabeth Alexander calls “the black interior.”6 The 
reader, in fact, learns nothing of the thoughts or feelings or losses sustained 
by the Africans on board the San Dominick, and Babo dies, emphatically, 
in silence. Nonetheless, Benito Cereno gestures toward practices of racial 
domination that are not only insusceptible to remedy by dint of white good-
will but are, in fact, sustained by it.
More specifically, the novella raises pointed questions about the vi-
ability of friendship as a mechanism for democratic revival in the aftermath 
of slavery and Jim Crow. One of the most disquieting elements of Melville’s 
story is its insight into the ways in which a brutal, racially hierarchical order 
was maintained through performances of friendship. What are the legacies 
of such performances? To what extent do political theoretical commitments 
to the value of social trust obscure this history or reinspirit its legacies? In 
a period defined by segregated neighborhoods and schools and widening 
racial inequalities, on the one hand, and the hegemony of color-blind dis-
course and policies, on the other, can the habits and rituals of friendship 
enable American citizens to negotiate the difficult choices and inevitable 
losses of collective life? If the regressive racial policies of the post–civil 
rights era are undergirded by a “friendship orthodoxy” that insists on citi-
zens’ essential sameness under the skin and feeds a culture of blame, can 
the idea of political friendship be reworked in progressive ways?7 I ap-
proach these questions by reading Benito Cereno alongside Danielle Al-
len’s Talking to Strangers, which makes a vigorous case for the democratic 
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importance, in the post–civil rights era, of treating one’s fellow citizens like 
friends. Although Melville published his story with an “eye on the gather-
ing storm,” I conclude that the novella’s great, troubling success may consist 
most dramatically in its capacity to foreshadow dangers that would linger 
long after the storm.8
Imagining Slave Insurrection
For today’s readers, it may be hard to understand how Melville’s story could 
be evaluated in isolation from its historical context or why his critical sense 
of events around him evaded so many astute critics for so long. Composed 
in the middle of a decade that began with the Fugitive Slave Law and ended 
with John Brown on the gallows, Benito Cereno first appeared in serial 
form in Putnam’s Monthly, an antislavery journal.9 Yet, as Carolyn Karcher 
remarks, “Until the mid-1960s, there was almost no interest in Melville’s 
racial views, and very little recognition of the prominent place that social 
criticism occupies in his writings.”10 Early commentary on the novella, which 
reads Babo as the embodiment of evil, has been supplanted more recently 
by an appreciation of Melville’s multiple social-critical targets. The text’s 
critique of prevailing racial ideologies, its references to Haiti, its implicit 
condemnation of American slavery and expansionism, and its exploration of 
the kinship of American and Spanish imperial aspirations have generated 
a vast scholarship.11 Recognizing that it would be a mistake to pin Melville 
to any one of these as his dominant preoccupation, I concur with Sandra 
Zagarell’s conclusion that “the novella’s comparisons range throughout 
modern Western history, often pivoting, as if in warning, on the rebellious-
ness of subordinated populations.”12
Although much of the action is seen, or not, from the perspective of 
the myopic American captain, Melville weaves references to historical events 
throughout the story. Taking inspiration from the historical captain Amasa 
Delano’s Narrative of Voyages and Travels, in the Northern and Southern 
Hemispheres, which was published in 1817, Melville redacts the original in 
ways that call into question the world that Delano—both historical and fic-
tional—represents. Perhaps most obviously, by changing the name of Cere-
no’s ship from the Tryal to the San Dominick and shifting the time of the 
revolt from 1805 to 1799, Melville sets his tale in the context of the age of 
revolution, generally, and the liberation of Haiti, most especially.13 As recent 
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commentators have noted, furthermore, Melville would have been familiar 
with the slave revolts on the Amistad (1839) and Creole (1841) as well as the 
slave uprisings that terrified the southern states and the debates about the ex-
pansion of slavery and the status of fugitives that roiled the nation.14 More, the 
story’s reference to the San Dominick as a “slumbering volcano” (698) may 
direct the reader to Frederick Douglass’s 1849 “Slumbering Volcano” speech 
and foretell the inevitability of slave insurrection.15 Melville does not tell us 
for certain, however. As Joyce Sparer Adler remarks, “Far from developing his 
thought in glaring black and white, Melville beclouded it, challenging Ameri-
can readers to ‘pierce’ in this work, as they needed to in life, the surface and 
also the upper substratum of slavery in order to arrive at its skeletal reality.”16
In its portraits of key figures, Benito Cereno also examines and under-
mines prevailing views about slavery and race. Delano stands for the liberal 
racialism of many northern abolitionists, opposed to slavery but not to the 
idea of racial hierarchy.17 Cereno, though emblematic of Old World atti-
tudes, is also, in the view of many scholars, a stand-in for slavery’s southern 
defenders. As Michael Rogin remarks, “Melville’s slave mutiny as masquer-
ade inserted itself between two opposed perspectives on the master-slave 
relationship in antebellum America, and unsettled both.”18 Further, Mel-
ville differentiates the slave characters, giving them individual histories 
that defy white characters’ repeated references to them as “the blacks” or 
“his blacks” or “the negro.” Though James’s characterization of Babo as “the 
most heroic character in Melville’s fiction” is not persuasive, Melville paro-
dies Delano’s incapacity to recognize Babo’s genius (“that hive of subtlety”), 
exposes the costs of Cereno’s inability to transform his own experience of 
bondage into insight into the slaves’ desires, and raises uneasy questions 
about which characters engage in “ferocious piratical revolt” (734).19 In-
deed, Sterling Stuckey and Joshua Leslie make a compelling case that Mel-
ville’s reading of Mungo Park and others inculcated in him a sense of West 
African cultural traditions that enabled him to produce complex accounts 
of even the unnamed characters—the African women, the oakum pickers, 
and the hatchet polishers.20
To say that Benito Cereno is a work of social commentary is not to un-
ravel, once and for all, the puzzle of precisely what Melville’s message might 
be. Indeed, the story signals its inscrutability from the first. Calling readers’ 
attention to what cannot be known, Melville sketches an opening scene that 
is inaccessible to at least three of the senses: it is gray, mute, and calm (673). 
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He also muddies the narrator’s point of view by writing in a flat, apparently 
detached tone across the novella’s three sections. In the first and longest sec-
tion, the action is narrated in the third person, but the perspective seems to 
be the occluded vantage of Delano himself.21 The second section consists 
of excerpts from Benito Cereno’s deposition after the American and Span-
ish sailors have retaken the ship and captured or killed the insurrectionary 
slaves. Drawing from the historical documents in Delano’s Narrative, this 
section testifies to extraordinary events in a manner that both mimics and 
undermines the objectivity of legal documents. The third section returns 
to the third person but no longer seems to issue from the viewpoint of the 
American captain. Throughout the novella, moreover, Melville deploys de-
vices that hide the meaning of events from the reader’s view. One of the 
most effective of these is his extravagant use of double negatives, which, Eric 
Sundquist argues, signal the tautology that “asserts the virtual equivalence 
of potentially different authorities or meanings.”22As Philip Fisher observes, 
furthermore, Melville intensifies both the critique and its ambiguity through 
the use of inclusive either/or sentences in which the second term preserves 
rather than negates the first: “For Melville this either/or that is protected 
from denial is the syntax of the superimposed space of American slavery. It 
is the political space of what we call occupation rather than conquest. Each 
gesture and every single fact has a double location that can only be experi-
enced by means of what appears to the eye and to the mind as an either/or.”23 
Through a series of overlapping truths—Babo is slave and master, Cereno 
master and slave—Melville signals that it is impossible, finally, to cut the 
“intricate knot,” to get to the bottom of things, and, most important, either 
to realize the promise of liberation or to restore, unchanged, the upended 
order. “What Melville represents,” in Fisher’s view, “is the simple fact that 
there might be no fundamental sense to the belief that slavery could be, in 
the strong sense, ‘abolished.’”24 And in this regard Benito Cereno may be 
most valuable not for its prediction of the cataclysm of the Civil War so much 
as for its illumination of the “low-grade civil wars” that both preceded and 
followed the epic struggle of 1861–1865, right up to the present day.25
Troubling Friendship
Among the many themes that have captured the attention of commenta-
tors on Benito Cereno, friendship may be one of the most salient and least 
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remarked. Even as the story advertises its gloominess with repeated refer-
ence to shadows, grayness, and specters, it is also permeated with allusions 
to friendship, civility, and sociality. These allusions do not serve to lighten 
the atmosphere, however. Instead, Melville’s reflections on the costs—
both current and impending—of chattel slavery set the terms through 
which friendships, both interracial and intraracial, develop. And gestures 
of friendship are the currency through which the action advances. It may 
even be in these performances of friendship that the story is most ominous. 
For in this regard, Benito Cereno offers more than a cautionary tale about 
democratic politics in the age of human bondage and imperial expansion: it 
also provides a vantage from which to regard the politics of friendship and 
the potential role of friendship in democratic politics after slavery.
Three central “friendships” structure the narrative of Benito Cereno: 
Benito Cereno and Alexandro Aranda, Cereno and Babo, and Cereno and 
Delano. Presented in overlapping or layered fashion, rather than entire-
ly discrete from one another, they might be said to represent the story’s 
past, present, and future, respectively.26 Despite obvious differences among 
them, furthermore, they are all entangled in the traffic in human beings 
and mediated by racial hierarchy. That this is true even of the oldest friend-
ship, the abiding love that Cereno expresses for Aranda, raises unsettling 
questions about the possibilities of intraracial friendship in a time of white 
supremacy. Murdered during the mutiny, Aranda haunts the action as his 
skeleton hangs behind a shroud from the prow of the San Dominick. His 
friendship with Cereno goes back to the latter’s youth, according to the 
deposition (743), but his introduction in the story is preceded by his slaves’. 
When Cereno declares to Delano that he is the owner of everything on 
board the ship, he makes an exception for “the main company of blacks, 
who belonged to my late friend, Alexandro Aranda” (689). As the conver-
sation proceeds awkwardly, Delano attempts to extract more information 
from Cereno, incorporating the slaves into an elaborate euphemism about 
the death of the Spanish captain’s friend: “‘And may I ask, Don Benito, 
whether—since awhile ago you spoke of some cabin passengers—the 
friend, whose loss so afflicts you, at the outset of the voyage accompanied 
his blacks?’” (689). In a final twist, when Aranda exits the story in the com-
pany of Benito Cereno, their reunion is effected by the absent body of Babo, 
which has been “burned to ashes” in punishment for the revolt (755). Only 
his head remains. Stuck on a pole in the Lima Plaza, where it could meet 
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“unabashed, the gaze of the whites,” Babo’s head rejoins Aranda’s bones, 
which are buried at St. Bartholomew’s Church, and Cereno’s body, interred 
in a monastery beyond the church, by holding both resting places in its 
regard (755).
Whereas Melville offers the reader—and Delano—only glimpses of 
the friendship between Aranda and Cereno, he lavishes attention on the 
elaborate pantomime of devotion presented by Babo and his master. As 
Delano regards the pair, his distaste for slavery, or at least the Spanish va-
riety, melts. Babo, he notes, fulfills his duties “with that affectionate zeal 
which transmutes into something filial or fraternal acts in themselves but 
menial; and which has gained for the negro the repute of making the most 
pleasing body servant in the world; one, too, whom a master need be on 
no stiffly superior terms with, but may treat with familiar trust; less a ser-
vant than a devoted companion” (680). If Delano disapproves of slavery’s 
“ugly passions,” he admires the sociable passions it instills and says of Babo: 
“Faithful fellow! . . . Don Benito, I envy you such a friend; slave I cannot 
call him” (685). Whether “presenting himself as a crutch” (732) for his mas-
ter or explaining away an injury vindictively inflicted by Cereno, Babo dem-
onstrates a virtuosic command of the conviviality through which slavery was 
sustained. Although the story is replete with happy images of interracial 
friendship, in other words, it does not countenance anything approximating 
the equality of Queequeg and Ishmael, sharing first the marriage bed and 
then the monkey rope.27 Instead, the reader encounters master and man 
tethered together by something more like a leash. Babo, after all, is intro-
duced with a face “like a shepherd’s dog” (678), and the narrator continues 
by observing that “Captain Delano took to negroes, not philanthropically, 
but genially, just as other men to Newfoundland dogs” (716). The question, 
of course, is: who is leading whom? Although Delano is deceived about who 
commands the San Dominick, the faked friendship he witnesses between 
Babo and Cereno copies precisely the everyday performances of familial 
and friendly relations that were part and parcel of the order of slavery. Ba-
bo’s self-fashioning as a loving and loyal friend to Cereno exposes an order 
based in “violence and ventriloquism,” feigned enjoyment and affection.28 
Intimations of interracial friendship or friendliness, furthermore, also pro-
vide the mechanism through which the rebels advance the plot, as when 
the oakum pickers relieve the tension engendered by Delano’s momentary 
suspicions “with gestures friendly and familiar, almost jocose, bidding him, 
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in substance, not be a fool” (711). The performance reaches a climax when 
Babo, “a dagger in his hand, was seen on the rail overhead, poised, in the 
act of leaping, as if with desperate fidelity to befriend his master to the last” 
(733).
Of all of the relationships that drive Benito Cereno, the halting friend-
ship between Delano and Cereno is the only one that unfolds across all 
three sections of the story. The first and longest section relates how Delano’s 
repeated gestures of sympathy and friendship are rebuffed by the mysteri-
ously unhappy Cereno. During his day on board the San Dominick, Delano 
continually makes overtures to Cereno. When they are, repeatedly, not re-
warded, Melville wryly observes, “He was not a little concerned at what he 
could not help taking for the time to be Don Benito’s unfriendly indiffer-
ence towards himself” (680). This is not to say that the captains are wholly 
equal in Delano’s eyes. While the American captain sees his colleague as 
“my poor friend,” he also regards him as “the Spaniard,” an envoy from a 
world that is dark in its own right and atavistic in its religious customs and 
its treatment of slaves. Indeed, one of the story’s most ingenious elements 
is its exposure of the degree to which rituals of friendship, for Delano, rely 
on a presumption of hierarchies that not only divide ship captains from 
bondsmen and crew but also sustain a vertical order between the captains 
themselves. Crucially, that order depends on rituals of friendship, and these 
rituals make possible Babo’s ingenious inversions. For example, one of the 
most harrowing scenes of the novella—when Babo drapes Cereno in the 
Spanish flag and proceeds to shave him—begins with an invitation to Del-
ano to join the two men in the cuddy, which the American approves as a 
“sociable plan” (714). Delano’s insistent reversion to the language of friend-
ship appears to defy common sense, but my reading in this regard departs 
slightly from Zagarell’s comment that Delano’s attachment to a “code of 
gentility” prevalent in Victorian America is “conspicuously irrelevant to the 
situation he actually faces.”29 Though Delano’s interpretation of the action 
within a framework of friendship, reciprocated and rebuffed, blinds him 
to the meaning of the action, Melville reveals that it is entirely appropriate 
to the world of American mastery he inhabits. When Cereno clings to the 
departing Delano’s hand “across the black’s body” and bids him good-bye 
as “my best friend,” Melville lays bare the ugly terms on which relationships 
among white men played out within the political and social economy of 
slavery (732).
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Melville also figures friendship as a primary currency of white inter-
course after revolution and restoration. During Cereno’s brief spell of rela-
tive tranquility and health on the return journey, “ere the decided relapse 
which came, the two captains had many cordial conversations—their fra-
ternal unreserve in singular contrast with former withdrawments” (753). 
Strikingly, Cereno repeatedly calls Delano “my best friend,” despite his ad-
mission that the American was able to foil the slaves only because of his 
hopeless obtuseness. Against the backdrop of the two captains’ repeated 
failures of communication on board the San Dominick, moreover, Melville’s 
portrayal of the them speaking with intimacy and affection calls into ques-
tion the terms on which friendships are undertaken.
Further, Melville hints that the promiscuity of Delano’s friendship, his 
democratic openness to all, goes hand in hand with a failure to feel the 
injustice of slavery. Just as he distributes freshwater to the thirsty men and 
women on board the San Dominick “with republican impartiality” (712), 
disregarding differences of rank and race, Delano seems equally deter-
mined to share his geniality with everyone and everything he encounters. 
The American captain’s expressions of friendship, significantly, are not in-
sincere. Indeed, Melville reveals them to be sincere and fatuous. Their du-
bious value is expressed by Delano’s readiness to extend the title “friend” 
beyond the human world, thereby exposing the ease with which he forgets 
the suffering of others, the fragility of his bonds of friendship. Attempting 
to cheer the morbid Cereno in the final pages of the story, Delano looks to 
the sky and sea and remarks: “‘These mild trades that now fan your cheek, 
. . . do they not come with a human-like healing to you? Warm friends, 
steadfast friends are the trades’” (754). The political implications of this 
paean to benign nature are troubling. As Wilson Carey McWilliams notes, 
Delano—and the North he exemplifies—“could express emotion and seek 
solidarity only with nonhuman things, with a personalized ‘Nature’ or with 
‘natural men’ deprived of human personality.”30 Further, Glenn Altshuler 
reminds us, the friendly winds Delano invokes are the trades that carried 
slaves from Africa to the Americas.31
Present-day readers may be able to see through Melville’s superficially 
positive figurations of interracial and intraracial friendship and apprehend 
“the skeletal reality” he sketches with such devastating power. But what 
seems obvious in the alien costume of a nineteenth-century slave ship may 
remain elusive when we turn to the conditions of democratic life today. In 
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Benjamin DeMott’s view, modern Americans are as blind as Delano to the 
regressive function of friendship in the post–civil rights era. The Trouble 
with Friendship: Why Americans Can’t Think Straight about Race eviscer-
ates the reactionary politics of today’s “friendship orthodoxy,” which under-
writes a form of politics that personalizes entrenched structures of racial 
inequality and relieves white citizens of any sense of responsibility. Three 
assumptions, DeMott argues, feed the idea that friendship is the cure for 
what ails interracial relations: (1) a conception of shared humanity that gives 
rise to a belief in shared values and feelings; (2) an understanding of racial 
disparities as the consequence of “personal animosity” rather than struc-
tural injustice; (3) a view of public assistance efforts as unnecessary relics of 
the past.32 Together these assumptions paper over a history of caste distinc-
tion whose effects have not been fully acknowledged, much less effaced. In 
effect, they bring Delano’s blindnesses into the twenty-first century: “How 
is possible to sustain faith in sameness and sympathy between the races 
when one knows at first hand the texture of today’s American cityscape—
the ocular evidence that gives the lie to versions of black America as solidly 
middle class? What are the sequences of thought and feeling that enable 
men and women neither callous nor credulous to confront, day after day, 
in their lived experience, manifest inequity while clinging to the myth of 
sameness and escaping altogether the sense of personal misconduct?”33
Can friendship be saved? Should it be? In spite of the ills DeMott asso-
ciates with appeals to interracial friendship, one of the most exciting recent 
books in democratic theory, and one of the few to take racial inequality as a 
fundamental concern, is premised on a vigorous defense of the importance 
of friendship as a vehicle for revitalizing democratic citizenship. Danielle 
Allen’s Talking to Strangers develops from the observation that “congealed 
distrust” among citizens signals a fundamental breakdown in the polity.34 
In the absence of habits of interaction among strangers, Americans are in-
capable of negotiating the losses inherent in majority rule and becoming a 
genuinely democratic people. What American citizens need, Allen avers, 
are “more muscular habits of trust production.”35 In her elaboration on what 
this entails, furthermore, she develops a conception of friendship that coun-
ters the terms on which the “friendship orthodoxy” is grounded.
First, Allen dispenses with arguments about shared humanity that 
depend on what DeMott calls “sameness-under-the-skin.” Her democratic 
society is defined by its heterogeneity, the manyness of the citizenry who 
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engage together in the difficult enterprise of becoming a people. “Whole-
ness,” not “oneness,” is the metaphor that captures this aspiration. And it 
cannot be realized through the disavowal of difference or the pretense that 
citizens are not situated in such a way that their interests may and often do 
conflict. Accordingly, Allen advances a conception of political friendship 
premised on self-interest rather than its denial. In view of the inevitability 
of sacrifice, of giving something up for others in democratic life, political 
friendship sustains a form of autonomy that “consists . . . of getting one’s way 
in concert with others, and as modified by them.”36 Reinvigorating democ-
racy, then, involves the cultivation of a capacity to transform the pursuit of 
one’s interests into practices, habits, rituals that enable citizens to interact 
as if they were friends.
Second, Allen does not reduce racial inequality among citizens to 
personal animosity or argue that they need to develop stronger emotional 
attachments to one another. Drawing on Aristotle and Ellison, she empha-
sizes the rituals and practices that enable citizens to treat each other with 
respect. Recognizing the inevitable gap between the freedom and autono-
my democracy promises and the actual experiences of democratic citizens, 
Allen maintains that these rituals serve a critical, political purpose. “Since 
the purpose of rituals is to create, justify, and maintain particular social ar-
rangements, they are the foundation also of political structures, and an in-
dividual comes to know intimately central aspects of the overall form of his 
community by living through them.”37 Becoming a more democratic people 
entails replacing the habits of domination and acquiescence with “new citi-
zenly techniques . . . [that] integrate into one citizenship the healthy politi-
cal habits of both the dominators and the dominated.”38 In this light, we 
see one danger of precisely the kind of friendship exhibited by “the gener-
ous Captain Amasa Delano.” Friendship requires not only a willingness to 
sacrifice for others but also an openness to being the beneficiary of such 
sacrifice: “we must . . . confront the counterintuitive idea that citizens who 
give often and generously to other citizens may be distrusted, despite their 
equitability.”39 An unwillingness to be indebted to others (or to acknowl-
edge one’s indebtedness) may simply be a ploy to reinforce one’s power, 
and it reflects a resistance to the vulnerability and lack of sovereignty that 
are the condition of all democratic citizens. Fugitive glimpses of human 
beings’ “mortal inter-indebtedness,” a term Jason Frank aptly draws from 
Moby-Dick in the introduction to this volume, point toward an alternative 
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conception of democratic sociality.40 It is a conception, crucially, that cannot 
be realized under conditions of racial domination.
Third, Allen counters Delano’s and her own contemporaries’ desire to 
put the past behind them with an insistence on the democratic value of his-
torical consciousness. Her argument begins with a retelling of the integra-
tion of Little Rock’s Central High School in 1957 and the “new constitution” 
that was “inaugurated” through the actions of the young women and men 
who braved murderous crowds to refound the polity more democratically.41 
Countering scripts in which it is African Americans who play the role of the 
supplicant and whites the part of the benefactor, Allen presses us to con-
sider whether the Little Rock Nine and their allies were in fact “philanthro-
pists.”42 She reverses prevailing understandings of who has been dependent 
on whom across the arc of U.S. history. Concerned that this history remains 
“undigested,” she traces the political consequences of such indigestion: the 
invisible costs some citizens are expected to pay to mitigate the unowned 
vulnerabilities of others.43
Despite the many strengths of Allen’s case, Melville’s story sounds an 
uneasy echo. Where Allen’s argument shifts between the habits of domina-
tion and the challenges of manyness, Benito Cereno (in contrast to Moby- 
Dick) adheres to the former and leaves little room for a heterogeneous 
world not permeated by the residual traces of hierarchy. Although Melville 
ingeniously disturbs assumptions about the racial order of his day, he cannot 
conceive that his characters will experience their interchangeability—black 
for white, master for slave—as equality.44 The centrality of friendship to the 
action of Benito Cereno raises questions about the vexed character of the 
rituals to which Allen turns to alleviate the effects of racial domination. The 
novella both “dramatizes the epistemological fancy footwork Delano must 
perform in order not to understand what is amiss on the San Dominick” 
and shows how much of that footwork is bound up with sending and inter-
preting signals of friendship.45 In other words, Melville sketches a world 
in which gestures of friendship and rituals of sociality not only modify the 
distrust of strangers but also inhibit reflection or vision. They blind Delano 
to the truth of what is happening on board the slave ship even as they en-
able him to perpetuate his blindness about the character of slavery itself. 
Indeed, Delano comes closest to apprehending what is happening on the 
San Dominick at those moments when his gestures of friendship fall flat. 
He stifles any possible insight when “a thousand trustful associations,” like 
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   271 10/29/13   10:57 AM
272  Lawrie Balfour
the sight of his old boat, reassure him that his own goodwill is legible to 
those around him (708).
Further, Melville’s story queries the likelihood that citizens might 
cultivate “habits of ‘antagonistic cooperation’” in such a way that sacrifices 
are acknowledged and reciprocated, when perceptions of self-interest and 
sacrifice are themselves shaped by expectations about one’s position in a 
racialized economic and political order.46 Though Allen rightly challenges 
the idea that self-interest is reducible to wealth maximization, Delano per-
ceives his own pursuit of profit, including profit derived from the trade in 
human beings that he professes to abhor, to be something akin to what 
she calls “equitable self-interest.” (He only wants his fair share!) Indeed, 
the dark side of Delano’s conviviality makes vivid Samuel Delany’s obser-
vation that social capital is “a truly outrageous metaphor.”47 Benito Cereno 
suggests why the insecurity that Allen identifies as the shared condition of 
democratic citizens remains politically undecided; it may move us to new 
forms of citizenly friendship, but it may also, perhaps more readily, rein-
force our commitment to the undemocratic relationships of old. Melville’s 
story eerily inquires of us: Would we know the difference? In the shadow 
of Benito Cereno, Allen’s gloss on Ellison’s claim that “our fellow citizens 
are the boat, and we in turn the planks for them” both demands something 
more strenuous than easy assurances that “we are all in the same boat” or 
Delano’s promiscuous friendship and elides a question raised so pointedly 
by the insurrection on the San Dominick: What kind of boat?48
What Babo Saw
Benito Cereno concludes with the display of Babo’s head, regarding white 
passersby as well as the remains of his former master and his master’s 
friend. What are readers to make of “his voiceless end” (755)? As several 
commentators note, at the very moment when the reader sees the action 
from Babo’s point of view, he has been permanently silenced. The action, 
as Dana Nelson suggests, is “arrested” in a way that may prevent eman-
cipation from the dynamic of black-white relations Melville so effectively 
undermines through the inversions of the plot.49 Further, it vivifies the fact 
that the black characters never speak in their own voices at any point in 
the story. Not only are all Babo’s words thoroughly scripted, even if he is 
the author of that script, but Melville prefigures Babo’s fate through the 
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character of Atufal, who in an especially elaborate masquerade is required 
to ask Cereno’s pardon and instead regards him with “unquailing muteness” 
(690).50 As Jean Fagin Yellin concludes, “Melville did not pretend to speak 
for the black man, but he dramatized the perception that his voice had 
not been heard.”51 Neither singly nor collectively. Melville does report the 
gestures of the oakum pickers, the clang of the hatchet polishers, and the 
“blithe songs of the inspirited negroes” (726), but the effect is to amplify the 
absence of their individual voices. Perhaps most obviously, Melville omits 
any discussion of friendships among the slaves, despite the fact that their 
elaborate cooperation drives the plot.52
What might Babo and his allies have said, if they could? What did they 
see? Unhindered by the blinders of mastery, Babo would not only have un-
derstood the inherent barbarity of his condition, but would probably have 
foreseen the obstacles to a postrevolutionary order shared by former slaves 
and masters alike. Although he utters no words after the unveiling of the 
plot, it is unlikely that he would have expressed surprise at the viciousness 
of the retaking of the San Dominick from the former slaves, during which 
shackled captives were killed by sailors (752); or at the spectacle of his own 
execution, beheading, and burning; or at the breeziness of Delano’s insis-
tence that the events on the San Dominick should be left in the past. Least 
of all would Babo have been surprised that the same man who had admired 
his services, to the point of offering to buy him, would not hesitate to grind 
the fugitive slave into the hull of a boat with his boot (733).
Babo might also have expected that Delano’s liberality in extending 
the title of “friend” to all would carry a substantial price tag. If the cap-
tain’s gifts are freely given, the gestures are meant to be received with ap-
propriate gratitude and the giver’s generosity recognized. In the historical 
Delano’s Narrative, the captain reports that he “was mortified and very 
much hurt” by Cereno’s unwillingness to compensate him for his efforts.53 
The recollections of “the generous Captain Delano” are tinged with self-
pity for “such misery and ingratitude as I have suffered at different periods, 
and in general, from the very persons to whom I have rendered the greatest 
services.”54 Even when Melville relates that “the noble Captain Delano” 
struggled to put an end to the needless massacre of captured slaves, the 
story leaves open the question of whether his mercy reflects humanitarian 
motives or his interest in the fate of the ship’s “cargo” as a source of his own 
repayment. Melville forces us to consider how certainly we can discern 
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the gap between a gesture of common humanity and a cold calculation of 
profit.
Where Melville dramatizes Delano’s easy slide from generosity to re-
sentment vis-à-vis the insufficiently grateful Cereno, he also drops clues to 
the kinds of expectations that would become the cost of black freedom in 
the United States. In its most pointed form, Patrick Buchanan’s “Brief for 
Whitey” summarizes the puzzled reaction of future Delanos to the articu-
lation of African American grievances: “Where is the gratitude?”55 To be 
sure, Buchanan represents an extreme view, but it is also a view that crys-
tallizes a tradition of friendship tethered to expressions of generosity and 
expectations of thanks, to the maintenance of hierarchy between benefac-
tor and supplicant. Such a tradition manifests itself not only in the stance 
of open racists but also in the responses of generations of “friends of the 
Negro,” who expect acknowledgment for their forward thinking on matters 
of race. Maybe this attitude even ensnares Melville himself, whose final 
poem in Battle Pieces asks, “Can Africa pay back this blood / Spilt on Po-
tomac’s shore?”56 As Karcher notes, the poem “reverses the role of debtor 
and creditor, victim and perpetrator, blaming Africans for having caused 
the war to end their enslavement in America and placing a higher value on 
the blood of white soldiers than on that of black slaves.”57 It presages what 
Saidiya Hartman calls “the debt of emancipation” and the rise of new habits 
of domination and submission.58
Babo might also have justly mocked Ishmael’s famous expression of 
shared subjection—“Who ain’t a slave? Tell me that”59—as politically ster-
ile. Certainly, Cereno’s experience of subjection fills him with horror, but it 
does nothing to enlighten him about the plight of the women and men in his 
charge. Despite their physical intimacy throughout most of the first section 
of the story, Babo never represents brotherhood for Cereno. Rather, Babo is 
a vision so fiendish that he continues to inspire fainting spells in the captain 
long after the insurrection has been suppressed. Delano, for his part, proves 
no more equipped than Cereno to broaden his sense of human concern, 
whether as a consequence of his democratic character or as a result of his 
experience in Babo’s thrall.60
Nor is he equipped either to remember or to forget the plight of the 
slaves who were killed, imprisoned, or reenslaved for their aspiration to free-
dom. “The past is passed; why moralize upon it?” (754). Delano’s attempt 
to cheer his melancholy friend summarizes his own actions, across the arc 
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   274 10/29/13   10:57 AM
What Babo Saw 275
of the story, as he continually responds to slights and stifles his suspicions of 
Cereno’s intentions toward him. Repeatedly, Delano is portrayed “drown-
ing criticism in compassion, after a fresh repetition of his sympathies” (686), 
or reassuring himself with the reminder that “yes, this is a strange craft; a 
strange history, too, and strange folks on board. But—nothing more” (710). 
Delano’s ritual suppression of unease not only heightens that of the reader 
but also reveals what his advice to Cereno disavows. Keeping the past at bay 
is not a once-and-for-all accomplishment but a task that requires continual 
vigilance on the part of the former masters and their allies. For the formerly 
enslaved, it might entail the imperative to “get over it,” “stop whining,” or 
simply “cease to be the special favorite of the laws.” For Delano’s heirs, it 
would involve an insistent repetition of the mantra that “the past is passed,” 
which has been deployed so effectively to forestall discussion of affirmative 
action, reparations, or even modest race-conscious proposals.61 The call to 
leave the past in the past might also manifest itself in the continuing force 
of the immunity-by-friendship defense through which relationships with 
African Americans reinscribe white innocence, even in the face of stark 
evidence of racial injustice. Neither Melville nor Babo predicts such devel-
opments, but I expect that neither would be surprised by them.
“Whatever else [Melville’s] works were ‘about,’” writes Ellison, “they 
also managed to be about democracy.”62 Benito Cereno was about the condi-
tions of American democracy in the 1850s, to be sure, and it looked ahead 
to see that the American appetite for slavery and expansion was propelling 
the nation toward disaster. That Benito Cereno traffics in partial truths and 
resists easy conclusions also suggests another way to read it as a democratic 
story. It calls on readers both to reflect on the circumstances as Melville laid 
them out and to heed Allen’s admonition, following Aristotle: “You’ve heard 
me, you understand. Now judge.”63 In this way we might say that the living 
value of Melville’s tale resides equally in what it tells us about his time and 
in what it withholds. This call to judgment, moreover, is not limited to the 
relatively safe enterprise of reflecting on the past. Much of Benito Cereno’s 
power emerges from the uncanny sharpness with which it prefigures the 
legacy that the age of enslavement would leave to future generations and 
demands a rethinking of our own circumstances. Part of that legacy, Mel-
ville intimates, is a history of friendships—interracial and intraracial—that 
transpire across and through the subject bodies of black women and men. 
This is not to say that political friendship has no role to play in remaking 
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American democratic life after the civil wars of the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries. But it presses us to be particularly alert to the ways in which 
friendship might yet sustain the relations those wars were meant to undo.
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“Follow Your Leader”
Melville’s Benito Cereno and the Case of Two Ships
Tracy B. Strong
Conceive the sailors to be wrangling with one another for control of 
the helm. . . . And they put the others to death or cast them out from 
the ship, and then, after binding and stupefying the worthy shipmaster 
with mandragora or intoxication or otherwise, they take command of the 
ship, consume its stores and, drinking and feasting, make such a voyage 
of it as is to be expected from such, and as if that were not enough, they 
praise and celebrate as a navigator, a pilot, a master of shipcraft, the man 
who is most cunning to lend a hand in persuading or constraining the 
shipmaster to let them rule.
—Plato, Republic, Book VI
I sometimes wonder that we can be so frivolous, I may almost say, as to 
attend to the gross and somewhat foreign form of servitude called Negro 
Slavery, there are so many keen and subtle masters that enslave both 
north and south.
—Henry David Thoreau, Walden, “Economy”
The metaphor of a ship for the polity is, as the epigraph from Plato shows, 
as old as Western political thought. It was especially prominent in Ameri-
can political discourse in the middle of the nineteenth century: as Alan 
Heimert has pointed out, there was a widespread fear about the direction 
in which the country was going, most often expressed as the fear that the 
American ship of state was running aground or being sucked into a gi-
ant maelstrom.1 President Polk’s provocation of the war with Mexico, the 
relentless expansionism, and the increasing tension over slavery all called 
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into question the nature of the American experiment. The ship of state 
could be foundering, and, as an author of his times and a widely traveled 
seafarer, Melville often chose, therefore, to place his tales on ships. Indeed, 
except for Pierre, all his novels take place aboard or in relation to ships: 
they were his frame for America. Appealing to his “shipmates and world-
mates,” he writes in White-Jacket (1850): “We mortals are all on board a 
fast-sailing . . . world-frigate.”2
In the case of Benito Cereno, we have two ships, linked by a longboat, 
throughout the book in some kind of contact with each other. The one is 
captained by a New Englander; the other, while appearing to be Spanish, 
is in fact run by slaves. Joined together as if they might be thought to form 
the two main sections of America, the two are, as we shall see, less different 
than they might at first appear. Central to the question of a ship, as Plato 
tells us, is the question of the captain and thus the question of sovereignty. 
The captain—as Melville will have the American captain observe in Benito 
Cereno—has absolute authority while at sea. It follows that the character of 
the captain and his relation to his crew may be reflected in the character of 
the ship, that is, of the polity. Such embodiment produced doubts in Mel-
ville: at the end of White-Jacket, a novel that is in part about the just way 
to run the ship of state, he indicates that trusting everything to the captain 
is a mistake.3
If the ship is the polity, what were Melville’s expectations for his own 
country? In his youth Melville had held to a version of the doctrine of Man-
ifest Destiny. In White-Jacket he writes that Americans are “the chosen 
people, the Israel of our time.” Even here, however, his doubts are already 
present, as he goes on to say that the “political messiah . . . has come in us, 
if we would but give utterance to his promptings.”4 As he matured, he came 
to worry greatly about the course his country was taking; America was a 
country that knew little of who or what it was, for, as he wrote in Redburn, 
it had neither mother nor father.5.His distress that America either does not 
know or has a dangerous idea of itself remained an important American 
trope. As Robert Frost put it a century later:
mist
I don’t believe the sleepers in this house
Know where they are.
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   282 10/29/13   10:57 AM
“Follow Your Leader” 283
smokE
They’ve been here long enough
To push the woods back from around the house
And part them in the middle with a path.
mist
And still I doubt if they know where they are.
And I begin to fear they never will.6
America did, however, have those who claimed to lead it, and the direction 
these leaders—its captains—sought to take was of major political concern 
in the middle of the nineteenth century (as it remains to this day).
In 1850 white Americans worked out a compromise concerning the 
status of the land arrogated from Mexico.7 To keep the country united, the 
slave trade was abolished in the District of Columbia, though the practice 
of slavery was retained; California was admitted as a free state; the new 
Southwest territories were to decide on the question of slavery by vote; the 
Fugitive Slave Act, however, required all citizens to assist in the recapture 
of escaped slaves. The result was a short-term papering over of the divisions 
in the country. It is in this context that the novella Benito Cereno first ap-
peared in 1855, serialized in three issues of Putnam’s Monthly Magazine, 
an antislavery publication with a distinguished stable of authors. (Thoreau’s 
Cape Cod first appeared there.) Stunningly, the last issue of the serializa-
tion included an anonymous, heavily ironic article titled “About Niggers,” 
which depicted blacks both as happy and with “terrible capacities for re-
venge,” referring specifically to the revolt in San Domingo.8 The anonymous 
article thus ironically exemplified (and, in my reading, undermined) the 
very ideology of white supremacy that Melville had taken up (and under-
mined) in his novella.
Melville republished his work in 1856 in a slightly revised version in 
The Piazza Tales. The story is adapted from the real-life account of the 
American Captain Amasa Delano in the eighteenth chapter of his Narrative 
of the Voyages and Travels, in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres.9 
In Melville’s account, the Bachelor’s Delight, captained by Delano, encoun-
ters a Spanish ship, the San Dominick, off the coast of southern Chile. The 
Spanish vessel is in seriously bad repair. Delano goes over to it to offer help 
and finds a ship whose personnel consists mainly of blacks, albeit with a 
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   283 10/29/13   10:57 AM
284  Tracy B. Strong
white captain, Don Benito Cereno, and very few other white sailors. Cereno 
tells a tale of disaster and death from storms, fever, and scurvy to account 
for the condition of the boat. He is assisted in all things by the African 
Babo, a small and physically unprepossessing man, who appears to be his 
body servant and never leaves his side, even when Delano asks for a private 
conversation with Cereno. Although the condition of the ship and a number 
of incidents raise doubts in Delano’s mind—he fears at times that Cereno 
is a pirate who means to take over his ship—he is never moved to action. 
As Delano leaves the San Dominick, Cereno jumps into the longboat; Babo 
jumps in after him, dagger in hand. Delano thinks first that Cereno means 
to kill him, then realizes that Babo means to kill Cereno. Babo is captured 
and the truth appears: the slaves had taken over the ship, killing the owner, 
Don Aranda, and most of the whites, keeping only Captain Cereno, those 
with the necessary skill as navigators, and a few others for show in case 
they were to encounter another ship. The entire experience aboard the San 
Dominick has been a piece of theater, carefully worked out by Babo, intend-
ed to dupe those commanding any ship they might encounter.10 The Span-
ish ship is recaptured. Taken to Lima, the capital city of the Viceroyalty of 
Peru, the slaves are tried and eventually executed; three months after the 
trial, the historical Cereno dies.11
Let me proceed by increments. The story is at least about the fact that 
the kind-souled, well-mannered, and unfailingly affirmative Delano12 has 
(like most of the first-time readers of the opening part of the novella)13 only 
the dimmest comprehension of the hatred that might have led the slaves to 
take over the ship. Nor does Delano ever come to an acknowledgment of 
the lot of the slaves that led to rebellion: at most he is interested in secur-
ing his salvage rights. If Delano is indifferent, however, the story makes it 
progressively more difficult for the reader to be so. It was thus certainly not 
a random choice that led Ralph Ellison to choose as an epigraph for Invis-
ible Man this quotation from Benito Cereno: “‘You are saved,’ cried Captain 
Delano, more and more astonished and pained; ‘you are saved: what has 
cast such a shadow upon you?’” Cereno’s reply, tellingly not given in Elli-
son’s epigraph, is “the negro.”14 Because of the question of race, we are not 
saved, we remain in the shadow.
What is meant by this question and this response? There is little doubt 
that race is an important question in Melville’s novella. Cereno is certainly 
referring at least to Babo, the self-liberated slave with whom he appears 
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   284 10/29/13   10:57 AM
“Follow Your Leader” 285
joined throughout the first part of the story. Race is what orients Delano 
toward everything that he sees, does, and feels; it also orients him toward 
everything that he does not see, do, and feel. As one peruses the secondary 
literature, it is problematically clear that the judgments about what Mel-
ville was saying about race vary enormously. They go from readings of the 
novella as being about human depravity and evil (as embodied in Babo), to 
a justification or acceptance of slavery, to an avoidance of the question of 
slavery, to an indictment of slavery wherein Babo becomes a kind of revo-
lutionary hero and martyr.15 I shall consider another kind of appropriation: 
the source of the range of interpretations derives, I think, not from lack of 
clarity or oversight on Melville’s part but from the fact that his novella is 
written precisely to get his readers to question first their own attitudes and 
behaviors in racial matters and then, more important, the source of those 
attitudes and behaviors.
Consider the lack of any authoritative authorial voice. Of the three 
separate sections, the first, three-quarters of the book, is written from, 
although mostly not in, the third-person point of view of Captain Amasa 
Delano (and is several times longer than Delano’s account in his book). I say 
from (not in), because for the most part the effect is as if a camera were fol-
lowing him around recording from his point of view both what he does and 
what he sees. This point of view is complicated by the fact that occasionally 
the narrative voice (of the camera, as it were) offers ironic reflections on 
Delano’s character. We find straight off that Delano might have been un-
easy were he not “a person of a singularly undistrustful good nature.” The 
narrator goes on to ask “whether, in view of what humanity is capable, such 
a trait implies, along with a benevolent heart, more than ordinary quick-
ness and accuracy of intellectual perception” and indicates that this “may 
be left to the wise to determine” (673). The irony alerts us to Delano’s lack 
of wisdom, although the syntax and double negatives allow a casual reader 
to pass over the passage, much as Delano passes through the world around 
him without really seeing it.16
On occasion, his anxieties lead him to question his position. After an 
incident that produces a “qualmish sort of emotion” (708), Delano interro-
gates himself—notably he thinks of himself in the third person, seeing him-
self as he thinks a camera might—only to conclude that it is “too nonsensical 
to think [that someone would] murder Amasa Delano. . . . His conscience 
is clean” (709). Delano suspects Cereno of malfeasance because he simply 
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cannot conceive of the possibility that African slaves might have been able 
to take over a ship—this despite the fact that by setting the story in 1799 
(rather than 1805, when the original account took place) and by renaming 
the Spanish ship San Dominick, Melville reminds us of the proximity of the 
slave rebellion in Haiti (1791–1798) and anticipates the subsequent freeing 
of the slaves in Santo Domingo in 1800.17 One would think that these events 
would be more present to Delano. As Lawrie Balfour shows in her contribu-
tion to this volume, what matters most to Delano are courtesies and good 
manners—what one owes to a stranger—and these courtesies are precisely 
what allow him to sustain relations of racist domination. That his conscience 
is “clean” merely means that he is unable and unwilling to perceive the real-
ity of the situation—so also was the conscience of many a New Englander 
“clean” about the matter of slavery (just as Thoreau had pointed out in his 
1849 “Civil Disobedience”).18
Delano encounters a world that is in effect a stage set for a ghastly 
play, although he does not know it to be theater. As in the case of a classical 
three-level Elizabethan stage, on the highest deck are four symmetrically 
arranged “elderly grizzled negroes,” apparently occupied at picking oakum 
(hemp fibers to be used for caulking) from junk (old or inferior rope).19 
Below and in front of them, “separated by regular spaces,” are “the cross-
legged figures of six other blacks; each with a rusty hatchet in his hand.” 
Below and in the center of this tableau, leaning against the mast, are Del-
ano and Babo. This is the setting for what will turn out to be a staged play 
(677–678).20
This first section forms the bulk of the book. The second section con-
sists of Cereno’s deposition before the court. Melville’s version of the de-
position is often word for word from the original but adds great emphasis 
on the weakness of Cereno (he is borne in on a litter, accompanied by a 
monk—whose name, Infelez, calls to mind infeliz, “unhappy”), a weakness 
and company not found in the original. That account (both in Delano’s book 
and in Melville’s story) is notably certified by “His Majesty’s Notary”: by 
explicitly omitting Delano’s account (present in Delano’s book), however, 
Melville focuses attention on what is referred to as Cereno’s account of a 
“fictitious story” dictated to Cereno by Babo after the takeover (747). In 
Delano’s book Cereno refers immediately to a signed contract (“by the de-
ponent and the sailors who could write,” Babo and Atufal doing so “in their 
own language”). In Melville the agreement among the slaves now in pos-
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session of the ship—that Cereno will take them to Senegal and that they 
will kill no more whites—is at first purely verbal; Melville presumably post-
pones the drafting of the contract in the novella to call attention to the fact 
that whites cannot conceive of valid contracts with slaves: it is only after 
further threats by the blacks to kill some of the crew (the cook in particular) 
that Cereno, “endeavoring not to omit any means to preserve the lives of the 
remaining whites, . . . agreed to draw up a paper” in which he also formally 
made the ship over to them (744–745).
In this section the story is told purely from the point of view of the 
members of a slave-accepting system. It is clear that the written agreement 
between the blacks and the whites is of no serious importance to the court, 
which presumes it was extorted, despite the fact that the whites had first 
refused to agree to any contract. No credence is given to the blacks’ descrip-
tion of this refusal. On the other hand, the court remarks that the blacks 
indeed had a plan to poison Cereno, on the grounds that “the negroes have 
said it” (749; again on 750). As the passage about the testimony of the blacks 
is not in Cereno’s actual deposition, Melville presumably added it as an 
ironic counterpoint to the unwillingness of whites to acknowledge the valid-
ity of any contract with blacks.
The narrative technique of the book is frequently reiterated across 
Melville’s work. There are official stories and unofficial stories. The separate 
accounts of the same event (here three, four if you count Delano’s original 
book, which was well known) serve to call into question, that is, to politicize, 
the very idea of an event. In Israel Potter, for instance, Melville’s intertextu-
ality manages both to call upon and to critique authoritative books and fig-
ures, including the Bible, the Odyssey, Benjamin Franklin’s Poor Richard’s 
Almanack, Irving’s “Rip Van Winkle,” Cervantes’s Don Quixote—and this 
is only a start. As he says in Billy Budd: “The symmetry of form attainable 
in pure fiction cannot so readily be achieved in a narration essentially hav-
ing less to do with fable than with fact. Truth uncompromisingly told will 
always have its ragged edges; hence the conclusion of such a narration is apt 
to be less finished than an architectural finial.”21
Benito Cereno has many “ragged edges.” The first two parts consist of 
a staged play and an ostentatiously “official” account of the meaning of the 
play. The third and last part is entirely Melville’s invention. Overall, the tri-
partite division is intended to cast doubt on at least the first two versions of 
the events. As if to raise the question, Melville is careful to note “it is hoped” 
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that the deposition will “shed light on the preceding narrative” (738). The 
stamp of authoritative state approval in and to the second part clues us to 
the fact that this is the dominant power’s version of events. Part III opens 
with an “If” of interrogation—here it is a question if the deposition did in 
fact “serve as the key to fit into the lock of the complications which precede 
it”: the presumption is that the answer must be “not entirely” (752–753). 
We have thus in the second part a questioning of the first part and in the 
last part a questioning of the two previous parts. Importantly, we find that 
even the identification necessary for the conviction of Babo as ringleader 
depended on the accounts of the surviving sailors, as Cereno had refused 
or been unable to speak of Babo or even look at him. Cereno’s refusal sug-
gests that as he was constantly joined to Babo, he may have in some sense 
also been ringleader. Thus: “On the testimony of the sailors alone rested the 
legal identity of Babo” (755).22
So is the novella about slavery? At one level it obviously is. Though 
against abolitionism (which he saw as another kind of racism), Melville de-
tested slavery.23 He was, however, well aware that preaching the message of 
the moral corruption induced by slavery would be of no avail to the broader 
public. That approach had been tried for decades. So he elected in this book 
to verbally so complicate the character of Delano that many or most of his 
white readers would be swept along by the events, as was Delano, without 
even grasping what was going on. The eventual revelation to Delano (“the 
negro”) thus functions as a revelation to the reader also.
Yet the slavery that this book is about is not just the slavery that ex-
isted in America in 1855 and over which a war was soon to be fought. All 
is mixed, without precise definition. The novella starts with an assertion of 
the color gray: Melville gives us both a lack of distinction between black 
and white and a lack of distinctness—there are vapors, like the fog and 
mist Robert Frost saw obscuring America’s view of itself. The San Domi-
nick appears as a “white-washed monastery” (675) apparently occupied by 
(Dominican) Black Friar monks (that is, whites who are dressed in black).24 
No appearance is secure: we are told that Atufal, who appears as a chained 
slave, was “a king in his own country” and that Babo, who, as we find out, is 
the leader, was a slave in his country. (Slavery is not exclusive to America.) 
The two figures on the carving on the stern of the San Dominick are en-
gaged in a combat that will be mirrored in the struggle in the longboat after 
Cereno jumps into it. Both are masked, and the “dark satyr” holds a “writh-
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ing figure” down, his foot on the other’s neck (676). If a parallel is intended 
with the scene in the longboat, it is Delano who becomes the “dark satyr” 
as he there holds Babo down with his foot.
It is thus significant that at no time during the story is the institution 
of American chattel slavery the explicit central focus of the book or directly 
called into question. On a rare occasion, Delano muses that “this slavery 
breeds ugly passions in man”—but, despite the fact that he is from Massa-
chusetts, the most abolitionist of the states, the focus of his distress is what 
he takes to be Cereno’s insolent behavior (721). As we shall see, I do not 
take this lack, as did F. O. Matthiessen, to be an oversight—I take it to be 
importantly purposeful, for Melville seeks to go, as it were, below the insti-
tution of American slavery.25 The simple condemnation of American slavery, 
especially by a New Englander, is easy—so easy that Melville, as had Tho-
reau, thought it self-serving. He not only explores the effects of slavery in 
Benito Cereno but seeks to bring to light what in human relations gives rise 
to slavery and what slavery gives rise to in human relations.26
There are many ways to read this story. One can read the novella, as 
does Michael Rogin, against the events of 1848 in Europe, as revealing the 
difficulties political theory has in dealing with slavery, and more narrowly 
as a reproach by Melville to his friend Hawthorne for the latter’s support 
of Franklin Pierce (and Pierce’s support of the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act, 
which repealed the Missouri Compromise).27 Along these lines, it is clear, as 
Jason Frank shows in his introduction to this volume, that Melville offers a 
far more complex analysis of slavery than the well-known section of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit, in which, despite everything, the ultimate victory 
of the slaves is dialectically assured. In the end, with Hegel we do not have 
to worry too much about the institution of slavery, for it is, ultimately, his-
torically progressive; for Melville, there is no such assurance.28
It does seem to me the case, then, that we cannot do justice to Benito 
Cereno if we limit it to being about American slavery. It is also, we can say, 
about the tendency Americans have to think of their nation as innocent 
and blessed. It is not so much that Delano has standard “white” opinions of 
blacks but that he is self-deluded, a delusion that Americans tend to share, 
thinks Melville, about themselves generally. And this delusion is not without 
its dangers; there are hints and more than hints of this: by renaming Dela-
no’s ship the Bachelor’s Delight, Melville has given it the name of the ship 
of a well-known seventeenth-century pirate, James Kelley.29 Though the 
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slaves may or may not technically be pirates (as they have taken over a ship 
and are using it for their own purposes), Melville gives an ironic credence to 
the possibility that the true pirate here may be the American ship.30 As he 
remarks in Israel Potter, “Intrepid, unprincipled, reckless, predatory, with 
boundless ambition, civilized in externals but a savage at heart, America is, 
or may yet be, the Paul Jones of nations.”31
It is also certainly the case that Delano manifests all the prejudices of 
certain American whites regarding the basic docility and gentleness of blacks. 
For example, in 1852, three years before the publication of Benito Cereno, 
Harriet Beecher Stowe could write in her best-selling Uncle Tom’s Cabin that 
when the “negro race [will] no longer [be] despised and trodden down, [it] 
will, perhaps, show forth some of the latest and most magnificent revelations 
of human life. Certainly they will, in their gentleness, their lowly docility of 
heart, their aptitude to response on a superior mind and rest on a higher 
power, their childish simplicity of affection, and facility of forgiveness.”32 Mel-
ville entertains no such illusions about any human being, black or white.
While Benito Cereno is indeed about slavery, it is not only about chat-
tel slavery as practiced in America and elsewhere.33 If one reads this book 
as being about only the institution of slavery, one must read it as simply a 
dialectic between oppressor and oppressed, as having a bipartite structure. 
Yet there is another way of reading. Babo, now a leader, had been a slave 
who was then enslaved by Don Aranda. Cereno, once in command, is now a 
slave. If the book is about slavery, it is about slavery as a consequence of the 
fact of domination, and it is thus about the meaning of how one follows one 
who is in power. (That Thoreau had the same distress can be seen from my 
second epigraph.) Let us say, then, that at least one of the principal subjects 
of Benito Cereno is the question of the actual practice of authority—here of 
“following your leader.” This question lies under and informs any consider-
ation of the master-slave dialectic, for Melville, it seems to me, understood 
that one cannot rest human affairs on a happy outcome of the dialectic. If 
one reads the book as being about leading and following, one must read it 
as having a second three-part structure, now centered on the three protago-
nists and loosely corresponding to the three-part narrative structure.
The final section, as noted above, starts with a conversation between 
Delano and Cereno, to which I now turn. After the trial and the account of 
the slave takeover, Delano wishes to know from Cereno how the latter was 
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taken in by the evil brewing under his nose. Cereno notes that had he been 
more acute, it might in fact have cost him his life. Indeed, “malign machi-
nations and deceptions impose” themselves on all human beings—he could 
not have done otherwise. The captain of a ship might be thought to be the 
model of what we mean by a “leader.” Yet here we have a story about a man 
who was obliged to accept a pose as being in control, while going along with 
evil because his safety required it (754).
As the longboat of the Bachelor’s Delight approaches the San Domi-
nick, the sailors and Amasa Delano notice that “rudely painted or chalked, 
as in a sailor freak,34 along the forward side of a sort of pedestal below 
the canvas [that covered the figurehead], was the sentence, ‘Seguid vuestro 
jefe,’ (follow your leader)” (676). We learn later that the original figurehead 
was that of Christopher Columbus, the “discoverer” of the New World who 
landed first on the island now called San Domingo and who introduced 
slavery to the Americas, and that that figurehead was replaced by the slaves 
with the defleshed, whitened bones of the murdered owner, Don Aranda.35 
Toward the end of the first section of Melville’s story, after Babo and the 
other slaves have been exposed and the battle to retake the ship has com-
menced, the shroud falls from the figurehead of Cereno’s erstwhile ship to 
reveal the skeleton of the slave owner in conjunction with its chalked mes-
sage, “Follow your leader” (734). And here is how the book ends:
Some months after, dragged to the gibbet at the tail of a mule, the 
black met his voiceless end. The body was burned to ashes; but for 
many days, the head, that hive of subtlety, fixed on a pole in the Plaza, 
met, unabashed, the gaze of the whites; and across the Plaza looked 
toward St. Bartholomew’s church, in whose vaults slept, then, as now, 
the recovered bones of Aranda; and across the Rimac bridge looked 
toward the monastery, on Mount Agonia without; where, three months 
after being dismissed by the court, Benito Cereno, borne on the bier, 
did, indeed, follow his leader. (755)
The last sentence (103 words!), with its slow and relentless cadence of 
a funeral dirge, has the effect of tying all the elements of the story together 
into a whole. The whole centers on the following of one’s leader. (We were 
given a clue to this when Melville has the first mate, leading the boarding 
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of the San Dominick, apparently gratuitously cry out: “Follow your leader” 
[737].) Benito Cereno is about, among other things, what being a leader or 
captain is, how one is to recognize one, and the mistakes that can be made 
in following him.
We are told at the end that Cereno does indeed “follow his leader.” 
But precisely whom is he following? In Melville’s account of his deposition 
before the court, he indicates that Babo had shown him a skeleton “which 
had been substituted for the ship’s proper figure-head, the image of Chris-
topher Colon . . . ; that the negro Babo had asked him whose skeleton that 
was, and whether, from its whiteness, he should not think it a white’s; that, 
upon his covering his face, the negro Babo, coming close, said words to 
this effect: ‘Keep faith with the blacks from here to Senegal, or you shall 
in spirit, as now in body, follow your leader,’ pointing to the prow.” Babo 
then repeats this requirement to each to the surviving Spaniards (744).36 
The leader could be Columbus. It could be Don Aranda (now skeletonized 
by Babo and the others—with a hint of cannibalism). It could be Babo. It 
could be the church to which Cereno retires. It could be the Spanish sover-
eign, Charles V, who had retired to a monastery: all are instances of leading 
and thus of sovereignty itself.37
In the actual deposition there is no mention of the change of figure-
heads; the various references to following a leader do not appear: these are 
all Melville’s additions. And as they bracket the story, appearing first with 
the passage about the figurehead and the warning from Babo, then the 
dropping of the shroud and the boarding of the first mate, down to the last 
words of the story, it would seem that Melville has clued us here to a cen-
tral concern of his work. If the novella is about following a leader, what is 
Melville’s understanding of a leader? As Catherine Zuckert and John Schaar 
have separately pointed out, there are three images of leadership in the no-
vella: Delano, Cereno, and Babo.38 Let us take them in sequence.
Delano self-identifies in Melville’s account and is identified in Cere-
no’s actual deposition as a person of “good nature, compassion, and char-
ity” (754). As noted, he is unfailingly courteous and concerned with good 
manners, shutting out the occasional doubts that the odd happenings on 
the San Dominick arouse in him. This is despite the fact that the white 
sailors try repeatedly to signal to him that something is wrong. His inability 
to grasp the situation is summed up in his encounter with an “aged sailor” 
whose hands are “full of ropes, which he was working into a large knot . . . 
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[which] seemed a combination of a double-bowline-knot, treble-crown-
knot, back-handed-well-knot, knot-in-and-out-knot, and jamming-knot.” 
Captain Delano addresses the knotter in Spanish: “‘What are you knotting 
there, my man?’ ‘The knot,’ was the brief reply, without looking up. ‘So it 
seems; but what is it for?’ ‘For someone else to undo,’ muttered back the old 
man.” The knotter urges Delano in the first English-language words heard 
in the novella to “undo it, cut it, quick.” Despite the fact that he apparently 
has recognized each of the component knots, Delano is no Alexander. He 
picks up the great knot, but does not know what to do with it (“knot in hand, 
and knot in head”) and surrenders it to “an elderly negro” who tosses it over-
board (707–708). Delano finds “all this . . . very queer” but soon gets over 
his qualms. The knot stands for what Delano does not understand, or rather 
that of which he has only the dimmest sense as something being wrong.39 
Thus, he “ignore[s] the symptoms” (708). Such ignorance is his trait. De-
spite the fact that he noticed that the San Dominick flew no colors, it never 
occurs to him that if Babo can use the Spanish flag as a shaving smock, it 
is unlikely that he, Delano, is now aboard a ship under Spanish command.
Additionally, he is self-satisfied in his ability to overcome his doubts. In 
his final conversation with Cereno, he claims that these traits are in the end 
a good thing, as without them he would have openly questioned the status 
of the Spanish ship and, in turn, would have certainly been murdered by 
the slaves. “Had it been otherwise, doubtless . . . some of my interferences 
might have ended unhappily enough. . . . Those feelings . . . enabled me 
to get the better of momentary distrust, at times when acuteness might 
have cost me my life” (754). Delano is a New Englander of a distinguished 
family. (Franklin Delano Roosevelt will be one of his descendants.) At the 
beginning, he arrives on a scene that is chaotic to the point practically of an-
archy. It is decidedly not the way a ship should be run—one imagines him 
coming on the ship Plato describes in the epigraph to this essay. If it had 
been his world, it would have been his role to restore order and set things 
right. We know from the account that he gives in his book that he had pre-
viously managed to set things in order on his ship with some “refractory” 
crew by “giving them good wholesome floggings; and at other times treating 
them with the best I had.”40 He clearly knows what supposedly proper order 
is: in his book he explicitly details all of the qualities that he thinks leader-
ship and rule should have—and in the case of the San Dominick is unable 
to exercise any of them.41
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Why so? He is kept from doing anything because he is unable to learn 
from the past how to deal with a new situation. Like Americans in gen-
eral in Melville’s understanding, he knows of nothing and cares for nothing 
but the present. The past is simply not available for him in his present cir-
cumstances—which is one reason Melville took care in the story to change 
names and dates so that the immediate past should have been present, as 
it should also be to the reader. Delano thus must fall back on the courtesy 
he fancies one owes a stranger, even one whose behavior is as strange as 
Cereno’s. In his conversation with Cereno after the trial, just before Del-
ano wonders why “the negro” continues to cast such a shadow on Cereno, 
Cereno has consoled Delano for having mistaken him for the dangerous 
person: “You were in time undeceived. Would that . . . it was so ever, and 
with all men.” Delano responds: “You generalize, Don Benito; and mourn-
fully enough. But the past is passed; why moralize on it? Forget it. See, yon 
bright sun has forgotten it all, and the blue sea, and the blue sky; these have 
turned over new leaves.” The “bright sun” contrasts with the fog and gray 
of the opening: colors (that is, black and white) are now clearly visible, and 
the world has come back to the order that Delano thinks it should have. 
Much as in Thomas Cole’s 1836 painting The Oxbow, the sun of civiliza-
tion has pushed back the clouds of savagery and order is reestablished.42 
That order is one in which whites rule and blacks obey. A true citizen of 
“Nature’s nation,”43 Delano has, in other words, learned nothing from the 
experience with Cereno and Babo, except perhaps to be more anxious about 
the dangers of blacks revolting if they were treated too trustingly (as had 
Don Aranda).44 (In Delano’s book, in fact, the incident of the San Dominick 
is not mentioned again and Delano passes immediately on to other matters, 
opening the next chapter with a business-as-usual “I shall now finish my ac-
count of the coast of Chili by giving some description” of various islands.)45 
Nothing is retained, except the desire for salvage rights. It is against men 
such as Delano that Melville puts this passage at the very close of the “Sup-
plement” to his Battle-Pieces: “Let us pray that the terrible historic tragedy 
of our time may not have been enacted without instructing our whole be-
loved country through terror and pity.”46
What are we to make of Cereno? The matter is not easy. Take this 
case. Carl Schmitt had risen to be one of the most prominent German legal 
scholars during the Weimar period and in 1933 had joined the Nazi Party. 
In 1938 he had been severely criticized in SS publications and had been re-
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lieved of his official non-university positions. Protected by Goering, he con-
tinued to teach and publish at the University of Berlin.47 He did not resign 
from the party and never apologized after the war. In a letter apparently 
written on his fiftieth birthday, in 1938, Schmitt signed himself as “Benito 
Cereno,” seeming to identify his lot during Nazism with that of Cereno.48 
He continued to use the name for himself in various letters and exchanges 
with Ernst Jünger throughout the war.49 Schmitt refered to Benito Cereno 
as “the hero of Herman Melville’s story” and noted that “in Germany he 
[Benito Cereno] has become a symbol of the situation of intelligence in a 
system of mass politics [einem Massen-System].”50 What is striking here is 
the reference to Cereno as the Held—the hero. Schmitt noted in a letter 
of March 11–12, 1941, to Ernst Jünger that “B C tells himself: better to 
die from them than for them.” The only place that this might make sense 
with reference to Melville’s story is the moment when Cereno leaps into 
the boat. He may indeed die, as Babo has clearly indicated that he will kill 
Cereno (or try to) if Cereno gives the play away. (And Babo does leap in 
after him.) In this sense, Hitler and the SS would be Babo, and Schmitt’s 
self-identification with Cereno a sign that he thought resistance to the state 
to be justified but would be at the risk of one’s life (and thus he was excused 
in the postwar period).51 In this reading Cereno (and Schmitt) are the aris-
tocratic elite, now dominated by the corrupted masses led by evil itself.52 
And, indeed, Schmitt closed his Ex Captivitate Salus by portraying himself 
as the “last conscious representative of the jus publicum Europaeum, its 
last teacher and researcher in an existential sense, [experiencing] its end as 
does Benito Cereno the voyage of the pirate ship.”53 Cereno is the old Eu-
rope taken over first by the dangerous masses, unable to find an intelligent 
leader, enslaved to the crowd, and helpless face-to-face with an uncom-
prehending, powerful, but fundamentally stupid America unappreciative of 
excellence. The novel then is more about class and its fate in mass society 
than it is about race.
There is a truth to this: Cereno is enslaved; Delano is unthinking. Mel-
ville’s story does not exempt the New World from the sins of the Old: I 
noted above the allusions to Charles V and more extensively to the bringing 
of institutions like slavery to the New World. (Lima was built on the backs 
of slave labor in the gold mines.) It is harder, however, to find in Cereno 
the aristocratic elite that seems at the basis of Schmitt’s interest. He ap-
pears initially to Delano as “half-lunatic”: indeed, “no landsman could have 
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dreamed that in him there was lodged a dictatorship beyond which, while 
at sea, there was no earthly appeal” (680, 681). It is noteworthy that while 
Delano is deluded in almost all of his perceptions of the situation about the 
Spanish ship, he is not deluded in his sense of what a ship’s captain should 
be: he recognizes clearly that Cereno does not correspond to it. Cereno is 
no hero, despite Schmitt’s need to call him one. The problem for Melville 
may rather lie in what Delano thinks a leader should be. (And here I recall 
that in White-Jacket Melville goes out of his way to attack the practice of 
flogging as well as the expectation that one should trust the captain in ev-
erything.) The parallels drawn by Melville serve rather to indicate that he 
does not find the American polity, as exemplified in Delano, to be excep-
tionally exempt from the sins of the Old World. But what are those sins?
Don Benito Cereno replies to Delano’s greeting of the healing sun and 
the turning over of “new leaves” with the following. The leaves can start 
anew “because they have no memory . . . because they are not human.” (The 
implication is that Delano lacks something as a human being.) To Delano’s 
insistence that the “mild trades [winds] that now fan your check, do they 
not come with a human-like healing to you?” Cereno replies that “their 
steadfastness but waft[s] me to my tomb.” It is at this point that the central 
teaching of the novella appears. It is the passage used by Ellison as an epi-
graph that I mentioned at the outset.
“You are saved,” cried Captain Delano, more and more astonished and 
pained; “you aresaved; what has cast such a shadow upon you?”
“The negro.” (754)
The next line is “There was silence.” Cereno’s answer—explicitly—puts an 
end to all conversation. There is not another word of direct speech in the 
novella, as if with this nothing more could be said, as if words had failed. At 
the outset of the story, at the end of the third paragraph, we were warned 
that there were “shadows present, foreshadowing deeper shadows to come” 
(673). We now encounter them.
The shadow for Cereno is “the negro.” In Spanish, negro means not 
only a black person, but also blackness, jet blackness. Blackness is associated 
by Melville with “those deep far-away things in [a person]; those occasional 
flashings-forth of the intuitive Truth . . . ; those short quick probings at 
the very axis of reality.”54 What do Cereno’s last words mean? Some read-
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ers have taken them to mean that Cereno has acknowledged what Delano 
could not, that the enslavement of others is wrong, a reading that could be 
that of present-day Delanos.55 A more obvious reading is that the caster of 
the shadow is simply Babo and that he, Cereno, is incapable of doing any-
thing, even of saying anything, about this fact. It is no accident that Ellison 
used this passage for Invisible Man without Cereno’s answer: the novel that 
follows becomes the answer to Delano’s question. Cereno will keep Babo 
invisible and unspoken of except by his own death. Saying “the negro” is a 
“flashing-forth of [an] intuitive Truth”: however, it is a truth Cereno cannot 
acknowledge. It leaves him speechless, and thus he refuses or rather is un-
able to acknowledge the actuality of his insight (an insight that never occurs 
in any form to Delano). The actuality of “the negro” calls into question for 
different reasons the ability of both Cereno and Delano to say anything ap-
propriate to the circumstances.
Most centrally, what is the relation of this shadow to the repeated in-
junction to “follow your leader”? To explore this, I turn to the third of the 
leader figures: Babo. Throughout the story he is presented as joined to Benito 
Cereno. They are leaning on each other in their first appearance to Delano, 
who finds in the tableau an example of the proper and admirable relation 
of whites to blacks. At the end it is not even clear that Babo and Cereno 
may not have died at the same time, for Babo is executed “some months” 
after the trial and Cereno dies “three months after being dismissed by the 
court” (755). Yet this union has multiple dimensions. Joyce Adler has given 
an excellent analysis of its complexity. On the one hand, she notes, the two 
are “inseparable.” From the scene in which Babo kneels to fix Cereno’s shoe 
buckle, to the shaving scene and more, “in all these scenes, which are like 
photographic stills, master and slave are bound together, their social con-
nection constituting their chain.” Beyond this inseparability, however, they 
are also “irreconcilable”: Babo seeks to kill Cereno after the latter leaps into 
the boat; Cereno will not confront or even face Babo at the trial. Finally, the 
two are “interchangeable”: the two cross the plaza at the end in the same 
direction. Master and slave are not a question of race but of domination. 
From all this, violence in inevitable.56
We know from the beginning of Rousseau’s Social Contract that “he 
who believes himself to be the master of another is just as much the slave 
as they.” Melville’s point here is similar. As long as one has domination over 
the other, Cereno and Babo are not individually free, or free of each other. 
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Note that when Cereno jumps into the longboat, even though he, in effect, 
breaks the contract he has made with Babo to take the blacks to Senegal, 
the two nonetheless remain tied to each other. This is why the story starts 
in gray, the colors indistinct from each other. There are no masters without 
slaves, no slaves without masters. Once Babo takes over the ship and makes 
Cereno the equivalent of his slave, he is just as much caught in this web 
as was Cereno before the revolt. This is the reason that Melville appears 
ambivalent about the slavery question: he understood that turning things 
upside down only reproduced the previous dynamics. Not for him was the 
too easy condemnation so loved by Northerners in Uncle Tom’s Cabin. (This 
is one of the reasons Ralph Ellison thought that Twain and Melville were 
the best writers on slavery in nineteenth-century America and paid no at-
tention to Stowe, except to dismiss a performance of Uncle Tom’s Cabin.)57
Nonetheless, one cannot stop here, for to do so would reduce the abili-
ties and courage of Babo and the other blacks to insignificance. We must 
also ask about Babo as the third example of leadership. Adler catches part of 
this in her essay: “His blackness marks him as the man taken by force from 
Africa to be a slave in the Americas. He has a rich intelligence: he has the 
qualities of mind of a master psychologist, strategist, general, playwright, 
impresario and poet. Melville endows him with his own poetic insight into 
the symbolic implications that can be found in significant figures and ob-
jects: the skeleton, the black giant who may throw off his chains and will 
not ask pardon, the padlock and the key, the Spanish flag used as a rag.”58
One could add that he writes and speaks Spanish. It is the case that 
of the three, Babo appears by far the most perceptive and able. We know 
him, however, only through his deeds—alone of the three, he is not given 
a point of view, except at the very end, where his “head . . . fixed on a pole, 
met . . . the gaze of the whites” (755). Delano is the eye for the reader 
in the first section; Cereno’s deposition offers his account in the second 
(an account, as I noted, stamped with official approval from the powers 
that be). But at the end we learn of Babo only that “seeing all was over, 
he uttered no sound, and could not be forced to. His aspect seemed to 
say, since I cannot do deeds, I will not speak words” (755). The words he 
spoke earlier in the story were the words of a script that he made up for 
himself in accordance with the expectations of the audience; they are not 
authentically his own. As there is no one able to hear whatever Babo has to 
say as himself, there are (as yet) no words for this situation. The contract 
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with Cereno has not been honored (and should not have been): after which 
there is nothing that can be said. As I observed earlier, in note 22, there is 
controversy over the resonances of “Babo.” While it is clear that Melville 
took the term from Delano’s account, it is also clear that he kept the name 
and did not change it, as he did a number of other names. Indeed, he fuses 
Babo with his son Mure (who does not appear at all) and does not have 
Babo die during the retaking of the ship. One possible reason Melville may 
have wanted to keep the character Babo is that his name resonates with 
the Greek term for those they could not understand, the barbaroi, the 
antonym to those of the pólis, those whose speech is of the logos—so Babo 
has nothing of his own to say. Our word babble possibly comes from this 
root. Demosthenes (Orations 3.10) is clear that the barbaroi do not speak 
Greek and relates barbaroi to language. For Melville, the name becomes a 
badge of the recognition of the distance to an acknowledgment of the other 
who is the enslaved.
In Moby-Dick the sailors come to follow Ahab enthusiastically: the re-
sult, for all but Ishmael, is death, and he is saved only by a coffin. There are 
three cases in Benito Cereno where the injunction to follow one’s leader 
appears: they also are all associated with death. The first are the words 
chalked by Babo on the ship’s prow. These are associated with him and the 
murders by the slaves. Babo warns the white survivors to keep their prom-
ise to help; if they don’t, they will “follow their leader.” The second is the 
cry of the first mate during the retaking of the San Dominick. These are 
associated with the slaughter of the blacks and the reestablishment of a legal 
order that allows slavery, and thus with the actions of Amasa Delano. The 
third is associated with Benito Cereno in death, as he in life does indeed 
follow his leader. Who the leader is has no single answer. The issue, rather, 
is the following of one’s leader.
I noted at the start that Melville writes the first part of the story more 
or less from the point of view of Delano. This perspective is one of a rather 
obtuse person, overly satisfied with his version of the state of the world. At 
times perceptions of the situation are given narrative voice. By and large, 
Delano and the narrator share similar perceptions: the doubling simply 
keeps one from too easily moving away from seeing the world as Delano 
does, for his vision seems confirmed (if occasionally undercut) by a more ab-
stractly authorial voice. This is a device that Melville uses quite often, nota-
bly in “The Paradise of Bachelors and the Tartarus of Maids” and “Bartleby 
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the Scrivener.” It consists in giving the reader a point of view that must then 
be discarded, even though it appears at times to be confirmed.
At the beginning of the story, the reader’s point of view follows that of 
Captain Delano. As the story goes along, the reader finds himself or herself 
more and more distant from Delano. At the end of the story the reader 
is left with the head of Babo—his body having been burned—a “hive of 
subtlety” that continues its gaze and which, having no words for what has 
happened, speaks volumes. As Melville moved through his career’s work, 
he became increasingly doubtful about the possibilities of expressing what 
was wrong with America. Bartleby, famously, has nothing to say to the 
other presences in the story. In “The Tartarus of Maids” the women are not 
allowed to talk. In “The Bell-Tower” workers are replaced by a speechless 
automaton “without a soul”; a giant bell is cast, during which the architect 
murders a man, and a fragment of the murder shows up as a flaw in the 
bell (much as the ship’s bell in Benito Cereno has a flaw: the resonances 
are obviously to the Liberty Bell).59 The automaton kills the architect and 
is destroyed by the townspeople. The great, flawed bell is rung for the 
first time and destroys the tower. The last lines of the story: “So the blind 
slave obeyed its blinder lord, but, in obedience, slew him. So the creator 
was killed by the creature. So the bell was too heavy for the tower. So the 
bell’s main weakness was where man’s blood had flawed it. And so pride 
went before the fall.”60 So also liberty as Americans practice it may destroy 
their polity.
In all this Melville’s strategy is to prod the reader to move from an 
initial comfortable position to a more complex understanding. Babo and 
the slaves are clearly presented as having murdered, often viciously: sailors 
were tied up and thrown alive overboard; Don Aranda was murdered and 
possibly cannibalized. Melville in no ways hides their violence. The same 
is true for the whites: during the retaking of the ship the sailors behave 
savagely toward the surviving blacks, to the point that Delano must stop 
them the next day. Likewise, the violence meted out to Babo and the other 
slaves is cruel; it is, however, “official” violence. Slavery is in itself cruel. The 
movement of the novella is thus a form of political education: it impresses 
on the reader the ease with which one accepts one’s prejudices as natural, 
and the difficulty in abandoning them. The important point is that this dif-
ficulty is made all the greater by virtue of the fact that one is not clear for 
what one abandons them (thus, Babo has no words of his own). If, in the 
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case of the Civil War, a shadow may be expiated and lifted from the land, 
it will still not be clear in which direction the land is headed. As Lincoln 
remarked at the opening of his June 16, 1858, “House Divided” speech: “If 
we could know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could then 
better judge what to do and how to do it.”61 The end of Battle-Pieces is a 
poem titled “America.” It closes like this, partially echoing the last conversa-
tion of Delano and Cereno:
While the shadow, chased by light,
Fled along the far-drawn height,
And left her on the crag.62
At the time of the writing of Benito Cereno, what was clear was that 
leaders—the leaders of that time—were not to be followed. (He also has 
leaders in general in mind and, as noted, at that moment Franklin Pierce 
in particular, whose signing of the Kansas-Nebraska Act had opened the 
whole country to slavery.) The question Melville poses is whether we can 
see legal savagery in the same light as we see supposedly “extralegal” sav-
agery. To do so would be to see ourselves as others—the slaves—see us, and 
this is what is lacking in all the white characters in this story.
There is great violence in this story, violence by blacks and whites. This 
shadow is on this story, as was the shadow, Melville knew, on the land. 
The shadow, then, is not slavery or blackness or Babo: what underlies all 
these is the following of a leader, simply because he is the leader. “Follow 
the leader” is child’s play: this is what Melville finds the most distressing. 
And his position is sorrowfully complex. In “The Portent,” the first poem in 
Battle-Pieces, Melville writes:
Hanging from the beam,
Slowly swaying (such the law),
Gaunt the shadow on your green
Shenandoah!
The cut is on the crown
(Lo, John Brown),
And the stabs shall heal no more.63
Harpers Ferry, the site of Brown’s raid, is on the Shenandoah River. Brown 
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was wounded by a sword during his capture. The next poem in Battle-Pieces 
is the 1860 “Misgivings,” which opens:
When ocean-clouds over inland hills
Sweep storming in late autumn brown,
And horror the sodden valley fills,
And the spire falls crashing in the town,
I muse upon my country’s ills—
The tempest bursting from the waste of Time
On the world’s fairest hope linked with man’s foulest crime.
The silences that envelop this story point to an increasing distress Melville 
has with his country. He writes the first three-quarters of the novella in such 
a manner that readers will be caught up in their own refusal to acknowledge 
the evil of slavery—much as Delano denies it. It is not that they do not know 
that slavery is evil, but that they do not, cannot, acknowledge it.64 Melville 
thus understands that simply telling his countrymen that they are in denial 
would be of little effect or import. As with the nation, the reader comes too 
late to see his or her “complicity in moral blindness.”65 One should, in read-
ing the novella, have a certain embarrassment at what one has assumed. At 
the end, though, there is silence.
Shortly before his execution, John Brown gave a handwritten note to 
his jailor: “I, John Brown, am now quite certain that the crimes of this 
guilty, land: will never be purged away; but with Blood. I had as I now 
think: vainly flattered myself that without very much bloodshed; it might 
be done.”66 Melville knew it also: so it is when leaders are followed simply 
because they are the leaders. Despite or because of his hatred of slavery, 
Melville found in Brown’s raid the bursting of a tempest on the land. (We 
have already seen the crashing spire in “Misgivings” and falling bell in “The 
Bell-Tower.”) Babo has no words of his own. Neither Cereno, nor Delano, 
nor Brown is able to find words for “man’s foulest crime.” Perhaps there 
could not have been any. For, if we can adequately express nothing, if we 
cannot find words for our actuality, then only violence will suffice: war was 
but five years away.
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I should like to thank Babette Babich for a helpful reading of this text and in par-
ticular for her suggestions about Plato and the name Babo. Forrest Robinson pro-
vided comments that expanded several issues more than I had done. Jason Frank’s 
careful reading opened up many doors, and the essay is much better for his intel-
ligence and generosity. Lawrie Balfour pointed to paths for rethinking two key 
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ano, a grip not even loosened by the seemingly negative judgments of the Ameri-
can Captain carried in phrases like ‘moral simplicity’ and ‘weak-wittedness.’” He 
adduces a number of critics who have failed to accomplish this break, on whom the 
effect of Melville’s irony seems to have gone unnoticed.
14. Herman Melville, Benito Cereno, in Pierre, Israel Potter, The Piazza Tales, 
The Confidence-Man, Uncollected Prose, and Billy Budd. (New York: Library of 
America, 1984), 754. All citations to Benito Cereno are given parenthetically in the 
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text and refer to this edition. Works other than Benito Cereno in this volume will 
be cited by title and the volume cited as Pierre . . . Billy Budd. See also The Col-
lected Essays of Ralph Ellison, ed. John F. Callahan (New York: Modern Library, 
1995), 88.
15. Some account of this can be found in Allan Moore Emery, “The Topicality 
of Depravity in Benito Cereno,” American Literature 55, no. 3 (October 1983): 
316–331. See also Kavanagh’s comments in “That Hive of Subtlety” on those critics 
who think that Melville is simply saying that there is a beast in us all.
16. The four previous sentences draw directly from remarks offered to me by 
Professor Forrest Robinson. I am grateful for his comments.
17. The original name of the Spanish boat was Tryal, and that of the American 
was Perseverance.
18. Henry David Thoreau, “Civil Disobedience,” in Walden and Civil Disobe-
dience, ed. Owen Thomas (New York: Norton, 1966), 228.
19. This was typically work imposed on jailed convicts.
20. On the gothic qualities of the whole scene, see McLoughlin, Dead Letters, 
120–121.
21. Melville, Billy Budd, in Pierre . . . Billy Budd, 1431. Architectural finials 
were once believed to deter witches from landing on one’s roof. I owe some of the 
thoughts in the next paragraph to Forrest Robinson.
22. See the important discussion in Joyce Sparer Adler, War in Melville’s Imagi-
nation (New York: New York University Press, 1981), 88–110. There is, incidentally, 
some controversy in the literature about the origins of the name Babo. Whatever 
reason Melville might have had for retaining this name, the name is in Delano’s 
deposition as that of the ringleader. See Delano, A Narrative, 335. See also Robert 
Cochran, “Babo’s Name in Benito Cereno: An Unnecessary Controversy?” Ameri-
can Literature 48, no. 2 (May 1976): 217–219. I discuss the name below.
23. See the discussion in Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity in 
America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 369; Eric J. Sundquist, 
“Benito Cereno and New World Slavery,” in Reconstructing American Literary 
History, ed. Sacvan Bercovitch (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 
93–122.
24. Melville backgrounds a very complex relation between the New World and 
the Old by a set of images that refer the reader to the Spain of Charles V (who, like 
Cereno, left his position of power to end his life in a monastery). See the seminal 
article by H. Bruce Franklin, “Apparent Symbol of Despotic Command: Melville’s 
Benito Cereno,” New England Quarterly 34, no. 4 (November 1961): 462–477. 
See also, on the lack of color, Darryl Hattenhauer, “‘Follow Your Leader’: Knowing 
One’s Place in Benito Cereno,” Rocky Mountain Review of Language and Litera-
ture 45, nos. 1/2 (1991): 7–17, esp. 8–9, and Rogin, Subversive Genealogy, 208, 
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who relates it to Hegel’s “gray on gray” in from the introduction to his Philosophy 
of History.
25. F. O. Matthiessen, American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age 
of Emerson and Whitman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), 508: “Mel-
ville’s failure to recognize [the fact of slavery] makes his tragedy comparatively 
superficial.” Also cited in John Schaar, “The Uses of Literature for the Study of 
Politics: The Case of Melville’s Benito Cereno,” in Schaar, Legitimacy in the Mod-
ern State (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1981), 84. Matthiessen found Benito 
Cereno to be a failure and pretty much dismissed the work, a rare mistake by a 
great critic.
26. Schaar, “The Uses of Literature,” 67–68, gets at this point in his consider-
ation of the importance of the “world of domination.”
27. Rogin, Subversive Genealogy, 208–220. The act gave the territories an 
opening to decide on the question of slavery by popular vote: this produced a 
bloody war in Kansas as settlers of both persuasions rushed to the territory. 
Lincoln’s speech against the act in Peoria on October 18, 1854, marks the real 
beginning of his national career. Hawthorne wrote a campaign biography of 
Pierce.
28. See the interesting discussion in Elizabeth Wright, “The New Psychoanaly-
sis and Literary Criticism: A Reading of Hawthorne and Melville,” Poetics Today 
3, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 98–100.
29. In the late seventeenth century Kelley became a pirate after being freed 
from a slave ship; his piracy was conducted mainly in the same waters as the events 
in this novella. He was eventually captured in Boston (with Captain William Kidd) 
and hanged in London in 1701.
30. See Carolyn L. Karcher, “The Riddle of the Sphinx: Melville’s Benito Cere-
no and the Amistad Case,” in Critical Essays on Herman Melville’s Benito Cereno, 
ed. Robert Burkholder (New York: G. K. Hall, 1992), 196–228, which analyzes 
very carefully the parallels and disjunctures between this case and that of the 
Amistad, wherein blacks had taken over the ship that was taking them to slavery. 
They were acquitted of piracy at their trial in Boston (John Adams was their law-
yer), as their abduction had been against their will and the takeover had happened 
outside American jurisdiction. On the name change, see ibid., 213–214.
31. Melville, Israel Potter, in Pierre . . . Billy Budd, 561. The distinction between 
privateer (which Jones called himself) and pirate was a matter of perspective.
32. Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom’s Cabin; or, Life among the Lowly (1852; 
repr., New York: Penguin, 1986), 275. See James Baldwin, “Everybody’s Protest 
Novel,” in his Notes of a Native Son (1955; repr., Boston: Beacon, 1984), 13–19. 
Those who compare Adventures of Huckleberry Finn unfavorably to Stowe’s book 
on the question of the portrayal of blacks should think again. On this see my “Glad 
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to Find Out Who I Was: Mark Twain on What Can Be Learned on a Raft,” Journal 
of Law, Philosophy and Culture 5, no. 1 (2010): 151–177.
33. See similar thoughts in Schaar, “The Uses of Literature.”
34. Freak can mean a prank or a sportive fancy.
35. According to Cereno’s deposition Aranda was murdered and simply thrown 
overboard.
36. This passage is not in Delano’s book.
37. See the similar thoughts in H. Bruce Franklin, “Past, Present and Future 
Seemed One” in Burkholder, Critical Essays, 231. Franklin makes an extensive 
case for the figure of Charles V of Spain. See also Franklin, “Apparent Symbol of 
Despotic Command.”
38. Catherine H. Zuckert, “Leadership—Natural and Conventional—in Mel-
ville’s Benito Cereno,” Interpretation 26, no. 2 (Winter 1999): 239–255. This is a 
helpful article even if I do disagree with its conclusion that Babo is the example 
of a democratic leader (assuming at face value that this is all she means). See also 
Schaar, “The Uses of Literature.”
39. See Wright, “The New Psychoanalysis,” 102–104. For a perhaps overly com-
plex reading of the suppressed erotic in this scene, see Myron Tuman, Melville’s 
Gay Father and the Knot of Filicidal Desire: On Men and Their Demons (n.p.: 
Cybereditions, 2006).
40. Delano, A Narrative, 320.
41. In chapters 16 and 17 of his book he spends a good deal of time laying out 
the proper qualifications of a sea captain.
42. An image of The Oxbow can be seen at http://xroads.virginia.edu/~cap/
nature/oxbow.gif.
43. The phrase is Perry Miller’s: “Thus, superficial appearances to the contrary, 
America is not crass, materialistic: it is Nature’s nation, possessing a heart that 
watches and receives.” See Miller, Errand into Wilderness (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1956), 210, as well as his Nature’s Nation (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1967).
44. Increased vigilance and severity of treatment were consequences of the 
rebellion of Nat Turner (1831). Delano expresses surprise several times at the laxity 
of the treatment of the Africans.
45. Delano, A Narrative, 354.
46. Melville, “Supplement” to Battle-Pieces and Aspects of the War (1866; repr., 
New York: Da Capo, 1995), 260; also cited by Schaar, “The Uses of Literature.”
47. See my introduction to Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Ger-
man ed. 1932; 1st English ed. 1976), trans. George Schwab, rev. ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007); and the excellent Thomas O. Beebee, “Carl 
Schmitt’s Myth of Benito Cereno,” Seminar: A Journal of Germanic Studies 42, 
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no. 2 (2006): 114–134, as well as my “Sacred Spirit of Politics: Thomas Hobbes, 
Carl Schmitt and St. Paul” in Jahrbuch Politisches Denken (2010), 245–294, and 
chapter 6 of my Politics without Vision: Thinking without a Banister in the Twen-
tieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 218–262.
48. Copies of the letter were sent to several people after the war, among them 
Armin Mohler, who printed it in the publication of his correspondence with 
Schmitt. Schmitt had apparently wanted this letter to become the epigraph to 
a reissue of his book on Hobbes, Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas 
Hobbes. Sinn und Fehlschlag eines politischen Symbols (Hamburg: Hanseatische 
Verlaganstalt, 1938).
49. See Schmitt to Jünger, February 25, 1941, and March 11–12, 1941 (sig-
ned “Grüss Ihres Cereno”), in Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jünger–Carl Schmitt. Briefe 
1930–1983 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cota, 1999). I was reminded of the Jünger references 
by Beebee’s article “Carl Schmitt’s Myth of Benito Cereno.”
50. Carl Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus. Erfahrungen der Zeit, 1945–1947 
(1950; repr., Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2002), 21–22.
51. Schmitt wanted his March 11–12, 1941, letter to Jünger used as an epigraph 
to his book Leviathan and conceived of that book, despite its anti-Semitism, as 
an act of resistance to Nazism. See my Politics without Vision, chap. 6, and my 
introduction to Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: 
Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol, trans. George Schwab and Erna Hilfs-
tein (original German ed. 1938; 1996; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2008).
52. It is certainly no accident that José Ortega y Gasset’s The Revolt of the 
Masses, first published in 1930, had been a best seller in Germany.
53. Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, 75.
54. Melville, “Hawthorne and His Mosses,” in Pierre . . . Billy Budd, 1159.
55. See, for instance, William D. Richardson, Melville’s Benito Cereno: An In-
terpretation with Annotated Text and Concordance (Durham: Carolina Academic 
Press, 1987), 86. Also cited in Beebee, “Carl Schmitt’s Myth of Benito Cereno.” 
See also Richard Faber, “Benito Cereno oder die Entmythologisierun Euro- 
Americas. Zur Kritik Carl Schmitts und seiner Schule,” in Kultursoziologie. Symp-
tom des Zeitgeistes? ed. Richard Faber (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 
1989), 82, who also refers to Babo as the hero of the story. Beebee also cites this 
article.
56. Joyce Sparer Adler, “Benito Cereno: Slavery and Violence in the Americas,” 
in Burkholder, Critical Essays, 82–83.
57. Ralph Ellison, introduction to the 1982 reissue of Invisible Man, reprinted 
in The Collected Essays of Ralph Ellison, 487, 483.
58. Adler, War in Melville’s Imagination, 88.
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   308 10/29/13   10:57 AM
“Follow Your Leader” 309
59. I was led to look to these works by Franklin, “Past, Present and Future.”
60. Melville, “The Bell-Tower,” in Pierre . . . Billy Budd, 833.
61. The text of this speech can be found, for example, at www.pbs.org/wgbh/
aia/part4/4h2934t.html; emphasis added. Similarly, Emerson had opened his great 
essay “Experience” (1844) with the question “Where do we find ourselves?”
62. Melville, Battle-Pieces, 162. Adler cites the same poem in War in Melville’s 
Imagination, 158.
63. Melville, “The Portent,” in Battle-Pieces, xix. Richard Cox and Paul Dowl-
ing have published an interesting study of Battle-Pieces in “Herman Melville’s 
Civil War: Lincolnian Prudence in Poetry,” Political Science Reviewer 29 (2000): 
192–295.
64. I can know you are late, you can know you are late, you can know that I 
know you are late; but unless you acknowledge it by doing something (saying, “I’m 
sorry”), the situation is not adequately dealt with.
65. Herman Melville, “Misgivings,” in Battle-Pieces. I owe the phrase “com-
plicity in moral blindness” to a personal communication from Forrest Robinson.
66. David S. Reynolds, John Brown, Abolitionist (New York: Knopf, 2005), 
395; emphases in original.
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The Metaphysics of  
Indian-Hating Revisited
Thomas Dumm
In his recent study of Abraham Lincoln and the abolition of American slav-
ery, Eric Foner argues that by the concluding months of the American Civil 
War, Lincoln had undergone a sea change in his attitude toward African 
Americans. Once firmly committed to the idea of colonization, believing 
that the inferiority of blacks made their presence in a postslavery society 
problematic, Lincoln abandoned the idea, not only because of its imprac-
ticality, but because he no longer held such a firmly racist attitude toward 
blacks. Lincoln wasn’t the only one. The movement toward the abolition 
of slavery that culminated in the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion reflected a remarkable transformation of attitudes on the part of white 
Americans regarding the natural rights of blacks, so that even the question 
of suffrage was able to be raised, opening the possibility of their participa-
tion in American life.
But Foner notices something less than transformative in Lincoln’s view 
of natural rights. “The continuing evolution of Lincoln’s attitudes regarding 
blacks stands in stark contrast to the lack of change when it came to Native 
Americans,” he writes.1 Lincoln shared a common assumption that Indians 
could not be civilized. Moreover, he believed that Indians constituted a 
primary obstacle to the Republican vision of a free-labor, free-market, uni-
fied nation-state; they had their own senses of sovereign nationhood, prom-
ised to them by succeeding U.S. governments, promises broken many times 
over. Foner mentions only in passing one other interesting piece of informa-
tion. Lincoln’s paternal grandfather, for whom he was named, was killed by 
an Indian while working on his Kentucky farm, “an event witnessed by the 
seven-year-old Thomas Lincoln [Abraham’s father].”2
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Foner disavows the idea that Lincoln was an Indian-hater, noting that he 
once commuted the death sentences of several hundred condemned Indians 
who had been convicted of the massacre of settlers (though he allowed thirty-
eight of the sentences to stand, which resulted in one of the largest mass ex-
ecutions in American history). Yet to think that young Abraham Lincoln, who 
became in adulthood almost a stranger to his father, would not have heard 
extensively of this family tragedy, that his father would not have imparted 
to him his personal knowledge of the killing of his grandfather, and that the 
grandson would then not have been strongly affected by it, is not plausible. 
Foner may be correct that Lincoln didn’t have a personal hatred for Indians. 
But that is not to say that he was not invested in what Herman Melville de-
scribes in The Confidence-Man as “the metaphysics of Indian-hating.”
In what follows I want to revisit Melville’s presentation of the meta-
physics of Indian-hating to think through the form of hate he describes. The 
formal characteristic of Indian-hating, I will argue, consists of two features: 
metaphysicians of Indian-hating characterize acts of violence committed 
against themselves as attacks on innocents, and their innocence is deeply 
related to their sense of moral superiority to those acting against them. This 
characteristic makes the metaphysics easily transferable to others who resist 
the metaphysician. Melville characterizes the metaphysical only implicitly, 
but he reaches deeper than the popular meaning of the day, the idea of 
metaphysics simply being obtuse philosophy. Melville was instead seeking 
to understand the origins of a permanent human emotion, that of hatred, 
and its changing object that becomes fixed, an obsession. In this sense his 
understanding is as close to Freud’s as it may have been to Plato’s.
In a sense, Melville is continuing an exploration of the relationship 
of woundedness and hatred that he began in Moby-Dick. When Ahab fa-
mously attributes to the white whale some sort of superhuman agency, he is 
projecting onto Moby-Dick, to the whale, the very violent impulses that he 
himself exhibits in the floating charnel house known as the Pequod. Ahab’s 
obsessive hatred leads to his destruction and that of his crew, but what is 
of interest in relationship to Melville’s later exploration of hatred is his ac-
knowledgment of the madness of his obsession and his refusal to give it up. 
In a key scene shortly before the chase begins, he refuses the mad Pip’s as-
sistance, saying, “There is that in thee, poor lad, which I feel too curing of 
my malady. Like cures like, and for this hunt, my malady becomes my most 
desired health.”3 Ahab’s sickness is his health.
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And there is another passage in Moby-Dick that more directly presents 
the metaphysical quandary faced by Ahab. In explaining, over the protests 
of Starbuck, why he must seek the whale, Ahab writes: “All visible objects, 
man, are but as pasteboard masks. But in each event—in the living act, the 
undoubted deed—there, some unknown but still reasoning thing puts forth 
the mouldings of its features from behind the unreasoning mask. If man 
will strike, strike through the mask! How can the prisoner reach outside 
except by thrusting through the wall?”4 This is the metaphysical quest Ahab 
has undertaken, to get to the root of the reason that Moby Dick took his leg, 
to find in the whale the source of all evil. One could well call this earlier 
effort the metaphysics of whale fishing.
In what follows I will provide two examples of the ongoing presence 
of this metaphysics in American life, first one culled from Laura Ingalls 
Wilder’s classic children’s book, Little House on the Prairie, and then one 
from the rationale put forward by Vice President Dick Cheney for the way 
the war on terror should be prosecuted.
Melville’s Indian
Melville’s The Confidence-Man has been read as a satire of transcendental-
ism, as a deep-seated primitive Christian critique of Christian hypocrisy, 
and as a gloriously complicated condemnation of American capitalism.5 
Melville may have sensed, given the increasingly poor sales of his previous 
works, Moby-Dick, Pierre, Israel Potter, and The Piazza Tales, that this was 
likely to be his last published novel.6 Hence, he seems to have written it as 
much for himself and his small group of loyal readers as for a general public. 
The language is picturesque, the plot is chaotic and episodic, and the novel 
doesn’t end so much as stop.
The Confidence-Man consists of a series of encounters on a steamboat, 
the Fidèle, as it is voyaging down the Mississippi River to New Orleans “on a 
first of April.”7 The confidence man referred to in the title appears through-
out the novel in a variety of disguises: as an elderly crippled black man, 
a man in mourning, a man in a gray coat, an herb doctor, a man in a yel-
low vest, and others (852–853).8 All these characters share in “confidence.” 
Melville contrasts these confidence men with hardheaded empiricists, men 
of faith who have a deep pessimism concerning the possibilities of earthly 
goodness, and others, as he tells his tale. The style of the novel harks back to 
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British satire of the century before, and the attempt seems to be to assume 
a Swiftian pose—the confidence man preys on the naive. Moreover, in the 
shape-shifting of the man on the boat we are to assume an allegorical refer-
ence to the greatest shape-shifter of all, Satan.
Many of the characters inhabiting this novel are based on famous con 
men, religious frauds, and other real people. But the Indian-hater of Mel-
ville’s account is not a confidence man at all. He is a supposedly heroic fig-
ure, Colonel John Moredock, an actual historical person who had previously 
been portrayed by James Hall, who wrote several books about the Ameri-
can frontier in the 1830s and 1840s. Chapter 26—the full title of which is 
“Containing the Metaphysics of Indian-Hating, According to the Views of 
One Evidently Not So Prepossessed as Rousseau in Favor of Savages”—dis-
cusses the character of the American Indian and explains why backwoods-
men hate him with such virulence. Chapter 27, “Some Account of a Man 
of Questionable Morality, but Who, Nevertheless, Would Seem Entitled to 
the Esteem of That Eminent English Moralist Who Said He Liked a Good 
Hater,” is specifically a retelling of Hall’s discussion of Moredock in an 1835 
book of sketches Hall wrote about the American West.
Hall’s essay is not only a portrait of Moredock. It is an attempt to ex-
plain Moredock’s hatred within the context of the pioneer culture of the 
time. Hall writes of the relative enlightenment of the nineteenth-century 
pioneer in comparison to that at the age of initial settlement. “America,” he 
writes, “was settled in an age when certain rights, called those of discovery 
and conquest, were universally acknowledged; and when the possession of a 
country was readily conceded to the strongest.”9 But even as the civilization 
advanced and more moral understandings of right and wrong prevailed, 
pioneers, living as they did away from the sources of civilization, were only 
slightly affected by this advance. Living close to Indians, they “form[ed] a 
barrier between savage and civilized men.” The pioneer does not believe 
“that an Indian, or any other man has a right to monopolize the hunting 
grounds, which he considers free to all. When the Indian disputes the pro-
priety of this invasion upon his ancient heritage, the white man feels himself 
injured, and stands, as the southern folks say, upon his reserved rights.” 
Moreover, every pioneer child is raised with tales of the conflict between 
Indians and his or her parents. Everyone grows up with stories of scalp-
ings and massacres. “The impressions which we have described are handed 
down from generation to generation, and remain in full force long after all 
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   313 10/29/13   10:57 AM
314  Thomas Dumm
danger from the savages has ceased, and all intercourse with them has been 
discontinued.” Hall is here describing precisely the experience of Lincoln, 
whose father would probably have handed down the tale of the death of 
Lincoln’s grandfather.
Hall then tells about the life and times of Moredock. Moredock’s en-
tire family was slaughtered by Indians when he was a child. He vowed then 
that he would hunt down all who killed them, and eventually, after killing 
all those Indians responsible, he simply continued his career as an Indian 
killer. “He resolved never to spare an Indian, and though he made no boast 
of this determination, and seldom avowed it, it became the ruling passion 
of his life.” Hall warns us not to infer “that Colonel Moredock was unsocial, 
ferocious, or by nature cruel. On the contrary, he was a man of warm feel-
ings, and excellent disposition.”
In placing Moredock firmly within the narrative of his novel, Mel-
ville uses the words of Hall himself. That is, the Indian-hating chapter is 
composed of a speech that is a secondhand account of someone who heard 
Hall himself discussing Moredock. This double distancing by Melville is in-
deed part of the larger masquerade Melville presents throughout the novel. 
Moredock’s hatred is thus taken by Melville to be witnessed by multiple 
others, providing ambiguous voices telling an almost mythical tale of the 
frontier. That he allegorizes the Indians as disciples of the devil is fairly well 
accepted by most Melville scholars. Yet Melville’s attitude about “savages” 
was in real life much more sympathetic. Of course, the relationship of Mel-
ville to the question of good versus evil is much more complex than to allow 
any simple conclusion concerning his attitudes. To make Indians into de-
mons is not to relieve the other masqueraders of their bad behavior. Indeed, 
if anything, Melville blurs the distinctions between the various deceivers, 
gullible victims of con men, and the more directly evil demons—perhaps 
we could even say the more honestly evil characters who also are floating 
down the river on the Fidèle.
One of the frustrating qualities of The Confidence-Man is its impos-
sibly complicated plot line, made more so by the multiple voices that seri-
ally inhabit the tale. Moreover, there are flashbacks and asides, characters 
appearing in disguise, accusations of fraud (sometimes by frauds), and so 
forth. In this instance, the lines can be particularly confusing. Moredock’s 
story is told to a cosmopolitan by a stranger. In an earlier chapter (chapter 
25) the cosmopolitan had an argument with a misanthrope. The stranger 
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begins the conversation by explaining to the cosmopolitan that he has ob-
served the cosmopolitan’s argument with the misanthrope, and he suggests 
that the misanthrope reminds him of Colonel John Moredock. The stranger 
seeks to distinguish Moredock from the misanthrope, noting that Mored-
ock’s hatred wasn’t directed to the human race generally, but instead to 
Indians specifically, “silky bearded and curly headed, and to all but Indians 
juicy as a peach. But Indians—how the late John Moredock, Indian-hater 
of Illinois, hated Indians, to be sure!” (990). After introducing the subject, 
the stranger goes on to suggest that he tell the story of Moredock as a friend 
of his father’s, James Hall, the judge, told it.
So we have the telling of a telling of a telling of a story. Hall’s nonfic-
tional rendering of Moredock becomes fictionalized by way of proxy. Who 
knows who the stranger is? Perhaps he is the biggest liar of all who, to fool 
us even more, decides to tell the truth. Rather than dream following dream, 
deceit follows deceit. Here epistemic uncertainty is driven by a willful psy-
chology of lies, ontologizing the triumph of an evil that is not so much banal 
as it is picturesque.10
According to the stranger, the way Hall explains the logic of Indian-
hating is straightforward, practically a syllogism. Even though not all Indi-
ans are bad, because you can never know for sure, you must assume that 
any Indian you deal with may be bad. Part of the proof Melville adduces, in 
Hall’s words, is as follows.
At any rate, it has been observed that when an Indian becomes a genu-
ine proselyte of Christianity (such cases, however, not being very many; 
though, indeed, entire tribes are sometimes nominally brought to the 
true light,) he will not in that case conceal his enlightened conviction, 
that his race’s portion by nature is total depravity; and, in that way, as 
much as admits that the backwoodsman’s worst idea of it is not very 
far from true; while, on the other hand, those red men who are the 
greatest sticklers for the theory of Indian virtue, and Indian loving-
kindness, are sometimes the arrantest horse-thieves and tomahawkers 
among them. So, at least, avers the backwoodsman. And though, know-
ing the Indian nature, as he thinks he does, he fancies he is not ignorant 
that an Indian may in some points deceive himself almost as effectu-
ally as in bush-tactics he can another, yet his theory and his practice 
as above contrasted seem to involve an inconsistency so extreme, that 
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the backwoodsman only accounts for it on the supposition that when a 
tomahawking red-man advances the notion of the benignity of the red 
race, it is but part and parcel with that subtle strategy which he finds so 
useful in war, in hunting, and the general conduct of life. (997)
For the Indian, then, there is no winning for losing. If he converts to 
Christianity, a sign of his conversion is his enlightened understanding of his 
depraved past. If he fails to convert, then no matter how good he may claim 
to be, he is mistaken. He is either lying to the white man or, in an especially 
depraved sense, lying to both the white man and himself. The Indian has no 
choice when this is his choice. That is to say, unlike the white man, who has a 
world of choices in front of him, he cannot be particular.11 In this sense only 
someone who behaves as brutally as the devil, in effect acting in response to 
the devil, is capable of resisting and overcoming the Indian’s cunning.
The paradigmatic Indian whom Judge Hall tells of is a chief named 
Mocmohoc, who for many years harassed a colony of settlers composed of 
the extended families of seven cousins, the Wrights and the Weavers. Even-
tually reduced to five cousins because of the ongoing attacks by Mocmohoc 
and his tribe, the settlers finally succeeded in making a treaty with him. 
Mocmohoc not only treated with them, but seemed genuinely pleased to 
become their friends. But still suspicious, the five agreed never to enter 
Mocmohoc’s wigwam together, so that if he was insincere, the remaining 
cousins could wreak their vengeance. Nonetheless, over time, Mocmohoc 
won them over, and he invited them all to a feast of bear’s meat. He then 
killed them all. Many years later, when reproached for this act of treachery 
by a hunter he is holding captive, Mocmohoc responds, “Treachery? Pale 
face! ’Twas they who broke their covenant first, in coming all together; they 
that broke it first, in trusting Mocmohoc” (999).
The effect that such depravity has on those who observe the Indian is 
considerable. Not all backwoodsmen are victims, but they all know some-
one or of someone who has been victimized. “What avails, then, that some 
one Indian, or some two or three, treat a backwoodsman friendly-like? He 
fears me, he thinks. Take my rifle from me, give him motive, and what will 
come? Or if not so, how know I what involuntary preparations may be going 
on in him for things as unbeknown in present time to him as me—a sort of 
chemical preparation in the soul for malice, as chemical preparation in the 
body for malady” (999–1000).
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These lines say much. A chemical preparation in the soul, involun-
tary preparations, in the face of free will there is a compulsion on the 
part of the Indian that, even though he resist with all his will, may over-
come him. And what may even be worse, should the Indian achieve a 
measure of success in resisting his inner self, there is no way that he 
will be trusted anyway. Despite this thorough examination of the soul 
of the Indian, the settler cannot know him, and, even more astonishing, 
the Indian cannot know himself. The settler may be ignorant, but his 
quandary is no different from that of anyone else who has realized that 
no one can know the pain of others. But Judge Hall seems to suggest 
something more, that the Indian cannot even know his own pain, and his 
self-ignorance will lead to self-destruction, even if that self-destruction is 
at the hands of the settler.
What is replayed here is the most common problem of skepticism, the 
inability to know others. But in this example the Indian is animalized, ren-
dered practically insentient. He is a force of nature; for the Indian-hater the 
very idea that an Indian can be thought of as a human being is oxymoronic. 
In fighting against his savage nature, the Indian cannot help becoming a 
coward. To resist your own nature requires not bravery, but submission to 
the superior culture of the white man, his Christianity. This leads the judge 
to his final observation concerning the Indian. “A coward friend, he makes 
a valiant foe” (1000).
At this point Judge Hall discusses the Indian-hater par excellence. Of 
the type, he argues, the purest is he who leaves his kin, goes deep into the 
forest primeval, and acts out “a calm and cloistered scheme of strategical, 
implacable, and lonesome vengeance” (1000). The emphasis might be on 
the word “cloistered,” for the Indian-hater par excellence is one whose biog-
raphy can never be told, who lives in intense solitude. Such a man is almost 
a parody of Emerson’s self-reliant individual. (It may even be the case that 
this was at least a part of Melville’s intent.) It is here that Melville has the 
judge turn more specifically to the story of John Moredock. The judge em-
phasizes how the perfection of self-reliant distance from others is not the 
case for Moredock. Though he was an Indian-hater, he had a heart, some-
thing that is curiously true of almost all real Indian-haters, who live through 
a contradiction, “namely, that nearly all Indian-haters, have at bottom, lov-
ing hearts; at any rate, more generous than the average” (1005). He had a 
wife and children, and even was considered to be a potential candidate for 
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governor of Illinois, but he declined, knowing that the pomp of high office 
would interfere with his ability to kill more Indians, distracting him from 
his solitary task.
What are we to make of this tale? It would seem that the metaphysics 
of Indian-hating involves some deep contradictions, to borrow from dialec-
tics. Loving yet hateful, suspicious yet openhearted, the Indian-hater can 
hate Indians only on condition that he be a lover of Christian mankind. He 
also, though, must be the sort of Christian who places suspicion above faith. 
But there is also the issue of grievance. Indian-haters must assume what 
William James was later to call “vicious naivety,” that is, an innocence that is 
not so innocent, that cloaks aggressive hatred in a sense of moral superiority 
and just vengeance.
In using the Indians this way, in making them into an entire race of 
confidence men, Melville is adding another chapter to his critique of the 
practicability of Christianity. That the Indian-hater is someone whom Mel-
ville uses to illustrate the unrealistic view of the world that a weak-minded 
Christian confidence might hold, presenting the Indian-hater as realistic in 
comparison, is but one dimension of his critique of American confidence. 
Another dimension of Melville’s critique of confidence has to do with its 
total complicity with genocidal evil, an evil that wraps itself in the cloak of 
Christian love.
At least as long as Christianity persists, Melville seems to be saying, so 
will this metaphysics. And so it is. The continued presence of such meta-
physics in the United States, even after the almost total decimation of the 
Indian tribes, suggests that, like other forms of hatred, it is able to outlast 
its original object. But this persistence is also transmogrified over time, 
as substitute objects of hatred and the hidden expression of other desires 
come into play. In that, Indian-hating either parallels Christianity, which 
responds to the world with its own powers, on its own terms, so to speak, 
and constantly finds new objects, or is one of the forms that Christianity as-
sumes in a frontier society.
Beyond the troubled notion of a Christianity that persists formally 
while losing sight of its original object of hatred, the devil, Melville presents 
us with an image of knowledge that finds itself in keeping with, or perhaps 
even prophesying, a larger theme of Western experience, that of the descent 
into nihilism. But nihilism itself has a long trajectory, and perhaps there are 
steps along the way.
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The Ingalls in Indian Territory
Along with hatred and repulsion, the metaphysics of Indian-hating is driven 
by fear and desire. Indeed, fear and desire are the twins of hatred and re-
pulsion. It is a bit like the story of the bear hunter who kills a bear, is mauled 
by another bear, heals, seeks revenge—and so the next year he kills the bear 
that mauled him. But then he is mauled by another bear. He eventually kills 
that bear and is mauled again by yet another bear. This goes on for a number 
of bears over the course of a number of years. Eventually, after he kills yet 
another bear, he is tapped on the shoulder, and the biggest bear of all says 
to him, “You don’t really come here for the hunting, do you?” This is the 
sort of dark comedy that Melville is able to extract from his relating the tale 
of Moredock. It is a desire that turns absurd. That which is forbidden exerts 
this sort of psychic power, in that we always seem to want most that which is 
denied to us, no matter how much harm it causes us, or perhaps because of 
the harm it causes us. Melville’s Indian-hater enjoys hating Indians, but the 
terrible price he pays is that there is no escaping this pleasure, and hence it 
becomes a pleasure that is no longer a pleasure.
What Charles Ingalls wanted was land. As settlers closed in on his fam-
ily living in the woods of Wisconsin, Ingalls concluded that it would be 
good to move to the western country. “In the West the land was level, and 
there were no trees. The grass grew thick and high. There the wild animals 
wandered and fed as though they were in a pasture that stretched much 
farther than a man could see. And there were no settlers.”12 The narrator 
immediately explains, “Only Indians lived there.”13
As is made clear in the conclusion of the story, Ingalls had decided, 
apparently in a mistaken faith in politicians who had said that the Indian 
Territory of Oklahoma was about to be opened to settlement, to jump the 
gun and get there first. His working assumption, like that of the others who 
squatted on the Indian Territory, was that the Indians had no serious right 
to inhabit the land despite the treaties that had been made, and that if set-
tlers like Ingalls would stake claims to the land, eventually the government 
of the United States would be compelled to protect them from the Indians. 
But Ingalls’s timing was off. At the end of Little House on the Prairie the 
Ingalls family have left their house and are moving on, northward toward 
Minnesota.
But the arc of this narrative is effectively framed not so much by Pa 
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Ingalls’s restlessness as by Laura Ingalls’s desire. This desire is first (predict-
ably) planted in her by her father. “Pa promised that when they came to the 
West, Laura should see a papoose. ‘What is a papoose?’ she asked him, and 
he said, ‘A papoose is a little, brown, Indian baby.’”14 Laura’s curiosity about 
papooses grows throughout the book and is coupled to more general, vague 
discussions of Indians. The expression of unconscious desire embedded in 
these discussions is remarkable. Consider this discussion between Laura 
and her mother as they are eating supper while spending their first night on 
the land they were settling on the prairie.
“Where is a papoose, Ma?” Laura asked.
“Don’t speak with your mouth full, Laura,” said Ma.
So Laura chewed and swallowed, and she said, “I want to see a 
papoose.”
“Mercy on us!” Ma said. “Whatever makes you want to see Indians? 
We will see enough of them. More than we want to, I wouldn’t wonder.”
“They wouldn’t hurt us, would they?” Mary asked. Mary was always 
good; she never spoke with her mouth full.
“No!” Ma said. “Don’t get such an idea into your head.”
“Why don’t you like Indians, Ma?” Laura asked, and she caught a 
drip of molasses with her tongue.
“I just don’t like them; and don’t lick your fingers, Laura,” said Ma.
“This is Indian country, isn’t it?” Laura said. “What did we come to 
their country for, if you don’t like them?”
Ma said she didn’t know whether this was Indian country or not. 
She didn’t know where the Kansas line was. But whether or not, the In-
dians would not be here long. Pa had word from a man in Washington 
that the Indian Territory would be open to settlement soon. It might 
already be open to settlement. They could not know, because Washing-
ton was so far away.15
In The History of Manners, Norbert Elias notes a dynamic in the emer-
gence of manners as a civilizing process. Manners initially were developed 
among the late medieval nobility so they could distinguish themselves from 
the very highest classes of royalty. Having less wealth, they invented other 
forms of distinction. Then those of the highest rank took note, and manners 
penetrated to the upper classes. And so manners were further refined by 
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the nobility in an attempt to retain their distinction. Though the back-and-
forth of codes of etiquette was for some time chaotic, Elias suggests that 
over time certain lines of development emerged. “These include,” he writes, 
“for example, what may be described as an advance of the threshold of 
embarrassment and shame, as ‘refinement,’ or as ‘civilization.’”16 This inter-
nalization of distinctions crossing ranks bound medieval society together.
The carrying of manners to the frontier, it would seem, involves pre-
cisely a raising of the threshold of shame. Even within the limited frame 
of the Ingalls family, Laura is less civilized than Mary; Mary is older, of 
course, and also more refined. So the questioning about Indians comes 
from Laura, who is less ashamed, less embarrassed to ask. Her mother is 
the teacher of her children, and of her husband (for she was born and bred 
in the East). She is the teacher of shame, and of its eventual internalization 
into guilt. Having absorbed the lesson of manners far more completely, Ma 
is unwilling to explain her reasons for hating Indians to the girls. But hate 
them she does.
But there is also a coupling of the desire to see with the act of eating. 
Laura shifts from asking what a papoose is to wanting to see one, imme-
diately after swallowing her food, without yet being given an explanation 
about what a papoose is by her Ma. Her father had already told her that a 
papoose is a “little, brown, Indian baby,” but here she wants to learn from 
her mother. And her mother resists, as if implicitly realizing the danger of 
Laura’s desire. The repetition of the question, the persistence of her inquiry, 
which eventually elicits a longer response from Ma, communicates a deep 
nervousness regarding the boundaries they are crossing. The entire conver-
sation is framed by questions concerning territorial lines. Laura wants to 
know whether they are in Indian country, and her mother tells her that she 
doesn’t know, perhaps that it doesn’t matter anyway.
The next major discussion of Indians occurs when two Indians invade 
the house while Pa is hunting. Ma feeds them cornbread after they sign for 
her to do so, and they take Pa’s tobacco with them. When Pa comes home, 
he explains that they did the right thing to feed them. But Laura, whom Pa 
had warned not to let the dog, Jack, off the leash, inadvertently lets Pa know 
she had thought to do just that. Pa is angry.
“Do you know what would have happened if you had turned Jack 
loose?” Pa asked.
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“No, Pa,” they whispered.
“He would have bitten those Indians,” said Pa. “Then there would 
have been trouble. Bad trouble. Do you understand?”
“Yes, Pa,” they said. But they did not understand.
“Would they have killed Jack?” Laura asked.
“Yes. And that’s not all. You girls remember this: You do as you’re 
told, no matter what happens.” . . .
“Do as you’re told,” said Pa, “and no harm will come to you.”17
Absolute obedience of the young girls in a situation of potential danger is his 
lesson to them. But there is more going on here than even the possibility of 
a confrontation over the dog (though such a confrontation is to occur later 
in the narrative).
One of the distinctive features of the Indians who come to the house 
is their strong odor. When Laura goes into the house she smells them first. 
“Laura ran toward Ma, but just as she reached the hearth, she smelled a 
horribly bad smell, and she looked up at the Indians.”18 Laura soon real-
izes why they smell so bad. “Around their waists each of the Indians wore a 
leather thong, and the furry skin of a small animal hung down in front. The 
fur was striped black and white, and now Laura knew what made that smell. 
The skins were fresh skunk skins.”19 Aside from the obvious use of skunk 
skins as codpieces, there is another symbolic role played by the presence of 
the skunk skins. Many Native American tribes tell tales of how the skunk 
was a monster that was brought down to size by one hero or another, some-
times being a symbol of evil.20 That the skunk skins are worn as codpieces 
indicates a threat of evil that has undertones of sexual violence. Pa seems 
aware of this fact. At one point during the evening after the Indians came to 
the house he says, “The main thing is to be on good terms with the Indians. 
We don’t want to wake up one night with a band of the screeching dev—.”21 
At this point Ma shushes him, presumably so that he won’t frighten the girls. 
But the association of the Indians with demons is completely consistent 
with Melville’s depiction of the rationale for Indian-hating. For the Indian-
hater it is impossible to be on good terms with the Indians. The tension that 
comes from trying to do so while knowing that they might turn into devils 
at any moment is unbearable.
One wonders what Pa is thinking. Despite the obvious signs of danger, 
he continues to make excursions away from the house. He goes to Inde-
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pendence, Missouri, some forty miles away, to trade furs for supplies and 
farming tools. Those trips also keep him informed of the latest develop-
ments concerning the status of the Indian Territory. The tensions with 
the Indians continue to build. Indeed, in the winter months preceding 
the planting season, two more Indians appear while Pa is away, and they 
almost make off with the furs Pa had been gathering to trade for farming 
supplies. (The Indian seizing the furs was stopped by his companion. The 
implication was that to take the furs was to cross some line that should not 
be crossed. Apparently, the Indians had good reason for tracing a delicate 
path as well.)22
When Pa comes home and is informed of this incident, he “looked 
sober.” That evening he plays a song on his fiddle about an Indian maid 
named Alfarata, which contains the lines “Fleeting years have borne away / 
The voice of Alfarata.” Laura asks where the voice went. “Oh I suppose she 
went West,” Ma answered. “That’s what Indians do.” This leads Laura to 
further questions about the Indians, which eventually result in Pa’s provid-
ing a fuller explanation, though not quite a complete one.
“When white settlers come into a country, the Indians have to move 
on. The government is going to move these Indians farther west, any 
time now. That’s why we’re here, Laura. White people are going to 
settle all this country, and we get the best land because we get here 
first and take our pick. Now do you understand?”
“Yes, Pa,” Laura said. “But, Pa, I thought this was Indian Territory. 
Won’t it make the Indians mad to have to—”
“No more questions, Laura,” Pa said, firmly. “Go to sleep.”23
This question, however, lingers through the rest of the story.
Eventually, the Indians do get mad and threaten to go on the war-
path. Only the intervention of a leader of the Osage tribe, named Soldat du 
Chêne, prevents a war from breaking out, which would have increased the 
possibility of the Ingalls family being massacred.24 Two days after the war 
party breaks up, a procession of Osage Indians passes the Ingalls home-
stead. The procession stretches as far as the eye can see, and it takes all 
day for the Indians to depart. Eventually, Laura gets her wish and sees a 
papoose, riding in a basket on the side of a pony with its mother. She looks 
deep into the baby’s black eyes.
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“Pa,” she said, “get me that little Indian baby!”
“Hush, Laura!” Pa told her sternly.
The little baby was going by. Its head turned and its eyes kept look-
ing into Laura’s eyes.
“Oh, I want it! I want it!” Laura begged. The baby was going farther 
and farther away, but it did not stop looking back at Laura. “It wants to 
stay with me,” Laura begged. “Please, Pa, please!”25
Fear has quickly been transformed into desire. Laura persists, even in her 
shame, and begins to cry.
Ma said she had never heard of such a thing. “For shame, Laura,” she 
said, but Laura could not stop crying. “Why on earth do you want an 
Indian baby, of all things!” Ma asked her.
“Its eyes are so black,” Laura sobbed. She could not say what she 
meant.
“Why, Laura,” Ma said, “you don’t want another baby. We have a 
baby, our own baby.”
“I want the other one, too!” Laura sobbed, loudly.26
Laura cannot say what she means, which is to say she cannot say why she 
wants what she wants. But want that baby she does. This desire to have that 
which she has been wanting to see, to see that which she originally wanted 
to know, a desire to know that is incited by her father’s comments, conflates 
knowledge, scopophilia, and possession into a single urge. She would add 
that baby to her collection—baby Carrie, and the papoose, the “other one, 
too.” It is a hunger she feels, a deep desire to possess, a desire that will be 
satisfied only temporarily and will require further fulfillment as time passes.
Laura is not an Indian-hater in Melville’s sense. But she is a member 
of a family of Indian-haters. It is apparent that she seems to be attempting 
to break with the family through the vehicle of desiring to possess the baby. 
Perhaps the desire to possess is not so far from the desire to destroy. But the 
generational shift is clear. Take the baby. Eat that baby, and move on.
Laura is indifferent to the baby’s mother. This indifference is remark-
able only if we think that she is seeing these Indians as fellow humans. She 
is not. They have become things to her. But then again, so is her own little 
sister, further down the internal civilizational order of her family.
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That evening, as the long procession finally comes to an end, the family 
seem to realize that they have been witnesses (at least) to something wrong. 
“Then the very last pony went by. But Pa and Ma and Laura and Mary still 
stayed in the doorway, looking, until that long line of Indians slowly pulled 
itself over the western edge of the world. And nothing was left but silence 
and emptiness. All the world seemed quiet and lonely. . . . [Laura] sat a long 
time on the doorstep, looking into the empty west where the Indians had 
gone.”27 The quiet that the Ingallses now sense is not a relief to them. None 
of them is hungry; they all feel, as Ma says, “let down.”28 This is what loneli-
ness is about, the loneliness of being absent in presence.29 Everyone alone. 
Yet they are alone together.
Why are they let down? Let down by whom? Ma and Pa are unable 
or unwilling to acknowledge their own complicity in this sad chapter. It is 
simply something that the Indians must bear. But they still feel their guilt, 
in the form of a loss of appetite.30
None of this guilt is resolved. Instead, the next chapter begins, “After 
the Indians had gone, a great peace settled on the prairie.”31 The page is 
turned, spring arrives, the burnt-over prairie turns green as if overnight, 
and a period of bucolic planting and caring for plants begins. “Pretty soon 
they would all begin to live like kings.”32 Only they won’t. Within a few 
months they will be on their way again, ordered out of Indian Territory 
by the U.S. government. Pa, hearing the news, will immediately make the 
decision to have the family leave the little house and homestead where they 
had spent the year. They take off the next day. But before they leave, he 
expresses his outrage. “I’ll not stay here to be taken away by the soldiers 
like an outlaw! If some blasted politicians in Washington hadn’t sent word 
it would be all right to settle here, I’d never have been three miles over the 
line into Indian Territory. But I’m not waiting for the soldiers to take us out. 
We’re going now!”33 In expressing his sense of betrayal, Pa conveniently ig-
nores the fact that he knew, when he entered Indian Territory, that he was 
squatting there. He never questioned his own sense of the inevitability of 
the fate of the Indians, his confidence in the government’s bad faith, and his 
reliance on the politicians’ willingness to break promises to the Indians. So 
when those politicians, in a rare gesture, keep their promise (for a while) to 
the tribes in the Indian Territory, he feels betrayed. This sense of betrayal 
can easily be transferred to the Indians themselves. Here in miniature we 
see the seeding of the metaphysics of Indian-hating in Charles Ingalls.
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So they leave. But there is one last peculiarity embedded in the final 
chapter of Little House on the Prairie. As the family settles in for their first 
night back on the plain, again on the move, Pa breaks out his fiddle. He 
begins by playing “Oh, Susanna,” Stephen Foster’s song of the Gold Rush. 
Of course, the Gold Rush was that great leap that inspired so many to go 
West. But it is the next two songs that Pa chooses to play that are most tell-
ing. First he plays “Dixie,” a song that originated in black minstrelsy of the 
1850s and then became the unofficial anthem of the Confederacy. Then 
he plays “Battle Cry of Freedom,” an 1862 patriotic song of the Union. It 
is as though he is enacting the tableau of race and reunion so powerfully 
explained by David Blight in his historical masterpiece of the same name.34 
Blight shows how the reconciliation of southern and northern Americans 
in the post–Civil War era entailed a dramatic and drastic revision of the 
reasons for and outcome of the Civil War, one that subordinated the eman-
cipation narrative of the war for one of “brother against brother” quarrels 
concerning autonomy versus unity. What happened by way of this forgetting 
of the reason for the war was the repression of liberated African Americans. 
If the war was fought over differences that were exclusively between white 
Americans, then the reconciliation of North and South, it follows, would 
involve only them. Of course, that involvement would entail the oppression 
of those who were the very reason for their war.
What might this strategic forgetting have to do with the metaphysics of 
Indian-hating? It turns out: everything. In the essay that concludes volume 
1 of Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville writes about “the three 
races that inhabit the United States.”35 For Tocqueville “the Negro” and 
“white man,” however unhappily, are destined to be with each other even 
when and if slavery is abolished. And even if the Negro remains servile, 
he will nonetheless survive. But the Indian is destined to be destroyed. 
Tocqueville writes at length of the process by which the penetration of the 
wilderness by European settlers disturbed the game on which the Indians 
depend; the settlements are made on territories ill-secured by the tribes, 
since they possess those lands collectively, if at all. “The Indians, who had 
lived until then in a sort of abundance, find it difficult to subsist, and have 
still more difficulty in procuring the objects of exchange that they need. 
By making their game flee, it is almost as if one had made the fields of 
our farmers sterile. Soon the means of existence is almost entirely lacking 
in them.”36 Tocqueville remarks on these matters sorrowfully, as though a 
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natural calamity were occurring. (The tone of his comments is similar to the 
language used by investment bankers when the markets crashed as a conse-
quence of their fraudulent practices; they referred to the crash as a financial 
tsunami, something no one could have predicted, a sort of act of God.)
William Connolly has noted that Tocqueville’s posture enabled the de-
struction of Indians to proceed under the guise of the civilizing process. He 
notes, “Tocqueville registers, then, in carefully crafted language, the con-
struction of ‘America,’ a civi-territorial complex in which the crucial dimen-
sions of territory and civilization reinforce each other until they accumulate 
enough force together to propel the ‘triumphal progress of civilization across 
the wilderness.’ What of those wandering nomads who are, well, not dispos-
sessed from territory they never possessed but displaced from a wilderness 
upon which they wandered? Tocqueville disposes of them sadly and regret-
fully, for they are dead to civilization even before the advance of civilization 
progressively kills them off.”37 Connolly’s description of Tocqueville’s sorrow 
could be transferred completely and clearly to the Ingalls family, who feel 
empty and lonely when the Indians leave, knowing, without acknowledging, 
that their role in the civilizing process entailed driving the Indians away. 
Yet by the end of the next and final chapter, they are cheered by the songs 
of the Civil War, not the war that was fought, but the fictional war between 
quarreling brothers, in which the ever-present bodies of black Americans 
are ignored in the name of national harmony.
In the End All the World Will Be America
“Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and moreso than that is 
now,” John Locke writes in his Second Treatise of Government.38 Locke’s 
state of nature was imaginary, but his imagination, as well as that of most of 
those who employed the concept, was sparked by the fact of the European 
encounter with the inhabitants of the Americas. Locke referred to Indians 
repeatedly and seems to have been fascinated with them, as though there 
were a way they might hold a key to all of political understanding. His state 
of nature was much more gentle than that imagined by Thomas Hobbes, at 
least in part because of better knowledge of the ways of the tribes of North 
America. Hobbes projected the idea of a war of all against all, not the loose 
associations that Locke could see as being the beginnings of civil society. 
Immediately following his description of life in the state of nature being 
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nasty, brutish, and short, Hobbes writes, “It may per adventure be thought, 
there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it 
was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where 
they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except 
the government of small Families, the concord whereof depend on naturall 
lust, have no government at all; and live this day in the brutish manner, as I 
said before.”39 In fact, a pregovernmental civil society is not so far from the 
manner in which many of the tribes seemed to govern themselves. Thomas 
Paine would later model his early governmental form directly on the way 
Indians governed themselves.
Let us think again about the theoretical justification for killing Indians, 
going back to Melville’s text. “What avails, then, that some one Indian, or 
some two or three, treat a backwoodsman friendly-like? He fears me, he 
thinks. Take my rifle from me, give him motive, and what will come? Or if 
not so, how know I what involuntary preparations may be going on in him 
for things as unbeknown in present time to him as me—a sort of chemical 
preparation in the soul for malice, as chemical preparation in the body for 
malady” (999–1000). What chance is one to take when someone who looks 
innocuous enough, and who professes to be a good human being, even if not 
a Christian, is nonetheless, perhaps even without knowing so, evil? What 
does it mean that the preparation for death include a chemical preparation? 
Is it only a poison, or is it even something more?
In the context of Indian-hating, what would it mean for all the world 
to be America now, that is, for us to imagine, like Locke (perhaps even 
more so, like Hobbes) that there is a brutish world of universal war, filled 
with untrustworthy savages? Could it be something like this? “If there is a 
one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda build or 
develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our 
response.”40 This “one percent doctrine,” as it is known, was first articulated 
by Richard Cheney, the vice president of the United States, following the 
attacks of September 11, 2001. It is a particular response to globalization, 
which in this context means the return of the entire world to a state of na-
ture. Before the 9/11 attacks Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in a 
memorandum titled “National Security Issues—Post Cold War Threats,” 
speculated about the equalizing power of contemporary technology. “The 
post Cold-War liberalization of trade in advanced technology goods and ser-
vices has made it possible for the poorest nations on earth to rapidly acquire 
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the most destructive military technology ever devised, including nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. We cannot 
prevent them from doing so.”41 Following the attacks of 9/11 the problem 
became even more difficult to address. Now it wasn’t simply poor states, but 
nonstate actors who would be able to collude with poor states to attack the 
United States. In this reversal, the world is filled with Indians, nonstate ac-
tors if ever there were, untrustworthy heathens, tribes of non-Christian ter-
rorists, filled with passion, undisciplined, but also uncompromising, willing 
to die for their beliefs, or at least for their reactive hate against those who 
in their innocence have unleashed death. Modern America is now besieged 
by the denizens of a world that is imagined in terms that are all too like the 
America imagined by the contract theorists.
And here the deepest irony of the historical unfolding as the metaphys-
ics of Indian-hating comes into view. It can be found in this final projection 
of American paranoid power. Where once the world was like America, in 
Locke’s and Hobbes’s states of nature, now it is the case that all the world is 
again like America, except for . . . America. We look out on a world that has 
returned to the state of nature imagined by Hobbes and Locke.
It is a fantastic vision, in the most straightforwardly etymological sense 
of the term. That is, it is a vision of the world that is a fantasy. It always has 
been a fantasy. That the United States has for so long deferred its historical 
accounting for the debt it has incurred by the destruction of the Indians 
does not mean it will not in the end be called to account. Melville knew 
this. He anticipated the prophecy that Lincoln thundered in his otherwise 
conciliatory Second Inaugural Address, in which Lincoln said of the war, 
“Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bonds-
man’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until 
every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn 
with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said 
‘the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.’” It is a ter-
rible legacy. Lincoln was able to weigh the tragedy of slavery, but not that of 
the vast harm of those other others. Possession against death or possession 
as the step after death, these are the choices for this culture. Laura still 
desires that baby.
Lincoln’s failure of sympathetic imagination helped point the United 
States toward its tragic future, one in which the rest of the world passes us 
by, as though we are the haunted house of the neighborhood of nations. 
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(This must be whispered, for as we know, Lincoln is a great man.) But Mel-
ville, who lived through Lincoln’s administration, and others, knew bet-
ter. He brought The Confidence-Man to an end without a real conclusion 
because he knew Americans would never disembark from the Fidèle. We 
remain in the thrall of the confidence man. And the boat drifts ever farther 
south.
That this metaphysical heritage of hatred found its clear articulation in 
what I suspect is Melville’s least often read novel is completely consistent 
with his understanding of the tragedy of American ignorance. A prophet 
then, he remains a prophet now. Once again, it seems, in the United States’ 
collective outrage, indignation, sense of injury, and self-deception, the 
country finds itself surrounded. We are not surrounded by heathens, but 
by our own past. Melville anticipated Lincoln on this matter as well. He 
presents us with a terrible heritage, but an honest one. For that, we need to 
thank him, reluctantly.
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Melville’s War Poetry 
and the Human Form
Roger Berkowitz
Forms, measured forms.
—Herman Melville, Billy Budd
Nothing can lift the heart of man
Like manhood in a fellow-man.
The thought of heaven’s great King afar
But humbles us—too weak to scan;
But manly greatness men can span,
And feel the bonds that draw.
—Herman Melville, “On the Photograph of a Corps Commander”
At the climax of Melville’s Billy Budd, Sailor (An Inside Narrative), Captain 
Vere is overseeing the trial and conviction of Billy Budd. Billy, Vere recog-
nizes, is wholly innocent, a messenger of divine judgment. And still, for the 
captain forced to become judge, the necessary outcome of the impending 
trial is clear: “Struck dead by an angel of God! Yet the angel must hang!”1
Budd’s conviction is frequently read as illustrating the conflict between 
formal state laws and natural law.2 The conflict between natural and state 
law, however, is not the intellectual or moral fault line of Billy Budd. Vere’s 
reasoned plea that the judges recognize the obligation of their magisterial 
buttons ultimately is unsuccessful. After his speech, the judges “moved in 
their seats, less convinced than agitated by the course of an argument trou-
bling but the more the spontaneous conflict within” (Billy Budd, 1415). As 
Vere himself admits, in a contest between these two legal orders, natural 
law—according to which Billy is “a fellow-creature innocent before God, 
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and whom we feel to be so”—must prevail. The appeal to positive law alone 
will not trump God’s law.
It is here that Melville has Vere “abruptly chang[e] his tone” (Billy 
Budd, 1415). The captain’s new tactic is to argue that it is war that ne-
cessitates Billy’s hanging. “We proceed,” Vere announces, “under the law 
of the Mutiny Act. In feature no child can resemble his father more than 
that Act resembles in spirit the thing from which it derives—War” (ibid., 
1415–1416). The invocation of war is essential, because war—and with it 
the law—“looks but to the frontage, the appearance,” and the form of ac-
tions. In war and law, form displaces content as the truth of the matter 
itself. The outward form trumps inward intent, which is why “Budd’s intent 
or non-intent is nothing to the purpose” (ibid., 1416).
That form is a central conceit of Billy Budd is no secret, announced as 
it is in both the final chapter of the main narrative and in the first chapter 
of the supplemental sequel that Melville appends to the text. First, in the 
final chapter of the main text, form is given voice by Vere at the moment of 
Budd’s hanging—after which Vere commands a “beating to quarters at an 
hour prior to the customary one.” The reason for the ritual is given clearly: 
“‘With mankind,’ [Vere] would say, ‘forms, measured forms, are everything; 
and that is the import couched in the story of Orpheus with his lyre spell-
binding the wild denizens of the wood’” (Billy Budd, 1430). The spellbind-
ing form of ritual, as is true of music, serves the purpose of discipline and 
war. Musical form, as Plato knew, is where one must erect the guardhouse 
of culture and order. It is the demand of formality that drives Vere and thus 
the narrative structure of Billy Budd.
Melville’s novella puts form in question throughout in the contest 
between war and peace and the stylized fictionality of the narrative. But 
Melville explodes the formal closure only at the end by appending a short, 
three-chapter sequel to his tale, a sequel that begins by announcing the fic-
tionality of form: “The symmetry of form attainable in pure fiction can not 
so readily be achieved in narration essentially having less to do with fable 
than with fact. Truth uncompromisingly told will always have ragged edges; 
hence the conclusion of such a narrative is apt to be less finished than an 
architectural finial” (Billy Budd, 1431). If war and the force of war on the 
Bellipotent require a formal closure that casts a spell that binds men to a 
common purpose, the humanity of fiction liberates man to the human pas-
sions, the philanthropic love of man that celebrates Billy Budd’s uncanny 
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goodness. Melville’s vision of war is tragic, not simply in the human cost 
war exacts, but also in the opposing forces war unleashes. Destructive in 
its violence, war is also unifying in its formal beauty. War unmakes political 
life, but it also can bring new states to be. War, in Melville, epitomizes the 
excessive humanity of what dissolves forms and breaks customary proce-
dures; yet war also demands a lawful formality that will straitjacket human 
passion into an equally human need for order.
The Forms of War
The importance of war in Melville’s later writing has only occasionally been 
acknowledged. In her insightful essay “Billy Budd and Melville’s Philoso-
phy of War,” Joyce Sparer Adler suggests an opposition between Vere and 
Melville’s philosophies of war: “While to Vere war is a sacred, fated form 
and the Bellipotent (literally, the power of war) a place of worship whose 
military architecture is complete, to Melville that architecture is neither 
holy nor final. Vere would bind man’s consciousness; Melville would awaken 
it.”3 There is, Adler argues, a gulf separating Vere’s warrior ethic and Mel-
ville’s humanism. Vere is the “symbolic figure . . . of civilized man. . . . His 
ultimate faith is in Force.”4 He is, she asserts, “appalling to Melville,” an 
example of the tragedy of civilization in which the creative potentialities of 
man are wasted.5 Vere becomes a one-sided acolyte—“the god whom Vere 
has been trained to worship is Mars.”6 War, in Adler’s rendering of Melville, 
is “madness,” a hell where one encounters the full “absence of morality.”7
At times Adler acknowledges the contradictoriness of Melville’s phi-
losophy of war, containing both abhorrence and luminosity.8 And Vere, too, 
she writes, has a certain humanity, so that “the contradiction within Vere is 
his very essence; the split in him is as central to his meaning as is the split 
in Ahab.”9 But Adler largely ignores these subtleties in her effort to recruit 
Vere and Melville to the side of a humanistic liberalism. In doing so, she 
misses the way that Melville’s vision of war emerges as a deeply human en-
deavor, and humanity itself is seen to emerge only through man’s bellicosity.
Another limitation of Adler’s powerful reading of Melville’s war phi-
losophy is her complete oversight of Battle-Pieces and Aspects of the War, 
Melville’s book-length collection of poetry inspired by the United States 
Civil War.10 She is, of course, not alone in ignoring Battle-Pieces, poems that 
are often relegated to that barren decade after Melville abandoned writing 
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prose in the aftermath of the critical and commercial failures of Moby-
Dick (1851), Pierre (1852), and The Confidence-Man (1857), and before the 
posthumous publication of Billy Budd (1924). Melville wrote and published 
nothing for nearly a decade before Battle-Pieces (1866) appeared, and this 
barren period is typically seen as the end of Melville’s writerly life, save for 
the “Indian summer” that brought forth the unfinished Billy Budd.
For Robert Penn Warren, who edited a collection of Melville’s poetry, 
that poetry needs to be understood “against the backdrop of his defeat as 
a writer.”11 Battle-Pieces must also be seen against the backdrop of war. 
“War,” as Warren remarks, “despite suffering and horror, fulfills certain 
deep-seated needs in men. . . . Men yearn for significance in life, for the 
thrill of meaning in action, for communion in a common cause, for the test 
of their fiber, paradoxically for both the affirmation of, and the death of, 
the self.”12 It would be one-sided to see war in Melville as simply a vessel 
promising a vital affirmation of life. And yet, Warren rightly notes that Mel-
ville’s return to life as a writer occurred amid the wages of war. And so for 
readings of Billy Budd, set as it is amid war and on the Bellipotent, these 
wartime poems are a necessary key to Melville’s later work.
Andrew Delbanco, Melville’s most recent biographer, acknowledges 
that Melville’s “turn to poetry amounted to an attempt to start his life anew 
amid a sense of failure.”13 For Delbanco that effort at rebirth was a failure: 
Melville “never satisfactorily” figured out how to present the Civil War in 
verse.14 Delbanco finds the poems overly “constructed, with none of the 
adventurous freedom of Melville’s stories and novels,” and constrained by 
a “certain hampered carefulness.”15 In the seven pages Delbanco gives to 
Battle-Pieces in his nearly four-hundred-page biography, he concludes that 
William Dean Howells had it right in an 1867 review: Melville’s poems are 
secondhand accounts of the war that ignore the war itself, poems filled with 
hot air, “not words and blood, but words alone.”16
Modern readings of Melville’s war poetry similarly tend toward paci-
fism. Michael Warner’s “What Like a Bullet Can Undeceive?” argues that 
Battle-Pieces rejects war. For Warner, Melville’s poetry reveals that “the 
whole idea of war fought for a cause, any cause, is made to seem absurd.”17 
“War,” he writes, “dramatizes the guilt of humanity,” and Melville’s “pasto-
ral theodicy makes violence categorically illegitimate.”18 The very brilliance 
of a bullet can “undeceive” men and show the illegitimate violence of war. 
“The bullet strips away conviction and habit,” leaving man bereft of any be-
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liefs and values, metaphysically naked, possessed of “not a creed but a way 
of prescinding from creed.”19 Warner’s account of Melville on war leaves us 
skeptical and disbelieving.
One way of politicizing Melville is to enlist him in a cause, be that 
cause pacifism or equality. Many of the essays in this volume, and also Jason 
Frank in his excellent introduction to it, imagine a political Melville who 
“articulates a political critique at the level of philosophical principle and 
deep cultural presupposition.”20 Melville’s critical eye is enlisted in the en-
lightenment project of exposing hierarchies of oppression and mechanisms 
of white supremacy. I do not deny these political readings of Melville; 
and yet Melville’s politics should not be reduced to a liberationist project 
of emancipation. For Melville politics is not simply about critique and un-
masking. Politics in Melville is importantly about the telling of stories and 
rendering of forms that will bind us to our highest and most glorious human 
and national ideals.
As Robert Penn Warren reminds us, Melville’s poetry in Battle-Pieces 
soars as an original metaphysical inquiry into the tragic polarities of the 
human condition as illumined by the act of war. The Civil War was pre-
cisely the “kind of big, athletic, overmastering subject which [Melville] al-
ways needed for his best work, and it was bloodily certified by actuality.”21 
Melville’s Civil War poetry collides grand ideologies with human passions, 
all tempered with a reverence for manly heroism that coexists with woeful 
destruction. In the clash and resolution of striving oppositions that fill his 
verse account of the Civil War, Melville achieved a “metaphysical style of 
his own.”22 It was a style born not only of struggle, nationalism, and rebirth, 
but of the equally bloody and heroic reality of the Civil War.
For Stanton Garner, Melville sought a “grand synthesis” that would pres-
ent America and its rebirth from the purification of war. At bottom, the war 
confronts Melville as an anarchic challenge, the breakup of the Union and 
the extraordinary civilization-destroying violence. In response to the chaos 
of the war, Battle-Pieces is composed of a “complex of metaphors and im-
ages” that begin, repeat, and transform themselves “so that the reader is not 
fully aware of what the book is saying or how it is saying it until after he has 
read all of the poems.”23 There is, as David Devries and Hugh Egan argue, 
“a heteroglossic lyric style” that “confront[s] the bewildering horror of the 
Civil War.”24 And yet these multiple styles and voices are forged into a unit.
Amid such plurality, Battle-Pieces is a “coherent literary entity,” a pre-
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cisely thematized struggle between the formal claim of a resurrected unity 
contrasted with the metaphysical brutality of war. The poems reflect the 
dissolution of faith and the loss of political meaning as well as an affirma-
tion of formal images—literally the “aspects of war”—that strike us with 
their heroic beauty. It is these aspects that Melville imbues with the com-
pelling power to rebind a broken people that is the driving political vision 
of Battle-Pieces. War has a vital capacity to focus attention on formal acts 
of greatness. And it is this formal power to raise aspect above reason that 
animates Battle-Pieces.
America and Its Shadows
Of the many images that run through Battle-Pieces, none is more present 
than the shadow. The book begins with “The Portent,” a poem telling of the 
shadow that John Brown cast on the American experiment. Another early 
poem, “The Conflict of Convictions,” introduces the new Iron Dome, which 
replaced the original wooden dome that had earlier adorned the Capitol. 
Here the Iron Dome “fling[s]” its shadow across the land, marking the 
maturing and also hardening of the American nation:
Power unanointed may come—
Dominion (unsought by the free)
And the Iron Dome,
Stronger for stress and strain,
Fling her huge shadow athwart the main;
But the Founder’s dream shall flee. (Battle-Pieces, 17)
The Iron Dome symbolizes both the loss of American innocence and the 
rise of brutal and imperial government, one whose bureaucratic inflexibility 
threatens the foundation of freedom. Together, the technological intransi-
gence of the Iron Dome and the racial shadow of John Brown are the dual 
specters that threaten to undermine American freedom.
Finally, Battle-Pieces ends with “America”—at least tentatively (for 
Battle-Pieces, like Billy Budd, has a supplement that bursts its formal 
bounds—in which the double shadows of slavery and dominion are “chased 
by light”).
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A clear calm look. It spake of pain,
But such as purifies from stain—
Sharp pangs that never come again—
And triumph repressed by knowledge meet,
Power dedicate, and hope grown wise,
And youth matured for age’s seat—
Law on her brow and empire in her eyes.
So she, with graver air and lifted flag;
While the shadow, chased by light,
Fled along the far-drawn height,
And left her on the crag. (Battle-Pieces, 162)
If the shadow of John Brown is the “Portent” that shatters the innocence 
of the American founding,25 and the dominating shadow of the Iron Dome 
threatens to extinguish American freedom, the fleeing shadow in the face 
of “America” reborn leaves the country wiser, more mature, lawful, and 
safe on the heights. Purified by pain, triumphal in knowledge gained, and 
transposed from death to life, America shines, free from the shadows that 
haunted her.
As a whole, Battle-Pieces aspires to set the United States into verse as 
a country reborn from the ravages of war.26 Or, at least, that is the book’s 
formally coherent aspiration. The coherent narrative, however, clashes with 
and is even undermined by Melville’s counterthemes of chaos, anarchy, and 
excess. Against the figures of formal order, there is also a celebration of dis-
sonance, a polyphony that bursts the bounds of formal symmetry and thus 
continues to threaten the newly reborn nation.
America Re-formed
Melville presents Battle-Pieces as a unification of the plurality in his intro-
ductory note—a note set off from the whole by brackets and on an unnum-
bered page in the front matter. The note advises that the poems, composed 
singularly after the culmination of the war, “naturally fall into the order 
assumed.” They consider “aspects which the strife as a memory assumes 
are as manifold as are the moods of involuntary meditation—moods vari-
able, and at times widely at variance.” It is this multiplicity that the poems 
represent to the reader, as Melville writes: “I seem, in most of these verses, 
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to have but placed a harp in a window, and noted the contrasted airs which 
wayward winds have played upon the strings.” And amid this limned multi-
vocality, the collected poems “make up a whole, in varied amplitude.” There 
is, at least at first glance, an ambition to paint the United States as a new 
nation, one birthed anew from out of the chaos of the Civil War.
If any poem in Battle-Pieces expresses Melville’s hope that formal 
unity might overwhelm and give sense to a reemergent America, it is “Du-
pont’s Round Fight.” Here Melville immortalizes the exploits of Commo-
dore Samuel Francis Dupont, who won one of the Union’s first battles of 
the war—at a time in November 1861 when dangerous losses at the Battle 
of Bull Run threatened the evacuation of Washington, D.C., and even the 
destruction of the Union. In the naval battle Melville commemorates, Du-
pont sailed his fleet down one side of Point Royal, in South Carolina, firing 
at and defeating Fort Walker, than sailed up the other side and took Fort 
Beauregard. The symmetrical, circular course of Dupont’s path led to one 
of Melville’s strongest affirmations of the power of form in war. War honors 
not simply victory, but victory accompanied by “geometric beauty.”
In time and measure perfect moves
All Art whose aim is sure;
Evolving rhyme and stars divine
Have rule, and they endure.
Nor less the Fleet that warred for Right,
And, warring so, prevailed,
In geometric beauty curved,
And in an orbit sailed.
The rebel at Port Royal felt
The Unity overawe,
And rued the spell. A type was here,
And victory of law. (Battle-Pieces, 30)
Dupont’s victory at sea depends, like the victories of art and law, on the 
perfection of form, the evolving rhymes, the geometric beauty of the sailing 
ships, and the measured coherence of aesthetic, scientific, and moral unity. 
If Right is to prevail, and it must, and if the Union is to be preserved, and 
it shall, then there is a kind of measured destiny in the universe, a law, at 
which art must aim and magnify.
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Milton Stern believes “Dupont’s Round Fight” is a key to the “conser-
vative nature of Melville’s poetry.”27 Stern sees in Melville’s portrait of Du-
pont the “type” of warrior later given form in Captain Vere, the last bastion 
of formal order in a world plagued by rebellion, chaos, and anarchy. Form, 
in Stern’s reading of Melville, cannot simply be the measure of general laws. 
The threatening spirit animating the dissolution of institutions and author-
ity, the chaos of the Civil War, like the revolutionary spirit of the times in 
Billy Budd, cannot be opposed by formal reason or written laws. Society is 
at war, and in war, form is paramount. But the form Melville invokes is law, 
in capital letters. Neither natural law nor positive law, the law of “Dupont’s 
Round Fight” is the geometric law of symmetry that imposes form and gives 
sense and significance to the world.
Another of Melville’s poems, “The House-Top. A Night Piece,” works 
together with “Dupont’s Round Fight” as a celebration of the draconian 
“victory of law” and the quelling of “the Atheist roar of riot.” In “The 
House-Top,” Melville clearly contrasts the perceived threat of anarchy to 
the redemption found in formal legality. In the draft riots of 1863 Melville 
finds chaos and anarchy, and the “Atheist roar of riot.” He tallies the loss 
of common truths, the “civil charms / And priestly spells which late held 
hearts in awe,” which “like a dream dissolve.” And against this “sway of self” 
that returns man to his precivilized state (“And man rebounds whole aeons 
back in nature”), Melville welcomes the formal authority of draconian law:
Wise Draco comes, deep in the midnight roll
Of black artillery; he comes, though late;
In code corroborating Calvin’s creed
And cynic tyrannies of honest kings;
He comes, nor parlies, and the Town, redeemed,
Gives thanks devout. (Battle-Pieces, 87)
“The House-Top” narrates the riots in New York City during the summer 
of 1863, themselves a response to the Enrollment Act. The act, passed by 
Lincoln and a Republican Congress, forced enlistment, and yet was deeply 
partisan and unpopular. For one thing, the act allowed men of means to 
hire substitutes to serve in their place or to pay a three-hundred-dollar 
commutation fee to avoid enlistment. This was at a time when the war was 
increasingly unpopular among whites who resented Lincoln’s Emancipation 
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Proclamation—which from Melville’s own Unionist perspective turned the 
object of the war away from the preservation of the Union toward the libera-
tion of slaves. Recall that New York at the time (and even more than today) 
was, as Stanton Garner has reminded us, deeply divided by wealth and 
politics. Of the city’s eight hundred thousand inhabitants, sixteen hundred 
had three-fifths of the income. The poor—including most of the city’s two 
hundred thousand Irish, lived in rags and were subject to cholera, smallpox, 
typhoid, and malnutrition. It had been one thing to fight to preserve the 
Union, but when Lincoln reoriented the war as a war for the liberation of 
slaves, the democratic masses of New York rebelled.28 There were daily riots 
that lasted until Lincoln sent in General John Adams Dix and the army to 
restore order.
In a note attached to the poem, Melville writes of the riots: “I dare 
not write the horrible and inconceivable atrocities.” Though disagreements 
continue about the true extent of the riots, over one hundred civilians were 
killed and a number of free blacks were lynched. Rioters also ransacked the 
homes of wealthy Republicans. In Melville’s concluding words, the town, 
New York City, was thankful for the draconian response of the army; only 
the army restored order and thus reaffirmed the foundational American 
belief in man’s natural goodness:
The grimy slur on the Republic’s faith implied,
Which holds that Man is naturally good,
And—more—is Nature’s Roman, never to be scourged. (Battle-Pieces, 
 87)
What Dix, interpreted as Draco, offers in the violent reaffirmation of the 
rule of law is the redemption of man’s natural goodness, his being “Nature’s 
Roman.” Garner claims that Melville writes ironically in “The House-Top” 
(and also in “Dupont’s Round Fight”) and that the narrative voice is not 
his own, but he offers no support for this claim.29 Whatever Melville may 
personally have made of the riots, “The House-Top” and “Dupont’s Round 
Fight” display a major theme of his poetry, the political and legislative 
power of beautiful and strong formal action to bind people together in the 
face of the emergent threat of anarchy.
It is hard to read “The House-Top. A Night Piece” and not think for-
ward to Melville’s setting of Billy Budd amid the specter of the terror of 
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the French Revolution and the “Red Flag,” symbols of anarchy that inform 
every aspect of Billy Budd, which is set in 1797, the same year as the mutiny 
at the Nore, where British sailors struck for higher pay and won. Thereaf-
ter, British sailors increased their demands for revolutionary changes in the 
very structure of authority and privilege. It is the revolutionary demand 
for equality and for restitution of past iniquities, the spirit of the age, that 
animates the French revolutionaries, American abolitionists, and British 
seamen. The revolutionary assault on natural distinction and order is the 
omnipresent background against which Vere must act and judge to restore 
order on the Bellipotent, just as the threatened dissolution of the Union and 
the specter of anarchy are the political and metaphysical settings behind 
Melville’s response to the Civil War.
What form connotes, especially as Melville expresses it in Billy Budd, 
is the legislating power of the visage, of the great deed. Melville introduces 
this theme of the legislating heroic act early in Billy Budd, in his textual 
digression on the topic of Admiral Horatio Nelson, “the greatest sailor since 
our world began.” Nelson’s greatness lay not in his wisdom, but in his recog-
nition that “an excessive love of glory, impassioning a less burning impulse, 
the honest sense of duty, is the first” and highest virtue in a military man. 
That Nelson, like Achilles, “under the presentiment of the most magnificent 
of victories crowned by his own glorious death,” adorned himself in his med-
als as if “for the altar” is proof of his greatness (Billy Budd, 1367). Nelson’s 
greatness lies in his deed, the outward appearance of his act, the form as op-
posed to the content. Melville brushes off the question of Nelson’s intentions. 
What matters is not the reasons that inspired Nelson—for example, if he 
acted to gain honor—but the outward appearance of the deed that, in being 
immortalized in song and myth, recalls to those who hear of it the truth of 
military greatness. Heroic action that is remembered and glorified, Melville 
suggests, lays out a truth through its formal power of being seen.
When Melville has Vere announce the entwinement of war, law, and 
form at the climax of Billy Budd’s trial, he recalls for the reader the virtues 
that distinguished Nelson, specifically his love of glory that impassioned 
a dimmer impulse toward duty. The importance of appearance and form 
serves to instruct Vere as to the necessary course of action. Most directly, 
Vere recognizes that the actual appearance of Billy being hanged is es-
sential to guard against a possible mutinous impulse among the crew. Ex-
plaining mitigating or exculpatory circumstances to the crew is insufficient. 
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They care only about Billy’s deed, which, however explained, will remain 
to the crew a simple murder committed in a flagrant act of mutiny. Against 
the possibility of mutiny, a deed is necessary to reassert order. What Vere 
recognizes is that the formal act of punishment itself is needed to bring law 
into existence.
The Beautiful Visage
The importance of the formal visage is at the core of Battle-Pieces and 
Aspects of the War. Indeed, the word aspect, which in its original sense is 
an “act of looking,” offers one key to reading Melville’s Civil War poems. 
Melville’s poetry not only offers multiple ways to look at the war—although 
it surely does that—but also expresses the various “Aspects of the War,” or 
the ways in which war looks. War looks useful and also useless. It is ghastly 
and gallant. Sometimes war looks ugly; at other times war wears the regalia 
of the beautiful. In all these aspects, war appears not simply as an object to 
be considered, but as an active subject. The aspects of war are the ways that 
war shows itself and makes its presence felt.
Nowhere does the beautiful aspect of war appear more vividly than in 
“Rebel Color-Bearers at Shiloh. A plea against the vindictive cry raised by 
civilians shortly after the surrender at Appomattox.” In this poem Melville 
writes of the resplendent bravery of the flag bearers “glorying in their show.”
The color-bearers facing death
White in the whirling sulphurous wreath,
Stand boldly out before the line;
Right and left their glances go,
Proud of each other, glorying in their show;
Their battle-flags about them blow,
And fold them as in flame divine:
Such living robes are only seen
Round martyrs burning on the green—
And martyrs for the Wrong have been. (Battle-Pieces, 144)
The poem is inspired by an account Melville read of in the newspaper. A 
Union general was trapped and his regiment under attack. A Rebel party 
began to form across the bank of a river, and their color guard “stepped 
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defiantly to the front as the engagement opened furiously.” The Union 
sharpshooters requested permission to shoot, to which a Colonel Stuart 
replied, “No, no, they’re too brave fellows to be killed” (Battle-Pieces, 252).
The “aspects” of Melville’s Civil War come through in a number of 
poems that address the shining brightness of heroic deeds. “The Eagle of 
the Blue” celebrates not a man but a bird, an eagle that was “borne aloft on 
a perch beside the standard” of a Union regiment. The heroic eagle “went 
through successive battles and campaigns; was more than once under the 
surgeon’s hands; and at the close of the contest found honorable repose in 
the capitol of Wisconsin” (Battle-Pieces, 250). Melville celebrates this bird 
who “exulteth in war” and is concerned, above all, with the power of his 
beauty:
No painted plume—a sober hue,
His beauty is his power;
That eager calm of gaze intent
Foresees the Sibyl’s hour. (Battle-Pieces, 122)
The aspect of the eagle—sober, intent, and powerful—enraptures as does 
the frenzied Sibyl, the divinely inspired prophetess of ancient lore who 
speaks in the name of God. It is this eagle that, when “the very rebel looks 
and thrills” (Battle-Pieces, 123), sends shivers into the rebel forces, and 
gives them a preview of the fated Union victory. The eagle’s powerful beauty 
may rupture the order of military rationality; at the same time, however, 
the grand bird offers an aspect, a visage, a form that elevates the spirit and 
binds the regiment to its common purpose.
If an eagle can raise the spirits of some and sow terror in others, only 
a man can truly shine in such a way that binds his fellow men to him and 
to each other. The formal power of manly beauty is on full display in “On 
the Photograph of a Corps Commander,” Melville’s paean either to General 
Ulysses S. Grant (as Megan Williams assumes) or, more likely, to General 
Winfield Scott Hancock (as Garner argues).30 The corps commander’s vis-
age itself is ennobling and enabling, Melville writes:
Nothing can lift the heart of man
Like manhood in a fellow-man.
The thought of heaven’s great King afar
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But humbles us—too weak to scan;
But manly greatness men can span,
And feel the bonds that draw. (Battle-Pieces, 106)
Whether the poem depicts Grant or Hancock, the corps commander is one 
of the few figures whose greatness shines through in Battle-Pieces, a bold 
reminder of Admiral Nelson’s heroically productive deed. Another is the 
southern general Stonewall Jackson, who merits two poems that are the 
“greatest tribute in Battle-Pieces to any single Civil-War figure.”31 What 
Melville marvels about in Stonewall Jackson is his resolve: “Stonewall fol-
lowed his star” (Battle-Pieces, 82). Taken by the simple fact of the man, 
Melville writes of the corps commander:
Ay, man is manly. Here you see
The warrior-carriage of the head,
And brave dilation of the frame;
And lighting all, the soul that led
In Spottsylvania’s charge to victory,
Which justifies his fame. (Battle-Pieces, 105)
In “The Armies of the Wilderness,” Melville lauds Grant not for his stra-
tegic brilliance or courage in battle, but simply as “a quiet Man, and plain in 
garb—”; he is “like a loaded mortar.” Melville attends to his outward look and 
names him, admiringly, “the silent General” (Battle-Pieces, 99). Walt Whit-
man described Grant as “the typical Western man—the plainest, the most 
efficient.”32 Similarly, Garner describes Hancock as “the natural leader that a 
democracy is capable of producing, not a man born to rank and position but 
one who is worthy of it.” Hancock is, Garner writes, thus a model for Billy 
Budd, the handsome soldier who commands respect through nothing other 
than his vibrant manhood. For Melville, Grant and Hancock were exemplars 
of the new democratic American. And all this is visible, Melville suggests, 
simply from a photograph—although, importantly, Melville himself visited 
with and experienced these paradigmatic democrats in the flesh.
What Melville emphasizes is not the experience of these men, but the 
force of their images. It is the corps commander’s visage, his form, that 
braces those who see it for the pursuit of greatness—the picture is “a cheer-
ing picture.” As the poet writes:
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A cheering picture. It is good
To look upon a Chief like this,
In whom the spirit moulds the form.
Here favoring Nature, oft remiss,
With eagle mien expressive has endued
A man to kindle strains that warm. (Battle-Pieces, 105)
Robert Penn Warren rightly sees in “On the Photograph of the Corps Com-
mander” Melville’s humanity, his sensitivity to human values and human 
suffering over and above the claims of ideology and religion.33 Melville can 
celebrate Stonewall Jackson and Robert E. Lee, even as he can the Union 
commander, not for what they fight for, but for who they are. What war 
brings home is the idea that alongside ideology and belief, right and wrong, 
and good and bad, these absolutes dissolve and what takes their place is the 
singularity of human character.
Forms and Violence
The attraction to the power of form is palpable in both Battle-Pieces and 
Billy Budd. And yet in both these works formal closure and coherence are 
upended. The famous “digression” that supplements and undoes the formal 
coherence of Billy Budd is well known and was discussed above. Less often 
remarked is the literal supplement that follows both the main text and even 
the notes in the original edition of Battle-Pieces. Melville begins his supple-
ment in words that clearly prefigure chapter 28 of Billy Budd, written years 
later: “Were I fastidiously anxious for the symmetry of this book, it would 
close with the notes. But the times are such that patriotism—not free from 
solicitude—urges a claim overriding all literary scruples” (Battle-Pieces, 
259). Why the overriding of literary scruples? And why, also, the overriding 
of the wartime focus on the external visage? For as long as war is the main 
event, Melville seems to hew to a martial reverence for formal coherence. 
Only with the end of the war, when it is time to “hymn the politicians,” 
does he abandon formality and symmetry. It seems that literary and mili-
tary scruples are united in the demand for form, whereas politics urges the 
overriding of such scruples.
Politics demands nuance—one thinks of Max Weber’s praise of an 
ethic of responsibility against an ethic of conviction in his essay “Politics as a 
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Vocation.” There is greatness in the judgment that affirms self-restraint just 
as there can be in bellicosity. Since the South will not repent for fighting for 
its convictions, the North must avoid the demand for voluntary humiliation. 
All that is needed, Melville writes, is that the “South have been taught by 
the terrors of civil war to feel that Secession, like Slavery, is against Destiny; 
that both now lie buried in one grave; that her fate is linked with ours; and 
that together we comprise the Nation” (Battle-Pieces, 260). The North must 
avoid triumphalism. It must admit that its victory was less from skill and 
bravery than from “superior resources and crushing numbers” (ibid., 266). 
And, too, the North must recall that many southern fighters were misled 
by their leaders and ancestors. And though we must sympathize with the 
“infant pupilage to freedom” that sets the freed slaves in need of assistance, 
Melville cautions that such humane kindness toward blacks “should not be 
allowed to exclude kindliness to communities who stand nearer to us in 
nature. For the future of the freed slaves we may well be concerned; but 
the future of the whole country, involving the future of the blacks, urges a 
paramount claim upon our anxiety” (ibid., 267).
Some have berated Melville here for preferring to mend fences with 
white Southerners to doing justice to freed slaves. They are right. The recon-
ciliation Melville affirms can and does support the rejuvenated nationalism 
that reaffirms America as a white nation through the period of segregation. 
And yet the point of the supplement is precisely that in politics, unlike in 
war and literature, compromises have to be made, corners cut, and common 
sense practiced. What common sense told Melville is that to save the Union, 
an olive branch had to be extended to the South, and that the rebirth of the 
nation meant that “no consideration should tempt us to pervert the national 
victory into oppression for the vanquished” (Battle-Pieces, 269).
Also in Billy Budd, Melville’s final digression is a response to prac-
ticalities in the world, to the fact that the actual world has ragged rather 
than symmetrical edges. The necessity of form, of beautiful narration, of 
heroism—when imposed on the real world—necessarily leads to injustices 
and to violence. Not all heroes will be the embodiment of absolute good, as 
is Billy, who willingly sacrifices his life to the king. Both Vere and Melville 
recognize that the imposition of form on the content of the real world is 
a violent one, but both also believe that such imposition is necessary and, 
more important, worthy of honor—at least in times of war.
Neither Vere nor Melville is lighthearted about the need for a formal 
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reassertion of the law at the expense of justice. Vere expresses his own an-
guish throughout the trial. After he emerges from his secret conversation 
with Billy, his face is “one expressive of the agony of the strong” (Billy Budd, 
1419). And Melville too expresses his own self-criticism by appending three 
short sections to the end of Billy Budd that self-consciously rupture the 
formal coherence of the story. Pure justice doesn’t accord with legal institu-
tions in a human world from which law has withdrawn. And even fiction, if 
it is to accurately reflect the truth of the world, cannot be pure.
In both its recognition of the absence of formal symmetry and its at-
tempt to recollect formal laws through heroic deeds, Melville’s Battle-Pieces 
remains, as does Billy Budd, an inescapably political book. As Hannah 
Arendt argues, Melville’s reversal of the primordial crime in which Cain 
slew Abel is based on the recognition that goodness, like evil, is “strong, 
stronger perhaps even than wickedness.” The strength of goodness and the 
“violence inherent in all strength and detrimental to all forms of political 
organization” means that if good goes unpunished, the consequences are 
as disastrous as when evil is left unpunished.34 Violence done by absolute 
good—as much as violence done by absolute evil—can set in motion a chain 
of violence and wrongdoing. In the face of potential violence motivated by 
the revolutionary and reformist spirit of the age, Vere recognizes that order 
must be restored less by positive law than through a radical recollection of 
form. And yet Melville also questions whether such an assertion of form can 
be valid in the real world.
War, Brutality, and the Dream of Justice
The struggle between the ordering power of form in war and the violent de-
structiveness of war’s formlessness is vivid in the best of Melville’s Civil War 
poems, above all in “The Armies of the Wilderness.” The two-part poem viv-
idly struggles with the destructive and brutal truth of the Civil War through 
a description of the Battle of the Wilderness near Spottsylvania, Virginia, 
in 1863. Part 1 of the poem describes the scene of the opposing Union and 
Rebel camps as they prepare for battle; part 2 introduces General Grant, 
unnamed, as he plans the attack and then narrates the bloody and brutal 
battle itself. It is one of the longest poems in Battle-Pieces and has rightly 
been called the “most important crossroads in [Melville’s] intellectual and 
moral response” to the Civil War. It is, as Garner writes, the poem in which 
Frank_5thProofBk.indb   349 10/29/13   10:57 AM
350  Roger Berkowitz
“the truth of the war—the Satanic state in which the rule of law and civility 
is mocked by violent armies bent on feral destructiveness—is seen.”35
“The Armies of the Wilderness” is also one of only a very few poems 
in Battle-Pieces that Melville could write by drawing from his personal 
experience. In April 1864 he and his brother, Allan Melville, traveled to 
the front, much as Walt Whitman had done in February. Unlike Whitman, 
Melville—still the adventurer from his days as a sailor—did not just watch 
the action, but participated as well, accepting an invitation from Colonel 
Charles Russell Lowe Jr. to ride along with a five-hundred-man expedition 
to track down and fight John Singleton Mosby, a commander of what then 
were called Partisan Rangers and today would be called guerrilla fighters. 
During the three-day and two-night mission, Melville lived among the sol-
diers as they tracked and attacked Mosby—and then fled, suffering casual-
ties along the way. A highly fictionalized version of the Mosby expedition is 
included in Battle-Pieces as “The Scout toward Aldie,” a long and thrilling 
poem that imagines Mosby as a human Moby Dick; as a mythic instantia-
tion of inscrutable evil, Mosby lives in the wilderness, where he is pursued 
by brave yet foolish soldiers who risk everything and achieve little.36
After returning to Lowell’s cavalry camp in Vienna, Virginia, Mel-
ville made his way to the main camps of the Army of the Potomac, then 
under the command of General Grant. Grant apparently received Mel-
ville, and the two discussed past battles. Melville toured the camps, where 
he also met General Winfield Scott Hancock, memorialized in “On the 
Photograph of a Corps Commander.” There is, in Melville’s depictions 
of Stonewall Jackson, Grant, and Hancock, a fortifying simplicity. These 
men are heroes. Eschewing grand theories and complicated theoretical 
justification, Melville affirms, simply, the truth of heroism. His heroes 
do not raise the firmament or “make the earth wholesome,” as Emerson 
would have it.37 Against Emerson’s vision of the uses of heroes who elevate 
man, Melville’s heroes bind men together. His heroes are immortalized 
for doing great deeds, and yet not once does Battle-Pieces descend to the 
melodrama of hagiography.
Against the simple force of beauty and calm that Melville invokes in 
his portraits of heroes, it is chaos and complexity that are the themes of 
“The Armies of the Wilderness” and also of Battle-Pieces more generally. 
The focus on the wilderness evokes the untamable vastness of nature. And 
the battle itself is pure chaos, in which simple vision and hard facts dissolve: 
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“Pursuer and pursued like ghosts disappear / In gloomed shade—their end 
who shall tell?” (Battle-Pieces, 102). It is the natural depths and byzantine 
mysteries of war that rise to the fore, and Melville struggles to find a lan-
guage with which to speak about these horrors of war:
None can narrate that strife in the pines,
A seal is on it—Sabaean lore!
Obscure as the wood, the entangled rhyme
But hints at the maze of war— (Battle-Pieces, 103)
The maze of war is both carnal and moral, as in the pitch of battle it is easy 
to lose sight of right and wrong, good and bad. Indeed, Melville purposefully 
opens his poem by painting a landscape of the uncertain moral verities at 
war in the conflict. It is a “strife of brothers,” and both sides cling fervently 
to belief in their cause:
On fronting slopes gleamed other camps
Where faith as firmly clung;
Ah, froward kin! so brave amiss—
 The zealots of the Wrong. (Battle-Pieces, 93)
Throughout Battle-Pieces Melville declares the Union forces to be fight-
ing for right and the South to be for wrong. Again later in this poem we 
learn that “but Heaven lent strength, the Right strove well, / And emerged 
from the Wilderness.” Yet the claims for right are always countered by an 
understanding that both sides have a claim for right: “yEa and nay— / Each 
hath its say” (Battle-Pieces, 18). Or as it is written in “The Armies of the 
Wilderness,”
Did the Fathers feel mistrust?
Can no final good be wrought?
Over and over, again and again
Must the fight for the Right be fought? (Battle-Pieces, 94)
Melville goes out of his way to humanize the Rebel soldiers, as in this early 
stanza describing how Union soldiers looked on their countrymen from the 
South across enemy lines.
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Through the pointed glass our soldiers saw
The base-ball bounding sent;
They could have joined them in their sport
But for the vale’s deep rent.
And others turned the reddish soil,
Like diggers of graves they bent:
The reddish soil and trenching toil
Begat presentiment. (Battle-Pieces, 93–94)
The presentiment in the digging of trenches is, of course, that the soil will 
soon shroud thousands of corpses. Approximately twenty-five thousand 
American soldiers were killed or wounded in three days of fighting in the 
wilderness around Virginia in a battle that has drawn sharp criticism from 
military historians and ethicists. Grant fought what some have called a “war 
of attrition,” sending wave upon wave of Union troops to simply overwhelm 
the southern defenses. William McFeely writes that Grant “led his troops 
into the Wilderness and there produced a nightmare of inhumanity and 
inept military strategy that ranks with the worst such episodes in the history 
of warfare.”38 James McPherson has a different view, concluding that it was 
Robert E. Lee who turned the battle into a war of attrition by “skillfully 
matching Grant’s moves and confronting him with an entrenched defense 
at every turn.”39 In either case, the cost of battle was colossal:
In glades they meet skull after skull
Where pine-cones lay—the rusted gun,
Green shoes full of bones, the mouldering coat
And cuddled-up skeleton. (Battle-Pieces, 101)
The challenge Melville confronts is to narrate what has come to be a 
new kind of war, one in which the simple truths and powerful acts have 
given way to mass movements and calculations of resources. In a war in 
which thousands upon thousands of men are sacrificed in a single battle 
in the midst of a nameless forest, the honor and dignity of the warrior 
yield to the brute force of numbers and steel. The color- and standard-
bearers whom Melville celebrates in “Rebel Color-Bearers of Shiloh,” 
the bold eagle of the “The Eagle of the Blue,” and even the manliness 
of Grant and Stonewall Jackson pale in the face of the “The Armies of 
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the Wilderness.” The new kind of war heralds the eventual dimming of 
martial heroism.
The focus on armies is intentional, moving us beyond the dignity of 
soldiers to the swarming masses where twenty and thirty thousand roughly 
clad and ill-slept soldiers clash in the darkness. In such a battle, “plume and 
sash are vanities.” They are useless, or at least useful only to “deck the pall 
of the dead.” The cannon are dragged over the ground and have “trenched 
their scar” on the earth. And “black chimneys, gigantic in moor-like wastes,” 
darken the sky, threatening to depeople the world: “The hearth is a house-
less stone again— / Ah! where shall the people be sought?” All markings 
of human civilization are endangered in this wilderness war. The soldiers
Kindle their fires with indentures and bonds,
And old Lord Fairfax’s parchment deeds;
And Virginian gentlemen’s libraries old—
Books which only the scholar heeds—
Are flung to his kennel. It is ravage and range,
And gardens are left to weeds. (Battle-Pieces, 98)
“The Armies of the Wilderness” explores the decline of human civiliza-
tion. Headstones are used for hearthstones to prepare celebratory feasts for 
the fighting men. And the tents of the camp are dim remnants of civilization 
that, like the Pleiades, which dim in the winter, itself is fading into a cold 
winter of barbarism. Indeed, there is in the progress of the war a dangerous 
regression.
Turned adrift into war
Man runs wild on the plain,
Like the jennets let loose
On the Pampas—zebras again. (Battle-Pieces, 98)
Just as the jennets, a breed of riding horse, reverted to being wild zebras 
after they were imported to the Americas and then let loose to run on the 
Pampas in South America, so too has man lost himself in the wilderness of 
modern warfare.
The great hero of “The Armies of the Wilderness” is the new kind of 
army itself, the large, mass, and impersonal force that is challenging the 
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traditional pride of bravery and personality. Admiral Nelson’s heroism is 
replaced by the force of numbers. Read in this way, the poem is a compan-
ion to “A Utilitarian View of the Monitor’s Fight,” a poem in which Melville 
sings of the highly modern and mechanical cadence of the new war, one 
that trades pageantry for “plain mechanic power.” The iron-clad Monitor is 
the most potent symbol of the transformation in war brought about by the 
Civil War, and it also infects the poetry of war in Battle-Pieces. Melville 
makes this poetic resonance palpable in the first stanza:
Plain be the phrase, yet apt the verse,
More ponderous than nimble;
For since grimed War here laid aside
His Orient pomp, ’twould ill befit
Overmuch to ply
The rhyme’s barbaric cymbal. (Battle-Pieces, 61)
The plainness and even clunkiness of Melville’s prose is a big part of the 
poem’s point.40 There are poems in which Melville remains faithful to 
a romantic vision of war and symmetrical rhythmic meter, but much of 
Battle-Pieces boasts rhymes that are ponderous and grimy. The poems 
bespeak an effort to invent a poetry fitting to a new kind of war, a war 
whose power proceeds less from form than from mass—it is not moral 
superiority or excessive courage, but simply the advantage in human and 
natural resources, in Melville’s accounting, that decides the war for North 
over South.
War is part of the human experience, and Melville’s engagement with 
war in Battle-Pieces shows him struggling with and exhilarated by the sav-
agery and the contest of the military ethic. And yet Melville also marks the 
change in war, its sacrifice of grandeur. Nowhere is that more apparent than 
in the final verse of “A Utilitarian View of the Monitor’s Fight”:
War shall yet be, and to the end;
But war-paint shows the streaks of weather;
War yet shall be, but warriors
Are now but operatives; War’s made
Less grand than Peace,
And a singe runs through lace and feather. (Battle-Pieces, 62)
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War is the “singe” that runs through the lace and feather of life, and yet 
that singe has itself lost at least part of its power. It still can burn and carry 
desolation, more than ever before, but war’s fiery capacity to enliven and en-
noble is clearly diminished. Once a matter of color-bearers and eagles, war 
is transforming and becoming a matter of brute efficiency. Once a contest 
of skill and strategy, war is becoming a matter of resources and production. 
The war music of old is being replaced by the barbaric cymbal, iron clashing 
against iron.
One need not be a romantic to recognize that war is, if not, as Hera-
clitus thought, the father of all things, at least central to the experience of 
being human. For Simone Weil, the good and the just are offspring of war, 
since justice makes sense only as an idea for which one will endure the 
most extreme sacrifice. Absent the glory and tragedy of war, there would 
be no spiritual cauldron in which to forge the mettle of justice. As Weil 
writes: “Only he who has measured the dominion of force, and knows how 
to respect it, is capable of love and justice.”41 What war teaches, Weil argues, 
is the experience of utter misery, the reduction of man to a mere thing, a 
plaything of fate. Only amid the fury of war, the savagery of strife, and the 
lashes of lightning do human beings confront the utter senselessness of our 
world, the very precondition that calls forth the dream of justice.
The experience of human misery is what first allows human beings to 
raise themselves to a higher plane, to “resort to the aid of illusion, fanati-
cism, to conceal the harshness of destiny from their eyes.” As did Plato and 
Nietzsche before her, Weil understood that the “man who does not wear the 
armour of the lie cannot experience force without being touched by it to the 
very soul.”42 Only the lie of justice, the dream of a higher plane of human 
purpose, allows us humans to survive the existential threat of war. Justice, 
in other words, is that noble lie that we humans invent to make our warlike 
and strife-filled lives meaningful.
The hope that war can offer meaning to life is palpable in Melville’s 
late writing, as he struggles to salvage both his own writing career and 
his pained nation. Battle-Pieces is, in large measure, an exploration of the 
continuing power of war to rejuvenate life. Melville celebrates that formal 
pomp and grandeur of war. He finds still in the Civil War the passions of 
loyalty and convictions of faith that can give and even restore meaning to 
life. He discovers in the war the possibilities not only for his own personal 
rebirth as a writer, but for the reconstitution of the United States as well. 
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In short, Melville finds the war stimulating in the way that wars have, since 
time immemorial, been essential prods to human greatness.
The power of greatness to bind men into peoples is celebrated in the 
same book that traces the rise of a utilitarian warfare that augurs the fading 
of heroic warfare. In such a world without heroes, brutality replaces ide-
als and totalitarian movements subvert the bonds that draw men together. 
Melville is alive to these threats. But Battle-Pieces is, in the end, an affirma-
tion of the notion that amid the brutality of modern war, human greatness 
will shine forth. War is brutality. War is utility. War is technology. And war 
is inhumanity. But war is also a testament to humanity. In celebrating the 
manly deeds of great heroes, we can, Melville argues, bind ourselves to a 
grand vision of who we are.
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The Lyre of Orpheus
Aesthetics and Authority in Billy Budd
Jason Frank
Be a man’s intellectual superiority what it will, it can never assume the 
practical, available supremacy over other men, without the aid of some 
sort of external arts and entrenchments.
—Herman Melville, Moby-Dick
“With mankind,” he [Vere] would say, “forms, measured forms, are ev-
erything; and this is the import couched in the story of Orpheus, with 
his lyre spellbinding the wild denizens of the wood.” And this he once 
applied to the disruption of forms going on across the Channel and the 
consequences thereof.
—Herman Melville, Billy Budd, Sailor (An Inside Narrative)
Herman Melville worked on Billy Budd, Sailor (An Inside Narrative) for 
the last five years of his life—between 1886 and 1891—and since its posthu-
mous discovery and publication in 1924 Billy Budd has often been read as 
Melville’s last will and testament, the most mature articulation of his social 
and political thought. There is, of course, little agreement over the meaning 
of this subtle and enchanting testament, although past interpretations typi-
cally cluster into two competing approaches. The “testament of acceptance” 
school associates Melville’s own position with Vere’s and emphasizes the no-
vella’s concluding affirmation of necessity in this “moral dilemma involving 
aught of the tragic.”1 The opposing “testament of resistance” school exposes 
the irony of Melville’s unreliable narrator and identifies a skeptical rejection 
of Vere’s claims of authority, even to the point of doubting Vere’s sanity.2 
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Billy Budd, one critic has recently noted, “taps commitments of ethical, 
political, and philosophical value that make its criticism peculiarly confes-
sional and urgent.”3 At the center of these controversies is the contested 
meaning of Vere’s famous judgment near the novella’s conclusion: “Struck 
dead by an angel of God! Yet the angel must hang!” (1406; emphases 
in original). These interpretations often turn on the vicissitudes of legal 
judgment, in other words, and situate Melville’s “inside narrative” within a 
broadly juridical, if not narrowly procedural, frame.
Judging Vere’s judgment has also been the guiding hermeneutic of most 
of the political theory scholarship dedicated to the novella. Hannah Arendt, 
for example, embraces the wisdom of Vere’s decision to “punish the violence 
of absolute innocence,” represented by Budd, as an exemplification of her 
theoretical insight that “the absolute spells doom to everyone when it is 
introduced into the political realm.” Arendt contrasts Budd’s otherworldly 
“innocence” and “goodness” to Vere’s personification of worldly “virtue,” a 
political principle “which alone is capable of embodiment in lasting insti-
tutions.”4 Michael Rogin, by contrast, rejects Vere’s decision as a grotesque 
sanctification of the state, which returns man to the unthinking nature of 
“beasts” rather than the “rights-granting nature of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.” “Like Melville’s fiction of the 1850s,” Rogin writes, “Billy Budd 
confines us in a denuded, mundane world, from which all possibility of trans-
formation has fled. But unlike the earlier stories, Billy Budd gives that world 
its blessing.”5 Arendt and Rogin judge Vere’s judgment differently, but they 
agree that the political theory of the story is located primarily in its drama-
tization of judgment. Even for these political theorists Billy Budd remains 
very much a “judge’s story.”6 It is as if most of what is of political theoretical 
significance in the novella were confined to three of its thirty chapters.
This essay takes a different approach. While the familiar focus on Vere’s 
judgment provides an illuminating example of the dilemmas of legal and 
moral judgment in times of political crisis—in light of contemporary theo-
retical preoccupations, Melville’s story may be said to dramatize the fraught 
exposure of procedural norms to the sovereign “state of exception”—this 
focus also quietly displaces another, perhaps deeper dilemma posed by the 
novella.7 Melville situates the story’s dilemma of judgment and legal pro-
cedure within a broader and more worldly theoretical rubric: the constitu-
tion and performative maintenance of political authority. Melville makes a 
political spectacle of legal judgment in Billy Budd, and even though Vere’s 
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drumhead court is “summarily convened,” and even though Budd is secretly 
tried belowdecks in the commander’s chambers, it retains aspects of a show 
trial. The many irregularities of Budd’s improvised court-martial are as 
much a part of the political spectacle orchestrated by Vere as Budd’s subse-
quent hanging at sea before the assembled crew (or, as Vere revealingly re-
fers to them, “the people”) (1416). Like many of Melville’s shipboard novels, 
Billy Budd provides a detailed investigation of the everyday mechanisms 
and manifestations of male authority as they interweave across different 
registers of social and political life. Borrowing from the aesthetic political 
theory of Edmund Burke, on whom Vere is modeled, Melville’s story dra-
matizes authority’s inextricable reliance on “forms, measured forms,” while 
also insisting that law itself be understood in its embedded relation to these 
myriad forms rather than isolated from them in unencumbered normative 
abstraction.8 To adapt the familiar terms of H. L. A. Hart’s legal positivism, 
we could say that Billy Budd is concerned less with the formal procedural-
ism of the “primary rules” of the law than the complexity of the secondary 
“rules of recognition” on which these laws depend.9
The problematic of authority in Melville’s novella is, therefore, before 
the law in both senses of the term: it is at once prior to law and a question 
of law’s appearance in front of its beholden subjects. Melville’s novella offers 
a sustained reflection on the usually hidden interdependence of these two 
senses of being before the law and, in doing so, draws readers’ attention to 
an often disavowed dilemma for democratic theorists past and present: the 
inescapably aesthetic dimensions of political authority.10 I will read Mel-
ville’s novella as a provocation for contemporary democratic theorists to be 
more carefully attentive to questions they typically reject as both norma-
tively and historically antithetical to democratic politics.
“Before the Law” is, of course, also the title of a well-known parable by 
Franz Kafka included at the end of his novel The Trial (but also published 
separately in Kafka’s lifetime).11 Rogin suggests that Billy Budd “anticipates 
the Kafkaesque strand of literary modernism,” having particularly impor-
tant analogies to themes developed in Kafka’s story “In the Penal Colony.”12 
I want to suggest that Kafka’s remarkable two-page parable “Before the 
Law” raises in condensed form theoretical issues about authority and aes-
thetics elaborated by Melville in his last work of fiction. A brief recount-
ing of Kafka’s parable can, therefore, provide preliminary orientation to the 
central themes of this essay.
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In Kafka’s parable “a man from the country” seeks to gain admittance 
to the law but is told by the doorkeeper that, though it is possible he might 
gain admittance later, he cannot be admitted “at the moment.” This comes 
as unexpected news to the man from the country, who thinks, in transpar-
ent democratic fashion, that “the law should be accessible to every man 
and at all times.” The door to the law remains open, and the man from the 
country peers inside. Seeing this, the doorkeeper laughs and suggests that 
the man from the country try to enter without his permission, but he warns 
that while he is powerful, he is but the first and lowest doorkeeper. “From 
hall to hall keepers stand at every door, one more powerful than the other. 
Even the third of these has an aspect that even I cannot bear to look at.” 
Hearing this, the man from the country “looks more closely at the door-
keeper in his furred robe, with his huge pointed nose and long, thin, Tartar 
beard,” and “decides he had better wait until he gets permission to enter.” 
The man from the country is here interpellated as an obedient subject 
through his senses, as his first act of obedience is founded on the sensuous 
particulars of the doorkeeper’s coat, nose, and beard, and what he imag-
ines to be the “aspect” of the other doorkeepers beyond these immediate 
perceptions. And so the man from the country waits obediently for days 
and years, and “during these long years the man watches the doorkeeper 
almost incessantly.” Indeed, he “forgets about the other doorkeepers, and 
this one seems to him the only barrier between himself and the law.” The 
man from the country becomes so enthralled with the doorkeeper before 
him in his “prolonged watch” that he comes to know the fleas in the door-
keeper’s fur collar and even begs these fleas to help him and to “persuade 
the doorkeeper to change his mind.” But to no avail. Finally, as his sight be-
gins to dim and the world darkens around him, the man from the country 
perceives a “radiance that streams immortally from the door of the law.” 
The onset of his physical blindness is coupled with a revelatory insight. 
With his vision darkening, his hearing failing, and his body infirm—with 
the growing incapacitation of his senses—the man from the country asks 
a final question: “Everyone strives to attain the law . . . how does it come 
about, then, that in all these years no one has come seeking admittance but 
me?” To which the doorman loudly replies: “No one but you could gain 
admittance through this door, since this door was intended only for you. 
I am now going to shut it.” The man from the country’s awareness of his 
ambiguously voluntary complicity in his own subjection comes only with 
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his death. “What like a bullet,” as Melville puts a similar point in “Shiloh,” 
“can undeceive?”13
Kafka’s parable, like Billy Budd, dramatizes the creaturely life of the 
law, how law’s authority is constituted and maintained by way of the sens-
es and imagination, through the mechanisms of aisthesis, which Jacques 
Rancière theorizes in terms of the “partition of the perceptible” and the 
“community of sense.”14 The authority of law in both stories does not re-
produce itself through knowledge of its origins or foundations—which for-
ever escape apprehension, in any case—but only through its delegated and 
multiform appearances. In both tales the law never emerges to speak in 
its own name. The forever receding horizon of what comes before the law 
as its universal origin (or natural foundation) is resolved only through the 
myriad manifestations of what comes before the law as its singular sensuous 
appearance. The inaccessible foundation, as Derrida writes of the Kafka 
parable, continually “incites from its place of hiding,” and this incitation 
comes through the appearance of those delegated to act on behalf of the 
law.15 Elaborating a similar point, Richard Flathman writes that “from the 
moment that legislators, judges, police officers, CEOs and union officials, 
colonels and sergeants, provosts, deans, and teachers attempt to promote 
the authority and bindingness of rules, historicity, narrativity, and hence 
imagination and fiction are introduced into the very core of legal thought.”16 
It is not what is hidden that Kafka’s parable and Melville’s novella illumi-
nate, but the allure of what is enigmatically manifest. The soft collar of 
sensory enthrallment depicted in both stories is not the same as violence 
or even the threat of violence. Kafka’s guardian does not threaten the man 
from the country, after all, but actually tempts him to disobey. The man 
from the country is kept waiting—and the authority of law sustained—
through his own desire to gain eventual—impossible—admittance to the 
sublime law. The door of the law always remains open—he is not physically 
debarred—but he “decides to wait” when confronted with the doorman’s 
appearance. Revealingly, the German is closer to “he decides to prefer to 
wait”—“Entschliesst er sich, doch lieber zu warten, bis er die Erlaubnis 
zum Eintritt bekommt”—a phrase that highlights the ambiguously nuanced 
account of volition, will, and consent in the parable. Melville, as we will see, 
gives a similarly nuanced account in the mesmeric agency depicted in Billy 
Budd, where authority operates through enthralling sensuous manifesta-
tions “spellbinding the wild denizens of the wood.” Both Melville and Kafka 
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redirect theoretical attention away from the question of law’s originary au-
thorization—they do not offer the critical justificatory theory of authority 
required by democratic theory—and toward its sensuous manifestations. 
These literary examinations of law’s surface mechanisms—its “forms, mea-
sured forms”—might alert us to the sensory operation of law’s everyday au-
thority, and thereby enrich or give needed texture to the sometimes anemic 
discourse of contemporary democratic theory.
Characterology and Authority
Melville’s preoccupations with the performative dimensions of authority are 
already evident in his first novels, with their sustained reflections on the 
intricate web of human relations aboard whaling ships (Typee and Omoo), 
merchant vessels (Redburn), and naval frigates (White-Jacket). His persis-
tent reliance on the ubiquitous ship-of-state metaphor, which Alan Heimert 
has shown to be an essential component of the nineteenth-century Ameri-
can political imaginary, allowed Melville to explore the concrete and daily 
mechanisms of authoritative relations and draw broad conclusions about 
how these relations are created, sustained, and undone, without relying on 
the conceptual abstractions of most theoretical reflection on these themes.17 
Ships were useful for focused explorations of authority, because, as Melville 
writes in Benito Cereno, “ship captains enjoy a dictatorship beyond which, 
while at sea, there was no earthly appeal.”18 Thus, in many of his novels 
Melville examined “the qualities needed to command and direct with skill, 
fairness, and justice.”19 Melville recognized early on that serious investiga-
tion into the workings of authority required richer symbolic and literary 
resources than those provided by the prevailing liberal political discourses 
of nineteenth-century America, most notably those theoretical paradigms 
emphasizing the central role of individual consent or social utility. Though 
none of Melville’s early novels matches the depth and subtlety of observa-
tion into the “little lower layer” of human motivation exemplified by “The 
Quarter-Deck” chapter of Moby-Dick, with its examination of the Pequod 
crew’s terrible conversion to be “all with Ahab, in this matter of the whale,” 
they do nonetheless indicate that from the beginning of his writing career, 
Melville recognized that the liberal language of rights, contract, and con-
sent and the utilitarian calculus of aggregate pleasures and pains obscure as 
much as they reveal when it came to matters of authority.20 Melville’s sailors, 
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Elizabeth Samet has recently argued, are living and breathing “metonyms 
for the situation of all citizens in a republic.”21 His literary examinations of 
the practical terrain between reasoned consent and coercion, or between 
riotous mutiny and disciplinary violence, map the rough middle ground of 
authoritative relations often missing from theoretical discussions of these 
issues. The “pervasive theme in [Billy Budd] is the mode of communication 
of men in authority,” as many readers have recognized, but this “mode of 
communication” is not narrowly discursive but broadly aesthetic.22 Like the 
lyre of Orpheus invoked near the novella’s end, authority “spellbinds” in 
part through mechanisms of sensuous captivation (1430).
Readers first glimpse these spellbinding mechanisms in Melville’s 
treatment of character in the novella. Melville outlined a typology or, per-
haps more precisely, a characterology, of authoritative relations in Billy 
Budd, which revolve around the three central figures of Budd, Claggart, 
and Vere.23 In the case of Budd the interrelationship between the forever 
receding foundation of authority and its sensuous manifestation connects 
Nature to visible and sonorous beauty. It is well known that Melville as-
sociates Budd broadly with Nature—he is a foundling, an American Adam 
born “before Cain’s city and citified man”—and also with Thomas Paine 
and the revolutionary ideals of universal natural rights (1362). Budd pro-
vides Melville with the opportunity to critically examine the Enlightenment 
and the American Romantic dream of grounding political authority in the 
harmonious order of nature. “You are going to take away my peacemaker,” 
says Captain Graveling to Lieutenant Ratcliffe when Budd is impressed at 
the beginning of the novella from the merchant ship The Rights of Man 
and onto the naval frigate H.M.S. Bellipotent (1357). “Before I shipped that 
young fellow, my forecastle was a rat-pit of quarrels. It was black times, I tell 
you, aboard the Rights here. . . . But Billy came; and it was like a Catholic 
priest striking peace in an Irish shindy. Not that he preached to them or said 
or did anything in particular; but a virtue went out of him, sugaring the sour 
ones. They took to him like hornets to treacle” (1356). The authority that 
Budd exercises over the crew of The Rights of Man is natural and instinc-
tive, based in free expression of love rather than persuasion or calculations 
of self-interest. Melville associates Budd’s authority with Paine’s idealization 
of a spontaneous social order based in the needs of Nature organized in civil 
society rather than built on the artificial government of men. Perhaps more 
interesting than Melville’s ultimately skeptical treatment of political author-
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ity based in the dictates of natural law (which Arendt also emphasizes in her 
reading of the novel) is how he understands the sensuous mechanisms of 
this peacemaking power. In this, Melville leaves Paine behind and seems to 
pursue the aesthetic insights of Paine’s central opponent in the “Revolution 
Controversy” of the 1790s, Edmund Burke.
In Melville’s story Budd’s authority is engendered through the sheer 
beauty of his physical presence, not through rhetorically persuasive speech, 
or the speech of reasoned deliberation or rational conviction. Indeed, 
Budd’s authority transcends the unreliable worldly mediations of speech 
altogether, as dramatized by his speech impediment, a stutter. The men 
aboard The Rights of Man do not consent to Budd’s authority. They are 
not convinced or persuaded into accepting it, but neither are they coerced. 
Like the “Handsome Sailor” invoked at the opening of the tale, of which 
Budd is taken to be a singular example, Budd in his harmony of outer form 
and inner nature elicits the “spontaneous tribute” of those gathered around 
him: “the crew,” “the people,” “the public” (1353). In a phrase that unites 
the theories of Paine and Burke, Melville writes of a “natural regality” that 
summons an “honest homage” (1353). This quality, Melville emphasizes, is 
not that “manufacturable thing known as respectability,” but an immedi-
ate physical manifestation of inner goodness and innocence. “The moral 
nature was seldom out of keeping with the physical make” (1354). Melville 
describes with great care the details of Billy’s body, the melodious song 
of his voice, and the unselfconscious virtuosity of his movements (1361). 
This immediate beauty and effortless grace cannot be faked, because it is 
an external and perfectly correspondent manifestation or expression of an 
inner truth, an expressive virtue of the heart. Throughout the story Melville 
establishes an elaborate connection between the innocence of Budd’s being 
and the captivating beauty of his appearance, which could be effectively 
described in terms of seduction were it not a manifestation of pure inno-
cence. Budd was not a seducer but what Melville describes as a “cynosure”; 
his authority is likened to the captivating but forever reliable guidance of 
the North Star (1354).
As Arendt also emphasizes, Melville associated this unmediated pres-
ence of the good with the incapacity of speech and violence. Just as “sponta-
neous,” “immediate,” and “unconscious” as Budd’s manifestations of natural 
goodness is the violence with which he reacts in the face of injustice. “Quick 
as lightning Billy let fly his arm” aboard The Rights of Man when harassed 
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without provocation by Red Whiskers (1357). Paralyzed by a “convulsed 
tongue-tie” in the face of Claggart’s false accusations, Budd “quick as a 
flame from a discharged cannon at night” knocks Claggart, his senior of-
ficer, to the ground (1404). Budd is abandoned by the mediating power of 
speech, and his ensuing violence manifests the tyrannical spirit beyond the 
mediating letter of the law, the violence of the Word made flesh.24 Bereft of 
a capacity for worldly mediation, he can only “speak with a blow.” It is not, 
however, simply the violence of the absolute that Melville dramatizes in the 
story, the focus of Arendt’s reading, but the captivating appearance of the 
absolute that works to veil the violence of its claim to transcend the condi-
tions of worldly mediated authority.
If Budd’s terrible innocence is incapable of “double meanings and 
insinuations,” and “seemed to have little or none” of “self-consciousness” 
(1359), Claggart is malevolent duplicity personified. As a portrait of “radical 
evil,” not only does Claggart suspect the motivations of everyone around 
him—he even suspects Budd of being a “mantrap under the ruddy-tipped 
daisies”—but his own motivations are a black hole of unintelligibility. Like 
Budd, a foundling with no known origin, Claggart has a mysterious past, but 
one shrouded by a dark veil of suspected criminality. Because of Melville’s 
insistence on Claggart’s inscrutability, and even taking into consideration 
the prurient “affair of the spilled soup,” I am not persuaded by readings 
of the novel that explain Claggart’s actions by reference to his repressed 
homosexual desire.25 It is explanation or the legibility of motivation itself 
that Melville denies in his presentation of Claggart: “to pass from a normal 
nature to his, one must cross the deadly space between” (1383). If Budd’s 
authority is engendered through an unmediated harmonization of its inner 
source and outer appearance, Claggart’s power emerges from the unbridge-
able gap between these registers of being. In his actions Claggart appears 
the most “rational,” “efficient,” and “deliberate” of men—the personifica-
tion of utilitarian instrumental reason—but these outward instrumentali-
ties serve obscure but suspected malevolent ends. Indeed, Melville suggests 
their power resides in part in this very unintelligibility (a theme also ex-
plored on a different register by that “inscrutable scrivener” Bartleby). In-
sight into Claggart’s motives requires the “lexicon of the Holy Writ” and 
spiritual perception of the “Hebrew prophets,” the narrator states, rather 
than the empirical legal code of “Coke and Blackstone” (1382). “Though 
[Claggart’s] even temper and discreet bearing would seem to intimate a 
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mind peculiarly subject to the law of reason, not the less in heart he would 
seem to riot in complete exemption from that law, having apparently little 
to do with reason further than to employ it as an ambidexter implement for 
effecting the irrational. . . . Toward the accomplishment of an aim which in 
wantonness of atrocity would seem to partake of the insane, he will direct a 
cool judgment sagacious and sound” (1383). Through Claggart Melville of-
fers a penetrating critique of instrumental reason. The dark malevolence of 
Claggart’s motivation is hidden behind his “constitutional sobriety,” “ferret-
ing genius,” “ingratiating deference to superiors,” and “austere patriotism.” 
Claggart, Eichmann-like, possesses a scrupulous instrumental rationality 
that veils the insanity or evil of the ends it serves. Claggart’s composed 
facade is, however, like Budd’s harmonization of innocence and beauty, 
presented by the narrator as a product of nature. Against both Paine’s En-
lightenment rationalism and the expressive nature of his transcendentalist 
contemporaries, Melville was insistent on the natural existence of radical 
evil. Claggart’s “evil nature” was “not engendered by vicious training or cor-
rupting books or licentious living, but born with him and innate” (1383). 
Claggart was the kind of man of whom John Rawls would famously write, 
his nature is his misfortune.26
As the Bellipotent’s “master-at-arms,” Claggart was “a sort of chief of 
police charged among other matters with the duty of preserving order on 
the populous lower gun decks.” Melville sets up a clear contrast between 
the spontaneous social order of Budd’s “peacemaking” aboard The Rights 
of Man and the covert and manipulative disciplinary mechanisms employed 
by Claggart and his “understrappers.” Whatever authority Claggart exer-
cises over the crew of the Bellipotent—and power is the more appropriate 
term—is a product of fear and manipulative but subtle coercion. “Of this 
maritime chief of police the ship’s corporals so called, were the immediate 
subordinates, and competent ones; and this, as is to be noted in some busi-
ness departments ashore, almost to a degree inconsistent with entire moral 
volition. His place put various converging wires of underground influence 
under the chief’s control, capable when astutely worked through his under-
strappers of operating to the mysterious discomfort, if nothing worse, of 
any of the sea commonality” (1376; emphasis added). Melville signals the 
illegitimacy of Claggart’s power as “inconsistent with entire moral volition,” 
and in doing so also remarks on the illegitimacy of the authority that struc-
tures the American workplace, a prominent theme in some of Melville’s 
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other stories, but he also emphasizes that this power works without relying 
on the means of direct confrontation and enforcement. Indeed, the story 
as a whole, as I will return to below, can be read as an inquiry into the 
varying degrees that constitute the juridical category of “moral volition.” 
The “converging wires of underground influence,” which Claggart works so 
astutely, and which are personified later in the story by the man who darkly 
hints at mutinous conspiracy to Budd, do maintain order aboard the ship, 
but they do so by means of inarticulate threat and insinuation internalized 
as pervasive and “mysterious discomfort” among the “sea commonality.” 
Under Claggart’s power a counterfeit environment of obedience based in 
manipulation and fear is established so that even spontaneous expressions 
of passion and feeling are shaped by a guarded self-consciousness. The crew 
laugh at the jokes and ironic remarks of the master-at-arms, for example, 
but they do so with a “counterfeit glee.” In his presence all are disfigured 
into flatterers and courtesans. The malevolent duplicity on which Claggart’s 
power is based is contagiously disseminated as pervasive mistrust among 
the crew. Even Vere is struck with “strong suspicion clogged by strange du-
bieties” in Claggart’s presence. In Claggart Melville dramatizes a form of 
power reminiscent of classical republican theories of despotism like Mon-
tesquieu’s, based not simply on fear of the despot but more centrally on the 
distancing mistrust between subjects, and a corrupting sense of being con-
stantly subject to another’s arbitrary will.27 While Claggart’s malevolence is 
portrayed as naturally evil, his power works by first separating the outward 
actions and inner beliefs of those subjected to him, and then separating 
these subjects from each other. If Budd’s authority achieves a spontaneous 
union of fraternity and goodwill, Claggart’s power works by corrosive and 
ubiquitous mistrust.
Unlike the natural power and authority of Claggart and Budd, Vere’s 
authority is expressly unnatural, artificial, constituted by men. Vere is not 
a natural leader, but the holder of a legally constituted office. In Vere Mel-
ville offers an account of political authority without appeal to Nature or 
God. This is stated clearly in one of Vere’s many addresses to the corporals 
assembled to serve as judges in Budd’s trial, addresses that many readers 
have taken to be the express articulation of the political theory of the story: 
“Do these buttons that we wear attest that our allegiance is to Nature? No, 
to the King. Though the ocean, which is inviolate Nature primeval, though 
this be the element where we move and have our being as sailors, yet as the 
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King’s officers lies our duty in a sphere correspondingly natural? So little 
is that true, that in receiving our commissions we in the most important 
regards ceased to be natural free agents” (1414). Portraying the sailors as so 
many “fast fish” (to use his term from Moby-Dick), Melville places agency 
and volition at the center of these questions of authority. Melville’s complex 
presentation of Vere’s character, judgment, and action has made Vere the 
centerpiece of most interpretations of the novella. Is Vere “an unambiguous 
figure of legitimate authority,” as F. O. Matthiessen would have it, or does 
Vere’s claim that the crew have “ceased to be natural free agents” simply 
restate the lack of “moral volition” associated with Claggart’s illegitimate 
power, as Richard Weisberg argues?28 These competing interpretations 
focus on the sources of Vere’s authority (the king) or the extent to which 
he abides by or violates authorized legal procedures in establishing the 
drumhead court to try Budd for Claggart’s death. As Vere’s invocation of 
signifying “buttons” already suggests, however, here too Melville is focused 
on examining not only the sources but the aesthetic manifestation of his 
authority, not just why but how authority is constituted, sustained, and con-
tested. Melville explores this theme most elaborately in the case of Vere, not 
only because Vere is the superior officer and highest authority aboard the 
Bellipotent, but because Vere at once enacts and theoretically reflects on 
the inexorably aesthetic dimensions of political authority. It is Vere, after all, 
who applies the lessons of Orpheus’s spellbinding lyre to the revolutionary 
threat emanating from France and the need for “forms, measured forms.”
The contrast Melville draws between bookish, “starry Vere” and Admi-
ral Lord Nelson is revealing in this regard. Nelson represents for the narra-
tor another expression of natural authority, here taking the form not of the 
“Handsome Sailor” but of the military hero. “Nelson,” the narrator states, 
was one “not indeed to terrorize the crew into base subjection, but to win 
them, by force of his mere presence and heroic personality, back to an alle-
giance if not as enthusiastic as his own yet as true” (1366). In the heroic fig-
ure of Nelson, Melville provides a contrast to the deflationary “Benthamites 
of war” whose reductive materialism and squinting focus on social utility 
obscure the importance of inspirational exemplarity and the aesthetics of 
glory to establishing military authority. The “martial utilitarians” can only 
criticize as “foolhardiness and vanity,” for example, the fact that Nelson, 
dressed in full military regalia, stood high on the quarterdeck of the Victory 
during the Battle of Trafalgar (1366). It was “a sort of priestly motive,” the 
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narrator states, that “led him to dress his person in the jeweled vouchers of 
his own shining deeds.” Nelson’s “ornate publication of his person” stands 
as a “poetic reproach” to the “new order” of a purportedly disenchanted 
modernity organized around authorities who no longer rely on those “ex-
altations of sentiment” that are “vitalized into acts” (1367). The narrator 
accuses this “new order” of a self-deluded and self-destructive “iconoclasm” 
that echoes Burke’s famous comments about the dangerous consequences 
of tearing off the finely wrought veils and moral drapery of public life.
Vere also does not “terrorize the crew into base subjection,” but neither 
is his authority grounded in the charismatic “presence [of his] heroic per-
sonality.” Throughout the novella Melville emphasizes the legal constitu-
tion and artifice of Vere’s authority, but he suggests that here too authority 
is sustained through what Burke called “pleasing illusions.”29 Like Burke, 
Vere rejects the self-evidence of natural law and the social-contract theories 
he associates with the French Revolution. Authority cannot be consistently 
or rigorously based in abstract justifications like free and equal consent, 
or popular sovereignty without fraudulence. Vere, the narrator reports, op-
posed the radicals and freethinkers of the Revolution, not out of the narrow 
class interest of “protectors of privilege,” or because he believed these ideas 
were only “insusceptible of embodiment in lasting institutions,” but because 
the appeal to the unmediated authority of Nature was at “war with the 
peace of the world and the true welfare of mankind” (1371). While Vere is 
portrayed as a philosophical conservative, one who recognizes the central-
ity of “forms, measured forms,” he is also presented as a knowing and reflec-
tive conservative. He personifies Burke and expressly admires Montaigne. 
Vere, the narrator reports, has “acquired settled convictions which were like 
a dike against those invading waters of novel opinion, social, political, and 
otherwise.” But these convictions are merely “settled,” not grounded on ra-
tional reflection or epistemic certainty. Moreover, Vere is known to act and 
judge with prudence “under unforeseen difficulties requiring prompt initia-
tive” (1396). He does not automatically rely on the authority of “precedent,” 
“custom,” “propriety,” or “usage.” Far from it. Vere’s criteria of judgment, 
as I will elaborate in the next section, are eminently worldly and politi-
cal, drawing on multiple contexts of consideration and attuned to questions 
of worldly appearances and popular reception, even when it comes to the 
theatrical appearance and sensuous form of legal procedure and judgment 
itself.
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Melville’s three-part characterology of authority in Billy Budd pro-
vides an important background for understanding the theoretical stakes of 
his account of Budd’s trial, which has become a premier canonical example 
in modern law and literature scholarship.30 Budd, Claggart, and Vere ex-
emplify three modalities of personal authority, but the insights Melville ac-
cumulates from these accounts, particularly in regard to the relationship 
between authority and appearance, carry over into his treatment of the im-
personal authority of the law overseen by Vere. The interweaving portraits 
of the novel’s central characters prime readers to recognize continuities of 
preoccupation once the story descends belowdecks to Vere’s improvised 
legal proceedings in the wake of Claggart’s death. This is not a question of 
the source of authority before the law—king or Nature—so much as the 
presentation of law itself as a means of staging or reconstituting worldly 
authority in a state of emergency.
Forms, Measured Forms
Melville modeled Budd’s quickly improvised trial, sentence, and execu-
tion on the Somers mutiny of 1842. “True, the circumstances on board 
the Somers were different from those on board the Bellipotent,” Melville 
writes, “but the urgency felt, well-warranted or otherwise, was much the 
same” (1417). In November 1842 three men were tried by a summary court 
aboard the U.S.S. Somers, a naval frigate fighting in the Mexican-American 
War, for plotting a mutiny against the ship’s officers. Among these officers 
was Melville’s cousin Lieutenant Guert Gansevoort, who also played a lead-
ing role in the subsequent court-martial. Like Budd, the accused men were 
tried, condemned, and hanged at sea, which provoked controversy at the 
time for its breach of procedural protocol. When the Somers arrived back 
in New York shortly after the hangings, the ship’s commander and other 
officers were pilloried in the press for assuming dictatorial powers in their 
handling of the case.31 The press also emphasized that there was very little 
evidence that a mutiny had, in fact, been planned. With this case provid-
ing the relevant historical context, some have read Billy Budd as Melville’s 
attempted literary rehabilitation of his cousin’s reputation, but this seems 
a rather low-sited end for such an ambitious novelist, and other historical 
analogies present themselves.
On May 4, 1886—the same year Melville began writing Billy Budd—a 
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bomb exploded in Chicago’s Haymarket Square during a labor rally. Doz-
ens of policemen were injured in the blast, and seven eventually died. The 
event immediately became a resonant symbol of the class struggle dividing 
America during the Gilded Age. The police arrested eight labor activists for 
the bombing, and what was proclaimed “the trial of the century” began the 
following month in Chicago’s Cook County Courthouse.32 Some scholars 
have argued that Billy Budd should be understood as Melville’s “imagi-
native response to the Haymarket affair,”33 and there are many intriguing 
parallels. Like Vere, Judge Gary appealed to emergency provisions in his 
conduct of the trial, and in both trials what was fundamentally at issue 
transcended local circumstances to assume an almost world historical sig-
nificance. Julius Grinnell, the state’s attorney, made these broader stakes 
clear in the prosecution’s opening statement: “Gentlemen, for the first time 
in the history of our country people are on trial for endeavoring to make 
Anarchy the rule.”34 According to the state’s argument, and trumpeted daily 
by the unprecedented coverage in the press, what was at stake in the legal 
trial of eight suspected anarchists was nothing short of the rule of law itself. 
“If I appreciate this case correctly,” another state attorney, George Ing-
ham, told the jury, “the . . . question . . . is whether organized government 
shall perish from the earth, whether the day of civilization shall go down 
into the night of barbarism.”35 The trial, conviction, and sentencing of the 
“Haymarket martyrs” was not only an expression of the state’s authority, 
but also a powerful means of securing that authority. What the backdrop of 
this overtly political and infamous show trial in Chicago helps reveal about 
Melville’s novella is how legal procedures—“forms, measured forms”—can 
be orchestrated to address broader worldly contexts of political authority. 
Just as the Haymarket trial addressed multiple and interweaving contexts 
of authority—from local struggles between labor activists and the Chicago 
police, for example, to the internationalist context of threatened proletarian 
revolution against industrial capitalism itself—so is Budd’s trial embedded 
in a dense network of overlapping authoritative relations—from personal-
ized relations aboard the ship, to relations within the fleet at a time of war, 
to mutinous challenges to naval authority, to the place of all authority in the 
Age of Democratic Revolutions. The fear of mutiny, insurrection, and revo-
lution haunts the novella from its beginning to its end, as does the related 
difficulty of sustaining authority in the midst of such pervasive threat. “The 
similarities of historical moment,” Alan Trachtenberg has rightly noted, “re-
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sound too insistently to be ignored.”36 The danger of insurrection and what 
Melville elsewhere called “riotocracy” (see Michael Jonik’s contribution to 
this volume) not only is invoked as background historical context, but also 
intimately shapes the dialogue and interactions of almost every scene; it 
shapes the emotional environment and mood in which the story unfolds.
Billy Budd is, among other things, an investigation of how abstrac-
tions of power—state sovereignty, police power, the rule of law—are cre-
ated, sustained, and contested in and through everyday performance and 
manifestation. It is a study of the intricate interdependence of these over-
lapping networks of authority, which become more brilliantly illuminated 
in times of emergency and crisis. Vere’s understanding of this basic inter-
dependence—at once sophisticated and intuitive—shapes his judgments 
and reactions to the unfolding events of the story and makes Billy Budd 
less a “judge’s story” than a phenomenological analytics of authority. Vere’s 
sensitivity to the mood of the crew and the “lurking” threat of sedition is 
indicated at every juncture of his decision making in the wake of Claggart’s 
death. In each instance, the narrator directs the reader’s attention to the 
relevant “antecedents” of Vere’s judgments: “The unhappy event [of Clag-
gart’s death] . . . could not have happened at a worse juncture. . . . For it was 
close on the heel of the suppressed insurrections, an aftertime very criti-
cal to naval authority, demanding from every English sea commander two 
qualities not readily interfusable, prudence and rigor” (1407). The emer-
gency considerations of the Nore Mutiny of 1797—itself occurring in the 
“aftertime” of the war with France (1793), and that in the “aftertime” of the 
French Revolution itself (1789)—shape Vere’s quick decision to summar-
ily and secretly convene a drumhead court to try Budd, even though this 
course of action clearly breaks from “usage,” which would require that Budd 
be imprisoned until the “ship rejoined the squadron” and then tried under 
the authority of the admiralty.
The narrator admits that in the “irregularities” of the legal proceed-
ings improvised by Vere (most important, its avoidance of “publicity”) 
“there lurked some resemblance to the policy adopted in those tragedies 
of the palace” characteristic of the state mysteries of monarchical authority 
so thoroughly discredited in an era of enlightened republicanism (1408). 
But while Vere was “a conscientious disciplinarian,” the narrator reports, 
he was also “no lover of authority for mere authority’s sake” (1371). Instead, 
the narrator presents Vere’s judgments as carefully calibrated to their “rea-
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sonable” political consequences in the critical “aftertime” of revolutionary 
unrest. A political realist of a distinctive sort, Vere seems to take the first 
political question to be “the securing of order, protection, safety, trust, and 
the conditions of cooperation.”37 “Feeling that unless quick action was taken 
on it, the deed of the foretopman, so soon as it should be known on the gun 
decks, would tend to awaken any slumbering embers of the Nore among the 
crew, a sense of the urgency of the case overruled in Captain Vere every 
other consideration” (1409). Not only does Vere convene the trial imme-
diately and secretly, but he deviates again from “general custom” in the 
irregular makeup of the court itself and in his frequent interventions in the 
court proceedings. All these “deviations” are components of Vere’s orches-
tration of the formal legal proceedings to subdue the “slumbering embers” 
of the “murmuring” crew. Aboard the H.M.S. Bellipotent, the secrecy of the 
proceedings is ultimately an essential part of the show.
Questioning the formal legality of Vere’s decision making at this point 
in the narrative, and within the procedures of trial itself—as Richard Weis-
berg, for example, has exhaustively done—seems somewhat beside the point. 
Scholars have persuasively “demonstrated that Vere was not empowered to 
try and execute Billy under the laws governing the case,”38 but the empha-
sis of the story seems continually to draw the reader’s attention away from 
strict construction. Time and again, Melville refers to the broader worldly 
contexts within which the legal proceedings are situated. In one of his many 
“formal and informal” interventions into the trial, for example, Vere argues 
that even in the “arbitrary” proceedings of a martial court, it is not the 
strict terms of the Mutiny Act that should be taken into consideration, so 
much as the broader political end that the act was designed to serve. He 
urges the judges to be attentive to the spirit over the letter of the law, and 
that spirit has a terrible visage, indeed: “In feature no child can resemble 
his father more than that Act resembles in spirit the thing from which it 
derives—War. . . . War looks but to the frontage, the appearance. And the 
Mutiny Act, War’s child, takes after the father” (1416). Further indicating 
the political, and perhaps even indirectly democratic, considerations of his 
improvised legal proceedings, and their importance as a manifestation and 
means of perpetuating political authority, Vere identifies the intended audi-
ence for the trial as “‘the people’ (meaning the ship’s company)” (1416). In 
a speech to the judges, Vere argues that they must take into primary con-
sideration, more than legal precedent or due process, the reaction of “the 
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people” to their ultimate judgment and sentence. “The people have native 
sense . . . how would they take it?” Vere asks. Again, Vere refers to the “re-
cent outbreak at the Nore” as the relevant context: “Your clement sentence 
they [the people] would account pusillanimous. They would think that we 
flinch, that we are afraid of them—afraid of practicing a lawful rigor singu-
larly demanded at this juncture, lest it should provoke new troubles. What 
shame to us such a conjecture on their part, and how deadly to discipline” 
(1416). Melville embeds the court’s legal judgment, in other words, within 
the larger political context of anticipated popular response.
Vere’s negotiation of legal proceedings in the story navigates between 
a rule-bound formalism and extralegal dictate, summed up by Melville’s 
felicitous phrase “lawful rigor.” But the improvisational approach that Vere 
takes to these legal proceedings would seem to be at odds with his pro-
nouncement of the importance of “forms, measured forms.” Indeed, sev-
eral critics who have explored the centrality of Vere’s invocation of “forms” 
to the political meaning of the story have done so to emphasize his (and 
Melville’s) “acceptance of convention, law, expediency and authority.”39 In 
Vere’s invocation of forms a number of critics have identified Melville’s late 
and tragic concession to the “regularities of custom and law.”40 What these 
approaches do not sufficiently account for, however, is the specific mythic 
reference that exemplifies the broader theoretical point; they do not ad-
equately engage the fact that it is the spellbinding power of “the lyre of 
Orpheus” that subdues the “wild denizens of the wood” and thereby dem-
onstrates the import of mankind’s need for “forms, measured forms.”41 A 
focus on the musical enchantment of these forms over their conventional or 
customary qualities brings to the fore the sensuous dimension of authority 
emphasized here. Moreover, this dimension is further highlighted by the 
events that precede and frame the narrator’s invocation of Orpheus’s lyre. 
Several stunning episodes of biblical murmuring and incipient insurrection 
punctuate the novel’s final pages, following the announcement of Budd’s 
condemnation and his hanging and burial at sea.42 Each of these moments 
brings to the fore an assemblage of mesmeric agency and sensory soft com-
pulsion that constitutes and sustains the novel’s relations of authority.
The aftermath of Budd’s trial suggests that Vere’s overriding concerns 
with the specter of latent insubordination among “the people” were war-
ranted and his judgment thereby (at least partially) vindicated, and this in-
determinate latency of revolt is expanded on in the final pages of the novel 
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as an object of sustained literary reflection. The first episode occurs after 
Vere announces the trial, judgment, and sentence of Budd to the assembled 
crew. “A confused murmur went up. It began to wax. All but instantly, then, 
at a sign, it was pierced and suppressed by shrill whistles of the boatswain 
and his mates” (1421). The officials’ suppression of this first episode of in-
choate “murmuring” and incipient or virtual insurrection by means of a 
“shrill whistle” suggests a sensuous recollection of form, a well-timed re-
organization of the regimented community of sense that sustains authority 
aboard the H.M.S. Bellipotent. By means of these “shrill whistles” of the 
boatswain and his mates, the murmuring multitude is effectively reinterpel-
lated into habitually subordinated subjectivity. The narrator suggests that 
this return to form is physically primed by the disciplined military habitua-
tion of the crew, because sailors, “of all men,” are “the greatest sticklers for 
usage” (1421).
The mesmeric automatic nature of this collective response is echoed 
in three additional episodes that follow in quick succession. As Budd stands 
on the mainyard with the “ignominious hemp about his neck,” he utters, or 
sings, his famous last words: “God bless Captain Vere!” This line, “delivered 
in the clear melody of a singing bird on the point of launching from a twig,” 
had, the narrator continues, “a phenomenal effect, not unenhanced by the 
rare personal beauty of the young sailor” (1426). The melodious clarity of 
Budd’s voice alongside his “now spiritualized” beauty also effects the spell-
binding charm of Orpheus’s lyre: “Without volition, as it were, as if indeed 
the ship’s populace were but vehicles of some current electric, with one 
voice from alow and aloft came a resonant sympathetic echo: ‘God bless 
Captain Vere!’” (1426). Melville’s emphasis on this “current electric” and 
the “spontaneous echo” of the crew suggests a mode of resonant affective 
or infrasensible communication that recurs at several points in the novella 
(and also in “The Quarter-Deck” chapter of Moby-Dick) and signals his 
attempt to elucidate a practical state of mesmeric volition obscured by theo-
retical discussions of authority emphasizing voluntary consent or rational 
calculations of utility.43 Vere’s famously indeterminate response to Budd’s 
final words suggests a similar condition: “either through stoic self-control 
or a sort of momentary paralysis induced by emotional shock, [Vere] stood 
erectly rigid as a musket in the ship-armorer’s rack” (1427). The practical 
ambiguities of agency and volition are at the center of the novel and its 
treatment of authority and its expressly aesthetic mechanisms.
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In the wave-washing silence that follows Budd’s hanging, Melville of-
fers the novel’s most sustained examination of these prearticulate affective 
orientations and dispositions. The passage is worth quoting at length, as it 
elaborates on both the ambiguity of the significance of insubordinate mur-
muring and the sonorous dimensions of its emergence and dissipation:
This emphasized silence was gradually disturbed by a sound not eas-
ily to be verbally rendered. Whoever has heard the freshet-wave of a 
torrent suddenly swelled by pouring showers not shared by the plain; 
whoever has heard the first muffled murmur of its sloping advance 
through the precipitous woods may form some conception of the sound 
now heard. The seeming remoteness of its source was because of its 
murmurous indistinctness, since it came from close by, even from the 
men passed on the ship’s open deck. Being inarticulate, it was dubi-
ous in significance further than it seemed to indicate some capricious 
revulsion of thought or feeling such as mobs ashore are liable to, in 
the present instance possibly implying a sullen revocation on the men’s 
part of their involuntarily echoing Billy’s benediction. (1429)
The “spontaneous echo” is here replaced by another resonant but inarticulate 
murmuring and, as is true of the earlier example, this inchoate unsettlement 
of the ship’s orderly community of sense is quickly reorganized by means of 
a disciplinary sonorous intervention. “But ere the murmur had time to wax 
into clamor it was met by strategic command, the more telling that it came 
with abrupt unexpectedness.” “Shrill as a shriek of the sea hawk, the silver 
whistles of the boatswain and his mates pierced that ominous low sound, 
dissipating it; and yielding to the mechanism of discipline the throng was 
thinned by one-half” (1429).
As if to underscore the significance of this interference of sound and 
affective reorganization, Melville offers another example. As Budd’s body 
is cast to sea in his hammock, Melville recounts a final incident of incipi-
ent insurrection dispelled by intervening sensory reorganization and the 
retrenchment of the reigning community of sense. Just as the body slides to 
sea, “a second strange human murmur was heard. . . . An uncertain move-
ment began among them, in which some encroachment was made. It was 
tolerated but for a moment. For suddenly the drum beat to quarters, which 
familiar sound happening at least twice every day, had upon the present 
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occasion a signal peremptoriness in it. True martial discipline long con-
tinued superinduces in average man a sort of impulse whose operation at 
the official word of command much resembles in its promptitude the effect 
of an instinct. The drumbeat dissolved the multitude” (1430). Dissolved 
them into what? A disaggregated collective of disciplined individuals? A 
regimen? A regime? The quick succession of these aural interventions de-
picted at the novel’s end seems to attempt to mimic the very rhythmic reor-
ganization they describe. In this final episode, which immediately precedes 
Vere’s invocation of “forms, measured forms,” Melville describes a form of 
subordinated subjectivity “toned by music and religious rites” that provides 
the corporeal or sensory preconditions of command (1430). The drumbeat 
that conclusively “dissolves the multitude” at the end of Billy Budd echoes 
the drumhead court convened to suppress “the slumbering embers of the 
Nore.” Melville suggests a continuity or interdependence between these 
forms usually thought of in isolation—the rule of law, sensory enchantment, 
and disciplinary organization—that emphasizes not only the “acceptance 
of convention, law, expediency and authority,” but the aesthetic means of 
constituting and sustaining that authority. As Elizabeth Samet writes in her 
study of the cultural negotiations of autonomy and obedience in nineteenth-
century American literature, “In the traditional dynamics of command and 
obedience there is always something covert, mysterious, magnetic, and fun-
damentally unreasoning, something unaccounted for by rational theories of 
the rights of man.”44
In each of these concluding episodes of murmuring, Melville dwells 
on an inchoate collective incipience—affective, shifting, episodic—that has 
not yet been organized as a legible articulation of resistance or subordina-
tion (a preoccupation prefigured in earlier stories such as “Bartleby” and 
Benito Cereno), a collective defined by affective orientation not yet cohered 
into the cogency of an articulation or a claim. His text lingers on these 
charged but indefinite moments, registering the subtle empirical contours 
of a typically unrecognized and ephemeral potentiality before it crosses 
over into legible experience or registers as an event. In these episodes Mel-
ville illuminates the fleeting potentiality and virtuality of resistance, and its 
sensory subordination and capture. He seems fascinated by the indetermi-
nacy of such collective states, as they drift along in a kind of mesmeric at-
traction between voluntarism and habituated behavior. In each instance the 
emergence of some new, more threatening form is deftly assuaged and re-
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directed through a sensory directive of whistle and drum. In each instance 
an order is restored through the sensory redirection of aesthetic experience.
This returns us, by way of conclusion, to Melville’s reliance on Burke’s 
theory of political authority in Billy Budd. It is widely accepted that the 
principles Vere espouses in the novella, particularly those statements Vere 
makes concerning the significance and political modernity of the French 
Revolution, echo Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France, a book 
Melville first encountered in his adolescence and referred to explicitly in 
Mardi.45 A Burkean conservatism has also been attributed to the narrator 
when, for example, he describes the Nore mutineers as replacing “the flag of 
founded law and freedom” with the “enemy’s red meteor of unbridled and 
unbounded revolt . . . ignited into irrational combustion as by live cinders 
blown across the Channel from France in flames” (1363). Thomas Scorza 
has argued that Melville’s critique of enlightened liberalism in Billy Budd 
actually occurred within “a more general critique of the whole of moderni-
ty” influenced by Burke’s writing.46 But what did Melville take from Burke? 
Was it Vere’s prudent consequentialism, or his embrace of settled conven-
tions and usage? The above discussion provides evidence that neither inter-
pretation adequately characterizes Vere’s actions in the novella, or Melville’s 
pointed emphases on the choreography of sensation. I want to suggest that 
what Melville drew most clearly from Burke in Billy Budd is the latter’s 
attention to the worldly context of law, its embedding in cultural and in-
stitutional networks of authority, and also the crucially aesthetic dimen-
sions of that authority’s constitution and maintenance over time. It is not 
simple violence or the threat of violence that lies behind the authority of the 
law—as Burke eloquently puts the point, the gallows do not stand behind 
“every vista”; rather, its authority is engendered through the means of what 
Melville described as “external arts and entrenchments.”47 These are not 
mere “ornaments” and “fictions” but the very vehicles enacting authority. 
Burke had a profound understanding of how political authority was actually 
maintained and supported through a dense network of adorned authorita-
tive relations throughout society. “The public affections,” as Burke put the 
point, “combined with manners, are required as supplements, sometimes 
as correctives, always as aids to the law.”48 All the “props of authority” that 
Paine summarily condemned under the name of a “Quixotic age of chival-
rous nonsense” are argued by Melville to be not so easily gotten rid of.49 To 
attempt to do without these “props” is to succumb to dangerous fantasies of 
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autonomy, mastery, and sovereignty that Melville created Ahab to at once 
exemplify and critically expose, but that is another story.50
Melville’s investigation of the interrelationship between authority and 
aesthetic form in Billy Budd carries through to the “ragged edges” of the 
novella’s famous afterword and conclusion. “The symmetry of form attain-
able in pure fiction,” Melville writes, “cannot so readily be achieved in a 
narration essentially having less to do with fable than with fact. Truth un-
compromisingly told will always have its ragged edges; hence the conclusion 
of such a narration is apt to be less finished than an architectural finial” 
(1431). The “ragged edges” of Melville’s “inside narrative” are contrasted 
at the novel’s end with two subsequent tales of the tragic events aboard 
the H.M.S. Bellipotent during the year of the “Great Mutiny.” “What Mel-
ville’s tale tells,” Barbara Johnson writes, is in the end “the snowballing of 
tale telling.”51 The narrator reports that the first of these concluding tales 
appeared in “an authorized weekly publication” of the British navy under 
the head “‘News from the Mediterranean.’” In the alchemy of this official 
transcript Budd is converted into an alien and vindictive murderer, while 
Claggart appears as a “respectable,” “responsible” “victim” with “strong pa-
triotic impulse” (1433). Though this official narrative serves an authorizing 
function in “His Majesty’s navy,” it also disappears completely from public 
memory; “long ago superannuated and forgotten,” this journalistic record is 
simply replaced by the next round of reported news and quickly buried in 
the archival ash heap of official history.
The second “record” also falsifies “the secret facts of the tragedy,” but it 
effects a transmutation of a different sort. “Billy in the Darbies,” the “rude” 
ballad with which the novel ends, springs from the naval world of the blue-
jackets themselves. Captivated by “the fresh young image of the Handsome 
sailor” and haunted by the “fact he was gone, and in a measure mysteriously 
gone,” this “hidden transcript” of the events orally circulates a “knowledge” 
directly opposed to officialdom.52 The “instinctive” sense of Budd’s inno-
cence and the injustice of his sacrifice are given poetic form by another 
foretopman gifted with an “artless poetic temperament.” Written from the 
perspective of Budd on the night before his hanging, the sailor shanty imag-
ines the final moments of Budd’s life and his death. “But aren’t it all sham?” 
Budd asks, “A blur’s in my eyes; it is dreaming that I am.” Unlike the official 
record, “Billy in the Darbies” converts “the striking incident” aboard the 
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Bellipotent into a lasting “monument” (1434). Here aesthetic form still cap-
tivates and spellbinds but serves the ends of popular subversion rather than 
authority. It resonates with the murmuring insubordination of the crew 
rather than their habituated obedience to “usage.”
Thanks to Harrison Hayford and Merton M. Sealts’s genetic analy-
sis of Melville’s manuscript, we know that the ballad with which the novel 
ends was actually the text that inspired the “inside narrative” itself. Mel-
ville began writing “Billy of the Darbies” in early 1896, and it is from these 
few lines that Billy Budd, Sailor (An Inside Narrative) would develop in 
Melville’s notes over the next five years. In this sense, Billy Budd is itself 
the “monument” of its eponymous hero’s death. Unlike monuments that 
provide sensuous markers of an authorizing discourse, however—think of 
Melville’s ironic dedication of Israel Potter to “His Majesty the Bunker Hill 
Monument”—Budd’s inside narrative neither sanctifies nor condemns.53 
The story at once invites and resists the allegorical readings that have so 
often been applied to it. Its self-proclaimed “ragged edges” and lack of for-
mal “symmetry” bespeak the unresolved conflicts that are enacted in the 
text itself.
One last historical anecdote will bring this essay to its own ragged 
ending. On the box where he kept the manuscript of Billy Budd, Melville 
glued a piece of paper commanding him to “keep true to the dreams of thy 
youth!” How to sustain a commitment to radical egalitarianism and affirm 
what Melville called “unconditional democracy in all things,” while also rec-
ognizing—and to some extent equally affirming—the spellbinding allure of 
authority in everyday life? The common view of Melville as a democratic 
egalitarian in his youth and a conservative in his middle and old age effec-
tively effaces the persistence of this conflict in Billy Budd. It is true that 
Melville was “one of early America’s frankest commentators on the hopes 
and the failures of democracy,” and the twinned and tragic preoccupation 
with hope and failure also characterized his last work of fiction.54 Melville 
believed prevailing theories of political authority based in consent and so-
cial utility did not provide adequate resources—symbolic, theoretical, and 
literary—for confronting and navigating the tensions that constitute an aes-
thetic democracy, and he worked to make up for that deficit in many of his 
novels, including Billy Budd. Rather than resolving or hoping to transcend 
these tensions, Billy Budd put them on tragic display (see my introduction 
to this volume). The pervasive sense of irresolution in the novel is even 
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stylistically transmitted in Melville’s almost compulsive use of double nega-
tives, which, in Sharon Cameron’s words, “at once assert and retract asser-
tion, speak and undo speech, . . . establish and nullify.”55 Melville’s last will 
and testament continues to illuminate the practical and irresolute terrain 
of political authority—its complicated assemblage of soft compulsion and 
mesmeric assent—still obscured by the dominant paradigms of contempo-
rary democratic theory. It is his own effort to do the work that Vere admires 
in the essays of Montaigne: to “philosophize on realities.” Less a political 
treatise offering norms than an acute literary examination of an irresolvable 
political problematic, Billy Budd continues to provoke and disturb, capti-
vate and enchant.
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Melville’s Law
Jennifer L. Culbert
When we think about law, how often do we essay a portrait and fail to hit it? 
As the legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart observes, “Few questions concerning 
human society have been asked with such persistence and answered by seri-
ous thinkers in so many diverse, strange, and even paradoxical ways as the 
question ‘What is law?’”1 Hart suggests that the difficulty of answering this 
question once and for all is due to the challenge of addressing issues raised 
when we think about law, issues like the nature of obligation, the relation-
ship of law to justice, and the meaning of rules.2 In this essay I suggest that 
these issues present such a challenge because we conceive of them in terms 
of a particular philosophical tradition. In this tradition we try to grasp the 
essence of law.3 Inspired by the fiction of Herman Melville, I propose we 
take another tack. Specifically, I propose we consider how all these diverse, 
strange, and even paradoxical answers to the question “What is law?” may 
be understood not as unsuccessful attempts to grasp the essence of law but 
rather as reflections of the experience of law.
When this experience is described in the conventional literature, it is 
usually represented as an experience of being subject to an external or in-
ternal will that uses the promise of physical harm, moral suffering, psycho-
logical pain, or social distress to deprive us of the opportunity to achieve 
or enjoy some desired end. This characterization of law reflects the major 
premise of legal positivism—that law is what is posited by a will or, rather, 
“a will empowered so to will” that thereby binds us.4 When I pay close at-
tention to the experience of law, however, what I observe is not an experi-
ence of subjection to or triumph of a will but rather an experience like love.
To describe this experience, I turn to Melville’s final, and famously un-
finished, novella, Billy Budd.5 Billy Budd is a work of fiction that has been 
interpreted, like Sophocles’s Antigone, as depicting the tragic consequences 
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of an irresolvable conflict between natural (or ancient or divine) law and 
positive (or modern or state) law.6 This conflict is frequently represented as 
a war of wills: the gods’ versus the king’s, God’s versus man’s, the people’s 
versus the state’s, the individual’s versus society’s, the individual’s versus 
itself. On my account of Billy Budd, these interpretations do not illuminate 
key tensions in the text as much as they illustrate the hegemony of legal 
positivism in the modern world.7 In this essay I do not comment directly on 
that claim. Instead, I show how the experience of law in Melville’s work is 
like an experience of love.
With this remark, I do not mean to suggest that law is love for Mel-
ville—or for anyone else, for that matter—but rather that law is like love. 
This is an important distinction because the analogy collapses or obscures 
a distance between law and love, a distance that the simile preserves. And 
it is in this in-between space, I argue, that we may glimpse the possibility 
of law as something other than a will working through opposition to realize 
a particular social or political order.8 Specifically, we may see law not as a 
willed blow resolving matters but as a touch exposing and unsettling them.
Obviously, this is an unusual way to discuss law. I do so in the spirit of a 
legal realist who takes seriously the claim that we live in an appearing world, 
so that when law is defined as “whatever judges or other relevant officials 
do,” it is defined by what is seen to be done.9 This means that, unlike legal 
realists such as Jerome Frank, I eschew psychological (and gastronomical) 
approaches to law in an attempt to attend to what appears or what presents 
itself.10 Though these appearances may imply interiorities in the same way 
that a surface may imply a three-dimensional space, Melville’s style of writ-
ing bids us to resist the habit of projecting the hidden depths we typically 
mine for meaning. Or, rather, it constantly tempts us to indulge this habit 
but abandons us in the pit when we try to come up with something tangible 
and certain.11 Thus, I begin to answer the question “What is law?” by read-
ing Melville’s story closely rather than deeply, sticking to the surface to see 
what Billy Budd makes possible for us to think about law.
Law
There are more interpretations of Billy Budd than there are readers of Mel-
ville’s final piece of fiction. The long short story revolves around a handsome 
sailor with a “vocal defect” named Billy Budd, who is pressed into service as 
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a foretopman on a British warship, the Bellipotent, during the Napoleonic 
Wars and after the Spithead and Nore mutinies. Budd is popular with ev-
eryone except for the ship’s master-at-arms, John Claggart, who accuses the 
young sailor of plotting mutiny. Brought before the ship’s captain, Captain 
Edward Vere, to answer the charge, Budd is tongue-tied. Urged by the 
captain to defend himself, the foretopman suddenly strikes the master-at-
arms with his fist, killing the superior officer instantly. To determine what 
should be done with Budd, Captain Vere convenes a drumhead court, at 
which he is not only the primary witness to the events in question but also 
the presiding officer. The captain is clearly sympathetic to the sailor but 
nevertheless pushes the court to sentence him to death. The next morning, 
as the ship’s crew watches, Budd is hanged. The story concludes with three 
different endings. One ending is a tale about Captain Vere on his deathbed; 
his last words are Billy Budd’s name. The second tale is an account of events 
printed in an authorized naval publication, according to which a noble Clag-
gart is stabbed to death by Billy Budd, who is cast as the ringleader of a 
plot against the Bellipotent. The final tale is a ballad in which Billy Budd 
anticipates his execution, speaking his last words as if already at the bottom 
of the sea.
It is commonly observed that when Billy Budd is sentenced to hang, his 
penalty is never completely legally justified.12 When Captain Vere informs 
the ship’s surgeon of his decision to convene a drumhead court, the doctor 
is struck by the captain’s choice to depart from convention. The surgeon 
knows the captain could simply have put Billy Budd in confinement, “in a 
way dictated by usage,” and waited until the Bellipotent rejoined the squad-
ron to refer the whole matter to the admiral (1406–1407). The surgeon, 
however, does not question or resist the captain’s orders because he realizes 
that to do so would be mutiny (1407). In other words, he defers not out of 
respect for custom or tradition but out of fear of punishment under martial 
law. We might summarize, then, by saying that what is theoretically rec-
ognized as law may ultimately be based on “social rules,” but it seems that 
what is actually practiced as law is ultimately based on threats of violence.13
The captain, however, seems to worry not so much about the reactions 
of his officers to his decision as about the response of the crew. Specifically, 
the captain expresses concern that the crew will interpret the failure to 
punish a sailor for killing a superior officer as a sign of fear (1416–1417). 
Putting Billy Budd in confinement would then be “deadly to discipline” 
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(1417). In other words, Captain Vere determines Billy Budd not only must 
be put on trial but also must die because the men expect the foretopman 
to be punished severely, and the captain is concerned that if he violates 
the crew’s expectations he will lose control of the ship. In brief, he worries 
that waiting to punish Billy Budd will strike the sailors as wrong, and it will 
strike them as wrong because they have been trained to assume that a cer-
tain type of behavior on the Bellipotent is normal.14
Thus, both despite and because of the fact that the men on board the 
Bellipotent have been drilled in military discipline to such a degree that 
“a sort of impulse whose operation at the official word of command much 
resembles in its promptitude the effect of an instinct,” any violation of con-
vention appears to threaten to undermine the efficacy, and legitimacy, of 
the captain’s orders (1430).15
As usage dictates both that Captain Vere wait to try Billy Budd and 
that he act immediately to put down a threat—a threat that, to complicate 
matters further, may not even materialize until the captain tries to put it 
down—it would seem that the law of social rules is really no law at all.16 At 
the same time, on its own terms, martial law appears no more “legitimate” 
than usage because its efficacy depends on circumstances that it does not 
completely control. Despite his position of authority, Captain Vere cannot 
simply do as he wishes. In the end, Captain Vere is damned if he acts and 
damned if he does not. No matter what he decides to do, the “legitimacy” 
of his decision is compromised, and, consequently, the violence he com-
mands and uses to effect his decision is not completely legal. No coher-
ent philosophy or practice of law authorizes him to condemn Billy Budd 
to death. When the surgeon comes to examine Claggart’s body in Captain 
Vere’s cabin, Captain Vere suddenly exclaims, “Struck dead by an angel of 
God! Yet the angel must hang!” (1406). As many readers have observed and 
complained, this “must” is never fully explained.17 Its source and its force 
are as mysterious as Claggart’s feelings for Billy Budd.18
I find two possible explanations of this “must” compelling but prob-
lematic. The first explanation casts Captain Vere’s decision to execute Billy 
Budd as an exercise of sovereign power. Melville’s story is set in 1797. The 
British navy is at war with French revolutionary forces. At the same time, 
mutiny has broken out, not once but twice, threatening the British fleet. 
The normal rule of law has been suspended and martial law governs the 
British on the high seas. It is an exceptional moment. Captain Vere reminds 
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the drumhead court of this fact when he observes that the court operates 
according to a code dictated by “imperial” rather than private conscience 
(1415). Acknowledging the hesitation of the officers on the drumhead court 
to condemn Billy Budd, Captain Vere recurs to “the facts”: “In wartime 
at sea a man-of-war’s man strikes his superior in grade, and the blow kills. 
Apart from its effect the blow itself is, according to the Articles of War, a 
capital crime.” The captain then observes, “We proceed under the law of 
the Mutiny Act. In feature no child can resemble his father more than that 
Act resembles in spirit the thing from which it derives—War” (1415–1416). 
As many readers of Billy Budd remark, concerns about security seem to 
trump all others, including justice.19 When the very existence of the state is 
at stake, “political” matters appear to outweigh “legal” ones. Interpreted this 
way, the handsome sailor in the story must hang not because he deserves 
to die and legally has been found guilty of a capital offense but because his 
death is necessary for the greater good. In brief, Billy Budd is sacrificed.20 
On this reading, for the benefit of king, country, and crew an innocent sailor 
is executed in a public ceremony with all the trimmings of a ritual.21
This sacrifice may well be a personal one for the captain. When he chal-
lenges the officers on the drumhead court to admit that they are reluctant 
to find Billy Budd guilty of murder because he is “a fellow creature innocent 
before God,” Captain Vere includes himself among those who feel this to be 
so. He tells them, “Well, I too feel that, the full force of that. It is Nature.” 
He goes on, however: “But do these buttons that we wear attest that our al-
legiance is to Nature? No, to the King. Though the ocean, which is inviolate 
Nature primeval, though this be the element where we move and have our 
being as sailors, yet as the King’s officers lies our duty in a sphere correspond-
ingly natural? So little is that true, that in receiving our commissions we in 
the most important regards ceased to be natural free agents” (1414).
Such passages are used to justify interpretations of Billy Budd as trag-
edy and Captain Vere as a man “trapped in a tragic dilemma, a formalist 
torn between adherence to the rule of law and his own heart and con-
science.”22 But these passages are just as often used as evidence of Captain 
Vere’s limited or flawed character. Robert Cover argues that though the 
captain may well have struggled with the moral-formal dilemma—parading 
his helplessness before the law, lamenting harsh results, intimating that in 
a more perfect world, or at the end of days, a better law would emerge—he 
ultimately “marched to the music, steeled [himself], and hung Billy Budd.”23 
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Yet others argue that Captain Vere was not formalist enough, and that he 
only claimed to follow the law so as to be able to kill Billy Budd out of an ex-
aggerated desire for order or bitter resentment.24 To these readers Richard 
Posner replies, “Vere is in sole command of a major warship in a major war. 
This is an awesome responsibility. . . . We are not meant to think that he had 
no choice, but no more are we meant to think that he was acting illegally or 
out of envy. His bookishness, his ‘pedantry,’ are intended to make us realize 
that Vere knew he faced a tough choice.”25
But to the extent that Captain Vere faces a tough choice, his actions 
are no longer determined by the political concerns manifest in the imple-
mentation of military law. As we already observed, there is evidence that 
martial law does not necessarily require or call for the trial of Billy Budd, 
let alone his execution. The sovereign decision, then, is not the decision 
of a distant king but of Captain Vere. Consequently, when Captain Vere 
exclaims that Billy “must” die, he does not express his sense of obligation to 
a sovereign but rather exercises the power of sovereignty himself.26 As Carl 
Schmitt elaborated, the sovereign is he who decides on the exception.27 The 
sovereign is the one who recognizes the unprecedented and unexampled, 
that which is “not codified in the existing legal order” and “cannot be cir-
cumscribed factually and made to conform to a pre-formed law.”28 In Billy 
Budd, when the foretopman strikes the master-at-arms, Captain Vere de-
cides that accepted practice does not apply. Given what he determines to 
be an exceptional situation, the captain declares that what is most holy, an 
angel of God, must be treated as a common murderer and hung.
The captain makes this decision from a position designated by a normal-
ly valid legal system but one that at the same time stands outside this system, 
for he exercises a competency that cannot be codified by the system. Thus, 
Captain Vere’s decision of Billy Budd’s fate sounds to the surgeon who wit-
nesses it as “mere incoherences” (1406). And yet the surgeon complies with 
the captain’s commands, as do the lieutenants and the captain of the marines, 
although they are also surprised and concerned by Captain Vere’s decision 
(1407).29 At the same time, as Schmitt’s philosophy insists, the captain con-
tinues to operate in a juridical framework. Captain Vere himself makes this 
clear when he reminds the members of the drumhead court that they do 
not operate as “natural free agents” (1414). With this reminder, the captain 
assures the officers of the ship that the circumstances that he determines to 
be exceptional do not cast them all out of the state and back into a state of 
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nature. He calls for an exception to the social rules and military law by which 
the ship would be guided in “normal” times, but his “must” nevertheless re-
mains “legal.”
As I have already said, I find this interpretation of the experience of 
law—the force of Captain Vere’s “must”—compelling. I also find it problem-
atic, however. One particular difficulty stands out. This interpretation does 
not account for Captain Vere’s insistence that he is somehow obliged to make 
the decision that he makes. For instance, speaking to the drumhead court, 
the captain explicitly recognizes that “the case is an exceptional one.” But, he 
goes on, “for us here, acting not as casuists or moralists, it is a case practical, 
and under martial law practically to be dealt with” (1414). He also reminds 
the court: “Our vowed responsibility is in this: That however pitilessly that law 
may operate in any instances, we nevertheless adhere to it and administer it.” 
Again, acknowledging that “the exceptional in the matter” moves the hearts 
of the members of the court and confessing that it moves his heart as well, 
Captain Vere tells his officers that they must decide with their heads (1415). 
Referring once more to their hearts and to the fact that he shares the officers’ 
feelings, however, the captain suggests that even their heads do not rule here, 
as “in this military necessity so heavy a compulsion is laid” (1417). In brief, the 
sovereign power ostensibly exercised here shades into its opposite, signaling 
that in Billy Budd, as Philip Loosemore suggests, “Melville . . . grapples with 
. . . the fundamental blurring of sovereignty and subjection, norm and excep-
tion, that it seems to entail, in the security emergency of revolution.”30 Writing 
before Giorgio Agamben’s influential analysis of the security emergency and 
the institution of the permanent state of exception, Michael Rogin observes 
how “natural” and “man-made” authority are imbricated in Billy Budd to 
such an extent that the boundary between natural force and human power 
is dissolved, placing men—officers and bluejackets alike—at the mercy and 
disposal of forces “beyond human reach.”31 This means Captain Vere’s “must” 
has no special force or significance. In a condition of undecidable ambiguity, 
the experience of law as such is indistinguishable from any other kind of so-
cial, political, moral, or biological compulsion.
The second explanation of the force of Captain Vere’s “must” explic-
itly takes issue with the experience of law as an experience of pure will or 
sovereign power. This approach to the mystery of the “must” in Billy Budd 
analyzes that mystery as the effect of repression, specifically the repression 
of eros in law.32 According to Freud, aggression is only one of the drives 
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that give rise to civilization and the law by which it is sustained.33 The other 
drive is eros, which binds communities libidinally. In her reading of Billy 
Budd, Martha Umphrey suggests that, to the extent that legal positivism 
assumes that law originates in a performative act of violence and denies the 
libidinal drive that brings people together, legal positivism is characterized 
by instances of opacity when this unacceptable impulse is blocked.34 Um-
phrey draws attention to some of these instances in Billy Budd to recover 
the erotic dimension of law.
Many readers of Billy Budd have suggested that the outcome of Billy 
Budd’s trial would have been different if Captain Vere had not explicitly 
prohibited the members of the drumhead court from consulting their emo-
tions.35 Umphrey makes a different, more subtle point, however. Following 
Freud, she claims that emotion can never be ruled out in a legal situation 
because eros is central to the sustenance of legal authority. Thus, eros can 
never be completely obscured or denied.36 She illustrates the point with 
Billy Budd’s execution. Standing with a rope around his neck before all the 
officers and crew of the Bellipotent, Billy speaks his final and only words: 
“God bless Captain Vere!” (1426). Umphrey claims these words “ratify and 
transcend the execution that Vere has brought about.”37 Though Captain 
Vere has gone out of his way to ensure that Billy Budd will be convicted 
and condemned to death, Billy Budd’s final words suggest that he bears 
no ill will against his captain. On the contrary, his words seem to express 
approval or thanks for what Captain Vere has done. Alternatively, or simul-
taneously, his final words suggest that Billy Budd is indifferent to the world 
in which the captain acts and therefore is indifferent to the consequences 
of the captain’s actions. His only concern is for Captain Vere himself, and so 
Billy Budd appeals to a higher authority to support the captain. Whatever 
its significance might be, Billy Budd’s utterance has a profound effect on 
the men summoned to witness his punishment. Instead of rising against an 
authority that not only can but also will inflict a lethal penalty on a sailor 
who is presumed to be innocent, without volition and in one voice they echo 
Billy Budd’s “benediction” (1426). As Umphrey points out, Billy Budd’s 
benediction actually reverses the order of authority; he is being hanged as a 
criminal or a traitor, but he is the one bestowing blessings and leading the 
ship’s populace in a unanimous salute to the ship’s captain.38 In this scene, 
she claims, eros triumphs over violence.39
This reading of Billy Budd calls attention to instances when law, un-
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derstood as the product of a will empowered to posit law by its own efficacy, 
is revealed to be the product of a will that is efficacious by virtue of its ca-
pacity not only to use lethal force but also to bring people together. Thus, 
this reading demonstrates the limits of an explanation of the legal “must” 
that focuses only on force or violence by showing how, at the heart of the 
matter, the will that posits law or empowers the will to posit law deploys 
eros as well as aggression. This reading also explains the mystery of the 
“must” of legal experience, as it suggests the force of the “must” is more or 
less consciously obscured by the story we tell ourselves about law, specifi-
cally, that law is nothing other than the monopoly of legitimate violence.
While I find this interpretation of the experience of law particularly 
suggestive, I nevertheless find it frustrating, too. For instead of facing the 
widely acknowledged fact that throughout Billy Budd the characters’ inner 
thoughts are never revealed—and hence the irony of the story’s subtitle, 
An Inside Narrative—the silences of the text are cast in Umphrey’s read-
ing as occasions of repression, and hence moments when something, and in 
particular something mistakenly assumed to be shameful, that is, eros, can 
be “discovered” and brought out into the light.40 What is more, this reading 
implies that through a practice of projection and recuperation, law may be 
healed, that is to say, restored to its whole self so it will no longer be so in-
clined to pathological outbursts of violence. Thus, the “true” nature of law is 
assumed to be something other than what the characters experience as law. 
A perverted but redeemable law sends Billy Budd to the gallows.
In what follows, I try to avoid thinking so deeply about law. I am not 
concerned with making law better—that is to say, I am not interested in 
finding a way to redeem law as a sovereign exercise of power or as the prod-
uct of a dynamic between two drives, human aggression and eros. Instead, 
I try to think of law superficially, in a realist manner, after a fashion. Thus, I 
try to attend to the surface of the matter and what strikes us there.
Love
When we take this superficial approach to Billy Budd, what do we see? 
Some critics complain that we don’t see much.41 Indeed, on one level, for all 
of the events recorded in Melville’s story, not a lot actually happens. There 
are no personal epiphanies; the characters do not grow or develop. Despite 
the period in which the story is set, there are no political or more broadly 
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social transformations; no wars are won or lost, no revolutions occur, no man 
is liberated. What critics who appreciate only narratives of transformation 
overlook, however, is that Billy Budd’s arrival on the Bellipotent coincides 
with a proliferation of body-to-body touches that destroy the self-possession 
of the men on board.42
Observing these touches, I suggest that Melville’s novella traces what 
I call, after Jean-Luc Nancy, the advent of love.43 The advent of love is the 
arriving or the beginning of love. It is the commencing of love, a commenc-
ing that does not cease. Love comes, it happens, it takes place, but, as it 
does not reach an end or any final destination, it is always suspended in its 
arrival. That is to say, love comes but it also goes, or, rather, it goes on . . . 
and on. Cutting across us rather than stopping and realizing or fulfilling the 
promise its appearance may seem to imply, love, as Nancy would have it, is 
“a moment of contact between beings, a light, cutting and delicious moment 
of contact, at once eternal and fleeting.”44 Nancy calls this incessant coming 
and going “the crossing of love.”45
In her famous reading of Billy Budd, Barbara Johnson calls attention 
to several such moments of contact and also describes them as crossings.46 
Observing how good and evil, innocence and guilt, criminal and victim, 
change places in the story, Johnson suggests that Melville sets up his plot 
in the form of a chiasmus.47 This chiasmus structure is evident in a passage 
that describes the moment when Captain Vere recognizes that Billy Budd 
cannot defend himself against Claggart’s charge of mutiny:
Though at the time Captain Vere was quite ignorant of Billy’s liability 
to vocal impediment, he now immediately divined it. . . . Going close 
up to the young sailor, and laying a soothing hand on his shoulder, he 
said, “There is no hurry, my boy. Take your time, take your time.” Con-
trary to the effect intended, these words so fatherly in tone, doubtless 
touching Billy’s heart to the quick, prompted yet more violent efforts at 
utterance. . . . The next instant, quick as the flame from a discharged 
cannon at night, his right arm shot out, and Claggart dropped to the 
deck. Whether intentionally or but owing to the young athlete’s supe-
rior height, the blow had taken effect full upon the forehead. . . . A gasp 
or two, and he lay motionless. (1404)
It is Vere’s intention to soothe, but the effect of his words is to provoke; 
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Vere’s benevolence touches Billy’s heart, but Claggart’s forehead suffers 
the impact of a fist propelled by the captain’s kindness. Johnson reads such 
reversals in parallel terms—ignorance/intelligence (“ignorant”/ “divined”), 
calm/inflamed (“soothing”/“violent”), words/deeds (“said”/“blow”), heart/
head (“heart”/“forehead”)—as an indication that Melville is not as pre-
occupied with “the static opposition between evil and good” as he with 
“the dynamic opposition . . . [of] man’s ‘nature’ and his acts.”48 What really 
interests him are the “twisted relations between knowing and doing, speak-
ing and killing, reading and judging, which make political understanding 
and action so problematic.”49 According to Johnson, Melville’s text shows 
that these relations are so “twisted” because the difference between the 
opposing pairs—intention/appearance, good/evil, Billy/Claggart—is really 
a difference within each one of them.50 What is more, she observes, “a dif-
ference between opposing forces presupposes that the entities in conflict 
be knowable. A difference within one of the entities in question is precisely 
what problematizes the very idea of an entity in the first place.”51 Johnson 
claims that it is this difference that prevents us from ever fully realizing the 
consequences of our actions.52 The entity to which responsibility would be 
attributed is never fully present, as it were, either to itself or to others. Thus, 
we do not know ourselves or what we do. We are not masters of our actions 
or our fates. We are called to judge and so to determine consequences and 
assign blame retrospectively. Yet judgment is an act itself, open in its turn to 
judgment.53 Consequently, we are never finished.
Against the backdrop of Nancy’s remarks about love, I am inclined to 
read the pairs of oppositions that Melville erects and the devastating effects 
of the crossings between them in a similar but more ragged fashion. Specifi-
cally, I find that Nancy’s remarks about love suggest an alternative way of 
reading the crossings that Johnson identifies. To put that alternative crudely, 
rather than reading these crossings under the regime of contradiction, we 
might read them under the regime of exposition. Under the regime of expo-
sition, the bursts, flashes, blows, and cuts that make manifest the moments 
of contact between ostensibly opposing pairs do not express what has until 
then been repressed—a difference within—but rather display, in Nancy’s 
words, “the world is a ‘with,’” a Mitwelt or shared world.54 In a shared world, 
being is “being-with.” Being-with does not mean that one is beside another, 
being with by being next to another who is also present. In a shared world, 
the verb to be means “to share existence.” In other words, one “is” not; one 
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shares being, one “with others” rather than “is.” To put the matter another 
way, existence does not belong to anyone; no one possesses it. No one pos-
sesses being because being is not a private property.
On this reading, every interaction in Billy Budd exposes human “finitude” 
or human “inappropriability” rather than the logical inconsistency of a subject’s 
identity. For that which is inappropriable has no property that belongs to it; nor 
can it acquire or realize any such property in a dialectical relationship with an 
outside or other. That is because the Hegelian logic that would dictate the pro-
cess by which the singular being would come to possess itself or know itself as a 
self through a confrontation with an outside or an other—a process of sublation 
or Aufhebung—is unavailable to that which has no being and therefore is not.55 
As singular being does not possess being, self-contradiction is impossible.
The exchange of properties in Billy Budd demonstrates this point inso-
far as throughout the story we see contact between the characters shatter-
ing their ostensible identities, dispossessing them of themselves. Being with 
others, they change. This is represented by the way they become other than 
themselves by taking on the properties of the other who has touched them. 
In a flurry of cuts, glances, blows, and digs, they lose their self-possession, 
or the appearance of possessing a self.
For instance, when the lieutenant from the Bellipotent takes Billy Budd 
from the merchant ship The Rights of Man to serve the king, Billy Budd’s 
former captain explains that he is so distraught about the loss of this sailor 
because of Billy Budd’s effect on the crew. Captain Graveling tells the lieu-
tenant, “Before I shipped that young fellow, my forecastle was a rat-pit of 
quarrels. . . . But Billy came; and it was like a Catholic priest striking peace 
in an Irish shindy. Not that he preached to them or said or did anything 
in particular; but a virtue went out of him, sugaring the sour ones” (1356). 
Here the apparent reversal that takes place on board The Rights of Man 
is explicitly ascribed to a “striking” arrival. What is more, the change that 
takes place in the sailors on the ship is described as something that occurs 
by osmosis rather than opposition. The “sour ones” are not converted but 
“sugar[ed].” In brief, members of the crew may be touched by Billy Budd 
but they are not saved by the power of his appearance in any Christian or 
Hegelian sense of a process of triumphant transformation.56
Of course, other instances of the exchange of properties do not appear 
to occur in so relatively mild a manner. Consider the oft-analyzed relation-
ship between Billy Budd and Claggart. This relationship appears to begin 
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when Billy Budd chances to spill soup across Claggart’s path (1380). Before 
this affair, the narrator insists, Billy has had no “special contact” with Clag-
gart. On this occasion, however, it becomes apparent that “at heart, and not 
for nothing,” Claggart is “down on” Billy Budd (1381).
How Billy Budd has had contact with Claggart is left ambiguous, but 
that Claggart is struck by Billy Budd is already obvious. Even one of the 
lowliest members of the Bellipotent’s crew realizes that Claggart loses his 
self-possession when Budd comes on board. First, Claggart has this corpo-
ral lay traps for the foretopman. Then, when Claggart receives reports from 
this corporal recounting episodes of Billy Budd’s expressions of resentment 
about being impressed and his ill will toward the officers, the master-at-
arms does not suspect their veracity. Claggart’s trust in these reports may 
be due in part to the fact that he knows “how secretly unpopular may be-
come a master-at-arms, at least a master-at-arms of those days” (1386). Nev-
ertheless, as the officer in charge of maintaining order on the Bellipotent, 
Claggart is required to be suspicious of everyone. In this case, however, 
Claggart’s “uncommon prudence” leads him not to verify his faithful under-
strapper’s stories but to impulsively cut himself off from the possibility of 
“enlightenment or disillusion” about them (1387). In this regard, Claggart 
becomes like the famously dumb Billy Budd.
Though there is no obvious explanation for Claggart’s unusual behav-
ior, eros is a reason often offered for his recklessness. Psychoanalytic read-
ings of Melville’s text, in particular ones that emphasize the homoerotic 
tensions on board the Bellipotent, refer to a story told in the narrative to 
illuminate Claggart’s character indirectly, a story about a man who “is a nut 
not to be cracked by the tap of a lady’s fan” (1382). The interpretation of 
Claggart’s feelings for Billy Budd as sexual ones that must be repressed or 
denied, and then are distorted or perverted by their forceful suppression, 
is further supported by certain “demonstrations” of Claggart’s feelings. It is 
recorded (although “unobserved”) that Claggart’s glance would follow Billy 
Budd “with a settled meditative and melancholy expression” that would 
sometimes “have in it a touch of soft yearning, as if Claggart could even 
have loved Billy but for fate and ban” (1394).
Of course, such readings conceive of eros in the familiar terms of a 
movement beyond the self—a movement through which the self strives to 
become one with a forbidden other or to become whole. If, as I have sug-
gested, however, love is at play on the Bellipotent, an encounter with an 
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other does not redeem or complete anyone, or fail to do so. Instead, such 
an encounter dispossesses the subject of its being and goes on, ricocheting 
throughout the ship, leaving the men broken open and marked by the touch 
of an other or a run-in with “the outside itself.”57 In brief, the subject is 
marked by what cannot be resisted, mastered, or worked through.58 To see 
this, we do not look behind what is presented to us, which would require us 
to project what we find there. Instead, we look to the frontage of things, the 
surface where these things take place.
With this in mind, recall that Claggart is down on Billy Budd “not for 
nothing.”59 The formulation “not for nothing” may prompt us to look for 
something to explain Claggart’s hostility. If we resist this impulse, however, 
we might observe that “not for nothing” may mean “for something” or “for 
something that is not.” What is more, reading “not for nothing” as “for some-
thing that is not” illuminates the cause that is given for Claggart’s enmity: 
“an antipathy spontaneous and profound” (1381). Like “not for nothing,” this 
response is indistinct. Certainly, it does not seem to shed any light on the 
original question about the matter of Claggart’s feelings, for being “down 
on” a man means nothing more or less than having “antipathy” toward him. 
Indeed, to identify a spontaneous and profound antipathy as the reason for 
being down on a man is only to reiterate the mysteriousness of the relation-
ship. That said, in its circular and self-referential structure, the tautological 
explanation of Claggart’s feelings for Billy Budd does indicate something. 
Specifically, it indicates that Claggart’s feelings are without a cause. Yet there 
is contact. A relationship between Claggart and Billy Budd occurs. This re-
lationship has no source or known origin, however. It appears to come from 
nowhere, spontaneously emerging to unsettle and break the self-possession 
of the selves touched. As the narrative states, the relationship between Clag-
gart and Billy Budd partakes in “the mysterious” (1381). No motive or reason 
explains it. Nevertheless, it takes place, and its effects cannot be denied. 
One of these effects is that Claggart, once suspicious, becomes naive and in-
nocent; another is that the guileless Billy murders a man and appears to the 
captain, a man who believes only in history, as an angel of God.
Law Like Love
I turn now from these reflections on love in Billy Budd back to my origi-
nal question, “What is law?” To answer that, I have suggested we address 
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ourselves to the experience of the mysterious “must” in Captain Vere’s pas-
sionate exclamation over Claggart’s body: “Struck dead by an angel of God! 
Yet the angel must hang!” (1406). To do that I have proposed we think about 
law in Billy Budd not in terms of will or violence but in terms of love. Spe-
cifically, I have proposed we think about law in terms of Nancy’s thinking 
about love, for Nancy’s definition of love can account for the destructive ef-
fects we see in Billy Budd and, what is more, it can do so without projecting 
into the text something to find that we then use to realize and make whole 
our interpretation. The task at hand now is to see how these reflections on 
love illuminate law.
Following Melville’s example, I undertake this task by indirection. In-
stead of telling a tale about an aggressive woman with a fan and an ap-
petite, however, I recite a poem. The poem is “Law Like Love” by W. H. 
Auden.60 Written during the heyday of legal realism, the poem reflects the 
realist view that law is a product of human beings and therefore is subject 
to human foibles and frailties. “Law Like Love” begins by briefly but suc-
cinctly and beautifully reviewing different philosophies of law.61 In a few 
simple words, Auden introduces a natural law in which nature takes pride 
of place—
Law, say the gardeners, is the sun,
Law is the one
All gardeners obey
To-morrow, yesterday, to-day
—and a natural law in which tradition and social institutions that have 
evolved over time demand respect—
Law is the wisdom of the old,
The impotent grandfathers feebly scold.62
In this review of different philosophies of law, Auden indicates the many 
ways in which human beings have conceived of law through time. In addi-
tion, the poem suggests, in realist fashion, how our understanding of law 
is directly related to our position in the world: the young claim law is the 
senses, whereas the priests say, “Law is the words in my priestly book,” and 
the judges insist, “Law is as I’ve told you before.”63 Legal scholars offer a dif-
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ferent perspective but, just like the other perspectives, it is one that reflects 
the values and priorities of the speaker. In the case of legal scholars, moral 
critique is suspended in favor of conclusions based on empirical observation 
and cautious generalization. All this is communicated in the lines “Law is 
only crimes / Punished by places and by times.”64
In her reading of “Law Like Love,” Linda Meyer argues that Auden’s 
poem provides a history of jurisprudence as a history of nihilism.65 Indeed, 
after the scholars (all good legal positivists) pronounce, “Law is neither 
wrong nor right,” the poem continues:
Others say, Law is our Fate;
Others say, Law is our State;
Others say, others say
Law is no more,
Law has gone away.
And always the loud angry crowd,
Very angry and very loud,
Law is We,
And always the soft idiot softly Me.66
Though a whole political and philosophical history may seem skeptically 
retold in these lines, I think in at least one significant regard Auden’s “Law 
Like Love” is not nihilistic, at least not in any “passive” sense.67 Specifically, 
“Law Like Love” does not suppress “The universal wish to guess / Or slip 
out of our own position / Into an unconcerned condition.”68 In the last few 
stanzas the narrator self-consciously attempts to offer his own definition of 
law.
This attempt is complicated, however. It is complicated by the fact that 
the narrator refuses to say “Law is.”69 The reason for his refusal is ambigu-
ous. According to the narrator, “all agree / Gladly or miserably / That the 
Law is.”70 To say simply what everyone already knows may, consequently, 
fail to satisfy the narrator’s vanity; he admits to a wish to be able to assume 
a position in which he does not have to suffer the limits of the human condi-
tion, a position from which he would be able to define law once and for all. 
As we have seen, others’ definitions of law betray how embedded they are 
in their particular place and time. The narrator may want to say something 
original, universal, and eternal about law, but given that the verb at issue 
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(“to be”) is ironically the one we use to convey such qualities, he cannot say 
something along these lines if he says “Law is.”
Alternatively, the narrator may refuse to say “Law is” because he un-
derstands that we live in a world of words (rather than things in themselves), 
and therefore nothing we say can illuminate law qua law. In other words, 
when we say what “Law is” all we do is “identify Law with some other 
word.”71 Given that we will never succeed at transcending the web of lan-
guage, the narrator thinks it “absurd” to try and therefore may prefer to say 
nothing.72
Finally, as Meyer suggests, the narrator may refuse to say “Law is” 
because he wishes to “release . . . ‘Law’ from any other words limiting or 
defining it.”73 The narrator’s reticence may then be an expression of concern 
about the future of law. For by defining law once and for all, we may restrict 
or deny law’s responsiveness, its ability to cognize unforeseen legal events 
and apply to facts that have not yet taken place and may not yet even be 
imaginable.
I am inclined to read the narrator’s refusal to say “Law is” along these 
lines as well, but with a slightly different emphasis. I suggest that “some 
other word” may limit or define law not because a word can provide only a 
partial and restrictive description of law, but because with or rather through 
that word we seek to “complete” law. The issue as I see it is not that we risk 
settling for a less comprehensive or capacious understanding of what law 
can be, should be, or is, but, rather, that some other word is the first step 
on a familiar dialectical path that directs us toward the goal of subsuming 
all loose ends either in overcoming some obstacles we find along the way 
(eros perhaps) or realizing the essence of law in the struggle to achieve the 
goal (the story of law as a bildungsroman). In either case, the path leads in-
ward rather than outward. For, rather than answering the question “What is 
law?” in “an unconcerned condition,” we find ourselves once more engaged 
in a relation with an ostensible mystery that is quickly reduced to an object 
through which we can better realize ourselves.
This interpretation of the refusal to say “Law is” offers another per-
spective from which to read the title of Auden’s poem and to observe how 
law appears in the poem itself. In particular, it draws attention to the fact 
that when the narrator gives in to the universal wish to say something more, 
he uses a simile. A simile is a figure of speech that compares two dissimilar 
things. Unlike other figures of speech that do the same thing, however—
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metaphors, for instance—similes explicitly preserve the distinctness of the 
two things being compared. When the narrator in Auden’s poem succumbs 
to the desire to say something about law, what he says does not assume 
identity between terms. Stating hesitantly “a timid similarity,” he says, “like 
love.”74
Thus, what the poem says about law emerges out of the space between 
“law” and “love,” a space held open by the simile while it holds the two 
terms face to face. Like surfaces in a hall of mirrors, the two terms reflect 
and illuminate one another in an infinite back-and-forth. In this dynamic, 
law is ascribed qualities. These qualities are not derived from any penetrat-
ing analysis but instead come to light when “love” subtly refracts and dis-
torts the image of “law” that it reflects.
Like love we don’t know where or why,
Like love we can’t compel or fly,
Like love we often weep,
Like love we seldom keep.75
In brief, like love we do not know where law comes from or why it comes to 
us. If it has a source, this source does not appear to us or explain itself. All 
we know is that it occurs, and that we do not control it. We are not able to 
make law do or be what we will. Nor can we escape it, even when it causes 
us to suffer. But we cannot preserve it, either. We fail it or it eludes us.
When Captain Vere exclaims, “Struck dead by an angel of God! Yet the 
angel must hang!” Hannah Arendt claims the tragedy of law is revealed, 
and that tragedy is that law is human.76 Law does not transcend the human 
condition of being with others. In her reading of Billy Budd, Barbara John-
son reaches a similar conclusion from different premises when she suggests 
that “law is the forcible transformation of ambiguity into decidability”77 in 
a condition in which “every judge is in the impossible position of having to 
include the effects of his own act of judging within the cognitive context 
of his decision.”78 The tragedy, the inevitable (illegitimate) violence of law, 
inheres in the impossibility of finding a position in which the effects of the 
application of authority are contained.79 Law is thus a lethal manifestation 
of our inability, as mortal and contradictory beings, to command our ac-
tions, to anticipate and determine their effects.
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What I have tried to suggest in this essay is that law qua law is not, in 
Billy Budd at least, necessarily the instrument of a commanding will, one 
that aspires to realize itself perfectly but always falls short with fatal con-
sequences that we are called to judge again and again. Rather, law qua law 
is more like an experience, in particular an experience of that call to judge. 
This experience is one of an irresistible provocation, a propelling or com-
pelling force on the occasion of an encounter with an inappropriable other. 
Moved this way, we are exposed to our condition of sharing the world. On 
this account, law is not then a tragic experience of repetitively and inevita-
bly erring—to use a favorite Melville word—determination. Law is instead 
known to us as the experience of a force that comes from nowhere and 
wrecks our self-possession. The grounds of this insight are found, Nancy 
says, in the middle of the philosophical tradition of thinking about love, 
for it is there that love is defined as “that which is not self-love”80—that is 
to say, as that which is not love of the self as property, as “the objectivized 
presence of subjectivity, its realization in the outside world.”81 In brief, and 
in sum, I timidly suggest that the experience of law is like the experience of 
an encounter—in a glance, a caress, a jab, a blow—that exposes us to how 
we share the world, how we “with others,” how we “are” not, how we hurt 
the ones we love.
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Novel 2, no. 1 (1968): 25–35.
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versity of Minnesota Press, 1991), 97.
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64. Ibid., 263.
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the Idols (1889), trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1968).
66. Auden, “Law Like Love,” 263.
67. On passive nihilism, see Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (1888), 
trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), 
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§22. On active nihilism see Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1882), trans. 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), §347.
68. Auden, “Law Like Love,” 263. The following reflections are suggestive also 
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